An academic look at India's military aviation attrition

[PAFAce]

There is a lot fo debate going on about the IAF fleet right now. Maybe if we look at the stats more closely, we can identify the cause. Many things come to mind, could be maintenance, could be simply Russian made equipment.

Here I present the stats for your information:

IAF Crashes so far in 2009
The year is proving to be bad for the IAF in terms of accidents with 13 crashes. These have included two Sukhois, six MiGs fighter jets, one Kiran MkII trainer, one HPT-32 trainer aircraft, one AN-32 transport aircraft and two helicopters.

In addition, I know of 1 Harrier crash and 1 Mi-17 utility helicopter crash this year.

That is, 6 Russian made fighter jets, 2 India made fighter jets, 2 India made trainers and 1 Russian made transport aircraft. This is in addition to any Army/Navy crashed this year.

Indian air crashes in 2008
Chetak HC
MiG-27M
MiG-21F
BAe Hawk
132 Deepak HPT-32
MiG-21FL
Cheetah SA-315
MiG-29F
MiG-21U
MiG-23U
Cheetah SA-315.

That is, 3 India made helicopters, 1 British made trainer, 1 India made trainer and 6 Russian made fighters.

Indian air crashes in 2007
Sea King
MiG-21 FL
Sea Harrier T.61
Cheetah SA-315
MiG-29 F
MiG-21 F
Cheetah SA-315
Kiran HJT-16
Sea Harrier
Jaguar IS
Kiran HJT-16
Kiran HJT-16
Sea Harrier
Jaguar IS
Mirage 2000
Dhruv HC
IJT T

That is, 3 Russian fighters, 3 British naval fighters, 4 Indian trainers, 3 French fighter, 3 Indian helicopters and 1 American helicopter.

Indian air crashes in 2006
MiG-21 Bison
Kiran HJT-16
MiG-21UM
MiG-29UB
MiG-29 F
Cheetah SA-315
MiG-27M
BN2 Islander
MiG-29 F

That is, 6 Russian fighters, 1 Indian helicopter, 1 Indian trainer and 1 British light utility aircraft

Sources:
- Indo-Asian News Service
- Warbirds of India
- IBN Live

[bigmoneymaker]

flying coffins can only be cannon fodder during battle, so exclude all those cannot be in normal conditions any longer and naturally you will get the rough numbers and quality<must have adequate maintenance regularly, must not be moneypocketed, else goldlike value weapons will be junk, same like here in malaysia without efficient management and supervision of airforce and army.....>

[Spitfighter]

Simply beautiful, 50 crashes since 2006?

I think this figure has nothing to do with the quality of the fighters.

One would assume that if maintenance was an issue, someone would have taken care of it after the first few crashes but clearly that never happened, so I think this is a result of poor training and corruption.

The PAF flies some really old planes too, on a much, much smaller budget, yet they don't have nearly as many crashes. The IAF doesn't deserve a dime of tax payer money until they get their house in order or they'll simply have more planes to crash. Best of all, no one is held accountable and they offer no explanations, I guess you can't really explain the highest crash rate in the world without landing your corrupt *** in trouble.

The airforce is a god damn embarrassment. Its been five years and the ******* idiots haven't been able to decide which plane to buy.

Here's to arguably one of the worst air forces in the world

[FreekiN]

2007 looks like a bad year for them. :/

[PAFAce]

Originally Posted by Spitfighter

One would assume that if maintenance was an issue, someone would have taken care of it after the first few crashes but clearly that never happened, so I think this is a result of poor training and corruption.

I think you are being a little too harsh on your Air Force, but at least you are asking questions. I would say it looks like a combination corruption, maintenance, training issues and the origins. The major culprits have been Russian aircraft, no doubt, but that may simply be because Russian origin aircraft make up most of the Air Force and Army Aviation. MiG-21s have been widely exported, yet there have never been as many crashes as in India. Many of these crashes have also been training aircraft, which makes sense.

On the brighter side, there hasn't been a single Mirage-2000 crash since 2006, which means something is being done right. Maybe the system around the Mirage can be studied in detail and applied to other platforms, but then again, Su-30MKI and Mirage-2000 are a different beast altogether. This is the second time the Su-30MKI has been grounded (I think), hence it is the perfect opportunity to look into why aircraft of Russian, British and Indian origin are so troublesome for the IAF.
Correction
There has been 1 Mirage-2000 crash since 2006.

