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Off. Ser. -No. 2 SC No. 06916/64
THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE
SECTION 111. (1961-1962)
This is t h e t h i r d i n a series of three working papers
on the Sino-Indian border dispute.
with the period from early 1961 through the t i m e of the
most serious clashes in autumn 1962. An appendix discusses
Sino-Pakistani border negotiations from 1960 to 1963.
This Section 111 deals
We have had a useful review of t h i s paper by P. D.
Davis of OCI. The DDI/RS would welcome additional comment,
addressed e i t h e r to the Chief or to the writer, ~ Arthur A.
Cohen 7-
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THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE
SECTION III. ( m i - i g 6 2 ) .
SUMMARY
Chinese policy toward India in 1961 operated on contradictory
assumptions, namely, that it was necessary to
"unite" w i t h Nehru and simultaneously to "struggle" against
hilil. The Chinese hoped that an opening for negotiations
would appear, b u t , at the same t i m e , they noted t h a t Nehru
would t a l k only about a Chinese withdrawal from the Aksai
Plain. They apparently believed that they had some room
for diploaatic maneuvering with him, when in fact such room
no longer existed.
The Chinese tried to persuade Nehru to drop h i s precondition
of withdrawal. In April 1961, they probed informa
l l y i n New Delhi for any willingness to accept "arbitration,"
and in May they asked the Burmese to induce Nehru to negotiate
on the China-Burma-India t r i j u n c t i o n point; they were turned
down in both attempts. They absorbed a continuous volley
of Indian insults and rebuffs without striking back publicly,
calculating that a public riposte would compel Nehru to leave
the dispute open indefinitely. They wanted it closed: it
was creating deep anti-Chinese feeling in India and was
providing Khrushchev with an i s s u e with which to lobby among
other Communists for support against the "adventurist" CCP.
they moved beyond Mongolia, Burma, and Nepal in early 1961
t o suggest border talks with the Pakistanis. This maneuver
rekindled Indian anger. It pointed up the self-defeating
aspect of the Chinese policy to press Nehru in various clever
ways but to offer him no concessions. That is, the Chinese
had rejected the carrot-and-the-stick as a policy because
the only carrot acceptable to Nehru was the e n t i r e Plain.
They were, therefore, l e f t with s t i c k s of various sizes,
and when they used even a small one the Indians winced.
Their adamant stand against withdrawal made pol it ical
probes-- by certain- Indian c i v i l i a n leaders--f ut ile exercises.
(The Indian army leaders preferred an unbending hard
Anxious to get Nehru to t a l k and to refute Khrushchev,
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l i n e , including military moves against Chinese posts .) The
MEA Secretary General, R.K. Nehru, was scolded l i k e a small
boy by Liu Shao-chi in July 1961 for coming to China only
to demand Chinese withdrawal and to i n s i s t that the border
had been d e l i m i t e d . A s a r e s u l t of the angry rebuke, relat
ions further deteriorated.. Even Nehru indicated he had
no choice but to adopt a tougher a t t i t u d e toward the Chinese.
The Chinese response was to treat him as an implacable foe,
at f i r s t l e t t i n g h i s own words (reprinted without comment)
in September 1961 ctprovelqt hat he was not only anti-Chinese
but also anti-Soviet, and then attacking hiln openly in
November and December. During the intervening month--October--
the Chinese formally protested that Nehru w a s engaged in
?*dishonest dealing." But such Maoist shock treatment conflicted
with their effort to a t t a i n a p o l i t i c a l settlement;
the %trugglett aspect of Chinese policy had once again
consumed the "unity" aspect.
Nehru was constantly pulled in t w o directions. H i s
inclination was to work for a political settlement; however,
Chinese adamancy made h i m vulnerable in Parliament and consequently
more susceptible than ever to the argument of
army leaders that the Chinese should be pushed back by force.
He accepted t h e i r view that flanking moves against Chinese
posts would provide a form of safe pressure. Beginning in
April 1961 and continuing throughout the year, Lt.' General
Kaul directed a l l three Indian army commands to increase
the strength of their forces along the border. But the
Chinese were alert t o t h e ensuing moveups; the Indians
could not move forward in 1961, as the Chinese hald done from
1957 to 1960, without detection. Beset, on the one hand,
by Chinese protests regarding Indian moveups, and compelled,
on the other, to pledge to Parliament a "forward" border
policy, Nehru spoke in tones of s t r i k i n g belligerency. He
promised publicly in November t h a t new posts would be set
up so that t e r r i t o r y held by the Chinese could be "recovered."
''Half a dozen new posts" already had been established, he
said, and more would be set up.
Chinese charges of Indian responsibility for the
i n i t i a l provocation-- i . e . , new posts in spring 196l--seem
to be valid. Although the Indian countercharge complained
of a new Chinese post set up at the same t i m e , they admitted
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privately t h a t (1) t h i s post was within the Chinese claim
l i n e of 1960 and (2) it had been after the Indian
posts had been established.
awareness of Indian moveups. They then warned Nehru t h a t
they would not remain passive observers; they put teeth into
t h i s warning by declaring (in a note of 30 November 1961)
that, i f the Indians professed t o be moving merely into
t e r r i t o r y claimed on Indian maps in the W e s t , Chinese maps
showed claims too: "€'he Chinese government would h ave every
reason to send troops to cross the so-called McMahon Line"
in t h e east. The warnings failed to deter Nehru; on the
contrary, they enabled his opponents to press for an even
harder ant i-China line.
In early 1962, the Chinese temporarily eased their
warnings and t r i e d a smaller stick. They used the Burmese
to convey to Nehru their formula for a settlement: China
would drop its map claims in the w e s t and r e t a i n '*only1'
the area Chinese troops held on the ground--i.e., the
Aksai Plain. The Indians insisted on "recovering" the
Plain. The deadlock persisted, and t h e Indians decided to
apply more military pressure on Chinese posts in the Aksai
Plain. The defense ministry in early April 1962 ordered
t h e Indian army t o flank several Chinese posts and induce
a withdrawal. The Chinese responded by stepping up patfolling
and reinforcement a c t i v i t y in the w e s t . Nehru stated
publicly on 2 May t h a t he would not be deterred by these
moves from his new lYorward'v military policy. The border
dispute was in t h i s way transformed by the Indians from a
primarily pol it ical quarrel into a serious military confrontation.
The Chinese t r i e d to deter Nehru by first indicating
Evidence suggests that in June 1962 Indian advances
behind PLA border posts convinced the Chinese leaders t h a t
t h e y h o u l d prepare for a major operation to clear out t h e
new enemy positions. In early July, when they felt safe--
because American assurances had dispelled t h e i r fears of
a Chinese Nationalist invasion--the Chinese made t h e i r
first countermove against Indian advance posts in the west,
encircling a new post in the Galwan River Valley. The
move was primarily intended t o convince Nehru t h a t they
were prepared to fight t o stop h i s llrecovery" plan.
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The Chinese use of t h i s big stick enabled Indian
military leaders to renew their demands on Nehru.
July, Nehru reluctantly agreed to Kaul's request t h a t
Indian troops on the border be given the discretion to open
fire.
In late
Convinced t h a t a calamitous defeat on the border--an
increasing probability--would end h i s p o l i t i c a l career, I
Defense Minister Krishna Menon worlied to establish a f l e x i b l e
policy. He gained Nehru's temporary acquiescence to drop
the withdrawal precondition for Sino-Indian negotiations.
However, the deeply suspicdous Chinese inf1BmiBly.insisted
on an e x p l i c i t Indian rejection of the precondition. By!.
t h u s refusing to .laaka even a token- conciliatory gesture,
the Chinese helped Indian army leaders and amateur policymakers
(i.e., j o u r n a l i s t s and certain Opposition Parliamentarians)
to discredit Menon's f l e x i b l e l i n e . And the Chinese.
felt confirmed in t h e i r suspicions when, on 22 August,
Nehru stated in Parliament t h a t India intended to make gains
on the border by military as w e l l as political pressure.
tion against further advances in the w e s t would not be confined
to that sector. PLA troops in September flanked t h e
Indian post in the eastern sector at Dhola (Che Dong). This
move spurred Indian army leaders to press Nehru for authority
to clear the Chinese from the Dhola area by a major operation.
Nehru agreed, and a new special corps under Kaul was
established in early October to direct the "squeeze" against
* Chinese troops. By mid-October, Nehru had agreed to extend
a'ctive pressure on the Chinese to.Ladakh. The long-range ~ plan was to be carried out over two or three years, the
flanking of forward posts constituting only a beginning.
Both army and c i v i l i a n leaders-&with the notable exception
of Krishna Menon-discounted the probability of significant
Chinese , r e t a l i a t o r y action even a f t e r the 10 October firefight
left 33 Chinese dead near Dhola.
ad such a long history that th eir unpact'on Indian thinking
was reduced in September and October--the f i n a l phase
of Chinese preparation for attack. When t h e Chinese began
to use significantly stronger language, the Indians viewed
the threats as more of the same.
The Chinese acted vigorously to warn Nehru t h a t retalia-
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Chinese warnings
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The Chinese apparently were motivated to attack by
one primary consideration--their determination to r e t a i n
the ground on which PLA forces stood in 1962 and to punish
the Indians for trying t o t a k e that ground. In general
terms, they tried to show the Indians once and for a l l that
China would not acquiesce in a military "reoccupation"
policy. The secondary reasons for the attack, which had
made it desirable but not necessary, included a desire (1)
to damage Nehru's prestige by exposing Indian weakness and
(2) to expose as traitorous Khrushchev's policy of supporting
Nehru against a Communigt country. They attained almost
unqualified success with the 9 irst objective, but attained
the second only w i t h respect to parties already in t h e i r
camp.
As for Chinese calculations of risk, Peiping seems
to have viewed its p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s
as insignificant. On the military level, the Chinese apparently
calculated that they could beat the Indians handily
and that t h e i r opponents would fight alone; they were right
on both points. However, they were taken aback by the
sharpness of the Indian turn toward the U.S. and UK for
equipment and supplies. On t h e political level, they saw
nothing l e f t to lose in their relationships with the
Indians and the Soviets; both had'run their course to
open enmity. By summer 1962, the Chinese and the Russians
were both on the offensive against non-Communist countries,
but so bitter was the mutual antagonism t h a t there was no
mutual support. When, theref ore, Khrushchev in mid-October
sought Peiping's support during h i s Cuban missile venture,
the Chinese not only were s t i n t i n g i n t h e i r support, b u t
also implicitly criticized h i m for encouraging the Indians
even before he had "capitulated" on Cuba.
The border dispute had a momentum of its own. The
Chinese attack would almost certainly have been made even
i f there had been no Cuban crisis and even if there had been
no Sino-Soviet dispute. Whether the Chinese would have
attacked precisely when they did if there had been no Cuban
missile crisis is c w c t u r a l , but the Soviet charge t h a t
the Chinese attacked because of the opportunity provided
them at t h a t time is overstated.
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I t seems l i k e l y that the continuing deadlock on the
border w i l l lead eventually to renewed clashes, at a t i m e
when the Indians have restored their s p i r i t s and forces.
A p o l i t i c a l settlement, which could not be negotiated when
relations were still to some degree amiable, w i l l be even
less l i k e l y in the prevailing condition of completely
antagonistic relations.
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SECTION 111, (1961 - 1962) I 1
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As of January 1961, the Chinese strategy toward
India was, to use Mao'S phrase, one of "unity as
w e l l as struggle"--"unity" meaning renewed e f f o r t s
to reach a rapprochement with New Delhi. The Chinese
leaders apparently viewed t h i s strategy as
having " t a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y , '' leaving "some leeway"
(again Mao's phrase) for Nehru-to see, that
is, i f he would come round to changing his anti-
China a t t i t u d e . A Chinese Foreign Ministry report
issued i n January 1961 depicted Peiping's prospect
i v e policy toward India as containing the following
major elements: an e f f o r t would be made to
mollify India and maneuver Nehru into assuming a
"passive position" on the border dispute, an invit
a t i o n would be sent to him requesting that he v i s i t
China a t "an opportune moment, " another border experts'
conference would be held, and the Sino-Indian
agreement on Tibet would be revised rather than perm
i t t e d to lapse. The report viewed the Sin-Indian
struggle as necessarily "subservient t o the struggle
against imperialism, 'I and advised t h a t India should
not be made the primary enemy. However, a l l of t h i s
was qualified by the warning to guard against another
anti-China wave.
Chinese policy toward India, therefore, operated
on two contradictory assumptions in the first
half of 1961. On the one hand, the Chinese leaders
continued to entertain a hope, although a shrinking
one, that some opening for talks.would appear. On ,
the other hand, they read Indian statements and actio-
as clear signs that Nehru wanted to t a l k only
about a Chinese withdrawal. Regarding the hope,
they were willing to negotiate and tried to prod
Nebru into a similar attitude. Regarding Indian intentions,
they began to act p o l i t i c a l l y and to build
a rationale based on the assumption that Nehru already
had become a lackey of imperialism; f o r t h i s
reason he opposed border talks. China was therefore
"justified" i n maneuvering to isolate him.
Chinese Feelers for Negotiations: January - June 1961 l i
The Chinese tried publicly and privately to persuade
Nehru to drop-his withdrawal precondition and
to convince him of t h e i r desire to a t t a i n an overall
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settlement. They conveyed t h e i r message publicly
by requiring of New Delhi a "mutual accommodation"--
apparently an exchange of claims to the NEFA and
the Aksai Plain-and cited the exam les of Burma
(Chou's speech of 9 February).
provided them- with some room for..private overturqs.
(Chou En-lai's speech Of 6 January) B and Nepal
This public position
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Seizing upon the unpublicieed Indian protest
note (30 December 19601, the Chinese once again
broached the matter of negotiations. The Indian
note had complained that the tri-junction shown on
the map attached to the 1960 Sino-Burmese Boundary
Treaty was a t the Diphu Pass, five miles below the
t r a d i t i o n a l -junction point and that t h i s -ed
Peiping had reJected the watershed principle on the
eastern sector. In t h e i r reply (note of 21 February
1961), the Chinese first denied that the Treaty map
showed the Diphu Pass as the tri-junction point and
stressed the indefinite aspect of the Treaty text
which resulted from the f a i l u r e to date of China and
India to delimit formally the boundary. The Chinese
then declared t h a t the Sino-Indian boundary dispute
involved not the question of individual points but
"large t r a c t s of t e r r i t o r y " and t h a t Peiping hoped
to seek a settlement through talks on the basis of
"mutual accommodation." Such an accommodation, they
urged , would settle the "entire" boundary question
as w e l l as the minor matter of the tri-junction.
Neutrals were enlisted in t h e i r effort. Foreign
Minister Chen Pi discussed the matter with Sukarno
on 31 March in Djakarta, i n s i s t i n g that China
did not want "disturbed" relations w i t h India, would
prefer that New Delhi stopped quarreling about
"snowy mountainous t e r r i t o r y that is probably inhabited
only by animal8 s '' and would rather ''discuss"
the existing map claim. Chinese o f f i c i a l s in Peiping
asked the Burmese border expert, Brigadier
* The Sino-Burmese boundary "agreement on principles"
had been concluded in January 1960 and the "treaty" had
been signed in October 1960. The exchange of instruments
on 2 January 1961 merely formalized the legal procedure
and was the occasion for Chou's v i s i t to Rangoon
and h i s speech there. A "boundary protocol," which set
out in d e t a i l the agreed alignment of the e n t i r e boundary
was signed in Peiping on 13 October 1961 by Chou and U
Nu, constituting the f i n a l act in the settlement.
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Aung Ghyi, in early May to induce New Delhi to negot
i a t e with China on the tri-junction i s s u e ,
made t h i s approach despite India's formal refusal to
negbtiate (note of 30 March) and continued to press
forward with t h e tri-junct ion proposal. While replying
(note of 4,May) t h a t New Delhi's refusal in
bffect meant rejection of a border settlement, they
r e i t e r a t e d their willingness "to define j o i n t l y w i t h
the governments of Burma and India the exact location
of t h e tri-junction"--Peiping's first and l a s t
formal proposal for a three-way conference on the
Indian border issue.
They
The Chinese had extended feelers in New Delhi
too, but of a less formal kind. The "culturaltt
counsellor in the Chinese Embassy there, Yeh Chengchang,
reportedly asked the chairman of the A l l -
India Peace Council on 1 A p r i l if he thought the
Indian leaders would support a Chinese move to appoint
an vtarbitrator" to adjudicate the border issue.
Yeh stated t h a t because China's disputes with Burma
and Indonesia had been settled, he believed it
lYkely Peiping was prepared for arbitration. Yeh
continued to probe, asking a local employee of the
embassy's v t c u l t u r a l l t office on 7 April if he felt
that the government would accept either U Nu or
Sukarno to a r b i t r a t e the dispute, inasmuch as China
was "seriously considering proposing arbitration."
Within t w o weeks after J. Narayan, a critic of
Nehru's foreign policy, stated publicly on 18 April
t h a t "the d i s p u t e with China was a f i t case for
arbitration, Yeh again approached an Indian employee
in the embassy to propose that the Indian leaders
take up Narayan's suggestion. Yeh's approaches were
a l l informal and on this occasion he insisted that
although Peiping desired arbitration, the first move
must be made by New Delhi. These probes apparently
were intended to provide t h e Chinese leaders with
some insight into Nehru's thinking about any alternat
i v e to his stand of no negotiations with= a prior
Chinese troop withdrawal in the Aksai Plain.
Nehru's a t t i t u d e was relayed to Yeh in late
April and transmitted to Peiping by him. Nehru declared
privately thgt he would not accept a r b i t r a t i o n
and that any formal effort to settle the border dispute
must be preceded by a Chinese "assurance" t h a t
t h e i r troops would vacate the Aksai Plain. H i s a t t i -
tude was more formally indicated in New Delhi's note
of 16 June which repeated the charge that the Sino-
Burmese boundary. map had shown the tri- junct ion point
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incorrectly t o be a t the Diphu Pass and which scored
the Chinese for seeking to drag India into talks:
The Government of China seem to be exploiting
the opportunity offered by the China-Burma
'Boundary Treaty to support their unwarranted
claim for negotiating the question of the
India-China boundary, As the Chinese Government
are aware, the Government of India have
pointed out repeatedly and i n clear and unmistakable
terms that t h i s boundary is w e l l
known and w e l l recognized and has been so
for centuries and cannot be a sub ect of ang
negotiations fimphasis supplie3d
This rejection came a t a t i m e when continuing private
Chinese probes also were rebuffed by the,Indians.
IErishna Menon is reported to have said that when he
arrived in Geneva on 6 June for the international conference
on Laos, Chinese o f f i c i a l s in Chen Y i ' s delegation
indicated that Chen might be interested i n discussing
the border dispute w i t h him. A t several private
meetings with Menon, Chen avoided any discussion
of the dispute and Menon surmised that the Chinese
wanted him to broach the matter first. He did not, as
he was under instructions from Nehru t o avoi'd taking
the i n i t i a t i v e , leaving the Chinese with the impression
that Nehru was unwilling to show any f l e x i b i l i t y .
That the Chinese leaders had persisted in probing
for talks, a t any level, i n the face of clear signs
of Indian intransigence reflected concern that the dispute
conflicted w i t h t h e i r basic i n t e r e s t s in south
Asia and significantly undercut t h e i r position as
"nonadventurist" Communists in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
They had persisted even in the face of New Delhi's
threat to "bring about the vacation of aggression" as
made in the January 1961 Resolution of the Congress
Party-a resolution drafted by Menon, providing further
evidence of h i s s w i n g away from Chinese positions ever
since the Sin-Soviet dispute sharpened i n April 1960,*
* Chen Y i told a bloc diplomat in Geneva i n early June
t h a t Menon is a good example of "how little t r u s t " one
can have for Indian leaders, Chen said %badly informed
imperialistst1 consider him, mistakenly, to be a man of
the extreme l e f t , and went on t o depict him as a completely
loyal instrument of Nehru, capable of wearing
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They had not stopped trying even a f t e r Nehru stated
(20 February speech i n Parliament) that the Chinese
were wrong in occupying '. . Indian territory, t h a t
"there can be no question of horse trading in t h i s
matter-that you take t h i s and we take that-that we
halve it," and that he could go to Peiping "only when
what we say about t h i s matter is broadly acknowledged
by the Chinese government,t' ** In short, they absorbed
a continuous volley of Indian i n s u l t s and rebuffs
without s t r i k i n g back p o l i t i c a l l y or m i l i t a r i l y ,
apparently aware that either kind of riposte would
compel Nehru to leave the dispute open indefinitely,
They desperately wanted it closed. Any delay worked
against them as it was creating an enemy s t a t e on
China's southern f r o n t i e r . There was, however, another
compel 1 ing reas on-- the SAno- Sovie t dispute .
quarrel was being used by the CPSU to substantiate
Khrushchev's charges t h a t the Chinese leaders were
warlike, "adventurist, '' and determined to drive India
into the West's camp. They viewed the s i t u a t i o n as
providing Khrushchev with an effective weapon i n his
lobbying among other p a r t i e s f o r support against the
The f a i l u r e of the Chinese to settle the border
* (continued)
various faces but in the f i n a l analysis "a servant of
reactionary interests."
Subsequently, however, as a r e s u l t of Menon's eff
o r t s to impel Nehru i n July 1962 to begin talks with
the Chinese, Peiping considered encouragement of h i s
a t t i t u d e as t a c t i c a l l y useful. The Chinese apparently
saw him as still close to Nehru even a f t e r his removal
from the post of defense minister, Chou En-lai is reported
to have sent a letter to Menon i n early January
1963 through the Ceylonese o f f i c i a l , Felix Bandarahaike,
expressing regret that the border dispute has led the
Indian government to wsacrifice" him. Chon went on to
say he hoped Menon would continue to use his good offices
with Nehru, particularly i n the context of the Colombo
Proposals for a border settlement,
** NCNA did not report Nehru's remarks, avoiding all.
reference to them u n t i l Peiping attacked Nehru personally
in late 1961.
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CCP, The border quarrel had placed them on the defensive:
they asked the Russians t o understand their
position which would be undercut if Moscow published
the 9 September 1959 TASS statement, blanched a t
Khrushchev's 30 September public rebuke regarding
China's urge to "test by force the s t a b i l i t y of the
c a p i t a l i s t system" (which they l a t e r said was an
"insinuation" referring to Taiwan and the Indian
border), personally briefed Xhrushchev on 2 October
about Indian provocations but were told by him that
in any case it was wrong to shoot people dead,
blanched again at Khrushchev's public d i g s on 31 Oc- .
tober and 7 November, and tried to change the Soviet
"neutral" Position i n s i x talks with the Soviet ambassador
between 10 December and 30 January 1960.
A t t h i s point, they apparently feared that Khrushchev
might score heavily against them on t h i s issue among
foreign Communists, thereby detracting from t h e i r
gains against him on the matter of revisionism. As
Khrushchev's campaign developed, they attempted to
demonstrate, i n an i r r e f u t a b l e way, t h a t the responsib
i l i t y for the quarrel and clashes was entirely India's.
They suggested that border settlements had
been achieved with Burma and Nepal because these
countries, unlike India, were acting in good faith.
Chou En-lai used the occasion of border treaty ceremonies
in Rangoon on 6 January 1960 t o advise the
Russians that the treaty with Burma proved, as would
future border pacts, that China desired a l l border
disputes to be settled peacefully. Chou said:
As for those who, for the t i m e being, do not
understand our position and policy, we are
willing t o wait patiently and welcome them to
observe and study our position and policy on
the basis of the development of events. We
believe t h a t with the passage of t i m e , they
w i l l eventually admit that China's position
and policy are in the i n t e r e s t s of world
peace and friendship between peoples. . ,
Chou was speaking a t a time when his colleagues i n
Peiping were briefing the Soviet ambassador, relaying
through him t h e i r request to Khrushchev that he stop
supporting Nehru and accusing China of "adventurist"
folly .
than ease it, the Russian leaders responded to t h i s
Anxious to exploit Chinese embarrassment rather
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request i n the CPSU's 6 February 1960 letter,
denied charges of Indian provocation and accused the
Chinese of "narrow nationalism" and a desire to hamper
Soviet foreign policy moves toward the US. Khrushchev
struck again on 22 June a t the Bucharest meeting of
Communist p a r t i e s , declaring that '*Indians were killed;
this means that China attacked India,"
They
Peiping - New Delhi Relations Worsen: January - June 1961
Throughout the period of probing for a possible
Indian desire to negotiate, the Chinese t r i e d to refute
Khrushchevvs position that Nehru was still nonaligned.
They depicted his policies as being pro-US
and opposed to specific Soviet policies as w e l l as
general bloc interests.* The procedure of quoting his
remarks without comment provided them with more flexihim
completely as a "class" enemy--a course adopted in
l a t e 1961.
b i l i t y than a direct propaganda campaign to discredit - >
However, the Chinese expatiated b i t t e r l y on Nehru
in private conversations.
in New Delhi told an Indian Communist confidant on
26 February t h a t Nehru's decision to send troops t o the
Congo confirmed the Chinese view that h i s policy is
basically pro-US, He complained that Nehru desired
"to drag out" the border dispute i n order to win votes
for the Congress Party in the 1960 elections. Behind
the scenes a t the World Peace Council (WPC) meeting i n
A Chinese embassy o f f i c i a l
* The New China News Agency (NCNA), for example, reported
.that (1) on the Congo issue, Nehru had turned
down Khrushchev's 22 February letter calling for withdrawal
of UN forces and that Nehru had kept "in close
contact with the US" on the issue (2 March)j (2) on
Laos, a f t e r Secretary Harriman m e t with Nehru, the
Secretary had stated that President Kennedy and Nehru
"see eye to eye" (25 March); and (3) on Cuba, US
papers said Nehru had tempered his statement on the US
role in the Bay of Pigs attack because the prime minister
did not want public opinion opposed to the US
(4 May). These NCNA reports carried no commentary;
each was s u f f i c i e n t l y pointed to convey an impression
of Nehru as a tool of the new US administration and
opponent of Moscow.
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New Delhi i n late March, China's chief delegate Liu
Ning-i, pressed for a resolution condemning Ind a's
Congo policy and "Nehru's p a c i f i s t attitude"; a -
though written into an original draft, t h i s criticism
was removed from the f i n a l version on the insistence
of the Indian delegate, Nehru was accused
of being "Kennedy's lawyer" by a Chinese embassy
official on 31 March, and by June, Chen Y i himself
began to disparage Nehru in private talks, Chen
told a bloc o f f i c i a l i n Geneva on 2 June that Nehru
was determined to f u l f i l l "with no excessive modesty"
the role of spokesman for India's big bourgeoisie
and claimed that this fact "explainsn his unfriendly
a t t i t u d e toward China and India's instigation of bord
e r incidents. Chen moved beyond t h i s doctrinal remark
to draw the only "logical" conclusion: China's
impression was one of "an increasing closeness of
relations between Washington and New Delhi." Finally,
he cast aspersions on Khrushchev by implication for
having been duped by Nehru for several years,
was aligned--with the US.
Nehru -
Sin-Indian relations continued to worsen as
each s i d e mistreated nationals of the other. Starting
with a crude attempt to embarrass the Indian ambassador
and a personal aide i n l a t e November 1960,
the Chinese took a series of steps t o harass Indian
personnel on the mainland. By early b y 1'961, petty
harassment of the Indian ambassador and his s t a f f in
Peiping had so nettled New Delhi that L. Menon, deputy
Minister of External Affairs (MEA) recommended that
a new ambassador not be sent t o China u n t i l relations
improved; Nehru, however, did not agree. He seemed
aware t h a t the annoyances had been motivated by Peiping's
desire t o retaliate for New Delhi's rough
handling of Chinese nationals in India. -He viewed
Peiping's protests as more moderate than anticipated.
When e a r l i e r (on 21 October 1960) a Chinese o f f i c i a l
had made a verbal complaint to the Indian ambassador
concerning the "quit India" orders given i n Calcutta
and Kalimpong to more than 30 Chinese, the accusation
was directed only against "local authorities" rather
than the central Indian government. Although subsequent
expulsions drew protests through diplomatic
channels, the Chinese leaders were at pains to avoid
sustained publicity on the matter and did not denounce
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I n d i a ' s action i n a major propaganda campaign.* Ref
l e c t i n g t h e i r desire to keep the issue of mistreatment
of nationals below the boiling point, NCNA's
report on 22 May of the deportation "under armed
escort'' of two Chinese was couched in r e l a t i v e l y
mild language and frequently made the point that
only "local authoritied" were responsible.
The Chinese in f a c t made no public statement
during the first half of 1961 regarding their basic
position on the border question, There were several
reasons for t h i s reticence. They calculated that an
open argument on any aspect of the border tssue
would further harden Nehru's a t t i t u d e , or the a t t i -
tude of his advisers, against them. Further, they
viewed the border experts' Re o r t issued by New Delhi
decided not to acknowledge it (at l e a s t in China);
a public dispute over the Re o r t would bury both sides
Chinese were trying t o *stress points of common agreement.
Beyond t h a t , they were anxious not to provide
Khrushchev with more amunition to feed his drumfire
complaints that Peiping's position was driving Nehru
to the right; the Chinese privately insisted that
Nehru was i n e f f e c t his own driver.
on 14 February 1961 as detrimen + a1 to t h e i r case and
in recriminations over detai + s at a t i m e when the
Determined to refute Khrushchev and to pressure
Nehru to negotiate, the Chinese moved l a t e r a l l y beyond
Mongolia, Burma, and Nepal--all states willing to
settle border discrepancies--to Pakistan, They suggested
border talks with Karachi in December 1960, and
by January 1961 they had gained concurrence to negot
i a t e a preliminary agreemerlt,
o f f i c i a l Indian suspicions of the Pakistanis and confirmed
t h e i r view of the Chinese as anti-India p o l i t i c a l
opportunists (See APPENDIX)
This maneuver rekindl'ed
* Indian Home Minister Shastri stated em 15 March
that as of 31 September 1960, 12,474 Chinese were
registered in India and that expulsion notices had been
served on 69, of whom 8 had been expelled forcibly and
26 arrested to face prosecution for anti-Indian activities.
The Chinese leaders almost certainly recognized
that the "local authorities" in West Bengal were acting
under the Home Ministry's policy of deporting anti-
Nehru Chinese, but sustained the local-national distinction
for t a c t i c a l reasons.
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The move toward Pakistan pointed up t h e contradictory
aspect of Chinese policy.
and talked about t h e need for negotiations but made
no concession t o a t t a i n them; on t h e contrary, t h e i r
p o l i t i c a l moves drove the Indians away from t h e
ttpropertt mental a t t i t u d e . At t h e same t i m e t h a t the
Chinese approach succeeded i n exacerbating India-
Pakistan r e l a t i o n s , it embittered Indian o f f i c i a l s
a l l the more against China.
They desired
The Chinese leaders were willing to accept the
consequences of probable failure of pressure tactics
against the Indians because they had no a l t e r n a t i v e
to these tactics.
negotiations were ruled out. India, they felt,
would view concessions as a sign of weakness and
i n s i s t on greater concessions-i.e. complete withdrawal
of Chinese forces from the Aksai Plain. Stated
d i f f e r e n t i y , the Chinese rejected t h e carrot-and-thestick
as a policy because the only carrot acceptable
t o New Delhi was the e n t i r e Plain. They were, therefore,
left w i t h sticks of various sizes, and when
they used even a small one-, the Indians winced.
Significant concessions, before
R. K, Nehru's Probe: July 1961
Prime Minister Nehru's rejection i n t h e first
half of 1961 of Chinese overtures for negotiating
on Pelping's terms-that is, h i s refusal to accept
occupation of t h e Aksai Plain--did not end Sino-
Indian contacts. H i s rejection was followed by a
one-man probe intended to determine whether t h e
Chinese might reconsider and soften t h e i r position
regarding the Plain..
Chinese willingness to withdraw troops at least
partially was i n the Indian view a sine qua non for
the start of any talks. From the Chinese viewpoint,
however, negotiations after an assurance had been
given to withdraw would be superfluous; nothing
would be left toMk about except t h e procedure of
t h e Chinese pullback. In other words, Nehru would
negotiate only after .the Chinese showed a willipgness t o
acce t t h i s occupation, Because of t h i s impasse,
mi-e+ ndian a t t i t u d e had been, both shortly before
t h e Chou-Nehru talks of April 1960 and consistently
thereafter, t h a t the only policy was to w a i t and
hope for Chinese agreement t o pull back, or to
consider compelling them t o pull back.
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However, the Sino-Soviet dispute led some
Indian leaders to believe t h a t the Chinese might
decide to soften t h e i r stand and even consider a
p a r t i a l withdrawal of t h e i r forces from t h e Plain.
They f e l t t h a t New Delhi should examine the possib
i l i t y .
MEA Secretary General, R. K. Nehru, who was supported
i n it by Krishna Menon. R. K. Nehru was
provided w i t h the occasion to i n i t i a t e a probe
of the Chinese position by t h e f o r t i e t h anniversary
of the founding of t h e Mongolian People's Republic
(July 1921) which he was scheduled to attend. The
/had arranged for SeGcre aIry
Chinese ambassador i n Cairo, Chen Chia-kang,
eneral Nenru to meet w i t h t h e Chinese leaders, having
discussed t h e t r i p with the Secretary General i n
Cairo during the June preparatory meeting of the Non-
Aligned Nations Conference. R. K. Nehrv, Chen stated,
had mentioned h i s forthcoming t r i p t o Ulan Bator but
was reluctant t o t r a n s i t China unless permitted to ,
meet with t h e Chinese leaders. Chen had assumed
R. K. Nehru wanted to discuss t h e border issue and
conveyed h i s remarks t o Peiping,"whereupon arrangements
for t h e v i s i t were made.
The chief proponent of t h i s view was the
The Drobe idea was sanctioned bv not enthusias-
Ithe Secretary
t icallg encouraged by P r i m e Minister Nehru .*
'over was approvea by. the Rime Minister i n a scribbled
note: "Can't! do much harm; may do some good." However,
it was opposed by Foreign Secretary Desai, who
felt t h a t R. K. Nehru had been influenced bv Menon
i n t h i s course and that, i n any case, Menon-was interf
e r i n g t o o much i n MEA policy formulation. [
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* 0ne"month earlier, Nehru had instructed Krishna
Menon not t o take the i n i t i a t i v e i n broaching the border
dispute with Chen Y i at Geneva. Nehru felt then
t h a t such an i n i t i a t i v e might be construed as a sign
of weakness and willingness to accept a compromise
settlement. Nehru's public and private statements made
after the failure of t h e Secretary General's t r i p were
post facto j u s t i f i c a t i o n s for t h e policy i n i t i a t i v e of
h i s MEA chief.
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prime minister, compelled to defend h i s subordinate's
prospective v i s i t at a press conference on 30 June,
stated t h a t R. K. Nehru had no instructions ,to
The Chinese leaders, however, apparently antieipated
a bargaining gambit or an indication of w i l l -
ingness to negotiate. This is suggested by t h e top
l e v e l a t t e n t i o n given Re K. Nehru when he arrived i n
Peiping on 13 July and held discussions with Liu Shaoc
h i . t h e next morning, and again by t h e more extensive
t a l k s with Chou En-lab and Chen Yi i n Shanghai on 16
July. More importantly, it is suggested by the outrage
of the Chinese leaders when they learned that
India's foreign policy chief had come with no negotiating
offer.
Nehru i f they were prepared t o retreat, they were
aroused and lashed out a n g r i l y at t h e Indian. In
reply to the Secretary General's demand t h a t t h e
Chinese withdraw from t h e Aksai Plain, Liu shot
back furiously t h a t it was "ridiculous" for Nehru
to make such a long t r i p i n order simply to restate
a position which China had previously indicated was
"unreasonable, unjust, and unacceptable. He told
t h e Secretary General t h a t i f New Delhi wanted the
Plain vacated before s t a r t i n g negotiations, the
Indians must vacate t h e NEFA, and t h i s was the
%nly'' condition on which China would consider even
talking about t h e Plain. Liu's counter-demand was
i n fact later incorporated i n the bitter Chinese
note of 30 November 1961.
H i s response to R. IC. Nehru's demand and Chinese
refusal to grant t h e Indian an interview with Bdao was
interpreted i n New Delhi by Krishna Menon-a supporter
of t h e visit--as another example of the "intolerable
arrogance" of the Chinese leaders. Nehru m e t with a
somewhat more t a c t f u l but equally solid rebuff when
he raised t h e obrder issue with Chou En-lai and Chen
Yi in Shanghai on 16 July dtwing a six-hour exchange.
Chou repeated Peiping's position that t h e border is
not defined and therefore should be a matter for
negotiation. When, at one point, Nehru complained
that the border experts' Report had been publisheki
by India but not China, C m p l i e d t h a t India had
been i n "too much df a hurry" to publish it and t h a t
When, on the contrary, they were aksed by R. K.
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by 17unilaterallyf1p ublishing it, India had "tried
t o make propaganda gains. '*
matter are further evidence t h a t t h e Chinese viewed
t h e i r legal case as somewhat weaker than India's.
When R. K. Nehru left Shanghai on 17 July, followed
three days later by recalled Ambassador Parthasarathy,
he left Sino-Indian high level contacts i n a state
of abeyance which lasted u n t i l discussions were held
i n Geneva i n March 1962. \
Chou's remarks on t h i s
Animosity had been deepened on both sides. The
Chinese leaders were personally affronted by t h e
v i s i t . The "cultural" counsellor of t h e Chinese
embassy i n New Delhi. privately commented t o an Indian
employee on 24 July that R. IC. Nehru's t r i p had been
a great disappointm.ent to Peiping; the Chinese government
was surprised t h a t a high-level Indian o f f i c i a l
would t r a v e l t o China merely t o "repeat demands and
adhere to positions" which already had been rejected . (Liu had taken v i r t u a l l y the same l i n e w i t h R. K.
Nehru personally.) The counsellor concluded t h a t
Sino-Indian r e l a t i o n s were going from "bad to worse."
In the Indian camp, even t h e moderates were hardened
against Peiping. The Chinese had not even hinted at
a concession (that is, a c a r r o t ) , but had used instead
a nasty lecture (that is, a stick). P r i m e
Minister Nehru commented privately on 21 July that
t h e Chinese were i n no mood .to settle the border
dispute, r e l a t i o n s would f u r t h e r deteriorate, and
he had no choice but to adopt a ."very s t i f f " a t t i t u d e
toward Peiping.
Chinese Harden Treatment of Nehru: Julv-SeDtember 1961
For t h e ensuing period of several months, t h e
Chinese dropped t h e assumption t h a t t h e Indian prime
minister could be prodded i n t o negotiations. They
decided to treat him as an implacable foe. Cons
t a n t ly plagued by Soviet criticism , however, they
continued t o cover t h e i r flank by l e t t i n g Nehru hang
himself with h i s own words, p a r t i c u l a r l y those words
which were directed against Moscow's moves. They
highlighted every public statement of Nehru's
which could be construed as anti-Soviet.*
* MCNA, for example, reported that (1) Nehru had
refused to comment on a "recent warlikett speech of
(Cont 'd)
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In September, t h e Chinese took a step toward
slandering Nehru openly i n t h e i r commentary. After
c i t i n g Indonesian and Burmese press criticism of
Nehru by name,,the Chfnese attacked him by implicat
i o n f o r h i s moderate remarks on colonialism (Peo le s
Ro-3n - ligned Nations Conference advanced the argument
t h a t the era of classical colonialism is gone
and dead...contrary to facts." This.was a d i s t o r t i o n
of Nehru's remarks but appeared close enough t9 be
credible. On the same day, Chen Yf referred to
Nehru by implication at the Bulgarian embassy reception:
'Those who attempted to' deny histroy, ignore
r e a l i t y , and distort t h e t r u t h and who attempted
to divert t h e Conference from its important object
i v e failed to gain support and were isolated."
On 10 September, they dropped a l l circumlocutions
and criticized him by name i n a China Youth article
and NCNA report--the first t i m e m r n m w o years
that they had commented extensively on the prime
minister.
