ANALYSIS: Dealing with Afghanistan —Najmuddin A Shaikh

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ANALYSIS: Dealing with Afghanistan —Najmuddin A Shaikh

We should use whatever means we have to promote the return of the reconcilable Taliban to the mainstream of Afghan life, obviating the need for such a large security force

Writing on a Thursday morning less than 24 hours after Secretary Clinton arrived in Pakistan on what was seen as a high level effort on the part of the Obama administration to convince sceptical Pakistanis about the sincerity of the American effort to forge a durable people-to-people relationship, I would normally have focused on what she has been able to achieve in this direction. That however will have to wait until the visit is over and until every media genius in our country has had an opportunity to prove that, even more than the general public, our media is distrustful of the Americans, knows little about the history of US-Pak relations, and even less about the US legislative process and about the reporting requirements imposed (sometimes in connivance with and sometimes in opposition) upon the administration by Congress in virtually every foreign policy initiative for which funding was needed. That hopefully can be the focus along with the results of the Clinton visit of next week’s article.

Today, however, the issue of concern is the situation in Afghanistan, how it is likely to evolve, how it will impinge on Pakistan’s security and how it will play into Pakistan’s perception of the regional security situation. Two important developments are awaited: the successful conducting under tighter UN control of the runoff election on November 7 for the Presidency of Afghanistan; and the announcement by Obama of his strategy for Afghanistan and specifically about his response to Gen McChrystal’s request for additional troops.

Former Vice President Cheney has accused Obama of “dithering” on this issue while others have supported him for taking his time to make a decision particularly given the uncertain political situation. The latest media reports however indicate that Obama will announce his decision sometimes between the November 7, when the runoff presidential election will be held, and November 11, when he is due to leave for Tokyo. Whether these dates hold or not, it is clear that the announcement cannot be long delayed.

Let me be rash enough to try and predict the election outcome and what the Obama strategy will be. First President Karzai will be re-elected perhaps with the lowest turnout in Afghanistan’s brief electoral history, but he will get enough votes in the North to set at rest concerns about the election creating an ethnic divide. His foreign advisers and mentors will make it clear to him that in his next term there will have to be a greater focus on eliminating corruption, limiting the influence of the warlords and decentralisation, meaning the devolving of meaningful powers to the newly elected provincial councils with whom donors could work on development and on effecting needed improvements in the social sector infrastructure.

NATO forces in turn will have to commit themselves to not depending on (bribing) local warlords to maintain peace in their areas of responsibility and to do everything possible to avoid collateral damage while combating the Taliban threat. This is not going to be easy but it will mean that, at least to start with, Karzai will only have ministers with relatively clean reputations and will curb the excesses of people like his brother Ahmad Wali Karzai in Kandahar.

Second, Obama will announce a strategy along the following lines:

n Disrupting, dismantling and destroying the Al Qaeda network was the US goal and in Afghanistan this meant the disrupting of the Taliban, Haqqani and Hekmatyar networks because in one way or another they supported Al Qaeda and would readily provide sanctuary to it in areas of Afghanistan where they could exercise durable control;

n Full endorsement of the policy of making the protection of the Afghan population the first priority for American troops. This will mean keeping most of the forces in the urban areas while abandoning most of the remote posts in the rural areas. This will also mean minimising the use of air power for the protection function and reducing its use in offensive operations against the Taliban when chances of civilian casualties are high;

n Increase development funds from the current $2.7 billion to $4.8 billion as requested by McChrystal. Meet in full the requirements of civilian experts which would mean adding another 300 or more to the 900 odd that are currently being processed and ensuring that these experts are for the most part those who can generate more agricultural and infrastructure development activity through using local contractors;

n Provide McChrystal an additional 15,000 to 20,000 troops in place of the maximum of 40,000 he had asked for and stipulate that most if not all of these troops be such as could perform the dual function of fighting the Taliban and providing training to the Afghan National Army;

n Emphasise that the strategy was designed to facilitate a withdrawal of US and NATO forces and that the training and equipping of greatly enlarged Afghan security forces to take over security responsibilities was a key element;

n Endorsing the recommendation that the strength of the Afghan National Army be raised to 240,000 and that of the Afghan National Police to 160,000. Committing to the provision of $7-8 billion annually for the next three four years for this training and committing a further $5-6 billion annually over the next five to six years for meeting the recurring expenses of this force. (An effort will be made to get other countries to pick up the tab — Japan for the Police, and the EU for the army, but the US would have to be ready to pick up the slack.); and

n Providing funding to a special team under McChrystal which will seek to wean the foot soldiers and junior commanders of the Taliban back into the mainstream by outright bribery or by offering relatively well paid make-work jobs. This too will be a well-funded operation to which US allies will be expected to contribute.

If this is the strategy that is announced, and with minor variations this is what it is bound to be, then Pakistan should be worrying about its implications.

First, if an army of this size is built up in Afghanistan, it will need for the foreseeable future foreign funding to keep itself afloat since it will be many decades before the Afghan economy can support such an enormous force. Afghanistan will therefore be under foreign influence for some time. Even if we regard American influence as benign, it is very likely that in a few years America will lose interest and then the job of funding may well be taken up by other regional powers.

Second, if the enlargement of the army takes place while the Pashtun areas remain disturbed by the Taliban, much of the recruitment will be done in Tajik and Uzbek areas. This has the potential of creating a backlash in the Pashtun areas since traditionally the army officers and men have been a Pashtun preserve. It is also evident that such an army will be regarded as occupiers as much as NATO forces when they move into Pashtun areas. The subsequent unrest will have an impact on our tribal areas and in the Pashtun belt along our border with Afghanistan in Balochistan.

Three, once an army of this size comes into being it will not be easily demobilised. It will have to justify its existence and for that it must pursue a nationalist cause such as for instance “Pashtunistan”. Would this not then bring about the dreaded “two front” situation that we were trying to avoid by seeking “strategic depth” in Afghanistan?

These are the things that we should be discussing both among ourselves and with NATO. We should be arguing that while an expansion of the Afghan fore is an inescapable necessity, it should (i) be ethnically balanced; (ii) be kept at a number that the Afghan economy can reasonably be expected to support in five or at most ten years time; and (iii) be such as would never become dependent on regional powers for its funding, training or equipment requirements.

On our part we should use whatever means we have to promote the return of the reconcilable Taliban to the mainstream of Afghan life, obviating the need for such a large security force.

Perhaps those media pundits who are genuinely concerned about potential threats to Pakistan’s security should initiate knowledgeable discussions on this and on what can be done about it.

The writer is a former foreign secretary