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Many factors led to Army giving up in 1962. But psychological collapse played a big role

That is your perspective, with which Chinese don't agree. Neither do I. I am of the opinion the 1962 War was caused by the ill-advised aggressive "Forward Policy" of Pandit Nehru. Chinese were left with no choice, but to respond to that, which they did. Any other powerful country, in place of China, would have done the same. A weaker nation might have submitted to such an aggression.
I know that the forward policy was one of the reason for the flareup in 62 but I'm talking about the situation post 1993 when the chinese resorted to salami slicing and occupation of territory in violation of the 1993 agreement. Chinese have been nibbling bit by bit on disputed territory even when india wasn't aligned with the US nor did it care to respect the border agreements with India. This problem has only worsened after 2010

Lol, you believe Chinese logistics are not as good as India's? PLA ride bullet trains to the Indian border, what about Indian troops?

New barracks

China's got good logistics no doubt. India is more focused on building all weather tunnels and new highways on the frontier areas. The terrain on the indian side is much more difficult than on the chinese side , mainly beacause the rivers from the indian side form north-south valleys which are disected by parallel mountain chains whereas on the Chinese side the yarlung Tsangpo valley runs from west to east making inter valley connectivity possible with lesser effort.
 
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I know that the forward policy was one of the reason for the flareup in 62 but I'm talking about the situation post 1993 when the chinese resorted to salami slicing and occupation of territory in violation of the 1993 agreement. Chinese have been nibbling bit by bit on disputed territory even when india wasn't aligned with the US nor did it care to respect the border agreements with India. This problem has only worsened after 2010

My original contention stands and that is that a major war between China and India has extremely low probability, in near future. Both the states are fully aware and conscious of the gravity and implications of such a scenario, and thus are fully geared up to prevent such an eventuality.
 


Clip circulated in 2020 by 🇨🇳 media showed Indian troops had transgressed into the Dongzhang area some 100m meters across LAC. In 2021 on regular patrol PLA troops were detained by IA for several hours in this area. PLA WTC refuted these Media claims. (3/n) https://t.co/UnGHljxAeU

🇨🇳 tourists filming forward 🇮🇳 army posts at Dongzhang. It is located in a valley near Langpo township, Cona county, Shannan city, Tibet. Dongzhang waterfall region was occupied by Indian Army in 2001 and have sentry posts in the region since.
27°46'45"N 91°58'39"E (1/n) https://t.co/OsLOU9J0VZ

45 bridges, 27 roads, 2 helipads & much more, as @BROindia goes deep into remote areas w/ its infrastructure projects & bolsters country's defence preparedness as well as local economies. https://t.co/t6X0DC1aCW

Significantly, Auli is situated just 95 km from the LAC
I don't know where the courage of these slum pariahs comes from? These pariahs don't even know where Galwan is.

This is the real galwan! China - India Conflict Zone!
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pariahs are pariahs forever! Low IQ likes to lie!

Just like you guys have occupied Tibet, Xinjiang and Hong Kong


Xi Jinping shuffled military leadership 3 times in 9 months

@SIPRA @Dungeness


Taipei also succeeded in hiring engineers, technicians and former naval officers from at least five other countries: Australia, South Korea, India, Spain and Canada. Based at a shipyard in the port city of Kaohsiung, the experts have advised the Taiwanese navy and state-backed shipbuilder CSBC Corporation Taiwan, the company building the new submarines


In a hypothetical armed confrontation that involves warships of the PLA(N), attacking the Philippines, the Chinese flotilla would be detected at ranges beyond 500 km by the surveillance-and-guidance radar of the BrahMos battery. It performs low skimming with greater speed i.e >>mach 3, can carry more warheads than Chinese anti-ship missiles

Brahmos travel much faster in its terminal stage

And with accuracy of “1m CEP”

Sea skimming is upto terminal phase after that brahMos does split-S maneuver attack which makes it even more lethal......The new generation dual role BrahMos comes with an advanced range and capability to take out targets on land as well as anti-ship attacks.


@SIPRA "I don't think that India is in a position to repeat that scenario" 🙈🙊

Indian Army’s Operation Against China On Intervening Night Of 29-30 August 2020

Tang Dynasty diplomat Wang Xuance conquered India in just 3 days. According to the logic of the Indians that "India is a British colony, India has the right to inherit the British expansion policy". India is just a province of China!
 