D a i l editorial, 9 September): "Somebody at t + e
The formal Indian riposte led t o an exchange of
recriminations which f u r t h e r demonstrated the animosity-:
impelling the Chinese to disparage Nehru and thereby
to contradict their,policy of attaining a border
settlement. Foreign Secretary Desai protested t o
Ambassador Pan Tzu-li on 14 September and t h e
'Indian charge i n Peiping made a verbal demarche to
3 (Continued )
President Kennedy (25 July), (2) Ambassador
Bowles i n New De'lhi had praised Nehru for "generous
support" on the Congo crisis (10 August), (3) Nehru
had told Parliament that 'The present tension i n
Berlin is due t o the Soviet Union's declaration it
would sign a peace treaty with Bast Germany" (23
August), (4) Nehru publicly had "ignored facts" and
disparaged t h e Berlin Wall as (29 August),
a:3d (5) Nehru had attacked the'S6viet Uni'on for resuming
nuclear weapons tests (7 and 10 November). Interspersed
in t h i s reporting were allusions to t h e Chinese
leaders' real complaint, namely, that on 23
August, 9 October,'and 6 November, Nehru had "slandered
China for Yllegally occupying Indian territory:"
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the Chinese Foreign Ministry on t h e same day, complaining
of distortion in Peiping's comment on Mehru's
Belgrade apeech.
tests, conveyed to the Indian charge by Deputy Foreign
Minister Keng Piao on 24 October, went w e l l beyond
a denial of distortion; Keng opened a personal attack
on Nehru and his aides. The Indians (note of 1'0
November) gave the following account of Keng's abusive
remarks :
The Chinese response to these pro-
The V i c e Foreign Minister. . . indulged in
personal attacks on P r i m e Minister Nehru,
Defense Xinister Krishna Menon, and Secrstary
General R.K. Nehra....He accused the
Secratary General of making an incorrect
and untrue statement' to the press on h i s
return from Mongolia via China....The
Secretary General was charged w i t h prevarication
and abuse of Chinese hospitality. '
Not concent with t h i s attack on the Secretary
General, V i c e Foreign Minister Keng
Pia0 has discourteously charged the Prime
Minister of India with 'dishonest dealing. *
Such accusat ions and off ens ive remarks
are not conducive to high level contacts
between two Governments.
The Indians asserted further that Keng's abuse was
"calculated to cause offense. '' This seems indeed
to have been the major Chinese calculation. They
used Keng primarily to convey t h e i r contempt for
what they f e l t had been Nehru's doubledealing in
sending R.K. Nehru only to harangue them in their
own offices as aggressors
diplomacy. It was instead an outpouring of t h e i r
animus against the Indian leaders, and if any other
calculation existed, the intention probably was
j u s t as self-defeating, namely, to shock the Indians
into a more submissive a t t i t u d e . Such Maoist
shock treatment d i r e c t l y conflicted with t h e i r
effort t o a t t a i n a border settlement. The "struggle"
aspect of Chinese policy had once again consumed
the 9mity" aspect.
This Chinese action was hardly cool, calculated
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- . Indian Moveups and Repercussions: April - December
1
I_
Nehru, too, was pulled by contradictory forces.
H i s natural inclination was to work for a p o l i t i c a l
settlement, However, Chinese refusal to withdraw
from the Aksai Plain and Opposition demands that
they be,compelled to witlidraw made h i m more susceptible
than ever before t o the army argument that
the Chinese would not move back unless pushed by
Indian troops.
By early 1961, the problem had become one ofj
u s t how to push them. Nehru's rejection in January
of action to oust the Chinese "by force if
necessary," and in February of "any move to push
the Chinese from Indian soil,11 ruled out a largescale
Indian offensive operation. However, it had
not had ruled out the establishment of new Indian
posts i n areas claimed by the Chinese (particularly
in Ladakh) by a process of moving closer t o and
between existing Chinese posts. The process would
require a series of small-scale advances, in order
to avoid provoking f iref ights , and flanking moves,
in order to press.Chinese forces t o abandon forward
posts. Direct assaults apparently would not
be required.
*r
4.'
The ratidnale for this process stemmed from
the view held by certain c i v i l i a n and army advisers
that stealthy Chinese advances from 1957
to 1960 provided j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r stealthy Indian
moveups in-1961. Nehru himself gradually accepted
t h i s simple logic of retaliation.
, . . .
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He agreed t o act in April 1961. In Order to
"bolster the regular strength" of Iqdian army units
on the border, the Chief of the Army General Staff,
Lt. General B.M, Kaul, sent an order in early April
to a l l three Indian army commands to furnish 10
percent of t h e i r current troop strength for service
with border units. In a clarifying statement
to tbe army commands, Kaul s t a t e d t h a t the intention
was not t o introduce "entire units" but to "augment"
army units already along the border in such a way
as not to give the Chinese cause for increasing
their o m troop strength. (Kaul was also anxious
to avoid giving the press the impression that the
army was "massing" troops on the border.) The
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Indians were wary of the Chinese military i n t e l l i -
gence e f f o r t , particularly after confirming through
interrogation that a Chinese soldier arrested in
Bhutan in March had had the mission of contacting
individual Indian military personnel t o obtain
order of b a t t l e information, Nehru showed some
anxiety in June that the Chinese were preparing
to respond t o Inbian moves by a major attack, but
was relieved ~ of t h i s worry in July and August by .
reports that the Chinese were merely improving
t h e i r border posts and communications.*
Nevertheless, the Chinese were a l e r t to increased
Indian border a c t i v i t y , The Indians could
not move forward in 1961 (as the Chinese had done
from 1957 to 1960) without detection. Following
t h e i r bitter exchanges w i t h B.K. Nehru, the Chi- -
nese leadgrs decided to protest any Indian patrolling
across China's 1960 * l i n e o E c t u a l control. **
They made their first formal protests in August
against Indian advances begun under Kaul's order
of early April. In addition to charges of a i r reconnaissance
carried out over Chinese-claimed territory
in May and June, their first note in the series
(12 August 1961) complained that:
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2, in May, Indian troops set up a checkpost
3, in July, 30 heavily armed Indian troops
"since l a s t April,** Indian troops began to
push further into China's I)emchong area,
a t nearby Oga,
conducted two patrols as f a r as Charding La,
* He and his aides had been particularly concerned
about a possible major Chinese bulldnp north of the
Slikkim border. Kaul himself reported in early July
t h a t Indian press reports and,.rwnors had been wrong,
The Maharajkumar of Siprkim t o l d an American o f f i c i a l
i n mid4ctober that there was only a brigade of Chinese
troops on the border and that a Chinese patrol
was seen only every two or three months; he implied
that i f the Chinese were doing the type o f , p a t r o l l i n g
which the Sfkkimese .and Indians were doing, they
would have been seen more frequently,
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4.' again in July, troops patrolled w e l l past
the Thaga Pass, and
5. in June, a detachment of Indian o f f i c i a l
personnel established themse'lves a t Wuje
(Bara H o t i ) ,
These actions, the note declared, had once again
caused t%ensiorl' on the border; India should i 6 e d i a t e l y
withdraw a l l troops and other official personnel
**who have crossed the border , '** The Chinese ' in
effect demanded that the Indians stop moving up.
l i c statements were expanded into,the bitterest
open Sino-Indian exchange since 1959,
New Delhi's formal response and Nehru's pub-
,The Indian response was primarily intended to
j u s t i f y their continuing advances on the border,-
New Delhi's note df 31 October rejected the Chinese
complaint as in effect accusing Indian troops
of moving on Indian soil. It deliberately ignored
both Peiping's 1956 and 1960 lines of actual control,
noting only t-hat patrolling within the
tttraditionalw line--that is, not the actual existing
one-was India's right. Thus, regarding the
new Indian post a t Oga (320 50' N - 790 26' E) in
the Demchog area, the note stated:
The MEA do not see why the Government of
China should have any concern with measures
India adopts inside her territory,..
As regards partrolling up to Kargo and
Charding La, while Rargo is w e l l within
Indian t e r r i t o r y , Charding La is on the
Kraditiona17 border, and has been under
Tndian contFol for severail years. -Em phasis
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* When recapitulating military moves of spring
and sumer 1961, the Indians (note of 30 April .
1962) stated that Chinese a c t i v i t i e s had compelled
them t o take "additional measures" to protect
Ind-ian t e r r i t o r y , However, they were careful not
.to specify that t-hese measures included forward
moves on the ground in the western and middle
sectors ,
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In order to counter Chinese charges more forcefully,
the note raised a complaint of Chinese incursions,
It insisted that since 1960, "aggression has been
added t o aggression" and instanced intrusions and
the establishment of new checkposts "ewen beyond t h e
Chinese claim line of 1956." These "fret;h Chinese
violationstt were given in the note as a post a t
Nyagzu, Dambuguru, and a t a point 330 19' N - 780
12' E, The Chinese, however, responded by focus'fng
on Indian advances, not Indian arguments. They ins
i s t e d (note of 2 November) that Indian troops were
still pressing forward on "China's border" and warned
of "very serious" consequences ,
The war of notes became open when Nehru on 20
November tabled in Parliament excerpts of the Indian
31 October note, The f i f t h Indian white paper was
also issued, delineating Sino-Indian exchanges regarding
the border. Nehru s t a t e d t h a t "in recent
weeks" some new checkposts had been b u i l t by the Chinese
beyond t h e i r 1956 claim line but within their
1960 line, The storm that broke in the Indian press
over the surf acing of these %ew'* Chinese incursions
was directed against the prime minister's policy of
'playing down the border question" and his unwillingness
t o take- military action,
Attempting to impede further criticism of his
"soft" policy, Nehru spoke in tones of striking belligerency,
he began, had changed progressively in India's favor
because of recently strengthened defenses.
promised :
The military situation on the border,
He then
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We w i l l continue t o build these things up
so that ultimately we'may be in a position
t o take effective action to recover such
t e r r i t o r y as is in their possession.
This was the most explicit public statement that -
Nehru had made regarding an intention t o take m i l i -
tary action to regain land held by Chinese forces.
The Chinese for good reason l a t e r cited it to
demonstrate Indian responsibility for border clashes.
Nehru went on t o give an account of India's "hardrt
moves, Although the Chinese had established three
%ew" posts in Ladakh, he said, India had set up
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six, including one a t Daulat Beg O l d i near the garakoram
Pass, He also cited a steady buildup of Indian
forces and noted that 500 t o 1,000 men were required
to 'provide l o g i s t i c support for one 50-man post
Compelled in t h i s way t o demonstrate Indian m i l i -
tary aggressiveness, Nehru a t times spoke about outposts
in d e t a i l , exposing his and his aides' confusion
about certain crucial facts; Regarding the time three
"new" posts were established, Nehru stated in Parliament
on 20 November that it had been '*in. recent weeks"
and, on 28 November, that it had'been "during the 2ast
two years" or, on second consideration, "during 3ast
summerr" Regarding location, he stated on the 28th
that rttwo..,are practically on the international
frontier between Tibet and Ladakh" but, on second
consideration, "we are not quite certain whether they
are a m i l e or t w o on t h i s . s i d e or on that side,?-
When a member of Parliament claimed that "then, they -
m u s t be on t h i s flndia's7 s i d e ; if there is any doubt,
they are obviousTy on t K i s side," Nehru agreed:
-
Let us presume that. We.have presumed that.
But I am merely saying that they are near
the international frontier.
Nehru's ambi,guity and uncertainty suggests t h a t the '
Indian charge that the three Chinese posts were '*newn
may not have been accurate,+*
*.. Reflecting the Indian propensity for swagger a t -
the t i m e , the Director of A r t i l l e r y told the Asnerican
army attache in l a t e November that his forces
had the firepower in Ladakh to make the Chinese
posts "untenable ,t1
* * H i s remarks a t the very least reflect MEA incompetence
in handling the charges, The MEA 31 October
note had incorrectly given one of the coordinates
for a "new" post as 33O 19' N, placing it ridiculously
deep-100 miles deep--within Indian territory; it
shpuld @aye b .-given as 359 19' N, placing it within
Peiping+s i96 la'im line. The &rror was not recognized
by, the Indians; it vas privately' pointed out
t o a ldEA officialeby an American embassy offlcial,
and the MEA was obliged t o send-a note of correction
on'the 23rd., The note of correction was not included
in the white paper tabled on the 28th or in Nehru?s
remarks of that date,
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The Chinese denied the posts were new.
stated (note of 30 November) that the places cited
"are within Chinese terri-tory," two of the posts--
a t Nyagzu and 350 19' N - 780 12'.E--%ave long
been i n existence, and no checkpost has ever been
established'at Dambuguru." The MEA'S China Division
director l a t e r (on 8 December) conceded privately
t h a t Dambuguru and Nyagzu were not new, having been
set up in 1960, (The Chinese apparently were correct
i n their assertion regarding Dambugurn a t '
330 58' M - 78O 52' E; it had remained unoccupied
u n t i l Indian troops moved into it sometime between
5 and ?3 M ay 1962,) However,- the HEA official insisted
that the third post--at 350 19' I - 780 1 2 8 ' E .
on the Chip Chap River-had been set up in epring 1961.
The Indians l a t e r (in their note of 22 February 1962)
changed the date to September 1961 $or t h i s Chip Chap
River post, and they did not c l a i m that it was beyond
the 1960 Chinese claim line, Is short, their
claim that Indian advances in spring and summer -
1961 had been made precisely t o counter %ewtv Chinese
posts cannot be substantiated. The Chinese
apparently viewed t h i s claim as part of an Indian
t a c t i c to cover Kaul's policy of advances,
ment and the press spurred the Chinese into releasing
their notes and launching a major propaganda
campaign directed against Nehru personally. The
l i n e they took in the onslaught suggests that by -
l a t e November 1961, the Chinese leaders were convinced
that Nehru had decided to intensify India's
m i l i t a r y plan t o recover t e r r i t o r y in the western
sector, They t r i e d to deter him.
to the plan, They pointed out (Foreign Ministry
statement of 6 December) that four Chinese notes
had been sent since August 1961 because, s t a r t i n g
in mid-May, Indian troops began to "overstep" the
l i n e of actual control in the western and middle
sectors. They theq depicted Indian statements in
November as '%antamount t o professlng'bpenly that
India intends to change u n i l a t e r a l l y the s t a t u s quo
on the border and is preparing to futher invade
Chinese territory."* This was interpreted as meaning
They
Nehru's public remarks and the uproar in Parli-a-
They led off by making it clear they were a l e r t
* They supported t h i s charge by c i t i n g Nehrufs
28 November statement in Parliament: **India..,is
now building up a system of roads and building
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ih effect that Nehrn had switched over from refusal
to settle the border dispute by talks to using force.
They concluded with a warning:
Should the Indian Government, going it -
alone obstinately, ,continue to push forward
into Chinese t e r r i t o r y and extend
its unlawful ocoupation, it m u s t b e a r
f u l l responsibility for the resulting
new tension. Emphasis supplie-d7
This policy..,is extremely dangerous...
under no circumstances w i l l the Chinese
Government be cowed by war clamor
and military threat.
They put teeth into t h e i r warning by turning
to a discussion of a hypothetical situation i n
which Chinese troops would be corapalled to r e t a l i -
ate. Seizing on the argument that Indian troops
were simply advancing into territory claimed on
Indian maps, they declared (note of'30 November)
t h a t t h e Chinese, too, had extensive map claims
and, were they to use New Delhi's logic, would be
j u s t i f i e d in moving on the ground into territory
claimed on Chinese maps. This threat was conveyed
to the Indian leaders as follows:
Such logic of the Indian Government is untenable
and also most dangerous. The. In- -
dian Government m u s t be aware that the Chinese
and the Indian Governments do not hold
identical views concerning the boundary between
the two countries. Taking the case
of the eastern sector of the boundary, the
Chinese Government has always held that t h i s
sector lies along the soutdlern'foot of the
Himalayae and that the so-called WBdcMahon
Line= is t o t a l l y i l l e g a l .
Government's above logic should be fqllowed,
If the Indian
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bases. a t suitable places'for our armed forces" in
the west: "forward posts" have been dispatched
t o t a l l i n g "more than half 6 dozen new posts;" India
must be prepared "to~recover" its territory. They
also cited a Times of+ India a r t i c l e Prom the same
date: clashes- **nowfbt e hard to avoid, "eapecia
l l y since the army-has instructions to proceed with
its plan of extending &ts checkposts;**
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the Chinese Government would have every
reason to send troops t o cross the socalled
'%cMaIh on Line," and enter the vast
area between the crest'of the Himalayas
and their southern foot. But the Chinese
Government has never done so and a l l Chinese
military and administrative persoanel-,
acting on orders, have not crossed the socalled
"McMahon Line. '' -Em phasis supplie-d7
This was not the first t i m e that the Chinese had
pointed to the consequences of the Indian argument.
They had said essentially the same thing in their
statement of 26 October 1959. However, they appraised
the Indian forward movement in l a t e 1961
as f a r more ambitious than that of summer 1959 and
used the threat of r e t a l i a t i o n in the east as part
of t h e i r effort t o deter Nehru from advances in the
w e s t
The warnings failed to deter Nehru.* On tbe
contrary, when publicized, they enabled his opponents
to c a l l for an even harder line. When,
therefore, Nehru referred to the warnings in Parliament
on 5 December, -he was compelled t o concede
that non-diplomatic-t hat is , military--methods
would not be ruled out to settle the border d i s -
pute.** But by l a t e 1961, such a policy was already
being implemented; the Chinese stick had the
effect of creating greater internal pressures on
Nehru t o press forward even more vigorously,
* ,For example, New Delhi's response (note of 9
December), stated in effect that what the Chinese
had done since 1956 in Ladakh, the Indians could
do better in 1961. :
** IJe said: 'While pursuing diplomatic and other
peaceful means, India is also preparing the ground
$or other methods t o be omployed,.,.The statement
that the government had issued orders to Indian army
personnel not to fire unless fired upon is absolutely
wrong. There are military orders to defend or attack,
whichever the situation might demand." The
Chinese l a t e r cited his remark on using "other methods"
to demonstrate that New Delhi had switched over t o
a poldcy of military aggression.
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Chinese Suggest Settlement "Formula" : January -
W[arch 1962
Having refuted charges of "new" Chinese advances,
demonstrated t h e i r awareness of Indian advances,
and threatened r e t a l i a t i o n , t h e Chinese
leaders'dropped t h e i r intense anti-Nehru propaganda
assault. They once again t r i e d to indicate to Nehru
they had not slammed the door on a p o l i t i c a l settlement.
Such a renewed approach apparently was motivated
by t h e calculation t h a t an overture might att
a i n two goals; it might
(1) d i l u t e Nehru's determination to forge
ahead w i t h an aggressive forward-post
policy by introducing an element of indecision
into Indian thinking and
(2) offset Soviet criticism of t h e CCP for
antagonizing India at a time when Peiping
was having some success i n using the
issue of Soviet "dictation" to turn
against Khrushchev ' s ant i-Albanian tirade
at the 22nd CPSU congress.
They may also have been convinced t h a t Nehru found
it advantageous for h i s domestic and foreign policy
to leave t h e border dispute "open...and to drag i€
out" (People's Daily editorial, 7 December 1961).
In January 1962, t h e Chinese suggested to t h e
Burmese* t h e i r terms for a settlement. The Indians
also indicated t h e i r position. In February, Chinese
embassy officials i n New Delhi informed leftist
j o u r n a l i s t s of a "formula'' which included j o i n t
Sino-Indian use of t h e Aksai $lain road, formation
of a j o i n t commission t o demarcate the Ladakh border,
and recognition of China of t h e McMahon Line.
Responding to t h e Chinese probes, Indian leaders
insisted on various forms of Chinese withdrawals.
* Home Ninister shastri indicated I
exchanges on t h e matter of a formula
t h a t U Nu had been acting as 'the middl eman" ' '
for settlement.
India i n January.
The Burmese premier had visited
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Nehru told President Prasad on 10 March that Peiping
must meet three conditions before negotiations can
be started:. (1) agree to vacate posts found to
be i n Indian-claimed t e r r i t o r y after t h e December
1960 border experts' meeting, (2) admit that the
Aksai Plain road traverses Indian territory in
Ladakh and agree to 'construct an alternate route,
and (3) publish t h e f u l l text ofsthe border experts'
Report. Nehru said that these conditions
had been communicated to the Chinese through informal
diplomatic channels, and that he included in his
formula permission for t h e Chinese t o use the road
Yemporarily. '' Later i n March, Foreign Secretary
Desai responde& t o a Chinese overture made at the
Geneva conference on Laos by repeating Nehru'S demand
t h a t the Chinese wit.hd.ra w from the Plain.
gesture t o show some amenability to compromise,
the Chinese at Geneva had added a new pro-.
posal to t h e i r formula.
retary Desai t'here that i n addition to giving up
their.map claim t o t h e - N E F A , they might give up
the map claim to- part 'of Ladakh, retaining *tonly*t
t h e Aksai Plain--i.e., t h e area they occupied on
t h e ground. Some Indian's apparently viewed tlZs
proposal as'nnerely an opening gambit which reflected
a basic Chinese willingness t o accede to Neliru's
demand for a si.gnificant 'pullback i n Ladakh.
t h e new Chinese fofmula'was report& t o R. K. Hehru,
he stated privately t h a t by standing firm, the
Indians would be able t o compel the Chinese to cede
some of the ground they held, enabling the prime
minister to m a c e ' w i t h the Opposition, the
press, and the pubIic.
They had told Foreign Sec-
When
However, t h e Chinese refused t o withdraw from
any territory on.which t h e i r forces already stood.
