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IAF: STRATEGIC TRANSFORMATION
Posted on 01 December 2014 by admin
Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap reflects not just what is needed, but also what is getting degraded, thus giving suggestions what needs to be acquired.
Sumit Mukerji
The massive IL-76 heavy lift transporter followed by the IL-78 Flight Refuelling Aircraft (FRA) and a while later six Jaguars of the IAF took off on a mission that would remain etched in the pages of its history, immortalised forever. The “package” had set out to navigate over 10,000 miles, leapfrogging through 9 stopovers to reach Eielson AFB, Alaska in a landmark effort. The Indian Air Force had announced its arrival on the international scene, showcasing its capability, its professionalism and its transformation, from a traditionally tactical Air Force to a strategic force, capable of extending its reach across the seven seas. Additionally, it was the first time international players were exposed to IAF fighters operating shoulder to shoulder in their midst. From executing an unplanned engine change on a Jaguar en-route through Canada, in pouring rain and freezing temperatures (this author was also with the technicians, soaked to the skin), to maintaining virtually a 100% serviceability record of the aging Jaguar fleet while at Alaska, displaying exemplary tactical skills and enviable professional and social skills, the pilots and technicians of the IAF earned the respect and appreciation of the other Air Forces participating in Ex – Cope Thunder and the USAF hosts.
But the cherry on the cake was probably the Indo- US Air Force to Air Force exercise called “Cope India” which was conducted in Gwalior later the same year. Without having to tom-tom about it, let the reports in the public domain speak for themselves. The exercise made the USAF pause and reflect and realise that having never faced an adversary, albeit in an exercise, not moulded in the American scheme of things, can actually be a setback and possibly intimidating. To repeat an earlier statement, “The Indian Air Force had arrived”.
The Basis of Shift
Having been bloodied in the both the World Wars, the pilots of the erstwhile RIAF and the subsequent IAF were keen to see their Air Force grow. The impact of air power in the world wars was immense with the third dimension creating terror among the ground troops from the fear of vertical envelopment and among citizens, of destruction from the air. It was the game changer in warfare and has never taken a back seat thereafter. Post WW II the jet age was upon the world and IAFs first major Air Force acquisition was the de Havilland Vampire, acquired from the British (who else ?) in 1945. The first transport aircraft to supplement the WW II Dakota was the C-119 Packet.
The general life cycle information above shows that aircraft generally follow a life cycle of approximately 30 years, around which stage upgrades become necessary to extend the life by about 15-20%. Thus a prudent planner will ensure that first, he has at least one additional source to do his acquisitions and secondly, his acquisitions are so spaced that the system (IAF) does not feel a resource crunch at any time. Missile systems and radars follow a slightly different cycle because of the dynamics and relative wear and tear compared to airborne platforms. But a life cycle is not the only occasion that one will decide to acquire new systems. Geopolitics of the region is a factor that may necessitate a change; or a quantum jump in technology which may render existing systems redundant or ineffective. Whatever the reason, because air power is the preferred medium to project power and rapidly respond to contingencies, the Air Force needs to remain contemporary and in a high state of preparedness.
Numbers Game
The vast areas of the Indian sub-continent and associated large EEZ are a nightmare to protect. From the world’s highest mountain ranges to scorching deserts, tropical rain forests and thousands of miles of coastline overlooking oceans and seas, defence of such territory offers challenges that no other country in the world faces. Add to this hostile neighbours and a history of aggression by them, national security takes on enormous importance. The Indian Air Force is tasked to defend the Indian air space and provide rapid response to natural disasters in times of peace. In times of war the IAF is expected to achieve air domination and / or control of the air, provide air cover to ground troops, provide air defence protection to VAs and VPs, dominate the SLOCs in the Indian Ocean and conduct strikes deep inside enemy territory in a bid to cripple his centres of gravity. The nation is also facing threat to its security from anti-national elements. While the IAF has not been deeply committed to countering these elements, it is but a matter of time.