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Just like you guys have occupied Tibet, Xinjiang and Hong Kong


Xi Jinping shuffled military leadership 3 times in 9 months

@SIPRA @Dungeness


Taipei also succeeded in hiring engineers, technicians and former naval officers from at least five other countries: Australia, South Korea, India, Spain and Canada. Based at a shipyard in the port city of Kaohsiung, the experts have advised the Taiwanese navy and state-backed shipbuilder CSBC Corporation Taiwan, the company building the new submarines


In a hypothetical armed confrontation that involves warships of the PLA(N), attacking the Philippines, the Chinese flotilla would be detected at ranges beyond 500 km by the surveillance-and-guidance radar of the BrahMos battery. It performs low skimming with greater speed i.e >>mach 3, can carry more warheads than Chinese anti-ship missiles

Brahmos travel much faster in its terminal stage

And with accuracy of “1m CEP”

Sea skimming is upto terminal phase after that brahMos does split-S maneuver attack which makes it even more lethal......The new generation dual role BrahMos comes with an advanced range and capability to take out targets on land as well as anti-ship attacks.


@SIPRA "I don't think that India is in a position to repeat that scenario" 🙈🙊

Indian Army’s Operation Against China On Intervening Night Of 29-30 August 2020

hey. Mr. Dalit. I noticed that you are talking about Indian missiles and China.... Emmm... I have a question. India can now assemble qualified rifles??

BTW. Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong were Chinese territory earlier than the Tang Dynasty conquered India... Well, I mean. China was the first country to conquer India.
 
... I have a question. India can now assemble qualified rifles??

Don't underestimate India. India, under a strategic defense arrangement, has recently gifted 30 fully-trained military mules to Bangladesh. 😛😛
 
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hey. Mr. Dalit. I noticed that you are talking about Indian missiles and China.... Emmm... I have a question. India can now assemble qualified rifles??
@SIPRA
Another example of Made in China 👇
-Drone crashing all over world:
CH-4B UCAV: 23
Wing Loong II UCAV: 8
Wing Loong I UCAV: 6
Sky-09P: 3
UV10CAM: 2
Chilong CL-4: 2
Chilong CL-11: 2
DB-2: 2
Aisheng ASN-209: 2
Sky-02A: 1
CH-3A UCAV: 1
CH-92A: 1
Harbin BZK-005:1
Sea Cavalry SD-60:1

Another example of Made in China.
We already know about the quality of Chinese made defence items which China have exported to Pakistan. Like Main battle tanks and Artillery guns, JF-17 (Which is already grounded by Myanmar).

Algeria saw a number of accidents involving Chinese CH-4B UCAV drones. The first accident took place in 2013, second in March 9, 2014 and third in June 2020

Jordan had purchased six of the same Chinese CH-4B UCAVs in 2016, but by June 2019, the country had decided to sell them off

When Kenya bought Norinco VN-4 armoured personnel carriers, China’s sales representative declined to sit inside the vehicles during a test firing.Kenya went ahead in 2016 with the purchase anyway and dozens of Kenyan personnel have been reportedly killed in those vehicles

Two Chinese 053H3 Frigates (BNS Umar Farooq and BNS Abu Ubaidah) arrived at Bangladesh in 2020, after experiencing multiple defects en route. This included a non-functioning navigation radar and gun system. The Chinese have asked for additional payment to repair the boats

“Tayokeset tayet-soke” (“Chinese machine; broken in a day”) is a well known and frequently used phrase in Myanmar


Nepal Airlines has decided to sell all its Chinese planes and spare parts, as they were plagued by breakdowns and malfunctions.
China not happy with this decision.

Emmm... I have a question. India can now assemble qualified rifles??
@SIPRA
Artillery to rocket launchers to radars — Armenia turns to India to beef up defence against Azerbaijan

 
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@SIPRA
Another example of Made in China 👇
-Drone crashing all over world:
CH-4B UCAV: 23
Wing Loong II UCAV: 8
Wing Loong I UCAV: 6
Sky-09P: 3
UV10CAM: 2
Chilong CL-4: 2
Chilong CL-11: 2
DB-2: 2
Aisheng ASN-209: 2
Sky-02A: 1
CH-3A UCAV: 1
CH-92A: 1
Harbin BZK-005:1
Sea Cavalry SD-60:1

Another example of Made in China.
We already know about the quality of Chinese made defence items which China have exported to Pakistan. Like Main battle tanks and Artillery guns, JF-17 (Which is already grounded by Myanmar).