That is, $hey refused to accept Nhhru's sine qua
n6n for the s t a r t - o f - n e g o t i a t i o n . By 24 April,
Desai'reported t h a t the Chinese, waiting for a
reply, had.made no ftirther overtures in Geneva.
By t h a t tame, t h e Chineqe were compelled to make
a new complaint-namely, that Indian checkposts
recently had been established behind Chinese posts . Viewing t h i s as t h e f i n a l - I n d i a n response to t h e i r
**of rmula, It they apparent l y abandoned the effort to
wean Nehru away from a forward border policy.
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Indians Flank Chinese Posts: April - July 1962
C r i t i c i s m of Nehru''s "soft" China policy in
November 1961 and t h e Chinese propaganda attack on
him made Nehru amenable to a new and bolder Indian
army strat egy-namely , moves around and behind
Chinese forward posts i n the w e s t .
tended to induce the Chinese to abandon the posts
by isolating them from their bases.
assault on the posts was ruled out as risky.
Formulated i n December 1961, the army plan envisaged
operations in Ladakh by spring when weather
conditionsl improved. Tbe plan called for the establishment
of f i v e new Indian posts of 80-100 men
each behind nine existing forward Chinese posts i n
L a d a k m of t h e 1956 Chinese claim line; the
posts were to be manned all-year round. Krishna
Menon instructed the Indian air force to prepare
a report on its capability.'to sustain a major air
supply effort. (Two of the Posts were to be set
up close to t h e .western part ,of the msai Plain
road, but the India& we& unable to move anyPlhere
near it in subsequent encounters.) Briefing
cabinet subcommittee officials onethe Wehru-approved
plan In late 'December , ' Krishna Menon stated
that the new posts would be positioned to cut off
the supply lines of'targeted-Chinese posts; they '
were to cause the "starving butn of the Chinese,
who would thereafter be replac'ed by Indian troops
in t h e posts., These points would serve as advanced
bases for Indian patrols assigned to probe
close to the road.
The ariny in-
A direct
A l e r t to the possibility of new Indian moves,
the Chinese in late 1961 had wakned the Indians
to maintain the border status quo. Privately i n
January 1962, they began 'to' threaten armed counteraction.
The Chinese ambassador in Cambodia told
his Burmese colleague in late January (at a t i m e
when Peiging was again probing for negotiations)
that China still desired Chou-Nehru talks, but i f
India wanted t o "bully, ressure, or fight" the
Chinese about the disp d ar@a, t h e Chinese would
prove to be tough adversaries'and were'"quite
willing to use troops' to' resist attack. I? This,
threat was communicated to .the Indian ambassador
in Phnom P e a , who apparently informed New Delhi.
Together with the publicized warnings, it may have
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contributed to Indian concern over a possible major
Chinese military counteraction. The Indian High
Commissioner i n Karachi told an American embassy
officer there on 2 February t h a t although India
"now" had military forces in Ladakh adequate to de=
feat Chinese troops in t h e area, they did not want
to provoke a countermove which'would r e s u l t i n a
major war. India must be sure, he said, that a l l
military moves i n Ladakh must be "localized;r* if
t h e new operations could be "limited s t r i c t l y t o
Ladakh, ** he concluded, t h e Chinese would find it
d i f f i c u l t to reinforce t h e i r advanced units.
provoke a major clash,' the Ministry of Defense
ordered t h e army in e a r l y April to flank Chinese
.forward posts and induce a withdrawal t o t h e 1954
l i n e agreed to by implication i n t h e Sino-Indian
trade agreement. !l%o Indian'battalions were
ordered t o move around and eventually r'retake** t h e
Chinese post at -35O 19' N - 78O 12' E i n the Chip
Chap River area-the-post which they inconsistently
claimed had been-established either i n spring or
September 1961 and which t h e Chinese insisted had
been i n existence for a much longer t i m e .
againat a Chinese post'was'directed against t h i s
disputed post i n midoApril. By 30 April, the
Chinese formally chapged that i n t h e period from
the 11th to the 27th, Indian troops had set up
two posts, one southwest itnd'one northwest of t h e i r
post, and had maneuvered around it i n groups numbering
up t o 120 men at times.*
Acting on the assumption t h a t moveups would not
The first planned Indian flanking operation *
The Indian operation was confirmed by t h e
American military attach6 i n New Delhi.
ported on 29 April t h a t t h e Indian army had been
ordered to use two battalions t o take the Chinese
He re-
* The Chinese later charged (note of 28 May)
t h a t t h i s flanking operation included t h e establishment
of a t h i r d post approximately f i v e miles
southwest of t h e i r post as w e l l as aggressive
patrolling i n areas immediately west, northwest,
and southwest,
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post "as soon as possible; *' he commented t h a t lack
of additional information indicated exceptional
Indian security measures concerning the move.
The Chinese reacted by ordering t h e i r troops
to resume patrolling along the Aksai Plain border
sector from the Karakoram Pass to the Kongka Pass.
They warned that the operation might provoke t h e i r
forces to f i g h t , When an American embassy official
on 2 May asked t h e director of the ABA's China
Division precisely what had motivated the threatening
Chinese note of 30 April, t h e latter disingenuously
replied that perhaps it related to "present
Pakistani pressure on India in the Security
Council. However , in attemptfng to calm public
fears regarding a possible Chinese offensive, Nehru
declared i n Parliament on 3 May that there really
was "nothing alarming" i n the Chinese note because
- ! it had been evoked by an Indian i n i t i a t i v e : India
had established a number o f t s , some of which
i were tvbehind" t h e Chinese post, causing the Chinese
some '~annoyance"--'~ence their note. The
Chinese leaders were provided with a f u r t h e r indication
of Nehru's gradually increasing militancy when
he stated publicly on 2 May that the Chinese note
would not deter him from supporting t h e forward
policy. "We w i l l stay where we are" and are
"prepared for them .if they step up pittr611ing.tv
The border dispute was in t h i s way transformed
by the Indians from a primarily political quarrel
to a serious m i l i t a r y confrontation, I
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The Indians decided to go ahead despite Peiping's
30 April warning. On 1 May, Indian army headquarters
with Nehru's approval ordered the immediate dispatch
of 1800 troops to Ladakh from the Srinagar Command
to serve as a supporting force in any fighting res
u l t i n g from the Chip Chap operation; they were
given a "f ight-to-the-death" speech by Kaul and
dispatched on 2 May. A t the same t i m e , Kaul w i r e d
instructions to those Indian border posts which
were tactically well-positioned to "retaliate
immediately" i f the Chinese wipe out any of the new
Indian forward posts.* Starting on-.5 May, Indian
troops began to move into the post at Dambuguru
and on 6 May, a c t i v e p a t r o l l i n g by troops of both
sides was reported to American officials by the
Chief of the General Staff, General Thapar,
. .
More ominously than i n April, the Chinese
threatened to f i g h t back. On 6 May, the Chinese
charge i n New Delhi told an Indian contact that
China, "shocked" by India's advances and establishment
of new posts ''at.places deep within China's
territory," has no a l t e r n a t i v e but to resist:
I hope the Government of India realizes the ,
consequences t h a t are bound to follow. China
wants no trouble, but if trouble is forced
upon it, it w i l l respond forcefully,
On 19 May, t h e ehargd stated privately t h a t Indian
troops, moving into Chinese territory, sometimes
in f u l l view of Chinese bbrder forces, seem to
be "spoiling for a fight." He warned t h a t Peiping
* The existence of Kaul's strike-back instructions
was indirectly confirmed on 15 June by the
MEA'S China Division director when he informed an
American embassy officer t h a t if the Chinese were
to push Indian troops from any post, Indian forces
in other positions would retaliate at Indian strong
points ,
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was aware New Delhi was preparing a major military
drive. The Chinese had already protested formally
(note of 11 May) that Indian troops on 2 May had set
up another new post in t h e area south of Spanggur.
Lake approximately 2.5 miles from the Chinese post
at Jechiung (Jechitung) , t h a t two Indian soldiers
had fired at the Chinese post on 5 May, and that
"very serious consequences" would have resulted if
Chinese troops had not been alert, cool-headed, and
restrained. This Chinese note was t h e first since
late August 1959 in which they had charged one of
t h e i r posts had been fired upon. On 19 May, the
Chinese demanded that Indian troops which had
moved across the McMahon Line into Longju in
late A p r i l must be withdrawn, warning t h a t notherwide
the Chinese Government w i l l not stand idly by."
They refused to view Nehru's proposal (14 May) for
a mutual withdrawal in Ladakh on the basis of each
other's map claims as anything but a diversionary
political move; th6y warned him (note of 2 June)
that it was unacceptable, requiring a one-sided
(Chinese) withdrawal and in fact intended to con;
ceal India's continuing drive "in s e t t i n g up m i l i t a r y
strong points on Chinese territory.,.a border clash
may touch off at any moment." mat is, they indicated
they would be guided in t h e i r decisions
by Indian m i l i t a r y advances more than by Indian
p o l i t i c a l statements.
Possibly in May and probably in June, Indian
advances convinced the Chinese'leaders t h a t they
should begin planning for a major action to clear
out the new Indian positions. There is some evidence
that active planning in June resulted in practical
steps taken in preparation for eventual military
action.
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Throughout June,. however, the Chinese avoided moving
against.any of the new Indian posts, They apparently
desired no clash with Indian forces at
tlie t i m e despite clear indications of New Delhi's
intent ions
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Chinese Encircle Galwan Post:
in notes with increasing frequency since t h e mid-
April Indian moveups, was motivated throughorrt May
and June primarily by Peipingss fear of a Chinese
Nationalist invasion, across the Taiwan Strait,
Chen Y i reflected the Chinese leader$' anxiety
regarding t h e "threat of aggression" by the
Nationalists i n his 29 May interview With Japanese
newsmen; t h i s anxiety was reflected i n other ways,
including the appraisal of the Chinese Communist
ambassador i n Stockholm who informed his embassy
rgtaff i n mid-June t h a t if t h e Nationalists attacked
at the same t i m e as the Indians, China would be i n
a *?bad situation." Statements made at the Sinonan
on 23 June and by President Kennedy to newsmen
on t h e 27th apparently dispelled these fears.
Security precautions i n the Canton area were eased
in early July and on 19 July, Chen Y i , during an
interview i n Geneva, three times referred to t h e
American t~assurance~gi' ven to Wang Ping-nan $hat
the US would not support a Nationalist assault
against the mainland, describing the assurance
as "not bad." He did not comment on Khrushchev's
2 July statement *
July 1962
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Chinese %elf-restraint, *' repeatedly expressed
American talks in Warsaw to Ambassador Wang Ping- . .
The Chinese leaders, no longer rattled by the
prospect of a two-front w a r , turned with restored
confidence to counter the Indian advances. Their
first major move of 1962 was in direct response
to a new Indian move in Ladakh,
charged (memorandum of 8 July) t h a t about 20 Indian
troops on 6 July moved into t h e Galwan River Valley,
attempting to establish "a new strong-point" and
"to cut off the only rear route" of a Chinese post
They formally
* During t h e first ten days of July, the Chinese
leaders t r i e d publicly to suggest a d e f i n i t e Soviet
commitment to assist them m i l i t a r i l y in the event
of a Nationalist attack, but t h e i r actual estimate
of KhrushchevOs intention in making h i s 2 July statement
was t h a t t h e Soviet leader hoped to make a
p o l i t i c a l gain (among foreign Communists) without
making a m i l i t a r y commitment. At least one Chinese
o f f i c i a l later indicated privately that Khrushchev's
hypocrisy was decisively proven by h i s f a i l u r e to
comment u n t i l after American assurances had been
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located at t h e lower reaches of the river. On 9
July, they displayed considerable pique, complaining
(People's Daily e d i t o r i a l ) t h a t Mehru three times
i n late June had %oastedtt in Parliament about
India's new posts set up behind Chinese positions
and t h a t Indian officials are "triumphantly bragging
about the aggressive a c t i v i t i e s of Indian troops
nibbling away at China's borders." Implying t h a t
they would deny the Indians any further opportunity
to continue flanking moves with impunity, the
editorial warned :
It seems t h a t t h e Indian Government has $&en
China's r e s t r a i n t as weakness. But the Indian
a u t h o r i t i e s are c o m m i t t i n g a big blunder if
they think that the Chinese border units w i l l
submit to t h e armed Indian advance, that they
w i l l renounce t h e i r sacred duty of defending
t h e i r fatherland and give up the r i g h t of
self-defense when subjected to unprovoked
attacks. . .
It is still not too late to r e i n i n on the
brink of the precipice. The 1ndian.authorities
had better think three times about t h i s matter.
The Chinese followed up t h e i r warning with a note
(10 July), detailing a series of Indian flanking
moves against six Chinese posts and citing Nehru's
20 June statement i n Parliament as proof of Indian
provocation.* A t the same t i m e , they moved on t h e
groufid. On the morning of 10 July, Chinese troops
be an to advance on a small Indian unit at 78O 38' E - 34 !3 40' N from t h e east, south, and w e s t , positioning
* In their note, t h e Chinese selected Nehru's
remarks which most strikingly supported t h e i r
argument: "In h i s speech in Parliament on
June 20, 1962, Nehru unwittingly let out the truth.
He stated that to say t h a t China Rad madeta fresh
intrusiont was 'hardly correct' and that it was
due to the Indian movements 'sometimes going behind
Chinese positions' and 'largely due to t h e movements
on ow (Indian) side that t h e Chinese had
also to make movements. *'*
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themselves at a distance of 20 yeards from t h e new
post.
Cabinet Defense Subcommittee on 12 July, the 20-man
Indian unit had been ordered to open fire if t h e
Chinese advanced any closer. Nevertheless, the
Chinese had t h e superior force and could have
destroyed t h e post without much trouble.
According to Krishna Menon's report to the
This three-sided encirclement apparently re=
flected t h e decision of the Chinese leaders to impress
Nehru that they would now fight to stop
h i s forward policy, Reluctance to f i g h t , they apparently
believed, had encouraged the Indians to
make new advances and new public boasts; t h e
Indians had not been deterred and China's prestige
was being damaged, Verbal warnings had to be made real
warnings by. moving troops on the ground. Actually,
the Chinese stopped short of launching an attack.
They apparently calculated t h a t flanking pressure
at points of their own choosing would not be a
risky policy, Chinese superiority i n men and arms
would be' ensured, and pressure provided them w i t h
more control over t h e - s i t u a t i o n than an outright
attack, They apparently believed that t h e numerically
i n f e r i o r Indian force would be withdrawn .
from the Galwan Valley post.
back under t h e circumstances as detrimental, providing
the Chinese with a bloodless victory.
began toslpply the poet by air and moved more, troops
into the valley,
for breaking the Chinese encirclement.
Galbraith received t h e impression from the IVIEA's
China Division Director, S, Sinha, on 13 July
that the *tstrategy*o' f the Indian leaders was to
hope t h a t the Chinese would go away. Displaying
some anxiety, Sinha stated that if Indiin troops
opened fire, many Indian posts i n the western
sector would also be vulnerable to Chinese retaliatory
action. The Chinese tried to induce a
withdrawal on 13 July by pulling their encircling
force back 200 yards from the post, opening a l i n e
of r e t r e a t along the supply €ra&l. At the same
time (on the evening of the 13th), they threatened
t h e Indians with the consequences of any rash action:
the Indian government should give %erious consideration
to the danger of the situation and not
play with fire; he who plays with fire w i l l burn
J However, the Indian leaders viewed a pull-
They
They had no other plan of action
Ambassador
himself , *I -Be
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Within the Indian leadership, the views of the
military prevailed with increasing vigor over those
of the c i v i l i a n chiefs. Nehru and his p o l i t i c a l advisers
found themselves under stronger pressure than
before t o stand pat at Galwan and t o continue the
policy of advances elsewhere i n the western sector ,
moveups throughout the summer, calculating that the
Chinese would not react on a large scale and t h a t
any small-scale reaction could be localized. Thus
Chinese encirclement of the Galwan post did not
change Indian strategy; on the contrary, Kaul privately
expressed confidence that the Chinese were
not operating from strength. He told Ambassador
Galbraith on 16 July t h a t the Indian army viewed
the Chinese as set in a "mood" of weakness and that
Indian policy was to take maximum advantage of t h i s
mood by establishing even more new posts, In cont
r a s t to the policy "ambiguities" of a year or two
ago, Kaul continued, the Indian army "is not now i n
a mood t o be pushed around." H i s remark about "ambiguities"
was directed implicitly against Erishna
Menon, who had never been enthusiastic about a forward
policy and was only driven 20 concur w i t h t h e
moves of spring-summer 1962 under threat of being
called "soft" on the Chinese as a r e s u l t of his early
contacts with them, Menon was made even more vulnerable
to criticism a f t e r an Indian advance i n the
Chip Chap River area resulted in a sharp f i r e f i g h t
on 21 July; Nehru himself was in effect compelled
t o approve Kaul's request that Indian troops on the
border be given the discretion to open fire. Prior
t o the incident, border units had been instructed
to fire only i n self-defense, although Kaul and the
army staff had been seeking such approval from Nehru
and Menon for several months,
the Indians from t h e i r forward policy was indicated
to the Chinese leaders i n several ways, the most
open being a 17 July Times of India a r t i c l e , Displaying
lofty d i s r e g a n r Chinese sensibilities,
it stated i n cavalier tones:
Indian army leaders planned t o continue the
The f a i l u r e of the Galwan encirclement t o deter
What has happened in the Galwan Valley is the
consequence of the f i r m policy decision by
India nearly ten months ago. The process of
extending our physical presence on what we
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regard as our t e r r i t o r v was begun a f t e r due consideration
of the risk involved. Even a t a much
e a r l i e r stage than l a s t week, the Chinese
should have realized that physical confrontation
between troops from either s i d e was inevitable.
We intend to go ahead with this
process.
f a c t , there may yet be a way out through nego-
=ions a f t e r mutual wi_thdrawal from the-disputed
area i n Ladakh,
If the Chinese accept t h i s unpleasant
lemphasis supplie-d/
This was tantamount to asking the Chinese leaders to
permit Indian troops to push back PLA border forces.
The Chinese maintained their positions around the
Galwan Valley post and moved elsewhere i n the western
sector beyond the 1956 claim l i n e up to the l i n e they
had shown Indian border experts i n 1960. They warned
New Delhi against making "a fatal mistake if it should
think China is flabby and can be bullied" (note of
16 July) and "a wrong assessment of the situation,"
gambling with the possibility of *'a war on two fronts
facing China" (Peo le's D a i l a r t i c l e , 21 July). In
ominous than previously as they improved t h e i r tact
i c a l positions0 and as the threat from Taiwan receded,
short, t h e i r actA ons an +warn ng s i n July were more
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Civilian Leaders Revive Negotiations Probe: July 1962
The Galwan Valley encirclement pointed up the
logistic capability and the t a c t i c a l f a c i l i t y with
which the PLA could move to hold Indian posts as
hostages. The encirclement had frightened c e r t a i n
key Indian c i v i l i a n leaders, p a r t i c u l a r l y 8, K, Nehru
and Krishna Menon. They worried about the vulnerab
i l i t y of a l l Indian border posts; as defense minister,
Menon worried about h i s position and prestige, A
successful Chinese attack against even one of the
posts would inflame the border area, and create new,
opportunities for Menon's domestic opponents t o bring
him down.
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Even before the Galwan Valley incident, these
Indian c i v i l i a n o f f i c i a l s had begun to recognize
that the Chinese had established their forces in
the Aksai Plain so securely that the army could not
r e a l i s t i c a l l y expect them t o evacuate holdings
there as a prerequisite for talks.* R. IC. Nehru
had approached t h e Chinese charge in New Delhi on
29 and 30 June and was advised by him t h a t China
would prefer that preliminary talks take place in
Geneva, wing the 14-nation conference on Lam as
a %overp" for talks. The Indian Secretary General
was also reported in early July to have been pressing
the prime minister with memoranda on the matter
of an overall border settlement; a t the same t i m e ,
Menon was working with the Secretary General in trying
t o prod other c i v i l i a n o f f i c i a l s i n t o concurring
i n an effort to seek such a settlement,
There was no real duplicity i n the Chinese action
of responding to R. K, Nehru's i n i t i a t i v e a t a
t i m e when t h e i r 'forces were primed t o move against
the new Indian post in the Galwan Valley, Ever
since the Chou-Nehru talks of April 1960, the Chinese
leaders without exception had been receptive
to any high-level Indian exploratory approach t o
talks, Only a f t e r they had ascertained t h a t the
Indian representative was s t a t i n g the same old position--
that is, Chinese withdrawal as a precondition
for negotiations--did they act to reject an
Indian overture. Thus i n early July, the Chinese
responded by returning Ambassador Pan Tzu-li, who
had been i n Peiping since January, to New Delhi to
make a personal determination of Nehru's willingness
to begin talks. Nehru advised the Cabinet Defense
Subcommittee meeting on 12 July that during
his meeting with Pan, the l a t t e r had suggested Sino-
Indian talks be i n i t i a t e d , Nehru told the meeting
* Such.a precondition-had been raised ia New Delhits
note of 13 March 1962 i n the following manner: "The
withdrawal of Chinese from Indian t e r r i t o r y , i n t o
which they have intruded since 1957, i n order to res
t o r e the s t a t u s quo, s h a l l be an essential step for
the creation of a favorable climate for any negotiations
between the two governments..,t' The Chinese
viewed t h i s s t i p u l a t i o n as "in f a c t tantamount to the
summary rejection of negotiations" (note of 22 March).