According to Sir Murad Khan, IAF officers of distinction do not enjoy instructing as part of the Fighters Instructors School which, incidentally, is considered an honor in the PAF. I don't know why they don't enjoy teaching, could be a number of reasons, but whatever they are, it simply means that young recruits are being taught by medium-standard teachers with some standard amount of hours. Maybe that is one point that must be looked at, or you can choose to ignore it.

Like someone on another thread said, this will probably severely damage the MiG-35s chances in the MMRCA. Not because the aircraft would have any problem, but because of fears of public outrage towards the government. Somebody has to be the lamb for the slaughter, and unfortunately for the Russians, it's looking like its going to be them.

[indianrabbit]

A big part of these crash's were of mig 21 due to faulty spare part purchase. I believe that this rate will go down after we retire old planes and induct new one. Indian military was neglected before hence less attention paid, this might sound stupid but is valid. With growing focus this will change. We are in initial stages of mordernization where rfp's are floated 3 years down the line things will be different.

[TheBraveHeart]

to the thread starter,

Its unjust to list only the Indian military crashes and say the planes keep falling, I would suggest you to go through the USAF, RuAF , PAF,etc attrition rate whereby the the percentage of aircraft mishaps in each of these countries can be compared.
I am sure the IAF mishaps would still standout but it would be obvious to those who think only Indian milittary planes crash that such mishaps are common all over.
for a start I would like to give the wiki link
List of accidents and incidents involving military aircraft (2000?present) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

u can subtract the enemy fire incidents and then make a comparison .

[gogbot]

Why the hell did we loose 5 Mig-29. This is really unacceptable. Some heads should roll over this


India, using mostly Russian aircraft, has an accident rate of 6-7 per 100,000 hours flown (compared to 4-5 for all NATO air forces.)

Most of the crashes have been attributed to pilot incompetence and a lack of training. Another major factor pointed out by the Russians is the fact that Bhrat insisted on using poorly manufactured local parts. After several hundred Migs had crashed, the IAF blamed the manufacturer of a faulty fuel pump. According to the IAF the breakdown in 2005 is as follows. 40%; human error (servicing) 2%; technical defects 41%; bird hits 9%; unresolved 6%; and others 2%.

Oh man some needs to be court martial ed.Its quite startling to see the figures over the last 3 years.
the Fact that we lost 5 MIg-29 , only makes it worse.

[Spitfighter]

Its high time they (air force) come out with some answers. Everything from trainers to Sukhois to choppers have crashed. Pilots have been needlessly lost and millions if not billions have been wasted, not to mention the time it will take to replace all the losses. We need to see some court martials.

[Screaming Skull]

Sir PAFAce,

Judging the attrition in an Air Force by counting the ‘absolute number’ of crashes in a year is a statically flawed method of comparison. It does not present the true picture in the sense that several other contributing variables are left out.

For comparison’s sake most air forces around the world use the term called ‘attrition rate’ which is an index representing the total number of aircrafts lost per given number of flying hours (generally 10,000 for large airforces like IAF and PAF). Take look at this article printed in the year 2000-

Attrition in the IAF : Myth and Reality

The Indian Air Force's (IAF) flight safety record has come in for much criticism lately. The press have called into question the IAF's ability to adequately carry out tasks assigned to it in light of a recent spate of accidents. "Experts" both in India and abroad have gone so far as to claim that the rate at which the IAF was flying itself into the ground, Pakistan would simply have to wait for the IAF to crash its entire fleet before obtaining air superiority. However, these "expert" opinions on IAF attrition in the 1990s are problematic in that they view IAF flight safety in isolation, both temporally and with respect to its principal adversary. Briefly, IAF attrition rates in the 1990s are half of they were in the 1960s and 1970s. Yet in neither of those decades was the IAF's operational capabilities compromised. More importantly, no one seems to have bothered to situate the IAF's attrition rate (and operational capabilities) in a comparative perspective. More precisely, if the IAF is flying itself into the ground what is happening with the Pakistan Air Force (PAF)?

In one sense this unbalanced perception aptly exemplifies the paradox in the kinds of information available on South Asia’s two major Air Arms. Furthermore, it highlights the differing political constraints under which the armed forces in India and Pakistan operate.Since the 1960s the PAF has published three official histories and has vigorously promoted a positive uncritical image of itself, often exaggerating its achievements and capabilities vis-à-vis the IAF. The IAF has, until recently, been shy of any publicity and has yet to publish an official history. Yet keen students of both air forces find that there is a greater volume of detailed meaningful open source literature available on the IAF than on its adversary. This is in great part due to the fact that the IAF is subject to both legislative and administrative oversight. The Joint Parliamentary Committee on Defence and the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India provide detailed (and often unflattering) audits of the IAF’s operations which cover everything from attrition to procurement decisions. More importantly, the auditors’ reports are unclassified and available to anyone interested. The PAF, however, is not subject to public audit.