The spectrum is vast and the requirements complex. It is but natural that only adequate numbers of platforms and equipment can perform such an onerous task. Some pundits may propose that multi-role/swing-role aeroplanes can overcome the shortage of numbers because of their sheer versatility. While this may hold true in countries with small areas, it is virtually impossible for a country like ours. The IAF had projected a case for an inventory of 44 combat squadrons to offset challenges of a two-front confrontation, as a worst case scenario. The government sanction of 39.5 squadrons was primarily due to resource and financial limitations at that time. Keeping life cycles in mind, Air Force planners would have certainly factored the necessity to sustain force levels to maintain the deterrence value, but the steady decline to 34 squadrons with a possible further drop to almost 30 squadrons by end 2015 is a cause for concern.
At this point it would be appropriate to mention that no country in the world today (including the USA) has the financial strength to replace whole fleets of aeroplanes at will. Every Air Force resorts to mid-life upgrades to stretch the life cycle. The procurement process and the ability of the seller to meet deadlines from an already occupied production line follows an extended time period which has to be factored into the planning. The current profile of the Indian Air Force is that it comprises roughly 15% state-of-the-art platforms and systems, 35% are in a ‘mature’ state of life and 50% are in a state of obsolescence. Not a very comfortable picture by any yardstick.
Planning Process
The 15 year Long Term Perspective Plan (LTPP) of the three services and the subsequently developed Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) put up to the government by HQ IDS have been oft repeated in various articles discussing modernisation and procurement. However, what is of relevance is the Technology Perspective & Capability Roadmap (TPCR), the de-classified version of the LTIPP which offers the industry and Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) a look into the direction the respective services are heading. A perspective plan / roadmap is an important document which involves a lot of foresight, deep technical know-how and its futuristic progression / application, sound knowledge of economies of scale and sharp business acumen in the geopolitical backdrop. The 5 year Action Plan (a sub-set of the LTIPP), which coincides with the national 5 year plans and therefore budget allocations, provides for mid-course corrections and control to stay within budgetary trendlines and finally the Annual Action Plan caters for arisings under contingent situations.
The shopping list in the latest TPCR (2012-2027) is exhaustive but to provide a broad brush picture of the path the IAF has decided to follow, some elements of the TPCR are highlighted below :-
(a) Advanced Weapon Systems. We are looking at targets across the spectrum, from strategic to tactical to counter-insurgency. Weapons should not only have the desired accuracy and lethality, minimum collateral damage must be associated with such targeting – Precision munitions with jam resistant capabilities.
(b) Information Dominance. The capitulating effect brought about by information dominance was aptly demonstrated in the first Gulf War by the US agencies. Extensive use of ECM and ECCM systems and ability to sift and integrate huge volumes of intelligence from various sources is the order of the day.
(c) Sensors. State-of-the-art AESA radars, advanced EO / IR sensors, laser based systems, sensor fusion systems are the progressive technologies in this area.
(d) Data Link/Transfer Systems. Essential to reduce the sensor to shooter cycle.
(e) Persistent Target Detection Systems. In this highly dynamic environment, with advanced technologies for deception and concealment, there is a need to detect a target in all-weather conditions, identify it and execute a high probability of kill from stand-off ranges, with minimal collateral damage.
(f) Unmanned Aerial Systems.
(g) Simulation Systems.
The elements given above are but a sample of the technologies that need to be procured and absorbed. These are over and above the platforms that are needed to protect the length and breadth of this country.
Transformation
The need to overcome the technology gap that was creeping in, with the associated degradation of potential of the IAF’s airborne fleets was identified in the previous LTTP. Understanding the time frames of the acquisition cycle, the IAF had commenced fortifying itself against the slow but sure depletion of its assets. Upgradation cases were taken up and commenced on the Jaguar, MiG-29, Mirage 2000 and AN-32 fleets. But this was just to cater to the transition period. It was time to transform the transport fleet, the helicopter fleet and augment the fighter fleet with contemporary platforms. While the erstwhile NDA I government had not articulated the “from the Gulf of Hormuz to the Straits of Malacca” statement made famous by the subsequent UPA Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, India’s regional aspirations were showing signs of expansion in the wake of economic resurgence. It was but natural that if regional aspirations spanned the Indian Ocean and northwards to the Siberian plains, platforms with strategic capabilities and / or the ability to straddle strategic ranges were the need of the hour.