Algeria saw a number of accidents involving Chinese CH-4B UCAV drones. The first accident took place in 2013, second in March 9, 2014 and third in June 2020

Jordan had purchased six of the same Chinese CH-4B UCAVs in 2016, but by June 2019, the country had decided to sell them off

When Kenya bought Norinco VN-4 armoured personnel carriers, China’s sales representative declined to sit inside the vehicles during a test firing.Kenya went ahead in 2016 with the purchase anyway and dozens of Kenyan personnel have been reportedly killed in those vehicles

Two Chinese 053H3 Frigates (BNS Umar Farooq and BNS Abu Ubaidah) arrived at Bangladesh in 2020, after experiencing multiple defects en route. This included a non-functioning navigation radar and gun system. The Chinese have asked for additional payment to repair the boats

“Tayokeset tayet-soke” (“Chinese machine; broken in a day”) is a well known and frequently used phrase in Myanmar


Nepal Airlines has decided to sell all its Chinese planes and spare parts, as they were plagued by breakdowns and malfunctions.
China not happy with this decision.
Like should produce cow dung tanks and fighters are much better.
 

Many factors led to Army giving up in 1962. But psychological collapse played a big role​

The Army had studied PLA tactics in the Korean War and knew the antidote to its strategy. But on ground, it violated all the fundamentals.

LT GEN H S PANAG (RETD)
17 November, 2022 12:31 pm IST
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The defeat of the Army in Phase 1 — 20 to 27 October — of the 1962 India-China war can be attributed to flawed political decisions, based on the premise that China will not initiate a war, and the acquiescence of the military leadership. Aggressive competitive flag-marking and a foolhardy plan to throw the Chinese out of Thagla Ridge led to the war. Isolated troops fighting from non-tactical defences without adequate logistics put up a heroic fight but were defeated in a matter of a few hours of actual fighting.


In Phase 2 — 14 to 20 November — there was little to no political interference. The Army was defending the ground of its own choosing with one divisional and two brigade-defended sectors. Main defences were connected by road except for Walong and air supply continued uninterrupted. All sectors were prepared for 7 to 10 days of battle. Yet, this formidable force was routed within two days of actual fighting.

At Sela-Dirang-Bomdila, 4 Infantry Division “psychologically collapsed” and disintegrated virtually without a fight in 24 hours. At Chushul, 114 Infantry Brigade inexplicably withdrew with a loss of only two companies out of 12. Only 11 Infantry Brigade at Walong fought a cohesive battle for 48 hours before withdrawing.

Flawed appreciation of enemy, terrain and weather, and psychological collapse of the leadership, which had a cascading effect on the rank and file, were the primary reasons.

Adverse terrain and weather

The campaigning season in the high-altitude areas of Ladakh and the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) is from June to November. Logistics and the troop built up for Phase 2 of the war were completed only by mid-November, leaving only 15 days for effective military operations. December onwards, operations get severely restricted due to the extreme cold and snow. There was no way the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could have sustained a large force in winter over tenuous and lengthening lines of communication with then-available infrastructure. The relative advantage was with the defender.

Our communications had shortened, and additional troop buildup was rapidly taking place. All that the Army had to do was to hold fast for two weeks to force a winter pause and possible withdrawal by the PLA. The Indian military leadership — from the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) to brigade commanders — failed to appreciate the terrain and weather factor and also lacked the will to defend resolutely. That the Chinese, obliged by our psychological collapse, announced a unilateral ceasefire and withdrawal to begin on 21 November and conveyed it to the Indian chargé d’affaires on 19 November, only proves the point. Ironically, on that very day, 4 Infantry Division was abandoning its defences without a fight and an intact 114 Infantry Brigade began its withdrawal from Chushul.

Enemy strength

The commanders had little to no knowledge of the enemy strength. In Ladakh, the PLA had only one division available for operations as is now known from Chinese accounts. Given the vast sector, it had to regroup to attack Chushul with barely one reinforced regiment. Hence, at best, it had the capacity to capture three to four infantry company-defended localities. In reality, it captured only two. It did not have any residual force to progress further. Yet, such was the moral ascendency of the PLA that 114 Infantry Brigade was ordered to withdraw to defend Leh.