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t h a t t h i s suggestion would be turned down because t..e
Chinese were capable of making further border advances
under the guise of talks. President Radhakrishnan concurred,
maintaining that no grounds for talks existed
as long as the Chinese persisted i n their refusal t o
withdraw first. Home Minister Shastri urged continuation
of a "firmt* policy: territory not actually in
Chinese possession, he said, should now be occupied
by Indian troops. The only dissenter, Menon, replied
t h a t the Chinese were complaining of Indian flanking
moves precisely because of the "firm" policy, He
informed the Subcommittee that Ambassador Pan Tzuli
had discussed the matter of talks privately with
h i m as w e l l as Nehru and that he, Menon, saw RO harm
in beginning discussions with Chinese o f f i c i a l s .
Cooperating with B, E. Nehru, Bishna Menon continued
to act on his own i n i t i a t i v e and without maj
o r i t y cabinet concurrence. The talks he began with
Chen Y i i n Geneva in late July had not been discussed
w i t h the prime minister prior to Menon's departure
for the conference, according t o a reliable source.
Only a f t e r arriving in Geneva did Menon cable Nehru;
he received only reluctant approval to t a l k with
Chen coupled with a warning to make no commitments
t o the Chinese foreign minister.*
The approach to Chen Y i was doomed to f a i l u r e
because Menon had no authority t o present a new Indian
position. He repeated New Delhi's view on Chinese
"occupation" of Indian territory, refusing to
say whether talks could begin prior to Chinese withdrawals.
Chen made no concession, but f i n a l l y suggested
that neither country should c a l l the other an
"aggressor." Menon refused to comply on the grounds
that he had no authority to issue a j o i n t communique,
Chen then took a tough l i n e with Menon; he was reliably
reported to have been "threatening," and Menon
was "somewhat shaken" by t h i s display of anger, The
Indian defense minister persisted in his efforts desp
i t e t h i s setback of 24 July,
High Commissioner Malcolm MacDonald i n Geneva to
He t r i e d to persuade
*Later, on 29 July, Nehru characteristically accepted
responsiblity for the actions of his long-time friend,
publicly claiming that he had personally asked Menon
to meet with Chen.
wTO l-7
"mediate" the dispute on the l a t t e r ' s t r i p to Peiping
i n the f a l l ; MacDonald refused. Following his return
to New Delhi on the 25th, Menon recommended that Ind
i a ' s 26 July note to China avoid raising the withdrawal
precondition for talks. The note in f a c t
avoided the precondition and stated only that "as
soon as tensions have eased and an appropriate climate
is created," India would be ready to negotiate.
Thus despite internal opposition Menon in effect
had established a flexible line.$
vised cabinet members a t a meeting on 25 July not only
to repudiate the withdrawal precondition as unrealistic,
but also to seek a settlement based on the Chinese
claim l i n e of 1956--the only way toward a peacef
u l solution. This view corresponded precisely with
the Chinese position. Menon had persuaded Nehru to
accept t h i s view prior to dispatching t h e 26 July
letter to the Chinese.
For 8 period of about three weeks, Nehru defended
Menon's line, However, he viewed it less as
a r e a l step toward a settlement than as a device t o
He had ad-
* The Times of India on 31 July carried an a r t i c l e
suggesting that Menon's desire for a negotiated
settlement was no longer an MEA secret, the country
was ready for such negotiations, Menon had been "encouraged"
by his talk with Chen Y i in Geneva, and
"further probes" ko find a mutually acceptable formula
were underway, As indicated e a r l i e r , Menon had not
been "encouraged" but rather frightened by Chen 's
threats a t Geneva during their 24 July meeting. However,
when he returned to New Delhi on the 25th, he
exploited the intransigence of Chen t o strengthen
his own argument that India should modify its withdrawal
precondition.
The Minister of State for External Affairs,
Lakshmi Menon, complained privately on 12 August that
the government had "reversed" its tough line on the
border dispute and t h a t "our wonderful Minister Menon
. is behind the change,''
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buy t i m e to gain a military s t a n d s t i l l on t h e ground
in Ladakh which would reduce t h e risk of clashes;
meanwhile, India would be able over t h e next f i v e
years to strengthen its positions i n Ladakh. Trying
to buttress h i s argument for a peaceful settlement,
Menon reported at a f u l l cabinet meeting on 1 August
that the Indian military position i n Ladakh was
'funtenable,'' t h a t the army had already pushed its
plan of establishing new posts beyond t h e l i m i t s of
military safety, that t h e Chfnese were steadily
bringing up supplies and equipment, and that t h e
Indians would never establish a supply l i n e i n the
Aksai Plain even roughly comparable to China's.
then made a s t r i k i n g estimate regarding t h e consequences
of a major border clash:
be wiped out immediately and the Chinese could, if they
desired, push the Indians far beyond t h e i r 1960 claim
without serious resistance. Idenon's sobering remarks
prompted the prime minister-whose ignorance of m i l i -
tary matters made him dependent on Menon's estimate--
to state t h a t it was necessary ''now'' for India "to
change" diplomatic tactics and to seek a de facto
military truce based on the current bordsr situation.
Nehru called for "a complete military disengagement"
so that fighting could not possibly begin--a l i n e
Chou En-lai had been i n s i s t i n g on since late 1959.
Once t h i s was accomplished, "discussions" on demarcation
of the border could go on "for f i v e or s i x years. '*
Regarding the matter of domestic criticism such a
drastic policy change would provoke, Nehru declared
t h a t it would be nothing compared to that which would
be unleashed following a military catastrophe. In
short, he and Menon showed considerable foresight by
not underestimating Chinese m i l i t a r y capabilities on
the border.
He
Indian forward posts would
This sober estimate was not shared by Indian army
leaders. The Chief of t h e Army General Staff, Thapar,
denied privately on 4 August t h a t t h e army had given
Menon such an alarming estimate of the military situation.
Thapar said the army report merely called t h e
Indian posit ion f'over-extended't and cautioned against
setting up new forward posts "until" l o g i s t i c support
could be assured, but did not predict a military disaster
if fighting should bEZk out.
made almost precisely t h e same criticism of Menon's
presentation on 5 August.
apparently continued to believe t h a t the Chinese were
i n a "mood" of weakness and that t h e forward border
policy should be sustained.
General Kaul
He and other army leaders
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Despite such opposition, Nehru tried to press
forward along Menon's l i n e favoring negotiations,
but the Chinese, too, made his progress d i f f i c u l t .
They were willing to begin negotiations but, unfortunately
for Nehru, they were obsessively concerned
with the possibility of Indian duplicity and w i t h avoiding
any impression of weakness.
and without equivocation that there should be no preconditions.*
Such explicitnesson the part of the
Chinese i n effect n u l l i f i e d their c a l l for discussions
"as soon as possible" (note of 4 August) and made
meaningless their l a t e r a l move in early August to
persuade a top Burmese foreign office o f f i c i a l to
gain New Delhi's accession to Burma as a meeting
place for immediate Chou-Nehru talks. Nehru had been
waiting for a straw to grasp--lee., a modest Chinese
conciliatory gesture indicating a small degree of
willingness to make a concession to the Indian position;
he did not find one, nor did the Chinese indicate
privately to him that one could be found. A t the very
l e a s t , the Chinese could have refrained from i n s i s t i n g
on "no preconditions," remaining as s i l e n t on the point
as the Indian note of 26 July, That they refused to
make even-this .gesture suggests either (1) they w e r e
unaware of the civilian-army policy dichotomy in the
Ipdian leadership or (2) they chose t o appratse it as
irrelevant so long as Indian troops continued to move
across the Chinese claim line. They concentrated t h e i r
attention on the l a t t e r consideration. That is, the
f a c t that Indian troops were still positioned to cross,
and were in fact crossing, the Chinese l i n e implied an
Indian intention to compel the Chinese to make a concession;
as viewed by the Chinese leaders, such compulsion
had t o be e x p l i c i t l y criticized, and the worst
response would have been to appear conciliatory.
Nehru found no softening of the Chinese position in
Peiping's note of 4 August, he had no choice (given
domestic pressure on him) but to note that Its tone
was "rather disappointidg" '(speech to Parliament on .
They i n s i s t e d publicly
Since
6 August). ._
When Y i stated publicly on 3 August that, regarding
a Chinese withdrawal from Ladakh, "no force in
the world could oblige us t o do something of t h i s
kind" and Peiping declared (note of 4 August) that
preconditions must be dropped..
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As word of Menon's new flexible l i n e spread in
Parliament and among journalists, Nehru was forced
into a series of r e t r e a t s in a l a s t effort to defend
it. Speaking to Parliament on 13 August, Nehru t r i e d
t o conceal the f a c t that the Menon-originated 26 July
note had used language which implied an Indian willingness
eventually to accept the 1956 claim line; on
14 August, he t r i e d to j u s t i f y talks with the Chinese
by asserting it.was "childish" to insist on a withdrawal
precondition and went on to take refuge in the
distinction between "talks '' and "negotiations , ** saying
that "talks" were an essential preliminary to negotiations.
On the same day, he demanded Parliamentary
approval for "freedom of action?' so that "we
may-I do not say we will--have some talks," The Opp
o s i t i o n l n Parliament a t the t i m e had no r e a l a l t e r -
native to giving Nehra t h i s "freedom of action," as
their e a r l i e r advice to evict Chinese troops "by
force" was based on an unrealistic view of India's
military capability. ' Y e t uncertainty regarding Menon's
motivations and uneasiness fed by suspicfons that
c i v i l i a n foreign policy advisers might cede a large
part of Ladakh continued increasingly t o operate as
factors r e s t r i c t i n g the prime minister's maneuvera
b i l i t y . The small group of journalists and Parliamentarians
who professed to be s p e c i a l i s t s on India's
China policy gradually compelled Nehru to r e t r e a t
further; on 22 August, he hinted i n Parliament t h a t
talks with the Chinese'now would be formally conditioned
on his e a r l i e r withdrawal stipulation, An MEA o f f i c i a l
l a t e r told an American embassy officer i n New Delhi
that certain "intended ambiguities, '' which had been
written into India's 26 July note in order to induce
preliminary talks, had to be "elaborated" in Part Two
of the 22 A u g u s t note; one such elaboration was the
raising again of the withdrawal precondition.
politicians and journalists in effect had assisted the
army leaders in destroying Menon's flexible line.*
Domestic
* H i s friend, Nehru, f i n a l l y had been compelled to
a c t on the proposition that it was more important (as
prime minister) to be r e a l i s t i c about domestic p o l i t i c s
than Sino-Indian poqitips. When, i n mid-August, R. K.
Nehru wrote a memorandum t o Rehru urging him to offer
publicly to go to Peiping to begin talks with Choa Enlai,
Nehru told h i s foreign policy adviser that the
proposal did not snake sense i n the current domestic
p o l i t i c a l scene. Nehru complained that the Indian
(Cont 'd)
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In retrospect, R. K. Nehru's and Menon's increasing
awareness t h a t Indian posts could not be moved any
farther forward and were in fact highly vulnerable t o
Chinese attack spurred them to press the prime minister
for negotiations.
catastrophe was probable and that such a development
would hurt them p o l i t i c a l l y , Nehru, too, apparently was
convinced t h a t a policy of military disengagement rather
than military advance was essential for the s e c u r i t y of
Indian posts, but he could not argue convincingly for
a flexible policy, He was driven back toward the pos
i t i o n favored by army leaders by the pressure of domestic
reaction; as he fell back, he was given no comfort
by the Chinese who refuaed t o make even a token concession
by employing new--or avoiding the same old--
language i n t h e i r 4 August note, Ma0 and h i s lieutenants
had drawn on t h e i r favorite colors--black and
white--in appraising the 26 July Indian note and, against
a background of Indian advances, they could see only
the black.
If the c i v i l i a n leaders had been permitted to
pursue their course, the border dispute might have
been turned away i n August 1962 from a military clash
and toward a political settlement, However, in addition
t o Chinese intrasigence and domestic opposition,
a majaor m i l i t a r y development on the border i n the east
a t l a s t locked the door which had j u s t been closed on
such a settlement.
They recognized that a m i l i t a r y
The Dhola (Che Dong) - Thagla Ridge Incident: September -
October 1962
As Indian advances continued, the Chinese leaders
apparently were confirmed in their appraisal of Indian
notes as merely diplomatic devices providing cover for
a military policy. They viewed the c i v i l i a n leaders'
approach increasingly as motivated e n t i r e l y by duplicity
rather than any sincerity for talks. D i s t r u s t of the
c i v i l i a n leaders was deepened .by what they considered a
deliberate effort to conceal Indian advances under a
cover of MEA d i s t o r t i o n s of developments on the border;
they specified (note of 27 August) New Delhi's attempt
311 (Continued )
press had t0.a "considerable extent" t i e d the hands of
Indian diplomats in dealing with the Chinese. Nehru
concluded t h a t he wanted a military disengagement but
d i f f e r e d with R. IC. Nehru who was i n s i s t i n g it was urgent
to begin negotiations for a settlement immediately.
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to cover up the f a c t that three Indian patrols had encircled
a Chinese post a t Pangong Lake by claiming
the Chinese troops were "located close to the supply
l i n e of the Indian post." Their suspicion of Indian
duplicity clearly had been confirmed by Nehru's own
admission (in Parliament on 22 August) that on the border
question, India was following a wdual policy,"
intending to make gains
tary pressure , or other pressures. t'
'%y p o l i t i c a l pressure, m i l i -
Prior to September, Chinese counteraction to Indian
advances in 1961 and 1962 had tasen place with
f e w exceptions in the western sector. They had held
strong counteraction i n the eastern sector in reserve,
as their basic negotiating position was premised on
Chinese de facto acceptance of the McMahon Line. With
the exception of Indian moves into Longjn in June 1962,
they did not protest the establishment of new Indian
positions i n the east u n t i l the incident at Dhola (Che
Dong) in early September.
For the f i r s t t i m e since November 1960, the Chinese
engaged an Indian military detachment on the eastern
sector when, on 8 and 9 September, approximately
300 Chinese took posations opposite the Dhola (Che
Dong) post manned by about 50 Assam R i f l e s , The
matter of just when the Indians had established the
Dhola post is important, The Chinese were remarkably
vague (note of 16 September), s t a t i n g that the Indians
had moved into the area '*recently," and l a t e r backed
* By f a r the greater part of Chinese and Indian moves
between 1961 and 1962 had occurred i n the w e s t . The
Chinese had established new posts in t h i s sector in
July and August 1962 to block the Indians; t h e i r posts
proliferated almost in the same measure as those of
their opponents to the south, In July, the Chinese had
insisted that "since spring 1962," 15 Indian posts had
been set up across the claim l i n e in the west, and they
pinpointed these on a published map (in Peo le s Dail
14 July); for their part, however, i n Se+p em erd t e:
dians pointed to new Chinese holdings, the number of
which was minimized by Krishna BBenon (in Parliament on
3 September) as merely "tactical dispositions" constituting
a "distribution of personnel into one, two, three
or four posts" which indicated "no further advance into
our territory," but was expanded by his critic, Lakshmi
Menon, to "30,.,since May 1962" (in Parliament on the
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away from this position, conceding (note of 3 October)
t h a t the Indians had entered as early as " l a s t June."
Thus, although the Indians apparently had set up the
post in June, the Chinese did not decide to move
against it u n t i l 8 September, This suggests that the
original Indian move had not provoked the Chinese, but
rather had provided them w i t h a pretext to be used at
some t i m e i n the future to warn the Indians t h a t continued
advances in the w e s t would be m e t by Chinese act
i o n i n the east, That is, the Chinese may have intended
their September move against the Dhola post as a clear
s i g n t h a t China could play the game i n the east which
India was playing in the west.**
of a major planned advance i n the east laid on by army
leaders in the spring of 1962. On 14 May, the Director
of Military Operations had ordered the Eastern Command
of the army to establish 25 additional posts along
the McMahon Line. Indian army troops had moved into
many of these posts in June, including the post a t Dhola.
Considerable anger was generated on both sides a f t e r the
Chinese i n s i s t e d in September that the post was north
of the McMahon Line and the Indians declared it was
south of their version of the Line. The original 1914
map, u p o n x h McMahon had drawn h i s l i n e and which
the Chinese used t o support t h e i r case, was very small
in scale and imprecise on the matter of the Tibet-Bhutan-
NgFA t r i j u n c t i o n where Dhola was located. Responding
t o Chinese charges, the Indians (note of 17 September)
claimed t h a t Dhola was on the southern s i d e of the Line;
subsequently, the dispute centered on pinpointing the
exact location of the trijunction area Line.
Indian establishment of the' Dhola post was part
* (continued)
same day). The scene of greatest military a c t i v i t y
between the two sides in the west had been the Chip
Chap and Galwan areas.
** The Chinese had threatened to play j u s t such a game
e a r l i e r . The Peiping People's Daily "Observer" commented
on 21 July:
If the Indian troops, according to the logic of
the Indian s i d e , could launch a t w i l l large-scale
invasion of Chinese territory, occupy what they
regard as t h e i r t e r r i t o r y and change by force the
s t a t u s quo along the border, then, it may be asked,
have not the Chinese troops every reason to enter
(Cont 'd)
s&*
I
The Chinese rejected the Indian attempt to insert
the watershed principle as the determining factor in
the case, They stated (note of 6 October) t h a t according
to both the map on which MclMahon had drawn his
l i n e originally in 1914 and the Indian o f f i c i a l map
of 1959, Dhola would be north of the Line.
declared that Indian border experts in 1960 had agreed
that the Line's western extremity was 27O 57' N -
9l0 40' E, placing Dhola w e l l north of the Line.
Indians, on the other hand, centered t h e i r case on the
the Line should in f a c t correspond w i t h the Bidge line,
and because the Chinese had come down across the Ridge,
it followed t h a t they had come down across the McMahon
Line simultaneously, They reminded Peiping (note of
10 October) t h a t the Indian border experts i n 1960 had
urged the Chinese experts to exchange maps "on a very
large scale" i n order to provide the f u l l e s t d e t a i l s
and that this proposal had been rejected by the Chinese,
who provided a map on the "diminutive scale of 1" = 80
miles," Peiping's reluctance to accept t h i s proposal,
the Indian note declared, indicated s a t i s f a c t i o n that
They also
The
' Thagla Ridge i n the t r i j u n c t i o n area. In their view,
the boundary "ran along the ridge." As the quarrel developed,
no fewer than three versions of the border
near the t r i j u n c t i o n were posited, two by the Chinese
(depicted i n People's Dailx, 8 &ad 11 October) and one
by the Indians (note of 10 October). Actually, Dhola
was north of the McMahon Line by a t l e a s t 400 yards as
x i m e d by the Chinese and it was only by using the
watershed p r i n c i p l e - t h a t is, the crest of the Thagla
Ridge as the natural boundary--that the Indians could
argue the matter credibly.
The Indian leaders, convinced that the Chinese
military force had crossed the Thagla Ridge to encircle
the advanced post at Dhola, decided that the Chinese
should be compelled t o pull back regardless of a l l
risks. Home Minister Shastri, acting head of the government
in the absence of the prime minister and the
finance minister, t o l d Ambassador Galbraith on 13 September
that the Chinese would have to be "thrown out."
He repeated t h i s statement publicly on 16 September,
On 17 September, Indian troops threatened to open fire
on Chinese troops at the Che Jao Bridge south of the
** ( continued)
and s t a t i o n themselves on the Chinese territory
south of the McMahon Line which is now under
India's forcible occupation?