There are two issues that, to my mind, have come to play a major role in the transformation of the Indian Air Force. Firstly is the deliberate strategic lean to the West for most of the new acquisitions, with the USA, France and Israel as major benefactors. Secondly, we decided to break the age-old shackles of the “L-1vendor” by introducing the factor of “Life Cycle Costing” providing a window of opportunity to acquire state-of-the-art systems, which though more expensive, offer far better value addition over its technical life cycle. Great emphasis has also been paid to systems which have architecture for growth.
The lifting of sanctions against India in 2001opened up military business opportunities with the USA and dislodged, in a manner of speaking, the Russian monkey off our back. Around the same time the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) in its present avatar (avatar), found its roots. Caution was the order of the day and thus the American offer of procurement through “Foreign Military Sales” (FMS) guaranteed US government backing to ensure a satisfactory acquisition. We grabbed the opportunity and the result was the procurement of C-130J Hercules for Special Operations and the Harpoon anti-ship missiles to equip the maritime Jaguars. Following close behind were the $ 4.1 Billion deal for ten C-17 Globemaster heavy lift transporters (with likely follow-on orders) and the $2.1 Billion deal for eight P-8I MR aircraft for the Navy. The Indo-US strategic relationship was firmly on the rails. The CH-47 Chinook winning the contract for the heavy lift helicopters and the AH-64 Apache for the Attack Helicopter role is indicative of the intense US influence in the IAFs purchases.
Billed as the arms deal of the century, the $10 Billion (now steadily increasing) 126 aircraft MMRCA acquisition saw world-wide interest in the fly-off for the selection. The Eurofighter Typhoon and the Dassault Rafale were shortlisted and finally, after considering all factors such as unit cost, purchase cost, life cycle costs, (and) offsets as also the transfer of technology offered, India announced that Dassault would be offered the contract for the MMRCA. While presently the process is on hold for bureaucratic reasons, it is hoped that it will be moved on a fast track in the near future.Airbus Industries has secured the contract for the Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) and the Israelis are hoping to follow up on their domination of the UAV fleet of the Indian armed forces, presently comprising the Searcher and the Heron. There is a huge thrust towards unmanned systems and the IAF is looking to procure Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) and High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) unmanned systems. A strong pitch has been made to acquire Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) carrying precision weapons which will bolster special operations.
The Indo-Russian strategic partnership is time-tested and has an inherent resilience. With on-going acquisitions like the $1.3 Billion deal for 71xMi-17V5 Medium Lift Helicopters and the additional 42x SU-30MKI swing-role fighters, the Russian pipeline remains open. It has been further fortified, in fact, by the Russian offer for joint development and production of the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), which the GoI has endorsed.
The IAF has always suffered from what can be termed as “logistical nightmare” because of the varieties of platforms and systems in the inventory. This is not likely to change when we are sourcing equipment from the USA, Russia, France, Israel, etc. The computer age, thankfully, should offset the burden. So are we on the right path? Do our efforts at transformation follow the direction provided by the LTPP and do we see the IAF of the next decade a formidable, contemporary, strategic force, comparable to the best in the world?
Transformation in Indigenisation
“India is the world’s largest importer of defence equipment”. Sounds like India are the world champions in cricket! But what a shame for a (the)country such as ours. Like our inability to win medals in the Olympics, we display our inability to manufacture defence equipment and our defence industry has no worthwhile credibility. Indigenisation and self-reliance is the core to survivability in a changing geopolitical environment with shifting alliances and partnerships. Why are we in this pitiable state, dependent on other countries and always in fear of someone pulling the plug? It was probably because of our misplaced sense of security that national interests may be compromised which prompted the government to make DRDO and PSUs the sole sources of military business. Bogged down with bureaucratic procedures and delays, the performance of these two organisations is best left to the proof of their output. Not allowing private industry to enter the defence sector has stunted our growth in self-reliance and indigenisation.
