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INSIGHT: Stay tuned: theres more to come! Ejaz Haider
For the purpose of forming a coalition, both parties have agreed to throw the issue of the judges, amendments to the constitution and the fate of Mr Musharraf before the next parliament. This is a smart move
As Pakistan moves towards government formation, the two opposition parties that have picked up nearly 60 percent of both the National Assembly seats and the total vote cast for the House have decided to join hands. Is this an unexpected combination?
It depends on how one approaches the issue. There are two broad perspectives: ideology and reality. Consider.
Ideologically, the League (all incarnations) has traditionally been centrist with a tendency to lean right-of-centre and the PPP left-of-centre. That being so, there is more affinity between the PMLN and the ousted PMLQ than between the PPP and the PMLN or PMLQ.
The PMLQ was born from the rib of PMLN; one of the reasons it was hard pressed to support General (retd) Pervez Musharrafs liberal policies was because of its ideological moorings. Mr Musharraf got his political support from the PPP on the issue of the Womens Protection Bill (WPB) because the PPP was closer to his position than Mr Musharrafs own allies.
The PMLN did not have a sizeable presence in the previous assembly but its approach during those days to issues of liberal legislation placed it much closer to the PMLQ and, yes, the MMA than the PPP with which it found itself in the political wilderness.
Corollary: Politics, at odd times, works less on the basis of pure ideological affinities and differences and more on the basis of a complex web of factors that determine the placing of various political actors.
Ideology itself can be driven by pragmatism. For instance, on the WPB, the PPP had a choice: close ranks with the opposition and also the recalcitrant PMLQ and defeat Musharraf or take a principled position and help a dictator push a good measure regardless. It chose the latter and earned plaudits. But did it do so without any quid pro quo? Not necessarily.
The coming together of the PPP and the PMLN has therefore to be seen on the basis of how politics has, and is likely to unfold in Pakistan.
What did the vote mean? The PPP and the PMLN have largely drawn from their own vote-bank. But that has also meant a downslide for PMLQ. Should the vote-split be seen three ways or two ways i.e., was (and is) there a vertical fault-line between the PMLQ and the rest (PPP, PMLN and other opposition parties included); or are there two fault-lines, one running between the PMLQ and the rest and one between the PPP and the PMLN?
Even if we accept the fault-line between the PPP and the PMLN, the one between the PMLQ and the rest cannot be ignored and runs much deeper because of the circumstances. In which case, having picked up the largest number of seats but unable to form a government single-handedly, what should the PPP do: join hands with the PMLQ or the PMLN?
Other options, except the PMLN joining up with the PMLQ, are statistically almost impossible. The only, by a long stretch, is the one that has the PPP join hands with everyone else except the PMLQ and the PMLN (MQM, ANP, MMA, PMLF, BNPA, PPPS, NPP and Independents). It could, if all of this happens, just reach the magic number of 172. It would also be a government constantly under threat of being overthrown and even PPPS with its single seat could bring it down.
Given the nature of the choices, the coming together of the PPP and the PMLN is more natural, despite their differences, than the PPP opting for PMLQ as a partner or trying to play mother hen to all other parties.
Add to this our earlier observation that there is not much ideological difference between the PMLQ and PMLN and it should be clear that it is easier to settle the issue on the basis of how the circumstances have unfolded than constraints or affinities of ideology. (Lets not forget Ms Benazir Bhuttos 2007 decision not to be at the London opposition parties conference convened by Mr Nawaz Sharif.)
Furthermore, the PMLQ was carved out as a political entity to get rid of the PMLN as a political force and create a third political force, given that Mr Musharraf had decided to push both the mainstream parties to the periphery. That too creates a natural bond between the PMLN and the PPP despite their differences.
That the electorate should have opted for their respective parties is simply because the PMLN and the PPP contested the elections as two separate entities, not an electoral alliance.
Coalition building is a normal, regular post-election exercise in countries where polls do not throw up a clear mandate in favour of a single party. Countries with proportional representation systems almost as a rule do not get clear mandates. Now, even countries with first-past-the-post system increasingly see the vote distributed among multiple political entities (India is a good example of that) which requires coalition governments.
The coming together of the PPP and the PMLN is thus part of the logic of the political situation obtaining in Pakistan. However, having said this, the difficulties of this combination cannot be avoided. They will most definitely manifest themselves in the days to come. But then politics is about managing differences rather than waiting for them to disappear.
Mr Sharif is wedded to returning Pakistan to status quo ante, essentially going back to the pre-Musharraf period by ensuring a post-Musharraf era. The PPP is not. The PPP agrees in principle on the need for democracy and constitutionalism but is not pegging it on the restoration of deposed judges etc.
For the purpose of forming a coalition, both parties have agreed to throw the issue of the judges, amendments to the constitution and the fate of Mr Musharraf before the next parliament. This is a smart move. Going around a nettlesome problem is often much better than attacking it upfront. That Mr Sharif has not insisted on a concession by the PPP on his maximalist position now shows he understands the dangers of making a shipwreck at this stage.
That said, this poltergeist will return to haunt the two partners. At that stage either the PPP will have to rethink its position on working with Mr Musharraf or the PMLN will have to review its own hard-line stance. The former is more likely than the latter, unless Mr Musharraf can pull strings (through the army and foreign interlocutors) to get Mr Sharif to stand down. That possibility cannot be discounted.
The other scenario, of a decision to impeach Mr Musharraf, will depend on statistics but more importantly, even if the right numbers are there, on whether the army is prepared to lend a shoulder to its former chief.
Stay tuned for more interesting times!