The publication of a recent article on PAF attrition by the semi-official Pakistan Institute of Air Defence Studies (PIADS) is therefore heaven sent. The article Air Accidents Inspite of High Efficiency by Air Marshal (Retd.) Ayaz Ahmad Khan (PAF) allows one a rare glimpse into the flight safety record of the Pakistan Air Force, and more importantly it helps to put the IAF’s attrition rate in perspective. Although Air Forces Monthly’s page on attrition does a fairly good job of covering accidents in the subcontinent, given the lack of oversight in Pakistan, usually only accidents that occur in built up areas or near population centers are reported. A snapshot of attrition rates for the two airforces covering the 1990s demonstrates that the myth of the PAF's superior safety record is just that: a myth.

The following figures are given by Air Marshal (Retd.) Ayaz Ahmad Khan in the PIADS article.

Annual Attrition Rates – Pakistan Air Force (expressed per 10,000 hours)

Unfortunately, Air Marshal Khan doesn’t provide a breakdown of the actual number of accidents and flying hours for each of these years. Since we have no information with which to assign weights to the annual averages in order to come up with a figure for the period 1991-1997, we are forced to use a simple average. This works out to an attrition rate of 1.37 per 10,000 hours over the entire period.

In the case of the IAF we can draw on figures for annual flying hours from the CAG reports between 1992 and 1998, and the 1998 Report of the Kalam Committee on Air Safety to arrive at a clear picture of IAF attrition over the period 1991/92-1996/97. The figures for 1997/98 amd 1998/99 are based on the Minister of Defence's written replies to Parliment in August 1999.

Annual Flying hours: IAF

Total Flying Hours 1991/92-1997/98: 1,836,875

During this period the IAF suffered a total of 194 accidents. Of these 154 aircraft were declared "beyond economical repair". If one uses the higher former figure to calculate IAF attrition, it works out to 1.07 per 10,000 hours. If one only includes write-offs, attrition falls off to 0.83 per 10,000 hours. Both figures for the IAF are lower than the lowest possible attrition rate for the PAF during the entire period based on a weighted average of their annual attrition rates.

Furthermore Air Marshal Khan writes that in a 19 month period from January 1997 (i.e. up to 31 July 1998) the PAF flew 110,000 hours and suffered 11 major accidents. An attrition rate of 1 per 10,000 hours.

While we do not know the exact number of flying hours for the IAF in that 19 month period we can use flying hours from the years 1997-1998 to 1998-1999 to come up a with a reasonable estimate. In 1997/98 the IAF logged 306,190 hours and in 1998/99 it logged 311,412 hours. For the sake of argument we can extrapolate that the IAF logged 181,657 hours during the first 7 months of 1998. Hence for the 19 month period beginning Jan 1997 the IAF logged a total 487,847 hours. During this period the IAF suffered 16 major accidents (7 in 1997 + 9 in first seven months of 1998). This translates into a loss rate of 0.32 per 10,000 hours. Thus as IAF, as a service, suffered an attrition rate that is less than a third of the Pakistan Air Force's during 1997-1998.

However, the figures do not adequately capture the attrition rates for fighters during the same period. Given the IAF’s almost transcontinental responsibilities, the IAF flies large numbers of helicopters and transport aircraft. For this reason attrition rates for the service as a whole don’t adequately reflect flight safety in the combat (fighter/fighter-trainer) elements of the two air arms.

The Pakistan Air Force has traditionally had a large fighter component. For most of the 1990s the ratio of the fighters/fighter-trainers to transports/helicopters in the PAF has been approximately 85:15. Unfortunately, Air Marshal Khan provides no breakdown of flying hours by type for the PAF. Let us, therefore, over-estimate the number of hours that that PAF fighters put in during the 19 month period from January 1997 (and thereby introduce a bias that favors the PAF), so that they are allotted 90% of the flying hours. This works out to 99,000 hours. Furthermore, Air Marshal Khan says:

"The PAF accident rate for 1997 till August 98 was 1 aircraft per 10,000 flying hours, and is a tribute to the high expertise and dedication of technicians, engineers and professional excellence of PAF fighter pilots."