The turnaround or the transformation was possibly initiated in the DPP 2006 with the introduction of the “Offset” clause, in the acquisition of major systems. Offsets are de rigueur as a part of acquisitions the world over and India is a late starter. Private industry was given a window of opportunity to participate and grow, contributing towards India’s self-reliance in defence. The 30% Offset rule seemed a tentative step by the government when compared to international businesses offering 100-110% offsets (in some cases). But as the major deals came into fructification it was realised that the investment required by local industry to absorb the Offset was so large that they could not afford it (other than the big business houses). While they are working their way around it, there is no doubt that the Offset clause has been the precursor of progress in private industry participation in defence.
The associated Transfer of Technology (TOT) along with the offsets has also been a major boost to motivate the private industry to enter the defence field. Cutting-edge technology, some of it ‘dual-use’ will be hugely beneficial to the growth of industry in this country. But (for obvious reasons) foreign vendor (vendors’interest in our private industry has been minimal because of the 26% cap on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) imposed by the DPP. The present government has clearly seen the need for self-reliance and indigenisation in defence as well as the need for active participation by the private industry. As a first step FDI in defence has been elevated to 49%. This has not only infused confidence in foreign vendors and governments but has opened the door for larger investments and leverage for TOT. Increased FDI in defence will increase the number of JVs and therefore offer more job opportunities in contemporary and critical technologies.
Developing self –reliance and transforming the private industry to actively participate for the benefit of the fourth largest defence force in the world will be a long drawn out process. But ‘well begun is half done’ and we will certainly see progress. Private industry needs assurance of continuity in business for it to be able to sustain itself. Red tape and bureaucracy should be minimised and smart business practices and procedures introduced by the MoD (within the bounds of clarity and control).
Conclusion
The IAF is in midst of transformation, there is no denying. Legacy systems, having undergone upgrades and at the twilight of their effective lives to be set aside & contemporary equipment acquired. The IAF is doing that & as the erstwhile Chief of Air Staff had commented, “The IAF is moving towards full spectrum capability, a strategic force capable of taking on multi-front, multi-dimensional threats”. The government, keen to enhance business in defence sector is promoting Offsets, TOT & FDI to seduce foreign vendors to invest & share cutting-edge technology. The private sector is bound to see growth & India is stepping into the dawn of self-reliance through indigenisation. Are we going to see a ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ in private industry participation?
Posted on 01 December 2014 by admin
Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap reflects not just what is needed, but also what is getting degraded, thus giving suggestions what needs to be acquired.
Sumit Mukerji
The massive IL-76 heavy lift transporter followed by the IL-78 Flight Refuelling Aircraft (FRA) and a while later six Jaguars of the IAF took off on a mission that would remain etched in the pages of its history, immortalised forever. The “package” had set out to navigate over 10,000 miles, leapfrogging through 9 stopovers to reach Eielson AFB, Alaska in a landmark effort. The Indian Air Force had announced its arrival on the international scene, showcasing its capability, its professionalism and its transformation, from a traditionally tactical Air Force to a strategic force, capable of extending its reach across the seven seas. Additionally, it was the first time international players were exposed to IAF fighters operating shoulder to shoulder in their midst. From executing an unplanned engine change on a Jaguar en-route through Canada, in pouring rain and freezing temperatures (this author was also with the technicians, soaked to the skin), to maintaining virtually a 100% serviceability record of the aging Jaguar fleet while at Alaska, displaying exemplary tactical skills and enviable professional and social skills, the pilots and technicians of the IAF earned the respect and appreciation of the other Air Forces participating in Ex – Cope Thunder and the USAF hosts.
But the cherry on the cake was probably the Indo- US Air Force to Air Force exercise called “Cope India” which was conducted in Gwalior later the same year. Without having to tom-tom about it, let the reports in the public domain speak for themselves. The exercise made the USAF pause and reflect and realise that having never faced an adversary, albeit in an exercise, not moulded in the American scheme of things, can actually be a setback and possibly intimidating. To repeat an earlier statement, “The Indian Air Force had arrived”.
The Basis of Shift
Having been bloodied in the both the World Wars, the pilots of the erstwhile RIAF and the subsequent IAF were keen to see their Air Force grow. The impact of air power in the world wars was immense with the third dimension creating terror among the ground troops from the fear of vertical envelopment and among citizens, of destruction from the air. It was the game changer in warfare and has never taken a back seat thereafter. Post WW II the jet age was upon the world and IAFs first major Air Force acquisition was the de Havilland Vampire, acquired from the British (who else ?) in 1945. The first transport aircraft to supplement the WW II Dakota was the C-119 Packet.
