Md Akmal
SENIOR MEMBER
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- Sep 22, 2010
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Md. Harun-ur-Rashid
@ US had been giving huge quantities of military aid to South Asian sub-continent, particularly to Pakistan of which Bangladesh was part until 1971. Bangladesh did not receive any military aid from the USA. Bangladesh like any other independent country, wanted to build its defense capability, but the policy makers in Washington seemed not to attach importance to Bangladeshs request for defense equipment as USA did not perceive any serious threat to Bangladeshs
national security. Thomas Stern an official of the State Departments Political and Military Affairs Division, informed to the Senate Arms control and Security Arrangements Committee that the US does not desire an arms supply relationship with Bangladesh We would, however, be prepared to consider export license request for cash sales on a commercial basis of limited type of military equipment such as transport and communication items. Consequently, Bangladesh could procure items for its defense.
@ For this purpose, the US government also provided some modest grants. In 1983 Bangladesh received a remittance of $ 400,000 from the US services Headquarters for buying these items and this was the general background of the US Bangladesh defense relations. US interest in Bangladesh was not strategic, but it was Washingtons interest not to allow this new country, so close to the Indian Ocean, where US had vital strategic interests, to be totally under either the Soviet sphere of influence of that of China. For the same reason, Washington wanted a stable Bangladesh, as any power vacuum in Bangladesh created by political and economic chaos resulting in upsetting the status quo was not in its interest. The defense relations between Bangladesh and the United States Strengthen during the time of Gulf war when 2300 member of Bangladesh army contingent served with coalition forces. With the invitation of US Bangladeshi troops participated in the multinational effort to restore democracy to Haiti.
@ Now two countries militaries have shared a warm and mutually beneficial relationship. There are joint military exercises between the two countries. The US military personnel expressed the view that the exercise will strengthen the bridge of friendship between the two countries. National Security of Bangladesh National security refers to the protection of core values, while the
definition of core value is complex, at least three are vital in any conception of security; territorial integrity or unity; foreign policy autonomy or independence; and the maintenance of national power.
@ National in turn is a summation of at least three components: military power, economic development and internal order. National unity and independence in other words depend on national power, which in turn rests on military, economic and political strength. The relationship of
these values is of course dialectical: a sense of unity and independence are the bases for national powers as much as the other way round.For Bangladesh, poverty, malnutrition, increasing unemployment and underemployment, rising external debt and dependence on outside help were the issues that threatened its national security. Md. Nuruzzaman rightly put these questions when he asks what does security mean for Bangladesh? What are the source of her insecurity
and how menacing they are? To what extent do the prevailing sources of threats undermine her security? What strategies both in internal and external contexts, should Bangladesh follow to preserve and strengthen her national security?
India factor
@ Indias size, military, Industrial, scientific and nuclear capabilities have caused a fear psychosis among smaller countries of the region. New Delhi plead that India has never been a predatory state in the part nor had been an expansionist power to dominate others. This assertion or assessment on the part of India is not being shared by other South Asian nation. Then what should India do? How a climate of trust can be generated? How can smaller nations take it for granted that Indias motivations and its politico military resources would not be directed against them? India has fashioned three kinds of responses, by which it tries to reduce the insecurity of the small states and there incentive to turn to non-regional powers.The first response has been to forge bilateral agreements with the smaller states, agreements that give India a role in their external security and obviate the need for non-regional protectors.
@ Thus, India has treaty arrangements with Bhutan, Bangladesh and Nepal. As things stand, Bhutan treaty is stable, the Bangladesh treaty seems unlikely to be renewed, and the Nepal treaty is under pressure but may well subsist. In any case, though, India will be deeply implicated if there is a serious external threat to either Bangladesh or Nepal-anboth countries recognize this. New Delhi has tacit droit de regard, and while neither country will say so publicly this is altogether unacceptable to Dhaka and Kathmandu. A second response to the insecurity of the small states has been New Delhis insistence that, in the event of internal instabilities, which require military and other forms of assistance, India should be consulted and used as a first resort. Commentators in South Asia have called this the India doctrine. Finally, India has reacted to the unease of its small neighbors by fostering regionalism. New Delhi hopes that regional concave will reassure the smaller states with respect to Indias motives and actions. SAARC is the example of this strategy, but Indias attempts to bring South Asian nations into regional arrangements have a longer history, dating back to the Asian Relations Conference of March 1947.