This would indicate that the 11 losses (all write-offs) were indeed all fighters. However, since this is not conclusive let us use a lower figure. We know with certainty that the PAF lost 7 fighters (4 F-7s, 1 Mirage III, 1 A-5, 1 F-6) during this period. Based on this figure the PAF's fighter attrition rate for the 19 month period works out to 0.70. If we use an attrition rate which represents attrition in the same ratio as hours flown by fighters (i.e. 9 fighter losses), the figure is a corresponding 0.90 per 10,000 hours.

Now let us turn to the IAF. The IAF's fleet breakdown (fighters vs. others) is approximately 60:40. However, we know that 50% of the IAF flying hours in 1997/98, or 153,000 hours, were contributed by fighters. Based on this, it is not unreasonable to assume that 50% of the hours, or 90,708 hours, during the first 7 months of 1998 would have been put in by fighters. This means that the fighters logged up about 243,708 flying hours during this 19 month period. Over this period the IAF lost 3 fighters in 1997 (2 MiG-21, 1 MiG-27) and 8 fighters (6 MiG-21, 1 MiG-23, 1 MiG-29) during the first seven months of 1998. This means that the loss rate for Indian fighters was 0.45 per 10,000 hours.

Regardless of what figure we use to calculate the PAF's losses, it seems that that IAF fighters suffered from lower levels of attrition. Of course the IAF’s high attrition rate remains a matter of concern. The MiG-21 fleet (esp. the FL, M, U, UM and US variants) is the main source of this problem. Given that these aircraft are well past their (manufacturer recommended) airframe lives and that the IAF pushes them to their limits, until new Advanced Jet Trainers are procured these aircraft will continue to be a source of grief for the IAF. Nevertheless, in the future, students of South Asian air arms would do well to remember that if the IAF is ‘falling out of the sky’, it is doing so less rapidly than its main adversary.

That was an analysis of the situation in the 90s. Even in this decade the average number of aircrafts lost in a year has remained pretty much the same but at the same time new aircrafts have also been inducted and total number of hours flown has increased. On that basis one can easily conclude that the attrition rate in the IAF has come down.

Now coming to the issue of the recent MKI crashes-

From open source literature available it may be ascertained that the flying hours clocked by IAF pilots in a year are quite high – at least on par with NATO flight hours if not higher. For MKI pilots it is believed that the average flying hours are as high as 350 hours in a year. This is a fact confirmed by some of the visiting USAF pilots during Cope India exercises. Here take a look at this citation for Gp. Capt. Sandeep Singh of the IAF who won the prestigious Vayu Sena Medal-

Wing Commander Sandeep Singh (17312) Flying (Pilot) was commissioned in the Indian Air Force as a fighter pilot on 22 Dec 1983. A recipient of Sword of Honour for standing first in the overall order of merit in his course, the officer is a Qualified Flying Instructor with A2 category and an Exceptional Test Pilot. Wg Cdr Sandeep Singh has over 4150 hours of flying and he is qualified on Su-30 MkI, Mig-29 and Mig-21 aircraft. He has been an instructor at the Air Force Test Pilots School, a flight commander of a Mig-21 Squadron, the project test pilot with the 1AF Su-30 Project team in Russia and is presently the Commanding Officer of a Su-30 Mk-1 Squadron. He has been commended by the Chief of the Air Staff for his dedication to duty. As a test pilot with the Su-30 Project team in Russia, he has been instrumental in evolving the navigation, display and weapon employment logic of Su-30 Mk I aircraft. The Su 30 Mk 1 is being hailed as a 'first of its kind' project In which the best of Russian and western technologies have been synergized to produce one of the most potent fighter aircraft in the world. Utilising his operational flying experience, professional knowledge and analytical approach, Wg Cdr Sandeep Singh spearheaded the integration team of Indian, Russian and Western specialists to ensure success of the Su-30 Mk 1 project. In view of his unparalleled knowledge of Su-30 Mk-1 operations and systems, he has been frequently called upon for consultations and briefings at Air Headquarters and various Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) labs on all issues related to the Su-30 Mk 1 programme. Wg Cdr Sandeep Singh was appointed as the Commanding Officer of a newly resurrected Su-30 Mk I Squadron on 15 Apr 04 and entrusted with the task of inducting the latest variant of Su-30 Mk 1 aircraft. Starting with a severely limited number of experienced pilots, engineers and technicians, he has led his team with personal examples to operallonalise the new aircraft, Despite the attendant pressures of forming a new Squadron, he has flown over 400 hours in the last one year. He has shown immense courage, exceptional skill and determination to successfully undertake pioneering missions on the Su-30 Mk I aircraft, such as the record breaking long duration flight of over 9 hour 30 minutes, solo low level aerobatics, air to air refueling and first time firing of guided munitions. For exceptional devotion to duty, The Hon'ble President is pleased to award 'Vayu Sena Medal' to Wing Commander Sandeep Singh.