At Sela-Dirang-Bomdila, 4 Infantry Division did not appreciate the fact that the PLA could build up to three divisions for the offensive, which was a remarkable feat as it was operating over the same area where we could barely commit one brigade. Consequently, the simultaneous envelopment, isolation and attack on all three brigades led to the collapse of 4 Infantry Division without a fight.

PLA tactics

The PLA was a seasoned army that had won a prolonged civil war lasting for two decades. It also fought the Japanese from 1937 to 1945 on the mainland and in erstwhile Burma. In Korea, from 1950 to 1953, it evicted the United States and United Nations forces from North Korea to ensure a stalemate along the 38th parallel. It had mastered the art of manoeuvre. Infiltration, outflanking, and isolation tactics to envelope enemy defences were its forte.

Sela, was attacked from all directions with one division. Simultaneously, from the east, a division minus one regiment using the 161 km-long Bailey Trail over very treacherous terrain, isolated and attacked Dirang and Bomdila and cut off the road axis. Another division infiltrated from the shorter western flank, and so did a battalion from the eastern flank to isolate Sela, assist in its capture and also attack Dirang and Bomdila. Thus, the divisional defended sector was cut into three parts with all routes of escape blocked.

At Walong, the PLA preemptively outflanked the defences to secure the higher features in the west to attack from a position of advantage and also threatened the rear of the brigade, making the defences tactically untenable to force a withdrawal. At Chushul, the two flank companies were captured to make the rest of the Kailash Range tactically untenable and also threatened the only road axis, from Rechin La.

Indian Army tactics
The Army had studied PLA tactics in the Korean War in detail and knew that the antidote to infiltration, envelopment and isolation, was to remain steadfast in main defences, keep the flanks and infiltration routes under surveillance to prevent or delay enemy advance along these approaches, and maintain an adequate reserve for spoiling/counterattacks. However, on ground, it violated all these fundamentals.

There was a fundamental flaw in the deployment of 4 Infantry Division. As per all appreciations done over the years, the Bomdila-Mandala complex was considered the best defensive position as it stretched the enemy’s lines of communications and shortened ours and could not be easily bypassed. The altitude was 9,000 to 10,000 feet. A compact divisional defended sector would have forced the PLA to attack from lower to higher heights. If Sela had to be defended, there was a requirement for an additional brigade to cater for the outflanking movements.

No viable effort was made to delay or defend the outflanking/infiltration manoeuvre of the PLA via Poshing La to Dirang and Bomdila or around Sela defences. Fire brigade actions at a late stage only led to denuding the defences of Dirang and Bomdila. As a result, the PLA was able to attack and threaten all brigade-defended sectors with a division-size force. All defended sectors were stocked for 7 to 10 days. A determined fight would have forced the culmination of the PLA’s attack as the bulk of its forces was operating on a man-pack basis. Instead of a determined fight, the divisional commander panicked, and the corps commander also lost his nerve to order a withdrawal that turned into a disorganised flight to the rear. The Chief of Army Staff, Eastern Army Commander and the Director General of Military Operations were present at the corps headquarters as mute spectators when this fatal decision was taken. For the Indian Army, 17 November 1962 was a disgraceful day.


At Chushul, 114 Infantry Brigade failed to secure the dominating feature called Black Top, which was initially not held, allowing the enemy to attack Gurung Hill from higher ground. No attempt was made to secure the eastern spurs of Kailash Range or carry out a covering action or aggressive patrolling to prevent the buildup of the enemy. The main effort was to defend the Spanggur Gap approach, which tactically was least likely to be used. More so when we also had six tanks to guard the same.

There was a yawning gap of 10 km between Magar Hill and Rezang La, and the most dominating feature, Mukhpari, was not held, allowing both to be isolated and attacked from flanks and rear. Rezang La on limb without fire support was literally set up for slaughter. Despite the odds, two of the most heroic battles of the war were fought at Rezang La and Gurung Hill. Inexplicably, one battalion, which was in depth and not even shelled, and the troops in the valley were not used for a counter-attack. The PLA had no capacity to progress further operations beyond the Kailash range or in any other sector, let alone to advance Leh. The corps commander took counsel of his fears and withdrew an intact brigade after a loss of only two companies to defend Leh, 160 km behind.

