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Differing threat perceptions?
Posted on May 26, 2011
Ikram Sehgal
Throughout the Cold War the US projected communism as the greater threat than India to Pakistan’s existence. Both in 1965 and 1971, the US “tilted” more towards Pakistan than India, when the chips were down we did not manage to get much more than tea and sympathy. With sanctions imposed after the 1965 war on both India and Pakistan, India’s armed forces got off scot-free, being equipped mostly with Soviet- or European-origin arms and equipment. Almost wholly dependant upon the US for its military supplies (an ally in both Cento and Seato), Pakistan not only had to scrounge and diversify, it was also forced into self-sufficiency when the sanctions put us repeatedly out in the cold every ten years.
Despite the Indians’ “non-aligned” status and Soviet connections, the US became India’s largest supplier of arms and defence equipment because of the 1962 India-China war. Despite this US largesse (which nearly included submarines to fight the Chinese in the Himalayas), India, for all intent and purposes, remained very much on the side, if not an active part, of the Soviet bloc throughout the Cold War. Who did they give whole-hearted support to during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan? Ambassador Chester Bowles subsequently laid the groundwork for stated US policy for the future with his famous memo dated May 25, 1965, supporting “democratic” India as a regional power to take on China, even at the expense of Pakistan. The collapse of the Soviet Union saw India starting to change tack. 9/11 allowed them to seize the opportunity to align themselves with the US desire to contain China. India used the “war against terrorism” to successfully label freedom fighters in Kashmir as “terrorists.” The 26/11 Mumbai incident in 2008 reinforced Indian claims that Al-Qaeda had India in its sights along with the US. CNN provides a platform for motivated Indian propaganda. Fareed Zakaria uses this media pulpit to for this.
There is no deep-rooted perfidy in US policy towards Pakistan, as our conspiracy theorists insist on suggesting. It has not changed in half a century. The US economic and military aid to Pakistan is (and always was) on an “as required” basis. We are a platform for their war in Afghanistan and, because of that, a victim of the terror proliferating throughout our heartland. We should learn not to resent realpolitik. India’s vast population makes it commercially more important than us. Even then, it was over violent Indian objections that the US stood its ground in keeping with its prime mission statement to protect US national interests no matter what. One has no reason to question US [resident Obama’s sincerity in believing that the existential threat to Pakistan comes from the terrorists running amok and that we must rid ourselves of the anti-Indian mindset. Unfortunately, the Indian armed forces deployment seems to have escaped US attention, or maybe in pursuit of their national interest they are choosing not to look! We are forced to juggle our priorities and our forces to combat both the threats.
The Indian forces on, or in proximity of, our eastern borders is not a figment of imagination but a real threat to our existence. Deployed to support operations in Siachen and Kargil, the Indian 14 Corps is mainly facing China (an infantry and mountain division each and armoured brigade): (1) 15 Corps facing us in Kashmir has two infantry divisions and an infantry brigade, 16 Corps comprising three infantry divisions and an armour and artillery brigade with 9 Corps having two infantry divisions and three armoured brigades; (2) In Punjab 11 Corps has three infantry divisions and an armoured and mechanised brigade each with 10 Corps having one infantry and three Reorganised Plans Infantry (Rapid) Divisions; (3) Haryana has two (Strike) Corps with one armoured, one rapid and one infantry division with an armoured and engineer brigade each as well as an armoured and engineering brigade; (4) Rajasthan 12 (Desert) Corps having two infantry divisions and an armoured and mechanised brigade each.
Well positioned to swiftly reinforce these forces (already more than three times our conventional strength at maximum stretch) on our borders, the Indians further have (1) 21 (Strike) Corps with an armoured division, a rapid division and infantry division and one artillery, armoured and engineering brigade each; and (2) 1 (Strike) Corps with an infantry division, a mountain division and an armoured division and 21 (Strike) Corps with an armoured division, a rapid division, an infantry division and an armoured, artillery and engineering brigade each. In face of this overwhelming 4:1 superiority, some of our available forces to deter this favourable attack ratio have been redeployed for counter-insurgency (COIN) operations.