The general life cycle information above shows that aircraft generally follow a life cycle of approximately 30 years, around which stage upgrades become necessary to extend the life by about 15-20%. Thus a prudent planner will ensure that first, he has at least one additional source to do his acquisitions and secondly, his acquisitions are so spaced that the system (IAF) does not feel a resource crunch at any time. Missile systems and radars follow a slightly different cycle because of the dynamics and relative wear and tear compared to airborne platforms. But a life cycle is not the only occasion that one will decide to acquire new systems. Geopolitics of the region is a factor that may necessitate a change; or a quantum jump in technology which may render existing systems redundant or ineffective. Whatever the reason, because air power is the preferred medium to project power and rapidly respond to contingencies, the Air Force needs to remain contemporary and in a high state of preparedness.
Numbers Game
The vast areas of the Indian sub-continent and associated large EEZ are a nightmare to protect. From the world’s highest mountain ranges to scorching deserts, tropical rain forests and thousands of miles of coastline overlooking oceans and seas, defence of such territory offers challenges that no other country in the world faces. Add to this hostile neighbours and a history of aggression by them, national security takes on enormous importance. The Indian Air Force is tasked to defend the Indian air space and provide rapid response to natural disasters in times of peace. In times of war the IAF is expected to achieve air domination and / or control of the air, provide air cover to ground troops, provide air defence protection to VAs and VPs, dominate the SLOCs in the Indian Ocean and conduct strikes deep inside enemy territory in a bid to cripple his centres of gravity. The nation is also facing threat to its security from anti-national elements. While the IAF has not been deeply committed to countering these elements, it is but a matter of time.
The spectrum is vast and the requirements complex. It is but natural that only adequate numbers of platforms and equipment can perform such an onerous task. Some pundits may propose that multi-role/swing-role aeroplanes can overcome the shortage of numbers because of their sheer versatility. While this may hold true in countries with small areas, it is virtually impossible for a country like ours. The IAF had projected a case for an inventory of 44 combat squadrons to offset challenges of a two-front confrontation, as a worst case scenario. The government sanction of 39.5 squadrons was primarily due to resource and financial limitations at that time. Keeping life cycles in mind, Air Force planners would have certainly factored the necessity to sustain force levels to maintain the deterrence value, but the steady decline to 34 squadrons with a possible further drop to almost 30 squadrons by end 2015 is a cause for concern.
At this point it would be appropriate to mention that no country in the world today (including the USA) has the financial strength to replace whole fleets of aeroplanes at will. Every Air Force resorts to mid-life upgrades to stretch the life cycle. The procurement process and the ability of the seller to meet deadlines from an already occupied production line follows an extended time period which has to be factored into the planning. The current profile of the Indian Air Force is that it comprises roughly 15% state-of-the-art platforms and systems, 35% are in a ‘mature’ state of life and 50% are in a state of obsolescence. Not a very comfortable picture by any yardstick.
Planning Process
The 15 year Long Term Perspective Plan (LTPP) of the three services and the subsequently developed Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) put up to the government by HQ IDS have been oft repeated in various articles discussing modernisation and procurement. However, what is of relevance is the Technology Perspective & Capability Roadmap (TPCR), the de-classified version of the LTIPP which offers the industry and Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) a look into the direction the respective services are heading. A perspective plan / roadmap is an important document which involves a lot of foresight, deep technical know-how and its futuristic progression / application, sound knowledge of economies of scale and sharp business acumen in the geopolitical backdrop. The 5 year Action Plan (a sub-set of the LTIPP), which coincides with the national 5 year plans and therefore budget allocations, provides for mid-course corrections and control to stay within budgetary trendlines and finally the Annual Action Plan caters for arisings under contingent situations.
The shopping list in the latest TPCR (2012-2027) is exhaustive but to provide a broad brush picture of the path the IAF has decided to follow, some elements of the TPCR are highlighted below :-
(a) Advanced Weapon Systems. We are looking at targets across the spectrum, from strategic to tactical to counter-insurgency. Weapons should not only have the desired accuracy and lethality, minimum collateral damage must be associated with such targeting – Precision munitions with jam resistant capabilities.