-4-&-- I
Thagla Ridge near the post , 'and on 20 and 21 September,
they attacked the Chinese, apparently k i l l i n g one officer
a t the Bridge and surrounding a small detachment
i n the vicinity. The situation worsened as the Chinese
h i t back on the 22nd; the Indians attacked again on the
24th. Foreign Secretary Desai told Ambassador Galbraith
on 25 September t h a t troops under the Eastern Command
were now under orders to shoot when necessary; accordingly,
he continued, they have been shooting and the Chinese
have been "responding," leaving a handful of dead and
wounded on both sides. Firing subsided by 29 September,
when an MEA o f f i c i a l claimed the Chinese had been con+
pletely cleared from the Che Jao Bridge. By t h a t t i m e ,
however, Indian advocates of the policy of expulsion had
become dominant i n the leadership and Krishna Menon,
who had opposed the policy prior to his departure for
New York on 17 September, left wsith the premonition
that full-scale fighting would contribute to the cause
of those Indians who desired his p o l i t i c a l death.*
Nevertheless, he had no practical recourse but to join
other Indian leaders who were denouncing Chinese actions
openly
* Menon apparently was aware that he was approaching
a morass i n which his p o l i t i c a l prestige would stand
or f a l l on the a b i l i t y of Indian troops to beat Chinese
troops--a morass he had t r i e d for months to stay clear
of because he was convinced that a major Chinese assault
would in f a c t wipe out advanced Indian posts and, as a
p o l i t i c a l reverberation, destroy h i m as the "guilty defense
minister." Lakshmi Menon quoted him as saying in
a state of anguish in mid-September that "Now my enemies
w i l l attack me, but I cannot reply because Nehru was
personally responsible for a l l decisions regarding the
NEFA and had refused to concentrate as much force there
as in Ladakh." Such was his fury t h a t he h i t out even
at his old friend.
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Chinese preparations for major operations against
Indian posts apparently were stepped up, The first
hint of a general s h i f t in emphasis of military activity
from Ladakh to the NEFA appeared in mid-Septembera I
-= I9 r dHono tien
were s t a r t e d and continued on almost a daily basis.
Eight transports eventually were involved in this operat
i o n t h a t probably served to resupply forward elements
with certain c r i t i c a l items,
The Chinese continued to prepare the Tibetan popu-
Tibetans were
Deing tola b f r o m 17-23
September that Indian troops had unlawfully intruded
in Tibet a t many points and that they (the Chinese)
would recover them soon. 'Indian troops were said to
be no match for the Chinese army. The Indians also reported
on 24 September that a large number of vehicles
carrying stores and equipment continued to arrive a t
forward posts i n the western sector, but interpreted
these moves as indicating the Chinese were stocking
their posts "for the winter,"
I
Chinese warnings increasingly implied that they
would be compelled t o use force following the firefight
near Dhola i n early September, New Delhi was
warned that "shooting and even shelling are no child's
playj he who plays w i t h fire eventually w i l l be consumed
by fire" (note of 13 September) and "flames of
war may break out" at Dhola where "Chinese troops w i l l
necessarily defend themselves resolutelyrt (note of
21 September), To defend against Indian "nibbling of
Chinese t e r r i t o r y , " Chinese border forces were ordered
t o resume patrolling and set up new military posts in
the middle and eastern sectors (note of 21 September).
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The Dhola confrontation stimulated Indian army
leaders to press Nehru to approve an increase i n
strength and to bring pressure on the Chinese in
the eastern sector. A new special corps was estab-
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t o direct operations against the Chinese.
consideration ever since the early September incident-
Nehru and Menon on 6 October approved an army head-
Following
' creation of the special corps--a move under active
. .
The Chinese a t t h i s t i m e began to cite certain Indian
acts which later served as j u s t i f i c a t i o n for
attack. For example, for the first t i m e in several
years they declared that one of t h e i r officers had
been k i l l e d (note of 21 September).
nificant admission, as Peiping had avoided mentioning
that four Chinese soldiers had been k i l l e d in the
firefight i n the Chip Chap area earlier in September,
The Chinese also introduced the l i n e that the Chinese
people were burning with "great indignation" over
the Indian actions on the border and that New Delhi
"cannot now say that warning was not served i n advance"
(People's Daily, 22 September). Moving to
arouse a warlike a t t i t u d e among Tibetans and PLA
forces, Chinese authorities in Lhasa on 29 September
held a memorial service for t h e i r casualties--the
"five martyrs" of the Dhola fighting. The p o l i t i c a l
commissar for the Tibet Military Region, Tan Kuansan,
declared that fighting was continuing, the
s i t u a t i o n was worsening, and predicted that Tibetans
and a l l officers and men of the frontier guard units
" w i l l shed blood i n order to defend the sacred territory
of the motherland."
This was a sig-
* The army planned to make no o f f i c i a l admission of
t h i s as policy, and so f a r as possible, any crossing
by Indian troops of the Line was to be denied. The
Indian a i r force had already violated the Line a number
of times, and it was reportedly under orders t o
continue to do so when necessary.
I. , --;49-. ' I
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army's view, India was "now" committed to fight the
Chinese a l l the way even if t h i s meant full-scale
war.
officer on 6 October that a steadily mounting "squeeze"
was being applied by the Indian troops to the Chinese
at Dhola and emphasized t h a t the Chinese must be
ousted.* The immediate r e s u l t of this Indian i n i t i a -
t i v e was the 9-10 October d a s h near the Che Jao Bridge,
during which, the Chinese claimed, 33 Chinese and 6
Indian soldiers were killed-the biggest and bloodiest
clash on the Sino-Indian border as of that date. The
Chinese declared that another one of t h e i r "frontier
guards" was killed i n a renewed f i r e f i g h t i n the area
on 16 October.
Foreign Secretary Desai told an American embassy
I ,
Army officers continued to insisrt on a more forcef
u l policy.
cepted a proposal, long pushed by the Indian army, part
i c u l a r l y by Kaul, t h a t it should be o f f i c i a l government
policy to evict the Chinese from the Aksai Plain
as w e l l as the "A. Menon agreed to present this proposal
personally to Nehru on the 17th and, upon the
prime minister's approval, the Tndian army general s t a f f
would be permitted, he concluded, to formalize its
operational plan for the e n t i r e border,
agreed; he informed Ambassador Galbraith on the 18th
that the Indian intention to keep steady pressure on the
Chinese now extends to Ladakh.
estimated that two or three years would be required for
the army to implement fully this long-range operational
plan; the forward posts constituted only a beginning.
Nehru may w e l l have had Indian army officers as w e l l as
Parliamentarians in mind when he informed the Ambassador
of his discontent w i t h those who had described e f f o r t s
to avoid a r e a l war as appeasement, Nehru and Menon
apparently continued to refuse to permit the army to
Krishna Menon on 16 October f i n a l l y ac-
Nehru apparently
The army general s t a f f
* The Indians preferred to move the Chinese out w i t h
threats rather than force. The Director of the China
Section, MEA, told an American embassy officer on 11
October that the Indian leaders were trying to give
minimum publicity to developments while applying m i l i -
tary pressure in order to provide the Chinese with the
opportunity to withdraw "without loss of face." He deplored
press headlining of military developments, as
such publicity undercut t h i s government policy,
I
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use t a c t i c a l a i r support for ground operations because
they feared t h i s would provoke the counteruse
of Chinese a i r c r a f t and thus increase the tempo
of the fighting and extend its scope.* As l a t e as
19 October, j u s t before the Chinese attack, Indian
army headquarters is reliably reported t o have spposed
Menon's decision to tentatively pull army units
out of the Galwan Valley, complaining that the defense
minister was really motivated by a desire for appease
ment rather than by any military considerations.
The caution some Indian army officers and many Indian
civilian o f f i c i a l s had shown in spring and summer
1962 seemed to have fallen away by f a l l , In speaking
of moving against Chinese forces i n the Dhola area,
army and c i v i l i a n o f f i c i a l s i n October discounted the
.probabili$y of r e t a l i a t o r y action on any s i g n i f i c a n t
scale, For example, when, on 13 October, Foreign
Secretary Desai confirmed to Ambassador Galbraith the
army plan t o "evict the Chinese from the IVEFA," Desai
stated that he did not believe the Chinese would attempt
t o reinforce heavily their troops on the Thagla
Ridge in the face of "determined" Indian action, as
the Chinese had commitments elsewhere along the border.
Moreover, Desai continued, there would be no
extensive Chinese reaction because of t h e i r fear of
the US--"It is you they really fear," This increasing
confidence that the Chinese would continue t o play
the game of flanking and counter-flanking maneuvers
with r e l a t i v e l y small units apparently contributed
t o the reluctance of important Indian leaders t o take
seriously Chinese warnings of full-scale war.
Chinese Prepare for October 1962 Attack: Final Phase
\
In retrospect, the Chinese seem to have moved in
stages toward their October 1962 attack, the early
stages having been more of a defensive nature intended
*
t i c a l a i r against Chinese patrols in mountainous
t e r r a i n , where ridges and spines are 13,000 f e e t ,
would have confronted the Indians with considerable
d i f f i c u l t i e s . Even t h e i r a i r resupply e f f o r t was
proving to be a f a i l u r e , a s the loss figure for a i r
drops in the Dhola area was as high as 85 percent,
Even i f permission had been given, t h e use of tac-
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t o strengthen their border positions in the event
that early Indian move-ups developed into a major
Indian military operation.
The Chinese had been alert to Indian move-ups
in the spring of 1961 and had appraised Nehru's
28 November 1961 statement on establishing border
posts t o "recover" Indian t e r r i t o r y as clear evidence
that New Delhi had switched over to a new policy of
force. It was probably a t t h i s t i m e that the Chinese
leaders began to move actively to buttress t h e i r border
defenses, simultaneously warning New Delhi that its
policy was "extremely dangerous" and Chat Indian moves
in Ladakh could lead to Chinese moves across the McMahon
Line into the NEFA. .
Shortly a f t e r t h e i r diplomatic effort designed
to negotiate an overall border settlement i n early
1962 was frustrated by Indian demands for Chinese
withdrawals, they w e r e alerted to a new Indian i n i t i a -
t i v e in April 1962, when Indian troops began t o move
up between and even behind
This new Indian p o l i n e n c i r c l e m e n t and pressure
on the posts indicated t o the Chinese leaders the
military nature of a long-range basic Indian plan and
New Delhi's determination to use force. This new
policy apparently impelled the Chinese leaders not
only to intensify defensive preparatfons and increase
patrol a c t i v i t y (which had been reduced but never completely
halted), bat also to prepare step-by-step for
a military action to push the Indians back from their
new positions. As noted e a r l i e r in this paperf the
Chinese were deeply worried about t h e i r security i n
June, Based on personal contacts w i t h Chou En-lai
and Chen Y i , l
and the Indians to launch simultaneous military actions
against China "anytime" between June and mid-summer
However, assured in l a t e June that the Nationalists
would not attack, they turned t h e i r attention to
planning for a major clearing action against Indian
posts, By early July, they began to insert sharper
warnings into t h e i r notes and public statements.
certain Chinese posts.
I in l a t e June 1962 that
cinrnese le aaers expectea zm! Chinese Nationalists
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Preparations continued during the r e l a t i v e l u l l i n
AugustQ
s u l t i n g in dead and wounded soldiers on both sides
helped transform the matter of a p o l i t i c a l settlement
into a purely, hypothetical proposition,
establishment of a new special corps under Kaul i n
early October and the k i l l i n g of 33 Chinese soldiers
near the Che Jas Bridge a t Chih Tung on the 9th and
10th precipitated the f i n a l phase of Chinese prepara-
The f i r e f i g h t s a t Dhola i n September, re-
The
t i O M
On ZV October,
Bimuitaneous arc'EacKS were l a n the Ladakh and
NEFA areas.
The Chinese stepped up their effort to stimulate
anti-Indian a t t i t u d e s among Tibetans and a combat att
i t u d e among t h e i r troops, On 11 October, one day
a f t e r the most serious f i r e f i g h t i n the Dhola area
(specifically, near the Che Jao Bridge a t Chih Tung
where the Chinese suffered 33 casualties), an Indian
MEA official informed an American embassy officer
. .
...
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that he had j u s t received a telegram from the Indian
Consul General in Lhasa reporting a series of anti-
India demonstrations had taken place in front of the
Consulate. The telegram also indicated that a Tibetwide
campaign had been launched to a t t r i b u t e local
food shortages to Indian aggressiveness and that vigorous
anti-Indian propaganda had been carried out within
PLA forces in Tibet.
The f i n a l phase of Chinese preparations for the
attack was marked by a series of belligerent notes which
in effect warned of imminent r e t a l i a t i o n . '+Result- .
ing casualties
bear if Indian troops did not stop moving forward
near Dhola (note of 11 October) was typical, The
People's Daily e d i t o r i a l of 14 October was a t once a
c a l l t o a m to the Chinese and a f i n a l warning to
the Indians:
would be India's responsibility t o
So it seems that Mr. Nehru has made up his
mind to attack the Chinese f r o n t i e r guards
on an even bigger scale..,.It is high t i m e
t o shout to Bilr, Nehru that the heroic Chi?.
nese troops, with the glorious t r a d i t i o n of
r e s i s t i n g foreign aggression, can never be
cleared by anyone from their own t e r r i t o r y , . , ,
If there are still some maniacs who are reckless
enough t o ignore our well-intentioned
advice and insist on having another Try, w e l l ,
let them do SO.
inexorable verdict,
History w i l l pronounce its
A l l comrade commanders and fighters of the
PLA guarding the Sin-Indian border: heighten
your vigilance hundredfold, The Indian
troops may carry out a t any t i m e Nehru's instructions
t o ' g e t r i d of you,
w e l l prepared, Your sacred task now is t o defend
our t e r r i t o r y and be ever-ready t o deal
resolute counterblows at any invaders,.,,
A t t h i s c r i t i c a l moment...we still want to appeal
once more to Mr, Nehru: b e t t e r rein i n a t
the edge of the precipice and do not use the
You m u s t be
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l i v e s of Indian troops as stakes i n your
gamble
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The e d i t o r i a l confined itself to implying r e t a l i a t i o n
i n t h e east. That is, i n referring to t h e imminence
of an Indian t h r u s t , it referred only to a pending
"massive invasion of Chinese t e r r i t o r y by Indian
troops i n t h e eastern sector." This was deceptive, .
as the Chinese attack on t h e 20th was opened on t h e
western sector as w e l l , surprising Indian forces i n
t h e r e l a t i v e l y less active area.*
TQ sum up, indicators of an imminent Chinese
o f f ensive did not begin to appear u n t i l mid-October ,
when the Chinese apparently were already i n their
f i n a l phase of preparation. Earlier indicators
suggest-in retrospect-that preparations for an
attack probably began i n late June 1962. As for
* Indian plans were grossly distored i n Peiping's
note of 20 October: "The Chinese Government received
successive urgent reports from t h e Chinese
frontier guards on October 20th to t h e effect that
Indian troops had launched massive general attacks
against Chinese f r o n t i e r guards i n both Eastern
and Western sectors of t h e Sino-Indian border
simultaneously. '* Thus t h e Chinese seized upon
publi'c Indian statements indicating an action against
troops in t h e Dhola area and exaggerrated them to
mean the Indians were planning and had started a
general offensive.
The Chinese later had no d i f f i c u l t y i n compiling
a public record of Indian statements-the
most convincing kind of record-regarding India's
plans. for a general offensive by merely clipping and
collating Indian press reports of October and
twisting them into t h e context of a hypothetical twofront
Indian attack. Such a record was printed in
Current Events Handbook of 6 November 1962; Chen
told a Swedish correspondent oh 17 February
1963 that he could demonstrat e Indian aggressiveness
by "leafing through t h e Indian newspapers of May .
and June 1962." Chen was a t great pains to deny
that the "great advances*',made by PLA forces southward
a f t e r 20 October 1962 i n any way proved t h a t
the Chinese attack was more than a mere counterattack
against Indian action i n the localized Dhola
area, He tried to lend c r e d i b i l i t y to h i s lie by
conceding that of course China had "prepared *'--but
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Chinese threats and warnings, they had .been made
over such a long t i m e period (beginning i n November
1961) t h a t t h e i r impact was,diluted i n Western and
certainly i n Indian thinking. As a r e s u l t , i n t h e
crucial warning period from mid-September to mid-
October 1962, when the Chinese began to use stronger
language, t h e Indians viewed Peiping's threats as
more of t h e same.*
Reasons for t h e Chinese Attack of 20 October
The Chinese leaders seem to have been motivated
by one primary consideration and several
secondary ones i n t h e i r decision to attack Indian
forces. Their determination to r e t a i n the ground
on which t h e i r border forces stood i n 1962 apparently
was more important than a l l other considerations
and sufficient by itself to explain
t h e i r action. That is, it was necessar to attack
for only one primary reason, a1d oug esi rable
for several secondary reasons.
I The primary reason reflected t h e i r view t h a t
the Indian leaders had to be shown once and for a l l
t h a t China would not tolerate any strategy to "recover"
border t e r r i t o r y . I n c l e a r i n g away Indian
border posts and routing Indian troops in two key
sectors., the Chinese conducted what has been called
a "punitive" expedition to chastize the Indian
leaders for past and intended moveups. They tried
* New Delhi's note of 25 September alluded disparingly
t o the number of warnings and reasserted
India's determination not to be "deterred" by them
from moving against the Chinese. American officials
i n Hong Kong predicted i n mid-October t h a t t h e
loss of 33 soldiers near Dhola would compel the
Chinese to h i t back i n force. However, at t h e same
t i m e , on 13 October, Indian o f f i c i a l s were still
discounting to American officials i n New Delbi t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y of any extensive Chinese military reaction
to Indian operations i n the Dhola area.
. . -56-
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to weaken Indian capabilities and discourage Indian
hopes for future advances. They apparently were
convinced that only a radical deflation of New
Delhi's m i l i t a r y pretensions could establish an
Indian a t t i t u d e of forebearapce. Direct diplomatic
appeals and indirect political moves-such as
border agreements w i t h other neighbors-had failed
to induce such an attitude. The Indians had to
be taught a lesson, which meant simply t h a t they
must begin to recognize realistically t h e i r m i l i t a r y
i n f e r i o r i t y . Chen Y i is r e l i a b l y reported to have
told Hong Kong Communist newsmen on 6 October i n
Peiping t h a t border clashes would continue '*unt il
such t i m e as India comes to recognize t h e power of
China." A more vigorous statement of t h i s view
was made w e l l after t h e Chinese attack by Liu Shao-chi
during his discussion with the Swedish ambassador
in late February 1963. Liu, becoming highly incensed
as he began to discuss India, stated t h a t the attack
had taught India a lesson and t h a t for the future,
rehru and t h e Indians must be'taught t h a t they cannot
change the border s t a t u s quo by force.*
J
The aggressive Indian attitude reflected i n
October i n the army's forward border policy-which
culminated i n the 9-10 October firefight, leaving
33 Chinese dead--would i n itself have compelled the
Chinese leaders to h i t back even if an overall plan
had not been l a i d on earlier. Failure to deliver
a strong riposte after absorbing such a humiliating
defeat would have encouraged the Indian m i l i t a r y
planners to conduct s i m i l a r l y aggressive operations
at other border points. The c i v i l i a n leaders would
again boast of an Indian "victory" i n Parliament
to improve t h e government's domestic p o l i t i c a l
prestige. Beyond t h a t , a natural desire for retribution,
combined with r a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y and
political considerations, became an overarching
emotional factor impelling the Chinese leaders to
* Liu also told Colombo conference representat
i v e s i n early January 1963 t h a t t h e Chinese had to
show the Indians t h a t China was a great power and, ' for t h i s reason, had to "punish" India once.
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view a policy of restraint as t h e worst way to handle
t h e bombastic Indians. *
Among the secondary reasons for attacking, a
d e s i r e t o damage Nehru's prestige by exposing India's
weakness apparently ranked high i n t h e Chinese
leaders' order of p r i o r i t y . Nehru's prestige was
considerable i n Asia; it was being used by New Delhi
to compete with Peiping for influence among leaders
of the emerging nations. New Delhi's publicly
expressed contempt for the "great power" s t a t u s of
China and the disrespectful behavior of a m i l i t a r i l y
inferi,or power (India) was more intolerable to t h e
Chinese leaders than t h a t of a m i l i t a r i l y superior
power (thepus). Chen Y i ' s above mentioned remark
of 6 October reflects a degree of injured national
pride. Liu Shao-chi had included in h i s January 1963
dischssion with Colombo representatives the remark
that Vhina r e a l l y . cannot accept India ' 8 attitude"
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*
to the Chinese leaders not only i n reports from
t h e i r own intelligence sources, but also, i n a
more galling way, from the Indian press. Several
of these are cited here: on 5 October, Lt.