At Walong, the fundamental error was not to hold the higher features on the western flank, allowing the brigade to be attacked from higher to lower ground and also isolate the entire sector. However, 11 Infantry Brigade fought a cohesive battle. Apart from aggressive patrolling, a heroic spoiling attack was launched by the 6 Kumaon and 4 Dogra to preempt the use of the vulnerable western approach. Unfortunately, once it failed, the brigade defences became untenable, and a relatively, better-organised withdrawal followed within 12 hours of the main attack.

Psychological collapse

It is empirical wisdom that the outcome of battle lies in the minds of the commanders and the troops. Both the attacker and the defender endeavour to create rapidly changing situations to make the adversary perceive that they can not cope with them. This brings about a psychological collapse and defeat. In attack, this is created by relatively higher mobility, manoeuvre, isolation, firepower, and finally, tactical battle for dominating ground. The defender tries to neutralise all these factors by aggressively interfering with and delaying the buildup and manoeuvre from the flanks, prevent isolation by deployment in depth, spoiling attacks, determined fight at the main defences and counterattack. As brought out earlier, the PLA tactics exploited all these factors, and the Indian Army remained passive in defensive positions. The outcome was inevitable.

The moral factor played a big role. The rout and destruction in Phase 1, particularly, the complete decimation of the 7th Infantry Brigade, adversely affected the psyche of the commanders and the troops. The PLA’s moral ascendency was absolute. How else can one explain the disintegration of 4 Infantry Division even before the battle began and the withdrawal of an intact 114 Infantry Brigade from Chushul? The Indian Army, despite all odds, had the capability to defeat the PLA in Phase 2 of the war, but it psychologically collapsed and gave up without a fight.

The moral factor played a big role. The rout and destruction in Phase 1, particularly, the complete decimation of the 7th Infantry Brigade, adversely affected the psyche of the commanders and the troops. The PLA’s moral ascendency was absolute. How else can one explain the disintegration of 4 Infantry Division even before the battle began and the withdrawal of an intact 114 Infantry Brigade from Chushul? The Indian Army, despite all odds, had the capability to defeat the PLA in Phase 2 of the war, but it psychologically collapsed and gave up without a fight.
This last para explains the competence of Indian
Despite having numerical superiority
They suffer from mental inferiority
 
BTW. Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong were Chinese territory earlier than the Tang Dynasty conquered India... Well, I mean. China was the first country to conquer India.
Just ike 50 million of you got wiped out by your dictator during great leap backward. You are probably the shortest, weakest and the most feminine race of men on the planet. You chingchongs eat literally anything that moves - insects, bats,rats, pangolins, weird sea creatures etc etc, which can easily be found on the ground or the ocean. On the other hand, Indians have to make an effor to grow their food - wheat, corn. lentils, tomatos, onions, etc etc, you probably haven't heard of these crops

This last para explains the competence of Indian
Despite having numerical superiority
They suffer from mental inferiority
About 20,000 Indian troops faced much superior Chinese troops, numbering about 80,000

But now the situation is completely different 👇

 
@Hellfire2006 @Black Tornado @Cheepek @SIPRA
China-India military standoff along their disputed land border heads into its third winter, questions and theories continue to swirl about Beijing's motivation for taking such aggressive action at this time.
But why now? There are many potential explanations, ranging from Chinese disgruntlement over Indian infrastructure upgrades near the LAC, to anger at India's rejection of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), to retaliation for New Delhi's decision to limit Chinese investment in India, among others.Even if Beijing's statement is not to be believed, experts would be hard-pressed to deny that India has been making significant upgrades to infrastructure along the LAC (and so has China as well). The posterchild of such developments, and perhaps the spark of the current hostilities, is New Delhi's completion of a strategic road known as the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat-Beg-Oldie (DSDBO). DSDBO is an all-weather road stretching approximately 255 kilometers that will dramatically improve travel times between the historical Himalayan capital of Leh and Daulat-Beg-Oldie, which is located at the Karakoram Pass and considered a geostrategically sensitive entrance point into China's restive Xinjiang province. As relates to the current standoff, Taylor Fravel, an expert on China's border conflicts, surmised that a feeder road from DSDBO toward the Galwan Valley was probably interpreted by Beijing as a potential “back door into [Chinese-controlled] Aksai Chin.

