Quote:
Originally Posted by wave69
Reading the article above reminds me few things about PA, All the books I have read on PA one things has been said again and again, That this army does not understand the concept of logistics properly nor do have right appreciation of Inter-service co-ordination. Modern war fare has evolved to be very challenging which requires very close understanding of each others objectives.. hope they will get soon...
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this remain the key for the 3 services to have a joint action plan. the army and airforce relationship is cordial at best. this is not because they are jealous of each other but it stems from the priorities both have to face if hostilities break out. eg.
PAF's prime objective would be to deny the enemy air superiority over pak skies and the forward battle areas. for this most of its assets are engaged. when the PA calls for ground support for its formations under pressure or strike corps counter-attacking, the PAF does not have enough assets available to support due to the aforementioned reasons. thus the mind-set of the commanders to "do it alone" and the subsequent "hesitancy" of formation commanders to expose themselves to enemy retaliation.
Now if the PAF had the requsite numbers of dedicated ADF and CAS aircraft then the co-ordination issues would subside to a great extent. now the PAF is working towards this with its ambitious plan of inducting 250 JF-17 multi-role aircraft which would be dedicated for various roles like ADF, CAS, NavAttack etc. this would leave the F-16s and the F-20s dedicated for the prime purpose. flying top cover.
now i am not a air strategist but this is how i see it.
i was talking to a naval officer attending a war course at NDU and there the navy is proposing that it should have its own naval air arm (PAF pilots deputised to the navy. the navy commander would write their annual ACRs) for the same reasons i have mentioned above.