Facing Bangladesh and China the Indians have 33 Corps with three mountain divisions, 3 Corps with one infantry and 1 mountain division and 4 Corps with three mountain divisions. Their logistics plans are in place to move another 10-15 percent from their eastern borders to join the 70 percent of their land forces already facing us within 2-3 weeks. With redeployment of their air force’s South-western command paralleling the army deployment, their air capacity has similarly overwhelming numbers.
Carrying out as many as 11 exercises in which 50,000 troops or more have been involved. Why is the Indian military trying so hard to operationalise its “Cold Start” Doctrine (CSD) against Pakistan for the last seven years? According to Masoodur Rahman Khattak, during the past month alone the Indian military concluded the six-day long joint military exercise “Vijayee Bhava” in Bikaner and Suratgarh in the Rajasthan Desert just 70 kilometres from the Pakistani borders. Blitzkrieg-type robust armoured incursions against Pakistan by mechanised and rapid divisions were practiced, emphasising rapid penetration into our territory and testing out their war fighting capability to launch night-time operations. India is placing eight Independent Brigade Groups (IBGs) close to the border with Pakistan to save mobilisation time and is further relocating its Strike Formation headquarters, armoured divisions and armoured brigades from their existing locations in central India and (in depth) in Punjab to forward locations. Having no strategic depth, Pakistan has its deployment close to our borders, the comparatively less time than India to deploy our forces offsets the element of surprise that CSD envisages.
Given the overwhelming numbers of the Indian deployment thereof, Pakistan should be forgiven for maintaining a minimum deterrent. To create a favourable environment maybe the US president could convince the Indians to publicly renounce their CSD option and redeploy even a token of their forces deeper into India. One would certainly like to have India as a friend, only peace can bring prosperity to South Asia. Can the country afford to take an existential gamble on Obama and Mian Nawaz Sharif coincidentally being on the same page with respect to their strategic threat perception that “India is not our enemy”? Can we declare India a “friend” when it persists in behaving as an enemy, and makes no secret about it?
What motive would the terrorists have in destroying Pakistan’s naval eyes and ears capacity? Who is the sole beneficiary of the loss of our P3C-Orions making our navy temporarily deaf and blind? Are we expected to be dumb also?
The writer is a defence and political
analyst. Email: isehgal@pathfinder9.com
-The News
Posted on May 26, 2011
Ikram Sehgal
Throughout the Cold War the US projected communism as the greater threat than India to Pakistan’s existence. Both in 1965 and 1971, the US “tilted” more towards Pakistan than India, when the chips were down we did not manage to get much more than tea and sympathy. With sanctions imposed after the 1965 war on both India and Pakistan, India’s armed forces got off scot-free, being equipped mostly with Soviet- or European-origin arms and equipment. Almost wholly dependant upon the US for its military supplies (an ally in both Cento and Seato), Pakistan not only had to scrounge and diversify, it was also forced into self-sufficiency when the sanctions put us repeatedly out in the cold every ten years.
Despite the Indians’ “non-aligned” status and Soviet connections, the US became India’s largest supplier of arms and defence equipment because of the 1962 India-China war. Despite this US largesse (which nearly included submarines to fight the Chinese in the Himalayas), India, for all intent and purposes, remained very much on the side, if not an active part, of the Soviet bloc throughout the Cold War. Who did they give whole-hearted support to during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan? Ambassador Chester Bowles subsequently laid the groundwork for stated US policy for the future with his famous memo dated May 25, 1965, supporting “democratic” India as a regional power to take on China, even at the expense of Pakistan. The collapse of the Soviet Union saw India starting to change tack. 9/11 allowed them to seize the opportunity to align themselves with the US desire to contain China. India used the “war against terrorism” to successfully label freedom fighters in Kashmir as “terrorists.” The 26/11 Mumbai incident in 2008 reinforced Indian claims that Al-Qaeda had India in its sights along with the US. CNN provides a platform for motivated Indian propaganda. Fareed Zakaria uses this media pulpit to for this.