General Kaul was made a commander of a new special
corps to be used exclusively against Chinese
forces, and after obtaining authority from Nehru
t o *'take l i m i t e d offensive actionYfh*e f l e w to t h e
front to give personal direction t o military forces
moving north of Towang; on 9 October, the Indian
air force was said to be i n an emergency'condition
and prepared to operate i n the NEFA; on 12 October,
Nehru declared t h a t he had ordered the Indian army
to "clear Indian t e r r i t o r y i n the NEFA of Chinese
invaders" and personally m e t with Kaul, issuing
instructions to him; on 16 October, Nehru held
a long conference with Menon and other senior
military officers and ordered a l l arsenals t o s t e p
up production i n order t o cope with the "threat of
large-scale war; 'I on 17 October, after meeting w i t h
Nehru, Menon hurried t o the new special corps headquarters
t o hold emergency talks with Kaul; and on
18 October, defense ministry o f f i c i a l s declared that
the Chinese had t o be "driven back two m i l e s . "
Clear signs of' Indian bombast were available
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which he described as% feeling of superiority to
the Chinese. '' f -
The animus aroused among the Chinese leaders
, :
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by India's public boasts and-taunts had been building
up for several months prior to the 20 October
attack, making them emotionally keen to humiliate
t h e i r humiliators. Lin Shao-chi, Chou En-lai,
and Chen Y i have been reported on various occasions
after the attack to have made disparaging remarks
about t h e t r a i n i n g and a b i l i t y of Indian officers
and men to foreigners and t o Chinese cadres.* The
blow t h a t Chinese forces dealt Nehru's prestige
simultaneously increased t h a t of Mao's; i n August
1963, General Hsiao Hua publicly attributed PLA
success i n the attack t o the fact that Chinese
troops had been indoctrinated intensively in the
political aspects of t h e "thought of Ma0 Tse-tung."
*
R. Shaha, i n December 1962 h i s great contempt for
the Indian army, and especially for Indian generals.
He also stated t h a t the Chinese had released many
Indian prisoners because they didn't want to have
to feed them--a half-truth which concealed the
Chinese aim of soothing New Delhi's anxiety to
acquire outside m i l i t a r y aid. Chou repartedly told
a meeting i n Shanghai i n late January 1963 t h a t t h e
Indians were not even qualified t o be called
"beancurd" soldiers-ltdao's term--and recounted t h e
alleged occasion when.one Chinese platoon captured
two Indian battalions along with a l l t h e i r equipment.
Liu told the Swedish ambassador i n late
February t h a t Indian military leaders were not veyy
good and that even American arms did not really in=
crease t h e Indian m i l i t a r y capability. However, the
Chinese military attache i n New Delhi was r e l i a b l y
reported i n August t o have shown considerable concern
about t h e increase i n t h i s capability through
US aid,
Chen indicated to Nepal's Special Ambassador,
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Morale i n China, wbich had slipped to a low point
after several years of embarrassing economic setbacks,
was given a considerable boost, and doubts
about t h e f i g h t i n g elan of PLA officers and men
were largely dispelled , *
Another secondary reason was the Chinese leaders'
d e s i r e to expose as traitorous Xhrushchev's policy
of supporting Nehru, a bourgeois leader, against
them, a Communist leadership. The Chinese i n d i r e c t l y ,
and the Albanians op'enly, i n summer and fall 1962
had c r i t i c i z e d Khrushchev for supplying military
aid to India. The Albanians had pressed forward
along t h e l i n e t h a t t h e action of "N. Khrushchev
and his group" was a betrayal of the r i g h t s of a
%ocialist" country and was intended to advance
his narrow a i m s of rapprochement w i t h imperialism
and bourgeois governments ( Z e r i I Popullit, two-part
article, 19-20 September 19621, "hi s 'merely made
e x p l i c i t the euphemistic criticism the Chinese had
directed at Khrushchev e a r l i e r (People's Daily,
17 and 18 September). That t h e 20 Oct ober border
war did i n fact confront Khrushchev with an embarrassing
choice between supporting "socialist"
China and ttbourgeois-nationalisttt India is indicated
by Pravda's swing toward and later away f r o m Peiping's
pos3.tion--temporarily criticizing certain CPI members
and later acquiescing i n t h e i r Indian-nationalist
%
o f f i c i a l s i n Hang Kong on 3 April 1963 t h a t t h e
Chinese leaders were i n a very ?'priggishtt mood
ga1neQ th eir objectives of exposing Indian weakness
and abasing Nehru, Lin Shao-chi had told the
Swedish ambassador earlier t h a t after the clash,
great self-confidence had permeated the Chinese
forces. That there may have been doubts regarding
the will-to-fight of Chinese troops is suggested
by the curious l i n e Chen Y i took on 28 September
1962 i n a speech to Overseas Chinese i n Peiping.
Chen repeatedly made t h e point t h a t the PLA had
(in June), insisted t h a t "not a s i n g l e one" had
balked, and that China was not ttworriedT*a bout warshe
could endure it.
-
The B r i t i s h chargd i n Peiping told American
I because tney na *
4
been "ready" to f i g h t Nationalist forces earlier v
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stand-and by statements made privately by Soviet
diplomats. H i s anguish w a s very apparent.
The Chinese were able temporarily t o tarnish
MOSCOW~S image i n t h e eyes of Indian leaders,
Soviet s h i f t s on the matter of MIG-21 delivery to
India were so frequent, so opportunistic, and I
so obviously related to Sino-Soviet relations, and
Pravda was so equivocal i n its support of India- - t i m e it veered to the Chinese positiont
h a t sane Indian leaders gained t h e d i s t i n c t impression
from these evasions that India could not
look for any vigorous support from the Russians i n
the event of possible future Sino-Indian border
clashes, Moreover, the Indians did not take kindly
to Soviet suggestions t h a t they agree t o negotiate
with t h e Chinese immediately and t h a t they keep
the 20 October attack out of the UN lest Moscow
be compelled "to support China, **
However, if a secondary aim of the Chinese
had been to sour cmpletely and irrevocably Soviet-
Indian r e l a t i o n s , they failed fn their attempt.
Indian leaders are still indulgent of many Soviet
policies.
a traitor i n the eyes of foreign Communists, the
Chinese probably made the point stick only with
parties who were already i n t h e i r camp. The
Albanians d i r e c t l y , and the Koreans indirectly,
condemned Soviet aid t o t h e Indians as unllbarxist.
The Indonesrians provided them w i t h unique support,
PKI party boss A i d i t , acting i n t h e i r cause but
probably on h i s party's i n i t i a t i v e , cabled Khrushchev
in early November, saying
A s for t h e i r attempt t o -depict' Khrushchev as
I cannot r e s t r a i n the joy of a l l members of
the Indonesian Communist party and myself with
regard to your government's decision to cancel
the dispatch of MIG aircraft to India,
By imputing a decision to Khrushchev which he had not
made, Aidit may have been trying to sour Soviet-
Indian relations and create Communist pressure on
Khrushcbev to make such a decision. News of A i d i t ' s
cable fanned some anti-Soviet sentiment in India
but its effect on t h e Soviet leader may have been,
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contrary t o expectation, to drive him i n t o subsequent
reassurances to New Delhi t h a t MIGs would
I ' indeed be dispatched.
., . ' ,.. '
Chinese Calculations of Risk
attack apparently was, i n the Chinese leaders'
view, that no major risk should be involved; Thus
they made t h e i r first move--in July, against Indian
forces at Galwan--only after they had ,received
American assurances t h a m Chinese Nationalists
would not attack from Taiwan; t h i s relieved them
of worry about a two-front'war. When they made
t h e i r f i n a l move--on 20 October--they apparently
believed t h a t (1) they could win against Indian
forces w i t h the advantage of surprise and number8
and (2) the Indians would f i g h t alone. They were
right on both points.
The necessary condition for the 20 October
'
However, they apparently did not anticipate
t h a t the Indians would fold so quickly.* Further,
they apparently had not estimated t h a t t h e Indians
would turn to the US and UK for military aid; they
were obviously taken aback by t h e sharpness of
t h i s turn,
"only t h e US imperialists would benefit from it
E h e clash7"
meir c o z e r n that t h e US might decide t o wintervenew
and wenlarge" the fighting during the second
Following t h e success of t h e i r major
t assault of 20 October, they soon recognized that
(People's Daily editorial, 8 November).
* Sihanouk t old a Western j o u r n a l i s t i n late
A p r i l 1963 that Chon En-la2 i n the course of a - - _ - - I long, wearisome briefing (on 10 February) had
stated t h a t the Chinese leaders were "surprised"
at t h e feeble resistance of t h e Indian army and
its quick retreat, According t o Sihanouk, Chou
said that before t h e Chinese realized ' S t , t h e i r
troops were "inside India" w i t h an embarrassingly
successful "counterattack!' on t h e i r hands ,. Chou
apparently was referring only to t h e 20 October
attack, as t h e second Chinese thrust-a deep
ripose t o Indian probes in mid-November-had been
gushed more than 100 miles "ins_i-d e India."
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assault--in mid-November-was reflected i n Chou
En-lai *s letter to Sekou Toure of 13 November.
Further, the US supply mission i n India may have
been seen by the Chinese as t h e first US move to
"poke i n its pand and develop t h e present unfortunate
border confli,& i n t o a war..." (Chinese government
statement, 21 November). This consideration
was probably decisive in shaping the Chinese decision
to announce a u n i l a t e r a l PLA withdrawal.
They seem to have believed that only such a drastic
move--backward--on t h e ground would alleviate the
anxiety driving t h e Indians toward acquiring US
arms hind establishing a US supply mission.
An e f f o r t had been made earlier to dispel t h e
impression t h a t China desired general war or largescale
fighting. Within one week of the 20 October
attack, a Bank of China official, who had been .
briefed on t h e attack In Canton i n late October,
stated that three points were t o be stressed In
Hong Kong Communist newspapers regarding the nature
of t h e border fighting:
1.
2.
3.
On no account was the border fighting to be
described as "war. '' In discussions, only
such words as "conflict, fighting, and
dispute" indicating a localized engagement
were to be used;
Mew Delhi. should be depicted as the
aggressor, accused of attempting to spread
its influence i n t o Tibet and Sinkiang; and
New Delhi's charges should be refuted by
saying that India does not need more
modern arms and equipment. This should
be demonstrated by no.tl%ng t h a t the arms
captured by the "frontier guards" were
not a l l out of date and that the Chinese
had not used heavy weapons. Further,
thk Indians i n i t i a l l y committed an enormous
number of troops to the fighting--"30,000" I
by Chinese estimates.
'
The t h i r d point i n part suggests a Chinese fear that
the Indians, i n turning to the US and UK, would begin
a crash program to moilernize Indian divisions
and mold them i n t o a force capable of eventually
s t r i k i n g back effectively at t h e PLA. Chon En-lai
and Chen Y i plied Malcom HacDonald on 29 October
i n Peiping with t h e l i n e t h a t the "conflict" was
really a localized affair and that a major "war"
between China and India was inconceivable.* They
handled the c r u c i a l matter of B r i t i s h arms w i t h
considerable delicacy: they professed t o "understand"
f u l l y British support for India as a fellow
member of the Commonwealth and, although regretting
British action in supplying arms, they '*understand*
and "do not intend to protest." They both stressed
t h e i r desire that Nehru negotiate, apparently
with the intention of spurring MacDonald to use
h i s influence w i t h the Indian prime minister.
But the PLA had i n f l i c t e d such a degrading defeat
on Indian forces t h a t lqehru was more than
ever before unable to consider negotiations as a
real course because such a course would have been
viewed as surrender after t h e battle. Nehru later
told Senator Mansfield that apart from h i s own
convictions, he could not stay i n office one week
if he negotiated w i t h t h e Chfnese.
was not restored by Peiping's 21 November announcement
of a u n i l a t e r a l Chinese withdrawal. Yet t h e
His prestige
Chinese leaders continued to insist-apparently
minimizing t h e pressures at work on Nehru-on a
"quick positive response" as though they believed
* A s t r i k i n g instance of Chinese downplaying
of the border fighting appeared in Peiping newspapers
after t h e 20 October attack. The Sino-
Indian clash was largely eclipsed by the Cuban developments.
Reports indicated t h a t t h i s disparate
treatment of t h e t w o situations was carried over
into a l l mainland propaganda.
Chinese students who had enthusiastically
urged reikforcement t o PLA border troops during the
fighting were cautioned by party cadres that t h e
Chinese leadership desired disengagement and a
peaceful solution.
For example,(
I - I m I I
it might be forthcoming from the prime minister.
If they believed, even for a short period, t h a t
Nehru would talk because he knew now that he could
not fight, they were radically wrong.* Their
military attack had precisely the effect of ensuring
that he would be forever t h e i r political enemy.
The Chinese military attack, therefore, opened
them to a p o l i t i c a l risk, Their apparent calculat
i o n on t h i s matter was to deny that it was a risk
i n the sense t h a t something would be lost. The
Indians were i n t h e i r view no longer amenable to
political manipulation, and as relations had de=
teriorated d r a s t i c a l l y by summer 1962, there was
nothing left i n the Sin-Indian p o l i f i c a l relation=
ship worth preserving. That is, they apparently b e
lieved that nothing existed to risk. The Chou-
Nehru relationship was dead; Mao's struggle-andunity
formula had become a l l struggle.
The Chinese leaders probably made a similar
calculation regarding the political risk of
damaging Sino-Soviet relations. There simply was
nothing left t o risk i n the relationship with
Khrushchev. Khrushchev for several years had been
exaggerating the seriousness of Sino-Indian border
clashes and using the situation hypocritically--by
.. .
* The Chinese professed a desire for talks to
start on a low level. Thus Chou, in h i s letter
to Nehru of 4 November 1962,' stated! "China and
India can quickly designate o f f i c i a l s to negotiate
matters relating to the disengagement. . . .When
these negotiations have yielded r e s u l t s and the
r e s u l t s have been acted on, the prime ministers
of the t w o countries can then hold talks."
After several months, they fell back into
a more realistic public appraisal of NehrzLds
a t t i t u d e , declaring that they could twqlso wait
a t i e n t l '* for ne otiations. That is, they took
to further suggestions of a p o l i t i c a l settlement.
the posizion open I y t h a t Nehru would not respond
. .
h .
imputing unwillingness on.the Chinese side to
negotiate-against them i n t h e world Communist
movement. The Chinese were prepared to attack t h e
Indians regardless of t h e political sniping t h e i r
m i l i t a r y attack would evoke f r o m Khrushchev.
fact, they now had an issue--betrayal of a "socialist"
country during w a r t i m e - t o use against him,
therefore, i n t h e f i n a l phase of t h e i r preparations,
the Chinese leaders were offered a pledge of support
from Khrushchev, they viewed it with considerable
suspicion. They saw it as at the most helpful i n
i s o l a t i n g Mehru but not essential to their planned
operation. Soviet support was not necessary, as
t h e Chinese had acted on t h e border without it i n
July and September 1962.
'
In
When,
That it was not solicited is suggested by the
unwillingness of the Chinese leaders t o reciprocate
and provide Khrushchev with the support he desperately '
desired during the Cuban crisis.
I acted throughout the overlapping periods of t h e i r
military attack and Khrushchev's showdown with the
US on the assumption t h a t they owed the hostile
Soviet leader nothing by way of support and would
not give him any support u n t i l , o r unless, he
unequivocally repudiated h i s past policy by openly
and f u l l y supporting t h e Chinese position i n t h e
border conflict .
The Chinese leaders
The following evidence suggests that t h e Chinese
desired Khrushchev *s complete capitulation and
would not accept minor concessions:
1. As the Cuban m i s s i l e crisis developed, t h e
Soviet leader decided t o offer t h e Chinese a
degree of support on the Sino-Indian border dispute
i n exchange for f u l l Chinese support of his Cuban
*venture. Khrushchev received Ambassador Liu Hsiao
on 15 October, after having snubbed him for m o r e
than a month.* (The Chinese version established
* KhrUShcheV'S flersonal snubs were deliberate.
Thus early i n September, Liu Hsiao had been received
by Kozlov rather than Khrushchev for his
farewell interview. However,. Khrushchev was reported
by British o f f i c i a l s to have found time to
receive not only t h e r e t i r i n g West German ambassador
but an American official and an American poet, a
Saudi Arabian, and, after h i s return t o Moscow from
h i s . Black Sea r e s o r t , the Austrian Vice Chancellor.
(Liu left in late September to attend the CCP's 10th
plenum b a Nogqw f o r the (cont'd)
II -nn- II
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13 October as the first Khrnshchev-Liu meeting,)
On the 16th, when Khrushchev entertained him at
a state banquet, Chinese diplomats were reported
as saying that the Russians would shortly "drop
t h e i r facade of neutralitytt on t h e Sino-Indian
dispute, That Khrushchev had suggested he would
change his position is also indicated by t h e
published Chinese version (People ' s Daily, 1 November
1963). According t o the Chi nese:
On 13 and 14 October 1962, Ehmshehev told
the Chinese ambassador the following: Their
information on Indian preparations to attack
China was similar t o China's, If they were
in China's position, they would have taken
t h e same measures. A neutral a t t i t u d e on the
Sino-Indian boundary question was impossible.
If anyone attacked China and they fihe Soviet-s7
said they were neutral, it would bZ an act
of betrayal,
Liu apparently had briefed the Soviet leader on
t h e 10 October firefight a t the Che Jao Bridge and
on Indian plans t o push forward i n ' t h e Dhola area.
He probably indieated the Chinese leaders' decision
to h i t back i f necessary. This briefing seems t o
have provided Khrushchev w i t h ' t h e opportunity to
offer his support and request Mao's in return. He
a l m o s t certainly informed Ambassador Liu Hsiao somet
i m e between 13 and 16 October of h i s Cuban missile
venture and seems to have requested t h a t he ask
Ma0 to forget t h e pastn
I
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In the autumn of last year, before the departure
from Moscow of the former ambassador on the
Chinese People's Republic i n the Soviet Union,
Comrade Liu Hsiao, members of the Presidium
of the CPSU central committee had a long
talk with him.
the members of the Presidium once again displayed
i n i t i a t i v e i n %he matter of strengthening
Chinese-Soviet friendship, Comrade N. s,
Khrushchev asked Comrade Liu Hsiao to forward
During t.hi.s conversation,
o er celebration. )
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to Comrade Ma0 Tse-tung our proposal: '%o
put aside a l l disputes and differences, not to
t r y to establish who is r i g h t and who is wrong,
not to rake up the past, but to start our relations
with a clear page." But we have not
even received an answer t o t h i s sincere c a l l .
(CPSU "open letter, '' Pravda, 13 July 1963)
Mao's refusal to respond was probably based on h i s
calculation that Khrushchev was i n real trouble and
was expediently maneuvering to buy him of2 by offering
support for China's border policy.
2. Mao's price was high. He apparently felt
that Khrnshchev should m a k e a clearcut public state- I ment , criticizing Nehrn's border policy. A t the
very least, Khrushchev should direct his top aides
and Pravda's editors t o make such a statement as
a token of Soviet sincerity. Ma0 seems to have
planned to continue attacking Khrushchev*s moves,
treating the Soviet leader's personal bid w i t h contempt,
u n t i l such t i m e as t h i s reversal of Soviet
policy was forthcoming.
report the effusive references to Sino-Soviet
friendship on the occasion of Khrushchev's meetings
with Liu Hsiao. People's Daily reported only the
fact t h a t Liu had been received at banquets given
by various Soviet leaders. -It avoided a l l mention
of Soviet press t r i b u t e s , which had included the
The Chinese press did -not
statement ehat Lints series of "warm, sincere" conversations
with top Soviet officials ended on 23
October with "a comradely discussionEt with Milcoyan.
(Liu left Moscow on 24 October.) On the contrary,
People's Daily and other Chinese newspapers maintained
a continuous anti-Soviet drumfire not only
immediately after the Khrushchev-Liu meetings, but
even after Pravda on 25 Octobbr took the Chinese
po$ition o n m n o t o r i 6 u s t 1 McBdahon Line, Sino-Indian
t a l k s , and certain "chauvinist CPI members . People's Dasly reprinted t h i s Pravda peace offering
on the 26th b ut did not use L t m n y follow-up
commentary. When, therefore, on t h X 7 t h ' P e o p l e ' s
Daily %xglained" Nehru's &+China policy as
-ally a matter._of h i s class position, Rhrnshchev
was implicitly attacked for "shielding and
supportingt1 Nehru and for trying to play "a pacifging
role in r e l a t i o n t o China."
attempt at conciliation was rejected w e l l before
he backed down on Cuba.