@ The combination of regional strategies has worked since the mid 1970s, outside powers including China have made it clear that they see India as the regional hub and that they are not interested in propping up these states against New Delhi. Obviously, Pakistan remains the exception, although even here both Washingtons and Beijings politics have been much more naunced since about 1976. As regards Bangladesh, India has certain problems to sort them out in an amicable manner. Problematic issues like the Farakka barrage, New Moor island, Tin Bigha corridor and the recent one the raising of barbed wires along the border have caused irritants in bilateral relations of India and Bangladesh.Bangladeshs policy towards Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. In the early years of independence, Bangladesh supported Indian Ocean as a zone of peace because of two reasons. First, since Indo-Bangladesh relations then were raised to the level of a special relationship sealed by a twenty five-year friendship treaty. India was not considered a threat to Bangladeshs security and therefore Indian naval ambition and its effects on Bangladeshs maritime interests were not factors in Bangladeshs security calculations. Bangladeshs interests with regard to the Indian Ocean coincided with that of India. Second, the then government saw Bangladeshs independence war as a struggle against economic and political exploitation which was equated with western imperialism, it was therefore, natural for the government to take a position against the western military presence in the Indian Ocean.
@ This policy however, changed with the fall of Mujib government, which also brought about a reversal of Indian attitude towards Bangladesh. Perception of India in Bangladesh radically changed from that of a benefactor to that of powerful adversary whose interests are at considerable variance with those of Bangladesh. Since then, enthusiasms for converting the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. Pragmatism dictates that Bangladesh should be wary of Indian naval ambition. The significant enhancement of Indias naval capabilities since 1971 is but a prelude to increased naval projection over a vaster area that are likely to manifest in the coming decade.
@ With the dispute over maritime boundary still to be settled, which will affect Bangladeshs
share of the oceans and its resources, Bangladesh cannot afford to be complacent about Indias growing naval might and its readiness to force an issue if need be. Under this changed circumstance, presence of the navies of the major power can and does serve as a check on the ambitions of the regional navies, and this can only be to Bangladeshs interest. By the
same token, the conversion of Diego Garcia to an American naval base is a necessary deterrent to regional naval ambitions and provides at least psychological security to countries like Singapore, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia among
many others. Thus Bangladesh should carefully weigh its interests in the context of regional realities and adopt policies regarding the Indian Ocean and the law of the Seas accordingly.
@ US had been giving huge quantities of military aid to South Asian sub-continent, particularly to Pakistan of which Bangladesh was part until 1971. Bangladesh did not receive any military aid from the USA. Bangladesh like any other independent country, wanted to build its defense capability, but the policy makers in Washington seemed not to attach importance to Bangladeshs request for defense equipment as USA did not perceive any serious threat to Bangladeshs
national security. Thomas Stern an official of the State Departments Political and Military Affairs Division, informed to the Senate Arms control and Security Arrangements Committee that the US does not desire an arms supply relationship with Bangladesh We would, however, be prepared to consider export license request for cash sales on a commercial basis of limited type of military equipment such as transport and communication items. Consequently, Bangladesh could procure items for its defense.
@ For this purpose, the US government also provided some modest grants. In 1983 Bangladesh received a remittance of $ 400,000 from the US services Headquarters for buying these items and this was the general background of the US Bangladesh defense relations. US interest in Bangladesh was not strategic, but it was Washingtons interest not to allow this new country, so close to the Indian Ocean, where US had vital strategic interests, to be totally under either the Soviet sphere of influence of that of China. For the same reason, Washington wanted a stable Bangladesh, as any power vacuum in Bangladesh created by political and economic chaos resulting in upsetting the status quo was not in its interest. The defense relations between Bangladesh and the United States Strengthen during the time of Gulf war when 2300 member of Bangladesh army contingent served with coalition forces. With the invitation of US Bangladeshi troops participated in the multinational effort to restore democracy to Haiti.
@ Now two countries militaries have shared a warm and mutually beneficial relationship. There are joint military exercises between the two countries. The US military personnel expressed the view that the exercise will strengthen the bridge of friendship between the two countries. National Security of Bangladesh National security refers to the protection of core values, while the
definition of core value is complex, at least three are vital in any conception of security; territorial integrity or unity; foreign policy autonomy or independence; and the maintenance of national power.