Source: Air Force Day 2006 Investiture Booklet

Now, I am not claiming that all MKI pilots clock such high flying hours, but it is a fact that the average flying hours for an MKI pilot is over 300 hrs. That being the case, it will not be correct to point fingers at pilot training standards of IAF. Moreover, in both the crashes involving the MKIs this year – the aircrafts were piloted by Wing Commanders. However, the first crash was attributed to pilot error when he inadvertently switched off the FBW switch. In the second crash, it is being reported that there was a fire in the engines – if true I will attribute it to a maintenance error or some problem with QC at HAL – that too is nothing more than an educated guess – the real problem may lie somewhere else but certainly pilot training is not an issue at all.

The above citation also debunks the assertion that the most experienced and talented IAF pilots don’t teach at the Air Force Test Pilots School.

Thank You!

[Patriot]

Originally Posted by PAFAce

I think you are being a little too harsh on your Air Force, but at least you are asking questions. I would say it looks like a combination corruption, maintenance, training issues and the origins. The major culprits have been Russian aircraft, no doubt, but that may simply be because Russian origin aircraft make up most of the Air Force and Army Aviation. MiG-21s have been widely exported, yet there have never been as many crashes as in India. Many of these crashes have also been training aircraft, which makes sense.

On the brighter side, there hasn't been a single Mirage-2000 crash since 2006, which means something is being done right. Maybe the system around the Mirage can be studied in detail and applied to other platforms, but then again, Su-30MKI and Mirage-2000 are a different beast altogether. This is the second time the Su-30MKI has been grounded (I think), hence it is the perfect opportunity to look into why aircraft of Russian, British and Indian origin are so troublesome for the IAF.
Correction
There has been 1 Mirage-2000 crash since 2006.

According to Sir Murad Khan, IAF officers of distinction do not enjoy instructing as part of the Fighters Instructors School which, incidentally, is considered an honor in the PAF. I don't know why they don't enjoy teaching, could be a number of reasons, but whatever they are, it simply means that young recruits are being taught by medium-standard teachers with some standard amount of hours. Maybe that is one point that must be looked at, or you can choose to ignore it.

Like someone on another thread said, this will probably severely damage the MiG-35s chances in the MMRCA. Not because the aircraft would have any problem, but because of fears of public outrage towards the government. Somebody has to be the lamb for the slaughter, and unfortunately for the Russians, it's looking like its going to be them.

1 Mirage 2000 crashed in 2007 just a week after crash of Jaguar.On a side note, Pakistan Air Force F-16 reached 100,000 accident free flight hours which is really incredible.

A three-member delegation of Pratt & Whitney called on Air Chief Marshal Kaleem Saadat, Chief of the Air Staff Pakistan Air Force at Air Headquarters to present a plaque to the Chief of the Air Staff in recognition of flying the F-16, for over 100,000 accident-free flight hours.
Lloyd W. "Fig" Newton, executive vice president, presented a plaque to the Chief of the Air Staff in recognition of flying the F-16, for over 100,000 accident-free flight hours.

They also commended the maintenance, quality control and flight safety standards of the PAF, which made this achievement possible.

Retired Gen. Lloyd Newton, along with Gen. (R) William J Begert, Vice President and Warren Boley, Vice President, remained with Air Chief Marshal Kaleem Sadaat, Chief of Air Staff for some time and discussed matters pertaining to mutual and professional interest.

http://www.f-16.net/news_article1468.html

[Storm Force]

I,m no professional.

But i would say a combanation of issues persist.

Poor maintenance
Very old fleet of Russian migs esp.
poor training
damn incompetence...
not enough quailty pilots coming thry all going to work in india inc where pay is better
No longer an honour to be a fighter pilot better TO fly air india 777 instead

[ouiouiouiouiouioui]

i believe they have same concept that microsoft approaches to the chips..they kill it by themselves...for new tech.....i hope indians are not doing that...!..