There is no deep-rooted perfidy in US policy towards Pakistan, as our conspiracy theorists insist on suggesting. It has not changed in half a century. The US economic and military aid to Pakistan is (and always was) on an “as required” basis. We are a platform for their war in Afghanistan and, because of that, a victim of the terror proliferating throughout our heartland. We should learn not to resent realpolitik. India’s vast population makes it commercially more important than us. Even then, it was over violent Indian objections that the US stood its ground in keeping with its prime mission statement to protect US national interests no matter what. One has no reason to question US [resident Obama’s sincerity in believing that the existential threat to Pakistan comes from the terrorists running amok and that we must rid ourselves of the anti-Indian mindset. Unfortunately, the Indian armed forces deployment seems to have escaped US attention, or maybe in pursuit of their national interest they are choosing not to look! We are forced to juggle our priorities and our forces to combat both the threats.
The Indian forces on, or in proximity of, our eastern borders is not a figment of imagination but a real threat to our existence. Deployed to support operations in Siachen and Kargil, the Indian 14 Corps is mainly facing China (an infantry and mountain division each and armoured brigade): (1) 15 Corps facing us in Kashmir has two infantry divisions and an infantry brigade, 16 Corps comprising three infantry divisions and an armour and artillery brigade with 9 Corps having two infantry divisions and three armoured brigades; (2) In Punjab 11 Corps has three infantry divisions and an armoured and mechanised brigade each with 10 Corps having one infantry and three Reorganised Plans Infantry (Rapid) Divisions; (3) Haryana has two (Strike) Corps with one armoured, one rapid and one infantry division with an armoured and engineer brigade each as well as an armoured and engineering brigade; (4) Rajasthan 12 (Desert) Corps having two infantry divisions and an armoured and mechanised brigade each.
Well positioned to swiftly reinforce these forces (already more than three times our conventional strength at maximum stretch) on our borders, the Indians further have (1) 21 (Strike) Corps with an armoured division, a rapid division and infantry division and one artillery, armoured and engineering brigade each; and (2) 1 (Strike) Corps with an infantry division, a mountain division and an armoured division and 21 (Strike) Corps with an armoured division, a rapid division, an infantry division and an armoured, artillery and engineering brigade each. In face of this overwhelming 4:1 superiority, some of our available forces to deter this favourable attack ratio have been redeployed for counter-insurgency (COIN) operations.
Facing Bangladesh and China the Indians have 33 Corps with three mountain divisions, 3 Corps with one infantry and 1 mountain division and 4 Corps with three mountain divisions. Their logistics plans are in place to move another 10-15 percent from their eastern borders to join the 70 percent of their land forces already facing us within 2-3 weeks. With redeployment of their air force’s South-western command paralleling the army deployment, their air capacity has similarly overwhelming numbers.
Carrying out as many as 11 exercises in which 50,000 troops or more have been involved. Why is the Indian military trying so hard to operationalise its “Cold Start” Doctrine (CSD) against Pakistan for the last seven years? According to Masoodur Rahman Khattak, during the past month alone the Indian military concluded the six-day long joint military exercise “Vijayee Bhava” in Bikaner and Suratgarh in the Rajasthan Desert just 70 kilometres from the Pakistani borders. Blitzkrieg-type robust armoured incursions against Pakistan by mechanised and rapid divisions were practiced, emphasising rapid penetration into our territory and testing out their war fighting capability to launch night-time operations. India is placing eight Independent Brigade Groups (IBGs) close to the border with Pakistan to save mobilisation time and is further relocating its Strike Formation headquarters, armoured divisions and armoured brigades from their existing locations in central India and (in depth) in Punjab to forward locations. Having no strategic depth, Pakistan has its deployment close to our borders, the comparatively less time than India to deploy our forces offsets the element of surprise that CSD envisages.
Given the overwhelming numbers of the Indian deployment thereof, Pakistan should be forgiven for maintaining a minimum deterrent. To create a favourable environment maybe the US president could convince the Indians to publicly renounce their CSD option and redeploy even a token of their forces deeper into India. One would certainly like to have India as a friend, only peace can bring prosperity to South Asia. Can the country afford to take an existential gamble on Obama and Mian Nawaz Sharif coincidentally being on the same page with respect to their strategic threat perception that “India is not our enemy”? Can we declare India a “friend” when it persists in behaving as an enemy, and makes no secret about it?
What motive would the terrorists have in destroying Pakistan’s naval eyes and ears capacity? Who is the sole beneficiary of the loss of our P3C-Orions making our navy temporarily deaf and blind? Are we expected to be dumb also?
The writer is a defence and political
analyst. Email: isehgal@pathfinder9.com
-The News
