Foriegn forces advanced to preparing ground against Pakistan, with support of their effective media compaign, and the present senerios (as shown in the news of The Obsever-Uk, posted hereunder) demanding serious attentions from nation ;civil societies, Media and Governament rankers/decision makers to realize the situation which is going worst and beyond the control, make-up minds and confidance of whole nation, draw brillient policies on realistic bases, to confront present border's situation to avoid any serious conflicts harmful for Pakistan in any case.
We have to ultimately break the trapes knitting by foriegn elements, against Pakistan. God Bless us,
Long Live Pakistan
Chris Ames: Nuclear scare stories | Comment is free | guardian.co.uk
Recent reports that blueprints for an advanced nuclear weapon could have been sold to "some of the most treacherous regimes in the world" are pretty frightening. But is there less to the story than meets the eye? It seems the only thing really new is the suggestion that the designs are for a bomb small enough to suit Iran's requirements - so is the story more about politics than proliferation?
The New York Times and Washington Post published a draft report by former UN weapons inspector David Albright, which said the bomb plans were found on the computers of the Swiss family Tinner, associates of "disgraced" nuclear trader AQ Khan. The next day Albright published his report, which apparently includes information from his former colleagues at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
It's not clear who leaked the story, which as a result became sexier. But the New York Times had spoken to US intelligence officials, who said off the record that they didn't know whether, let's say, Iran had acquired the designs. Certainly the idea that plans for a bomb could be circulated so easily made an impact. One British MP told me it was "frightening" while James Forsyth on the Spectator's Coffee house blog said: "It really is just a matter of time before terrorists get their hands on a bomb."
But the basic story has been around for a while. For example, last May the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) published a dossier on Khan's network. IISS director-general John Chipman said:
"Bomb designs were apparently digitalised and copied on to computer disks at one of Khan's offices in Dubai. One of the Swiss members of the network admitted to having atomic bomb construction plans in his own office. Swiss and American authorities, as well as the IAEA, have been trying to discover what other use may have been made of these bomb designs, including the alarming scenario of whether any copies were sold to terrorist groups."
Last month, the Guardian reported that "nuclear bomb blueprints and manuals on how to manufacture weapons-grade uranium for warheads are feared to be circulating on the international black market".
What is new about this week's story is Albright's claim that the designs were for a smaller bomb that "would have been ideal for … Iran and North Korea". In particular, it could fit Iran's ballistic missiles. Iran is back in the nuclear frame, in spite of the publication last year of the US National Intelligence Estimate, reporting "high confidence" that it had halted its nuclear weapon programme in 2003.
The Washington Post said that "weapons experts have long puzzled over whether Tehran might have previously acquired a weapons design from the Khan network", which had sold it uranium enrichment technology. Iran is reported to be struggling to enrich uranium (and produce plutonium) and experts have suggested that it might be able to resume weapons development in the future and produce a bomb relatively quickly.
On the Arms Control Wonk blog James Acton doubts whether there is much new in the story and suggests that "mounting a warhead on a missile is surely only a modest strategic advantage compared to obtaining the bomb in the first place". A deterrent is a deterrent: "The prospect of military action against Iran will evaporate if it ever gets the bomb."
On the same site, Jeffrey Lewis agrees that the new design would be helpful to Iran but doubts whether simply receiving a design is enough to get you to a weaponisable device.
Weapons and proliferation experts I have spoken to are also unfazed by the revelations. Dr Brian Jones, a former defence intelligence WMD specialist, told me it would obviously have been more difficult for the nuclear smuggling network to sell enrichment technology or capability without a bomb or warhead design. "The critical question is, of course, whether the designs referred to would work and even if they were viable, whether the recipients could make them work (on a missile)."
Jones said he would be suspicious that the disclosure might be politically motivated: it puts pressure on the new Pakistani government to keep Khan under control and perhaps helps the US case regarding Iran's nuclear programme because Iran has the relevant or similar missiles.
Certainly, the revelations follow reports that Khan might be released from the house arrest he has been under since 2004. Albright says Khan should be interrogated about the plans. This seems reasonable but Pakistan has refused on the grounds that he knows too much about its own bomb. It says the Khan case is closed. Meanwhile, the US is said to be warning Pakistan not to release him. Khan, who has been speaking to the media quite a lot lately, has denied the claims and alleged that Albright's study is funded by the CIA.
No one is saying it's not a problem if designs for advanced nuclear weapons can be copied and passed around the world. It is indeed a worrying possibility. It's just that it isn't always clear what is behind claims that certain countries are closer to getting the bomb than we thought – and journalists don't always ask. There has been a tendency in the past to sex-up these claims and "military action" has been the result.