(b) Information Dominance. The capitulating effect brought about by information dominance was aptly demonstrated in the first Gulf War by the US agencies. Extensive use of ECM and ECCM systems and ability to sift and integrate huge volumes of intelligence from various sources is the order of the day.
(c) Sensors. State-of-the-art AESA radars, advanced EO / IR sensors, laser based systems, sensor fusion systems are the progressive technologies in this area.
(d) Data Link/Transfer Systems. Essential to reduce the sensor to shooter cycle.
(e) Persistent Target Detection Systems. In this highly dynamic environment, with advanced technologies for deception and concealment, there is a need to detect a target in all-weather conditions, identify it and execute a high probability of kill from stand-off ranges, with minimal collateral damage.
(f) Unmanned Aerial Systems.
(g) Simulation Systems.
The elements given above are but a sample of the technologies that need to be procured and absorbed. These are over and above the platforms that are needed to protect the length and breadth of this country.
Transformation
The need to overcome the technology gap that was creeping in, with the associated degradation of potential of the IAF’s airborne fleets was identified in the previous LTTP. Understanding the time frames of the acquisition cycle, the IAF had commenced fortifying itself against the slow but sure depletion of its assets. Upgradation cases were taken up and commenced on the Jaguar, MiG-29, Mirage 2000 and AN-32 fleets. But this was just to cater to the transition period. It was time to transform the transport fleet, the helicopter fleet and augment the fighter fleet with contemporary platforms. While the erstwhile NDA I government had not articulated the “from the Gulf of Hormuz to the Straits of Malacca” statement made famous by the subsequent UPA Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, India’s regional aspirations were showing signs of expansion in the wake of economic resurgence. It was but natural that if regional aspirations spanned the Indian Ocean and northwards to the Siberian plains, platforms with strategic capabilities and / or the ability to straddle strategic ranges were the need of the hour.
There are two issues that, to my mind, have come to play a major role in the transformation of the Indian Air Force. Firstly is the deliberate strategic lean to the West for most of the new acquisitions, with the USA, France and Israel as major benefactors. Secondly, we decided to break the age-old shackles of the “L-1vendor” by introducing the factor of “Life Cycle Costing” providing a window of opportunity to acquire state-of-the-art systems, which though more expensive, offer far better value addition over its technical life cycle. Great emphasis has also been paid to systems which have architecture for growth.
The lifting of sanctions against India in 2001opened up military business opportunities with the USA and dislodged, in a manner of speaking, the Russian monkey off our back. Around the same time the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) in its present avatar (avatar), found its roots. Caution was the order of the day and thus the American offer of procurement through “Foreign Military Sales” (FMS) guaranteed US government backing to ensure a satisfactory acquisition. We grabbed the opportunity and the result was the procurement of C-130J Hercules for Special Operations and the Harpoon anti-ship missiles to equip the maritime Jaguars. Following close behind were the $ 4.1 Billion deal for ten C-17 Globemaster heavy lift transporters (with likely follow-on orders) and the $2.1 Billion deal for eight P-8I MR aircraft for the Navy. The Indo-US strategic relationship was firmly on the rails. The CH-47 Chinook winning the contract for the heavy lift helicopters and the AH-64 Apache for the Attack Helicopter role is indicative of the intense US influence in the IAFs purchases.
Billed as the arms deal of the century, the $10 Billion (now steadily increasing) 126 aircraft MMRCA acquisition saw world-wide interest in the fly-off for the selection. The Eurofighter Typhoon and the Dassault Rafale were shortlisted and finally, after considering all factors such as unit cost, purchase cost, life cycle costs, (and) offsets as also the transfer of technology offered, India announced that Dassault would be offered the contract for the MMRCA. While presently the process is on hold for bureaucratic reasons, it is hoped that it will be moved on a fast track in the near future.Airbus Industries has secured the contract for the Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) and the Israelis are hoping to follow up on their domination of the UAV fleet of the Indian armed forces, presently comprising the Searcher and the Heron. There is a huge thrust towards unmanned systems and the IAF is looking to procure Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) and High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) unmanned systems. A strong pitch has been made to acquire Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) carrying precision weapons which will bolster special operations.