Ejaz Haider is Op-Ed Editor of Daily Times and Consulting Editor of The Friday Times. He can be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk
For the purpose of forming a coalition, both parties have agreed to throw the issue of the judges, amendments to the constitution and the fate of Mr Musharraf before the next parliament. This is a smart move
As Pakistan moves towards government formation, the two opposition parties that have picked up nearly 60 percent of both the National Assembly seats and the total vote cast for the House have decided to join hands. Is this an unexpected combination?
It depends on how one approaches the issue. There are two broad perspectives: ideology and reality. Consider.
Ideologically, the League (all incarnations) has traditionally been centrist with a tendency to lean right-of-centre and the PPP left-of-centre. That being so, there is more affinity between the PMLN and the ousted PMLQ than between the PPP and the PMLN or PMLQ.
The PMLQ was born from the rib of PMLN; one of the reasons it was hard pressed to support General (retd) Pervez Musharrafs liberal policies was because of its ideological moorings. Mr Musharraf got his political support from the PPP on the issue of the Womens Protection Bill (WPB) because the PPP was closer to his position than Mr Musharrafs own allies.
The PMLN did not have a sizeable presence in the previous assembly but its approach during those days to issues of liberal legislation placed it much closer to the PMLQ and, yes, the MMA than the PPP with which it found itself in the political wilderness.
Corollary: Politics, at odd times, works less on the basis of pure ideological affinities and differences and more on the basis of a complex web of factors that determine the placing of various political actors.
Ideology itself can be driven by pragmatism. For instance, on the WPB, the PPP had a choice: close ranks with the opposition and also the recalcitrant PMLQ and defeat Musharraf or take a principled position and help a dictator push a good measure regardless. It chose the latter and earned plaudits. But did it do so without any quid pro quo? Not necessarily.
The coming together of the PPP and the PMLN has therefore to be seen on the basis of how politics has, and is likely to unfold in Pakistan.
What did the vote mean? The PPP and the PMLN have largely drawn from their own vote-bank. But that has also meant a downslide for PMLQ. Should the vote-split be seen three ways or two ways i.e., was (and is) there a vertical fault-line between the PMLQ and the rest (PPP, PMLN and other opposition parties included); or are there two fault-lines, one running between the PMLQ and the rest and one between the PPP and the PMLN?
Even if we accept the fault-line between the PPP and the PMLN, the one between the PMLQ and the rest cannot be ignored and runs much deeper because of the circumstances. In which case, having picked up the largest number of seats but unable to form a government single-handedly, what should the PPP do: join hands with the PMLQ or the PMLN?
Other options, except the PMLN joining up with the PMLQ, are statistically almost impossible. The only, by a long stretch, is the one that has the PPP join hands with everyone else except the PMLQ and the PMLN (MQM, ANP, MMA, PMLF, BNPA, PPPS, NPP and Independents). It could, if all of this happens, just reach the magic number of 172. It would also be a government constantly under threat of being overthrown and even PPPS with its single seat could bring it down.
Given the nature of the choices, the coming together of the PPP and the PMLN is more natural, despite their differences, than the PPP opting for PMLQ as a partner or trying to play mother hen to all other parties.
Add to this our earlier observation that there is not much ideological difference between the PMLQ and PMLN and it should be clear that it is easier to settle the issue on the basis of how the circumstances have unfolded than constraints or affinities of ideology. (Lets not forget Ms Benazir Bhuttos 2007 decision not to be at the London opposition parties conference convened by Mr Nawaz Sharif.)
Furthermore, the PMLQ was carved out as a political entity to get rid of the PMLN as a political force and create a third political force, given that Mr Musharraf had decided to push both the mainstream parties to the periphery. That too creates a natural bond between the PMLN and the PPP despite their differences.
That the electorate should have opted for their respective parties is simply because the PMLN and the PPP contested the elections as two separate entities, not an electoral alliance.
Coalition building is a normal, regular post-election exercise in countries where polls do not throw up a clear mandate in favour of a single party. Countries with proportional representation systems almost as a rule do not get clear mandates. Now, even countries with first-past-the-post system increasingly see the vote distributed among multiple political entities (India is a good example of that) which requires coalition governments.
The coming together of the PPP and the PMLN is thus part of the logic of the political situation obtaining in Pakistan. However, having said this, the difficulties of this combination cannot be avoided. They will most definitely manifest themselves in the days to come. But then politics is about managing differences rather than waiting for them to disappear.
Mr Sharif is wedded to returning Pakistan to status quo ante, essentially going back to the pre-Musharraf period by ensuring a post-Musharraf era. The PPP is not. The PPP agrees in principle on the need for democracy and constitutionalism but is not pegging it on the restoration of deposed judges etc.
For the purpose of forming a coalition, both parties have agreed to throw the issue of the judges, amendments to the constitution and the fate of Mr Musharraf before the next parliament. This is a smart move. Going around a nettlesome problem is often much better than attacking it upfront. That Mr Sharif has not insisted on a concession by the PPP on his maximalist position now shows he understands the dangers of making a shipwreck at this stage.
That said, this poltergeist will return to haunt the two partners. At that stage either the PPP will have to rethink its position on working with Mr Musharraf or the PMLN will have to review its own hard-line stance. The former is more likely than the latter, unless Mr Musharraf can pull strings (through the army and foreign interlocutors) to get Mr Sharif to stand down. That possibility cannot be discounted.
The other scenario, of a decision to impeach Mr Musharraf, will depend on statistics but more importantly, even if the right numbers are there, on whether the army is prepared to lend a shoulder to its former chief.
Stay tuned for more interesting times!
Ejaz Haider is Op-Ed Editor of Daily Times and Consulting Editor of The Friday Times. He can be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk