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Khrushchev's
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A l l the Soviet leader gained from h i s u n i l a t e r a l
concessions had been to sour temporarily h i s relation-
&Pp with Nehru and to suffer a diplomatic defeat at
the hands of h i s formal a l l y , Wao Tse-tung. For his
part, the Chinese leader gained an admislsion from
the,CPSU (Pravda editorial of 25 October) that he had
been r i g h t n e matter of the Mcbhhon Line and
on h i s insistence on no preconditions for talks,
Only after the Soviet leader began (CPSU %pen
letter" of 13 July 1963) publicly t o attack the
Chinese for their display of "narrow nationalism"'
i n the Sino-Indian dispute was he able to drive
home effectively a olitical point against h i s Chi-
The Soviet charge, made along the l i n e s of CPI
nese adversary on ti ek orr e-r issue,
leader Dange's article (New Age, 21 April 1963, supplement),
that the C h i n e m c k k d begause of t h e
opporthnity provided them by the Cuban missile
crisis, is declamatory history. The Chinese attack
would have been made even if there had been no
Cuban crisis (and even if there had been no Sino-
Soviet dispute). The border dispute had a momentun
of its own. The important h i s t o r i c a l fact is that
both China and the USSR had been engaged i n an
increasingly bitter argument at a time when they
both, independently, decided months earlier to go
on the offensive against non-Communist countries,
Further, neither of these a l l i e s gave the other
more than restrained support at a t i m e when each
sought all-out support--a commentary on t h e state
of the Sino-Soviet alliance i n f a l l 1962.
The Prospect
The Sino-Indian dispute probably w i l l remain
unsettled for many years, primarily because the
Indians w i l l continue to i n s i s t that the Chinese
withdraw from the Aksai Plain. The Chinese w i l l
not withdraw.
r e t a i n t h e ground t h e i r troops stand on and the road
t h e i r troops defend between Sinkiang and Tibet,
The decisive implication of Liu Shao-chi's statement
to R. R, Nehrm i n July 1961 is t h a t China has
as much right to r e t a i n the Plain occupied since
1956 as India has t o t h e NEFA occupied since 1951.
Even i n t h e best case-that is, a complete Indian
withdrawal from the =FA-Liu implied that China
would only "considertt a pullback from the Plain,
They have made i-t clear t h a t they w i l l
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! '
The Chinese are left with only a hope that a
future Indian leadership w i l l decide to negotiate
rather than fight.
China would not i n i t i a t e an .attack €n.the future.
Peiping has indicated t h a t
However, Chinese concern t h a t the Indians w ' i l l ' be
emboldened to t r y again is reflected in their
decision to insert a t h i t d party--i.e., t h e Colombo
powers--into the border dispute t o impede a new
Indian border venture. * The miserably beaten
Indians may t r y again eventual1 when t h e i r forces
and s p i r i t s have been d d . Alt hough t h e
Chinese attack i n f a l l 1962 deflated Indian military
pretensions, it so intensely humiliated the Indian
leaders and so v i t a l l y affronted t h e pride of the
nation that t h e deep desire for ultimate vindication--
that is, to fight with new weapons and more troops,
and win--.may w e l l prevail over the m o r e sober calculation
that the safest way out of the deadlock
is, a p o l i t i c a l settlement on Chinese terms,
3
t h e Indians was indicated by the following passage i n
People's Daily of 13 October 1963: "Should the
Indian Government, under the instigation of the US
imperialists and modern r e v i s i o n i s t s , pin blind
faith on the use of force and deliberately rekindle
border conflicts, t h e Chinese Government
would first of a l l inform the Colombo conference
countries of t h i s s i t u a t i o n , requesting them to put
a stop to it. The s i t u a t i o n today is very different
from that of a year ago." Chou En-lai had stated
e a r l i e r (on 11 October to Beuters correspondents)
that the Colombo powers can "play the role 6f dissuading
India,,.sbouId India create tension on the
border again."
to point out to the Indian leaders t h a t four' area$
are sensitive, that is, are closed to Inaian farces.
They have implicitly warned that any e f f o r t to
establish an Indian milit-ariy presence in any of
the four would meet with PLA counteraction. They
have also implicitly warned that should checkposts
again be set up anywhere else at t h e l i n e of actual
control, or on the Chinese s i d e of it, they would
inform the Colombo powers and r e t a i n t h e option t o
wipe them out. (See attached map)
The Chi nese decision to apply a r e s t r a i n t on
The Chinese have also taken t h e precaution
I
. .
. .
'.. .
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The Indians have been clearcut and unequivocal
i n s t a t i n g t h a t they w i l l not accept Chinese terms,
When Chou En-lai sought to demonstrate to Nehru
(and to various neutral leaders) t h a t t h e Chinese
would return t o their positions and had not attacked
i n order to seize t e r r i t o r y (letter to Nehru of-
4 November 1962),* the Indian prime minister responded
s a r c a s t i c a l l y that Chou was merely making
a "magnanimous ofeer of retaining the gains of
the earlier fi957-19607 aggression" (letter to
Chou of 14 Svember).- This was, Nehru concluded
.,.an assumption of the attitude of a victor,
/%%e demand for India to accept t h e Chinese
lf9SS line7 is a demand to which India w i l l
never s u . i t whatever the consequences and
however long and hard the struggle may be.
Nehru had not been deterred from h i s rejection of
the Chinese version of t h e l i n e by Chou's trifling
concession made on a map sent t o heads of state
(appended to Chou's 15 November letter)** The
Indian position was stated prfvately by the MEA
China Division Director, Menon, to an American
embassy officer on 31 December 1962,
asserted t h a t although it was not necessary that
Menon
* To use Chou's words: 'The fact that the
Chinese Government's proposal has taken as its
basis the ,1959 l i n e of actual control and not
the present l i n e of actual control between the
armed forces of the t w o sides is f u l l proof t h a t
the Chinese side has not'.tried to force any
u n i l a t e r a l demand on the Indian side on account
of the advances gained in the recent counterattacks
i n self-defense," '
** Chou sent various neutral heads of state t h e
map published i n the People's Daily on 8 November,
depiciting the new, proposed Chi nese base l i n e
(1962) and t h e old Chinese claim l i n e (1959), The
two lines coincided qcept at .five points, at -
each of which the 1962 base l i n e deviated ,eastward
and northeastward!; making, small encxaves
into Chinese t e r r i t o r y . The Chinese position
allows for t h e move of Indian troops roughly to
t h e vicinity of t h i s base l i n e but not into four
sensitive areas.
-7a-
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India be permitted to re-establish every post lost
since 8 September, nevertheless, f o r the sake of the
principle of not sanctioning acquisition of t e r r i t o r y
seized through military means, India ttmustw re-establ
i s h its presence in t e r r i t o r y lost durihg the
attacks of October and November .
A p o l i t i c a l settlement, which could not be
negotiated when Sino-Indian relations were still to
some degree friendly, w i l 1 be even less likely now
that relations are completely antagonistic.
deadlock w i l l remain, aiid it seems probable that
border clashes w i l l recur at some future t i m e when
t h e Indians regain their confidence.
The
.. I .
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APPENDIX
SINO-PAKISTANI BORDER NEGOTIATIONS: 1960-1963
, .
. ....
, . .
Combined w i t h their effort to demonstrate that
Nehru had gone over to the American camp, the Chinese
t r i e d to pressure and embarrass the Indians by
approaching the Pakistanis in 1960 for negotiations
on their common border in the northern area of .
Kashmir.
This overture required a degree of opportunistic
maneuvering by 'the Chinese, who had been maintaining
that they were more Leninist and.ideological1y purer
than the Russian leaders, They began to move toward
the Pakistanis despite the fact that the Communist
actionary regime, ? member of the "imperialist m i l i -
tayy bloc," and led by a strong-man who had none of
the s o c i a l i s t pretensions of certain neutr.alist
leaders. .The Chinese had beenowarning other Commun
i s t s to reject cooperation w i t h a l l , b u m y
s o c i a l i s t leaders or a t l e a s t t r u l y neutral'neutrals.
President Ahyub was neither, nor could he reasonably
be depicted(as a member of the ahti-imperialist
''national bourgeoisie." Y e t Peiping began in 1960
to seek a major accord with Pakistan.
. movement had held Pakistan t o be an obviously re-
Unlike the Russians, the Cfiinese evGr since
1950 had kept open an avenue of approach t o the
Pakistanis on the Kashmir issue. The Chinese positiorl
had been t o equivocate, which meant refusal to
recognize Indian sovereignty over the area, For
example, Chou En-lai took an equivocal public position
on Kashmir when pressed on the matter during
a news conference in Earachi on 24 December 1956,
Chou said he had not the matt'er and suggested
that India and Pakistan settle it by negotiations'outside
the UN. This position'was significantly
different from Moscow*S, as the Russians had recognized
the j u r i d i c a l accession of Kashmir to India,
Privately, the Chinese had indicated considerable
concern that Pakistani-held Kashmir might be converted
i n t o a missile base, and their ambassador in
Karachi, Keng Piao, had inforped the Swedish ambassador
in mid-April 1957. that Peiping preferred that
the "status quo" in Kashmir be maintained. During
the border experts talks with the Indians in 1960,
the Chinese experts consistently refused to discuss
the segment of boundary west of the Karakoram Pass,,
as such action would have implied Chinese'recognition
of Indian ownership of that segment pf t e r r i t o r y ,
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For their part, the Pakistanis saw the value of
CENT0 and SEAT0 decrease as the US began to show a
willingness to tolerate 1ndia's.nonalignment policy
and a s + t h e US refused t o make these alliances into
defense arrangements against the threat from India.
The Pakistanis in l a t e 1960 turned more and more
away from a close relatioriship w i t h the US and toward
a new, improvedcrelationship w i t h the Chinese
and the Russians. Increased Amerikan and B r i t i s h
m i l i t a r y aid t o India deeply troubled the Pakistanis
and further impelled them into a rapproachement wkth
the Chinese, who were l a t e r willing to hint that
China would provide Pakistan wiqh protection in the
event of an attack from India. Thus, as China in
1959-60 became the enemy of India, and the US gradually
became India's best friend, the Pakistanis .
looked to a closer p o l i t i c a l relationship w i t h the
Chinese against a common enemy.*
The Chinese did not turn d i r e c t l y toward the
Pakistanis u n t i l the complete collapse of Sino-Indian
negotiations i n December 1960. They began to move
from a position of holding in abeyance a border
settlement w i t h Pakistan to one.of active overtures
for high-level negotiations.
t o Pakistan reportedly suggested in December 1960 that
talks be started over the Hunza area and such other
regions along'the border as Pakistan might wish to
discuss. By January 1961, the Pakistani foreign
minister indicated that a "preliminary" boundary
agreement was being discussed w i t h the Chinese.
Chinese procedural plan seemed to be similar t o the
one they had used with success in handling the Bur-
'mese and Nepalese, e.g. a step-by-step advance, beginning
w i t h an accord **in principle" recognizing
the need to negotiate a definitive boundary, the formation
of a j o i n t committee to discuss the d e t a i l s
of surveys and demarcation on the ground, and the
drafting of a formal border treaty.
The Chinese ambassador
The
* The Director of Pakistan's Ministry of External
'Affairs, Mohammed Yunis, told an American o f f i c i a l
' i n Karachi on 4 February 1962 that regarding his
government's policy toward-Peiping, the principle
of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" applies.
-2-
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. .
.. .
The Chinese maneuver was not l o s t on the 'Indian
leaders. They reportedly protested to Peiping in
January 1961, i n s i s t i n g t h a t India was sovereign over
a l l of Kashmir and that Pakistan therefore had no
common frontier with Chin'a. Fore-ign Secretary Dutt
t o l d the American ambassador i n New Delhi on 24
January that the Shno-Pakistani agreement "in principle?'
$0 negotiate the boundary demarcation made
Peiping's policy very clear: "to i s o l a t e India and
cast heit in an intransigent role," Dutt speculated
that t o accomplish t h i s the Chinese might even concede'
a l l the Pakistani claims involving some 6,900
square m i l e s of territory--a guess which depicted
the,Chinese leaders as being more generous than they
actually proved to be, but captured the s p i r i t of
the Chinese attitude. Dutt reflected Indian concern
by pointing t o other signs of Chinese efforts to
isolate India: China's nonaggression pact w i t h
Afghanistan, continuing approaches to Nepal,
near-complet ion of the Sino-Nepalese boundary treaty, *
the Sino-Burmese boundary treaty and Chou En-lai's
early January elaborate v i s i t t o Rangoon, and Chinese
o f f i c i a l statements suggesting China would regard
J
* The Sino-Nepalese boundary treaty (which used the
"traditional boundary" and s p l i t the difference on
ownership ofi M t . Everest) was signed in Peiping on
4 October 1961 shortLy a f t e r Liu Shao-chi implicitly
criticized the Indians by'praising Nepal for having
resisted "foreign aggression and pressure." This
treaty, and the accords on Chinese economic assistance
as w e l l as on a Chinese-constructed road from Tibet
to Katmandu; represented a major diplomatic defeat
for New Delhi and opened the door for the spread of
Chinese influence, The Chinese have tried to keep
t h i s door open through f l a t t e r y of Nepalese o f f i c i a l s
and assurances of support against Indian pressure,
The B r i t i s h High Commissioner in New Delhi reported
to his government on 16 February3962 that the predominating
position in Nepal which the British bequeathed
t o India in 1947 should have, provided India
w i t h a strong bastion. But New Delhi's "neglect and
disdain" of Nepal, followed by attempts a t interference
and l a t e r still by indiscreet speeches and
support for refugee p o l i t i c i a n s had given the. Chinese
an opening which they had been quick t o exploit.
He saw no prospect for the development of relations
of r e a l confidence w i t h the Mahendra regime.
(Cont 'd)
-3-
I I I
. a.
. .
Bhutan and Sikkim l i k e any other independent South
Asian countries. Ambassador Bunker felt that Dutt's
i n i t i a t i v e i n broaching the matter was in the nature
of "an unexpressed hope" that the US would discourage
the Pakistanis from any rapprochement with either
the Chinese or the Russians.
After moving rapidly in late 1960 and early
1961 t o gain an i n i t i a l agreement i n principle to
negotiate the Sino-Pakistani border matter, the
Chinese leaders, having attained the agreement,
were compelled to mark t i m e . They exchanged notes
thereafter on occasion w i t h the Pakistanis, who
had begun to drag t h e i r feet, but were unable t o
bring them to "preliminary talks" u n t i l March 1962,
when the Indians were preparing to outflank Chinese
posts.
substantive negotiations soon a f t e r the October 1962
attack on Indian positions, Chou En-lai was reported
to have invited Foreign Minister Mohammad A l i t o
Peiping i n l a t e November, and on 26 December, Karachi
announced that complete agreement in principle had
been reached w i t h Peiping on the "alignment" of their
common border. The announcement of this agreement
on alignment, intended by the Pakistanis to put pressure
on the Indians to reach.an agreement on Kashmir
a t a t i m e when the Indfan negotiating team was arriving
in Karachi for talks on the disputed area, also
served the Chinese purpose of convincing the Ceylonese
prime minister (then on.her way as Colombo Power
courier to Peiping) that the Chinese were willing to
reach f r o n t i e r accommodations. To t h i s end, the Chinese
also had announeed t h e i r border accord with
Mongolia in Decembero Beyond t h i s , the Chinese apparently
calculated that t h e i r agreement with the
Pakistanis on an area claimed by India would s t i f f e n
The Chinese pressed Karachi for full-scale
. * (continued)
Chinese exploitation of the Indian- policy f a i l u r e
in Nepal included a *orma1 charge t h a t India had engaged
i n ''great nation chauvinism." In its note
to India of 31 May 1962, Peiping cited a New Delhi
statement that the border runs from the t r i j u n c t i o n
of the boundaries of India, China and Afghanistan to
. the India, Burma, China t r i j n n c t i o n in the east, and
then asked: "Pray, what kind of assertion is that?
*,.Nepal no longer e x i s t s , Sikkim no longer exists,
and Bhutan no longer exists. This is out-and-out
great power chauvinism, '* -4-
I I
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' I
i
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i
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, -
I I
Nehru's resistance t o making any concessions t o Pakistan,
thereby exacerbating already strained India-
Pakistan relations.
The Chinese in January 1963 temporarily dragged
t h e i r f e e t in talks with Pakistan, hoping for talks
with the Indians on the basis of the Colombo Proposals.
Failing to gain Indian responsiveness, they
resumed their move toward Pakistan. The Chinese
formally concluded the border agreement with Pakistan
on 2 March 1963, announcing simultaneously that border
negotiations with Afghanistan would soon begin,"
They stressed the speed and ease w i t h which the f i n a l
agreement on the border alignment had been reached,
leaving a j o i n t commission to survey the China-Pakistan
border for demarcation and to erect p i l l a r s , Chinese
anxiety to furnish new "proof" that India was the rec
a l c i t r a n t s i d e in the Sino-Indian dispute provided
the Pakistanis w i t h an opportunity to achieve a favorable
border settlement,, The Chinese apparently did
not attempt t o persuade the Pakistanis to give up
any t e r r i t o r y they already controlled and even conceded
several hundred miles of valley grazing land
on the Chinese side of the watershed. Although a
major Chinese motive was to increase India-Pakistan
"contradictions," the Chinese were careful to deny
t h i s publicly i n a Peo le s Daily e d i t o r i a l on 4 March.
The e d i t o r i a l state&emat the Chinese wanted
t o be f a i r about the matter: China takes the position
of %on-intervention and impartiality toward both
sides." A f t e r the Kashmir dispute was settled, it
went on, either of the disputants would have the right
"to reopen negotiations with the Chinese Government
on the boundary treaty to replace the agreementon Privately,
however, the Chinese t r i e d to j u s t i f y their
moves i n the direction of a "reactionary" Pakistan
as indeed an attempt mrely to s p l i t them from the
Indians. An o f f i c i a l of the Chinese Communist Bank
of China i n Hong Kong defensively asked the bank s t a f f
on 7 September 1963 a rbetorical question: "Would it
be good if Pakistan and India had joined together to
... ,.
* When, on 22 November 1963, the Chinese signed the
boundary treaty with the Afghans, politburo member
Peng Chen implicitly underscored New Delhi's recalcitrance
by noting that four countries on China's south
and southwestern borders had adopted an a t t i t u d e of
"active cooperation"--Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, and
Afghanis tan.
-5-
I I 1
I I
fight us?" He went on to "explain" the Sino-Pakistani
a i r flights agreement as tased on the consideration
of isolating the Indians.
.
The Russians moved to expose the hypocrisy of
Chinese pretensions to be pure and principled Commun
i s t s . The Chinese reportedly took the l i n e with Moscow
t h a t talks with Karachi were a "first stegm towards
leading Pakistan out of the Western alliance. * But
following the outbreak of open polemics in mid-July
1963, the Russians bore down hard i n public statements
on Chinese opportunism not only i n connection w i t h
Peiping's support of the anti-Communist Iraqi Bathists,
but also regarding the Chinese e f f o r t toward Pakistan.
The Russians ignored Indian intransigence and emphasized
Chinese deals w i t h "reactionaries" a t the expense
of neutrals. Pointing to the n a t i o n a l i s t i c motivation
* - of the Chinese leaders, an 8 September MQSCOW broadcast
noted that the Chinese understand very w e l l that
Pakistan is a member of the "aggressive CENT0 and SEATO
pacts. ''
ment attacking Chinese opposition to the p a r t i a l test
ban treaty also contained a caustic remark about Peiping's
actions:
Moscow's 21-22 September 1963 government statei
...
* Chou En-lai was also defensive on the matter of
China's move toward a pro-Western regime. Chou conceded
in an interview on 31 March t h a t there is a
"certain contradiction" between Pakidtan's si ning
a border agreement w i t h China and its m e m b e h n
SEATO, but, in doing so, he cleverly placed the onus
on the Pakistanis for departing from principle and
international alignment.
** In a conversation w i t h an American o f f i c i a l on
15 June 1962, the MEA China Division Director, S.
Sinha, stated he had information t h a t t h i s had been
Peiping's position i n justifying the move to Moscow.
-6-
I
Such an a t t i t u d e to a n e u t r a l i s t country /.i.e.,
India7 is a l l the more unclear in view of-the
fact-that the Chinese Government had in every
way been making overtures to the obviously reactionary
regimes in Asia and Africa, including
the countries belonging t o imperialist m i l i -
tary blocs ,,
On the day t h i s statement was published, Soviet A e r o -
f l o t representatives were scheduled to arrive in
Karachi to negotiate landing rights i n Pakistan; an
air l i n k agreement was signed in October.
-7-
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i
SINO-INDIAN BORDER
Chinese Claim ' Lines' of 1956 and 1960 in the Western Sector
__ i
me**** .Chinere I956 claim line (offirme
by Premier Chw En-Loi in
Decembar I959 am He correcr
boundory claimed by Chino)
I-- Chinese cloim line of 1960
* Points to which lndlon patrols
hod been going up to 1958
New Delhi, December 1962
ne
d T
N A
3
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