The Indo-Russian strategic partnership is time-tested and has an inherent resilience. With on-going acquisitions like the $1.3 Billion deal for 71xMi-17V5 Medium Lift Helicopters and the additional 42x SU-30MKI swing-role fighters, the Russian pipeline remains open. It has been further fortified, in fact, by the Russian offer for joint development and production of the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), which the GoI has endorsed.
The IAF has always suffered from what can be termed as “logistical nightmare” because of the varieties of platforms and systems in the inventory. This is not likely to change when we are sourcing equipment from the USA, Russia, France, Israel, etc. The computer age, thankfully, should offset the burden. So are we on the right path? Do our efforts at transformation follow the direction provided by the LTPP and do we see the IAF of the next decade a formidable, contemporary, strategic force, comparable to the best in the world?
Transformation in Indigenisation
“India is the world’s largest importer of defence equipment”. Sounds like India are the world champions in cricket! But what a shame for a (the)country such as ours. Like our inability to win medals in the Olympics, we display our inability to manufacture defence equipment and our defence industry has no worthwhile credibility. Indigenisation and self-reliance is the core to survivability in a changing geopolitical environment with shifting alliances and partnerships. Why are we in this pitiable state, dependent on other countries and always in fear of someone pulling the plug? It was probably because of our misplaced sense of security that national interests may be compromised which prompted the government to make DRDO and PSUs the sole sources of military business. Bogged down with bureaucratic procedures and delays, the performance of these two organisations is best left to the proof of their output. Not allowing private industry to enter the defence sector has stunted our growth in self-reliance and indigenisation.
The turnaround or the transformation was possibly initiated in the DPP 2006 with the introduction of the “Offset” clause, in the acquisition of major systems. Offsets are de rigueur as a part of acquisitions the world over and India is a late starter. Private industry was given a window of opportunity to participate and grow, contributing towards India’s self-reliance in defence. The 30% Offset rule seemed a tentative step by the government when compared to international businesses offering 100-110% offsets (in some cases). But as the major deals came into fructification it was realised that the investment required by local industry to absorb the Offset was so large that they could not afford it (other than the big business houses). While they are working their way around it, there is no doubt that the Offset clause has been the precursor of progress in private industry participation in defence.
The associated Transfer of Technology (TOT) along with the offsets has also been a major boost to motivate the private industry to enter the defence field. Cutting-edge technology, some of it ‘dual-use’ will be hugely beneficial to the growth of industry in this country. But (for obvious reasons) foreign vendor (vendors’interest in our private industry has been minimal because of the 26% cap on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) imposed by the DPP. The present government has clearly seen the need for self-reliance and indigenisation in defence as well as the need for active participation by the private industry. As a first step FDI in defence has been elevated to 49%. This has not only infused confidence in foreign vendors and governments but has opened the door for larger investments and leverage for TOT. Increased FDI in defence will increase the number of JVs and therefore offer more job opportunities in contemporary and critical technologies.
Developing self –reliance and transforming the private industry to actively participate for the benefit of the fourth largest defence force in the world will be a long drawn out process. But ‘well begun is half done’ and we will certainly see progress. Private industry needs assurance of continuity in business for it to be able to sustain itself. Red tape and bureaucracy should be minimised and smart business practices and procedures introduced by the MoD (within the bounds of clarity and control).
Conclusion
The IAF is in midst of transformation, there is no denying. Legacy systems, having undergone upgrades and at the twilight of their effective lives to be set aside & contemporary equipment acquired. The IAF is doing that & as the erstwhile Chief of Air Staff had commented, “The IAF is moving towards full spectrum capability, a strategic force capable of taking on multi-front, multi-dimensional threats”. The government, keen to enhance business in defence sector is promoting Offsets, TOT & FDI to seduce foreign vendors to invest & share cutting-edge technology. The private sector is bound to see growth & India is stepping into the dawn of self-reliance through indigenisation. Are we going to see a ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ in private industry participation?