@ National in turn is a summation of at least three components: military power, economic development and internal order. National unity and independence in other words depend on national power, which in turn rests on military, economic and political strength. The relationship of
these values is of course dialectical: a sense of unity and independence are the bases for national powers as much as the other way round.For Bangladesh, poverty, malnutrition, increasing unemployment and underemployment, rising external debt and dependence on outside help were the issues that threatened its national security. Md. Nuruzzaman rightly put these questions when he asks what does security mean for Bangladesh? What are the source of her insecurity
and how menacing they are? To what extent do the prevailing sources of threats undermine her security? What strategies both in internal and external contexts, should Bangladesh follow to preserve and strengthen her national security?
India factor
@ Indias size, military, Industrial, scientific and nuclear capabilities have caused a fear psychosis among smaller countries of the region. New Delhi plead that India has never been a predatory state in the part nor had been an expansionist power to dominate others. This assertion or assessment on the part of India is not being shared by other South Asian nation. Then what should India do? How a climate of trust can be generated? How can smaller nations take it for granted that Indias motivations and its politico military resources would not be directed against them? India has fashioned three kinds of responses, by which it tries to reduce the insecurity of the small states and there incentive to turn to non-regional powers.The first response has been to forge bilateral agreements with the smaller states, agreements that give India a role in their external security and obviate the need for non-regional protectors.
@ Thus, India has treaty arrangements with Bhutan, Bangladesh and Nepal. As things stand, Bhutan treaty is stable, the Bangladesh treaty seems unlikely to be renewed, and the Nepal treaty is under pressure but may well subsist. In any case, though, India will be deeply implicated if there is a serious external threat to either Bangladesh or Nepal-anboth countries recognize this. New Delhi has tacit droit de regard, and while neither country will say so publicly this is altogether unacceptable to Dhaka and Kathmandu. A second response to the insecurity of the small states has been New Delhis insistence that, in the event of internal instabilities, which require military and other forms of assistance, India should be consulted and used as a first resort. Commentators in South Asia have called this the India doctrine. Finally, India has reacted to the unease of its small neighbors by fostering regionalism. New Delhi hopes that regional concave will reassure the smaller states with respect to Indias motives and actions. SAARC is the example of this strategy, but Indias attempts to bring South Asian nations into regional arrangements have a longer history, dating back to the Asian Relations Conference of March 1947.
@ The combination of regional strategies has worked since the mid 1970s, outside powers including China have made it clear that they see India as the regional hub and that they are not interested in propping up these states against New Delhi. Obviously, Pakistan remains the exception, although even here both Washingtons and Beijings politics have been much more naunced since about 1976. As regards Bangladesh, India has certain problems to sort them out in an amicable manner. Problematic issues like the Farakka barrage, New Moor island, Tin Bigha corridor and the recent one the raising of barbed wires along the border have caused irritants in bilateral relations of India and Bangladesh.Bangladeshs policy towards Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. In the early years of independence, Bangladesh supported Indian Ocean as a zone of peace because of two reasons. First, since Indo-Bangladesh relations then were raised to the level of a special relationship sealed by a twenty five-year friendship treaty. India was not considered a threat to Bangladeshs security and therefore Indian naval ambition and its effects on Bangladeshs maritime interests were not factors in Bangladeshs security calculations. Bangladeshs interests with regard to the Indian Ocean coincided with that of India. Second, the then government saw Bangladeshs independence war as a struggle against economic and political exploitation which was equated with western imperialism, it was therefore, natural for the government to take a position against the western military presence in the Indian Ocean.
@ This policy however, changed with the fall of Mujib government, which also brought about a reversal of Indian attitude towards Bangladesh. Perception of India in Bangladesh radically changed from that of a benefactor to that of powerful adversary whose interests are at considerable variance with those of Bangladesh. Since then, enthusiasms for converting the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. Pragmatism dictates that Bangladesh should be wary of Indian naval ambition. The significant enhancement of Indias naval capabilities since 1971 is but a prelude to increased naval projection over a vaster area that are likely to manifest in the coming decade.
@ With the dispute over maritime boundary still to be settled, which will affect Bangladeshs
share of the oceans and its resources, Bangladesh cannot afford to be complacent about Indias growing naval might and its readiness to force an issue if need be. Under this changed circumstance, presence of the navies of the major power can and does serve as a check on the ambitions of the regional navies, and this can only be to Bangladeshs interest. By the
same token, the conversion of Diego Garcia to an American naval base is a necessary deterrent to regional naval ambitions and provides at least psychological security to countries like Singapore, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia among
many others. Thus Bangladesh should carefully weigh its interests in the context of regional realities and adopt policies regarding the Indian Ocean and the law of the Seas accordingly.