Given Chinese concerns, Beijing probably wants to offset Indian infrastructure improvements that might offer logistical advantages in the future. Interestingly, China may have little choice in the matter. Although rarely discussed in Western circles, China probably lost its last standoff with India, referred to as the Nathu La and Cho La clashes, in 1967—and this predates the infrastructure upgrades that are set to give New Delhi potentially new military advantages. Furthermore, India's strategic roads are not just roads with implications during wartime, but in peacetime they also support India's ability to patrol disputed areas. Indian geopolitical analyst Harsh V. Pant of the Observer Researcher Foundation argues that “India has ramped up infrastructure on its side, so the Chinese military is finding Indian soldiers in locations where they are not used to seeing Indian footprint. Indian Army's patrolling is also more effective than in the past, forcing Chinese military to up the ante.” Thus, Beijing would reasonably want to respond through consolidation of its territorial claims.

Finally, Western analysts to date have probably underestimated the significance of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's decision in August 6, 2019, to revoke Article 370 of the Indian constitution to unilaterally change the status of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh. For New Delhi, doing so should have been a non-factor since these are settled territories. For Beijing, however, the move seems to have struck a chord because it called into question Indian motives for Aksai Chin which borders Ladakh. Preeminent South Asia specialist Ashley Tellis raised the issue, writing: “…China's fierce opposition to the transformation of Ladakh's status, something that received only passing attention hitherto, set the stage of the militaristic power play that is now underway along the LAC.” Tellis later added that Beijing believes New Delhi had been involved in “cartographic aggression,” and as a result, he has been receiving “an earful” from Chinese interlocutors about it. On the same day as Modi's abrogation of Article 370, India's Home Minister, Amit Shah, vowed to give his life for the integrity of Jammu and Kashmir—to include Aksai Chin—further stoking Chinese concerns.

There is no doubt that countering Indian infrastructure development near the LAC played a crucial role in Beijing's decisionmaking. Additionally, Modi's decision on Article 370, though not considered a big deal in New Delhi, apparently rang alarm bells in Beijing. Of course, there could be other reasons that contributed to China's assertiveness along the LAC. None, however, support the notion that China was trying to exploit the coronavirus pandemic for geopolitical gain.

If anything, China expert Yun Sun reverses the causation, arguing that Beijing may have thought New Delhi's growing assertiveness at the LAC was nefariously timed to exploit China while it was trying to deal with deteriorating U.S. ties amid the coronavirus fallout. She references a Chinese article that notes India had tried “to stab it [China] in the back.” Thus, Beijing had to respond forcefully. Even if this argument is to be believed, it still does not negate Chinese grievances about Indian moves at the border. Rather, it seems that Beijing would have responded militarily regardless—albeit perhaps without as much force and at a different time—to properly adjust what it saw as New Delhi's steady attempts to change the status quo on the ground.
 
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When slum pariahs really believe that slum missiles are advanced... but,but,but....
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A video from 10 years ago ? That's insas LMG and it has been replaced by Negev Ng7 guns last year. That bulletproof jacket isn't even used any longer. It was replaced in 2019 by jackets contracted from indian firm smpp

This is the indian soldier at LoC in 2022
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Like should produce cow dung tanks and fighters are much better.
Try to fight with logic rather than insults. Trust me, it will make you feel better
 
Just ike 50 million of you got wiped out by your dictator during great leap backward. You are probably the shortest, weakest and the most feminine race of men on the planet. You chingchongs eat literally anything that moves - insects, bats,rats, pangolins, weird sea creatures etc etc, which can easily be found on the ground or the ocean. On the other hand, Indians have to make an effor to grow their food - wheat, corn. lentils, tomatos, onions, etc etc, you probably haven't heard of these crops


About 20,000 Indian troops faced much superior Chinese troops, numbering about 80,000

But now the situation is completely different 👇
[URL -unfurl="true"]https://www.news18.com/news/india/i...irfields-after-2020-galwan-clash-6392191.html[/URL]

but.but.but...

CATERS_MONITOR_LIZARD_IN_MOUTH_01-768x1151.jpg


I only admit that 150cm little indians have more courage on the keyboard.

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hey. 150cm little Indian. I know you are severely hungry and malnourished. But don't bring slum jokes to our modern civilized world. thank you. After all, this is not India.

omg. 150cm Indians really believe in Indian jokes.
 
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