The Afghanistan mess

[batmannow]

The Afghanistan mess /analysis

Daily Times.com
Tuesday, January 27, 2009
Rasul Bakhsh Rais

Foreign benefactors and friends are a poor substitute for indigenous political and social forces in mediating conflict between old and new power elites and rival ethnic groups. Reviving the internal social and political energies of Afghanistan is crucial to preventing a return to chaos and civil disorder

US Vice President Joe Biden has provided a frank assessment of the situation in Afghanistan, terming it a ‘real mess’. This mess is a collection of the troubled legacies and foreign policy failures during the Bush years.

The challenges facing the United States today are too many, too complex, and distributed in too many difficult regions of the world. Every new American leader promises change, but how much of a departure he can make from well-beaten tracks is subject to circumstances and the evolving policy consensus.

Will the Obama administration address Afghanistan, Pakistan and the security issues along the Pak-Afghan border differently from how the Bush administration handled them?

There is much excitement around the world that Barack Obama will handle the foreign affairs of the United States very differently from his predecessor. Maybe, maybe not. Much will depend on issues related to the dynamics of the regions involved, the nature of threats and the interests of allies.

A lot of the optimism surrounding Obama stems from the fact that American prestige and standing in the world suffered immensely under George Bush, and the new administration has stated its aim to reclaim the ideals and values of America that have been lost in the frenzy of the war on terror. However, there is a big question mark on whether the damage done to the United States and to the world can be repaired quickly, or by a single administration.

Afghanistan is one of those places where we are not going to see much change. And if there is any, it is going to be greater focus on the country. But essential elements of state- and nation-building strategy will remain.

There has been remarkable consensus within the American policy and political establishment on going after the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11. Obama, even with the message of hope and change on many issues, is going to persist with the war in Afghanistan. He has the same strategic concerns, and may therefore retain essentially the same elements of strategy. The change may be in the provision of greater resources, economic as well as military. The announced ‘surge’ of forces in Afghanistan rests on the same operational assumption that more forces will help eliminate the Taliban threat to the central regime in Kabul.

While injecting more troops and money into Afghanistan, the Obama administration may do two things that have not been tried so far. First, hold the Kabul regime more responsible for its failures than it has been in the past; it is quite possible that the new administration may ditch President Hamid Karzai and bring in somebody with a greater support base or better ability to manage the country.

The second important change may be in regional diplomacy, particularly in managing tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The appointment of Richard Holbrooke is a good sign for better coordination between the two countries and the decision-makers back in the US.

Will the US be able to bring peace and normalcy to Afghanistan, where the security situation has ‘deteriorated a great deal’?

Not by military means alone. Peace and stability efforts in Afghanistan must involve non-military elements, including national reconciliation through dialogue and power-sharing.

The challenge for Afghan leaders and the international community, who are both trying to rebuild the country, is achieving peace, stability and normalcy in a society that has experienced one of the most devastating and prolonged conflicts of our time. They are trying to reconstruct the country’s political institutions, structures of governance, vital state institutions, infrastructure and the rural economy. This reconstruction model has a focus on effective statehood, something that has eluded Afghanistan. This is also the vision that a silent majority of Afghans, tired of the vicious cycle of violence, would like to pursue.

But this cannot be done without international assistance. There is a realisation among Afghan leaders and ordinary Afghans that they need foreign assistance to overcome their myriad difficulties, notably the stubborn legacies of conflict — warlords, drug mafias and remnants of the Taliban. There cannot be any two opinions about peace and stability being the fundamental requirements for reconstruction. Conversely, progress on the reconstruction of infrastructure and state institutions will have credible, demonstrative effects on the population and will wean them off the warlords and the Taliban.

One of the major obstacles in the way of reconstruction has been and continues to be the Taliban insurgency in Pashtun majority areas. Taliban attacks on NATO, US and Afghan security forces, and the counter-insurgency operations against the Taliban, have delayed the rehabilitation of the population and the revival of normal life.

A negative result of the growing conflict is the diminishing trust between ISAF and the local communities because of the collateral damage suffered by civilians. Winning the support of the population through reconstruction and security programmes remains as important as ever. Coalition forces face enormous odds in delivering these programmes in what is essentially a state of lawlessness in the Pashtun regions. The resurgence of the Taliban has slowed the pace of reconstruction somewhat, but the movement has not acquired the capacity to reverse the process and change political dynamics in its favour.

Military action and counter-insurgency operations in situations like that of Afghanistan are essential, but have to be linked with peace-building, negotiations and conflict resolution through a shared vision for society and the integration of the interests of various stakeholders. The international community can play a constructive role in bringing together different factions in Afghanistan, including moderate Taliban elements and former Mujahideen leaders, to the negotiating table. A political solution to the conflict, aimed at reconstituting broad and legitimate power arrangements would be credible only if it gathers the support of all important groups in Afghanistan.

However, if the main actors impose solutions from above, the involvement of foreign powers, no matter how well meaning it may appear, may complicate the task of restructuring national consensus in Afghanistan.

Foreign benefactors and friends are a poor substitute for indigenous political and social forces in mediating conflict between old and new power elites and rival ethnic groups. Reviving the internal social and political energies of Afghanistan is crucial to preventing a return to chaos and civil disorder, which could wipe off the gains made so far.

The Obama administration must act differently by focusing on national reconciliation within Afghanistan instead of using force against one particular ethnic or social group to the benefit of its rivals.

Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais is author of Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2008) and a professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of Management Sciences. He can be reached at rasul@lums.edu.pk