Banglar Bir
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Our turn now,to invite them to a troll feast.
What’s the India, China Doklam standoff about?
- Thread starter bluesky
- Start date
Banglar Bir
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World Military News In Bangla - বাংলাতে বিশ্বের সামরিক খবর
Page Liked · 2 hrs · Edited ·
ভিডিও ক্লিপ আজকের পর্বে চীনের তিব্বতে ভারতীয় সীমান্তের কাছে চীনের বিপুল সমরাস্ত্র নিয়োগ ও সামরিক মহড়ার একটি ছোট ভিডিও
Page Liked · 2 hrs · Edited ·
ভিডিও ক্লিপ আজকের পর্বে চীনের তিব্বতে ভারতীয় সীমান্তের কাছে চীনের বিপুল সমরাস্ত্র নিয়োগ ও সামরিক মহড়ার একটি ছোট ভিডিও
Zabaniyah
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He's right actually, a war between them would impact Bangladesh and the neighborhood badly. That war won't benefit anyone. Only terrorist groups will benefit.
Just imagine in an escalating war, the Indians start firing on Chinese cargo vessels and vice versa. Imagine the merchandise was ours. We as a big importer will surely be affected if such a situation arise, which in turn would hamper our exports. Furthermore, our RMG sector is now in the bit of a sensitive and troubling period.
No, the real fighting/action is neither done by the PDF keyboard warriors nor it is as shown in the war movies. We are in the very close neighborhood of Doklam. A peaceful solution is best for all the countries here. Note also that BD can certainly expect a direct co-lateral damage or an indirect damage created by the unwelcome economic chaos in our very vicinity by a fighting. A war is not as fun and enjoyable as it is in the Hollywood movies. I just wish a negotiated settlement and a full time peace.
Zabaniyah
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Reality is a b!tch...
Banglar Bir
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Flip-Flop By Ministry Of Defence Delays Acquisition Of Crucial Ammunition For Army
Nitin A. Gokhale- Jul 25, 2017, 2:51 pm
SNAPSHOT
While the Ministry of Defence is still undecided about keeping out the inefficient public sector undertakings (PSUs) from manufacturing vital ammunition, the Indian Army continues to wait for it.
Inexplicable flip-flop by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) over a decision to keep out inefficient public sector undertakings from participating in fresh tenders to manufacture vital ammunition for the Indian Army, has dismayed private players in the fray.
Eight Requests for Proposal (RFI) were issued in November last year for the manufacture of different kinds of ammunition needed urgently by the Indian Army. The contracts, once finalised would run into at least USD 5 billion worth of orders over the next decade.
In fact, the MoD had in 2015 recognised the need to augment capacity for ammunition manufacture in private sector since the Indian DPSUs and the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) were unable to meet the perpetual critical shortages faced by the Army. Pre-bid meetings were accordingly held with prospective private players in late 2016. In these meetings, PSUs—Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL), Electronic Corporation of India Ltd (ECIL) and OFB — were not invited as the MOD had decided to build additional capacities in the private sector only.
Subsequently, Director General Ordnance Services (DGOS), published RFPs in March this year for procurement of eight types of critical Ammunition Stores inviting offers from the private sector only. The intended participation of Indian private industry in this segment was aimed at harnessing the capabilities of the private sector to accelerate the process of indigenisation of strategic ammunitions to meet the requirements of Armed Forces.
The MoD had good reasons not to allow DPSU participation. According to figures available with those who have the responsibility to deal with ammunition availability, BEL and ECIL, entrusted with manufacturing the crucial electronic fuses meant for 105 and 130 mm guns, will take five and six years respectively to complete the existing orders given to them, because of their own track record, dating back to many years, of manufacturing just about 50,000 fuses per month.
The Army cannot wait so long. Therefore the decision to invite the private sector participation in what is considered a strategic sector was taken. The idea was to create additional capacity in the country (in the private sector) even as DPSUs continued to manufacture part of the requirement.
Accordingly, sources say as part of the RFP process, the pre-bid meeting was held at Sena Bhavan on 8 May 2017 in which DPSUs were not allowed to participate as the response was invited only from the private sector. In fact, representatives of some PSUs who happened to be in the room were barred from attending the pre-bid discussion.
Then suddenly, in early June following vigorous lobbying by representatives of ECIL and BEL, the Department of Defence Production (DDP) apparently reversed the earlier decision not to allow DPSUs to participate in the eight RFPs under discussion.
The fear among private sector players now is that the level playing field that was being offered by the MoD by keeping the DPSUs out is being abandoned. The reason is simple: DPSUs already have the rights to technology sourced from abroad–and purchased earlier. They can, therefore, quote a price much lower than the private manufacturers who are still in talks with some of their foreign partners for the Transfer of Technology (ToT). “In the event, this RFP is extended for bidding to DPSUs, PSUs and OFB… (it will) result in a further additional price advantage to the DPSUs, PSUs and OFB due to the ability to cross-subsidize across two different orders,” one of the associations said in a letter to the government.
While the DPSUs can theoretically supply crucial ammunition at a lower price, they are certainly not in a position to meet the timelines prescribed by the Army. In any case, the Army is not taking away the orders from the DPSUs; the private players would only add to indigenous capacity.
As other private sector competitors said in a communication to the government: “We learn that the PSUs are being allowed to participate in the bidding which would definitely be a retrograde step…allowing the entry of PSUs will be the repeat of the PSUs dependent model which has repeatedly failed miserably over all those years.”
Almost all of them have sought reversal of the MoD decision and have even approached the Prime Minister’s office (PMO) to intervene in the matter.
While the government’s final decision is awaited, there is clearly an internal tussle on within the MoD, given that the final extension for participation in the eight crucial ammunition tenders is yet to be published by the ministry.
Meanwhile, the Army continues to wait for the crucial ammunition.
This article was first published on Bharat Shakti and has been published here with permission
https://swarajyamag.com/defence/-fl...ys-acquisition-of-crucial-ammunition-for-army
Nitin A. Gokhale- Jul 25, 2017, 2:51 pm
SNAPSHOT
While the Ministry of Defence is still undecided about keeping out the inefficient public sector undertakings (PSUs) from manufacturing vital ammunition, the Indian Army continues to wait for it.
Inexplicable flip-flop by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) over a decision to keep out inefficient public sector undertakings from participating in fresh tenders to manufacture vital ammunition for the Indian Army, has dismayed private players in the fray.
Eight Requests for Proposal (RFI) were issued in November last year for the manufacture of different kinds of ammunition needed urgently by the Indian Army. The contracts, once finalised would run into at least USD 5 billion worth of orders over the next decade.
In fact, the MoD had in 2015 recognised the need to augment capacity for ammunition manufacture in private sector since the Indian DPSUs and the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) were unable to meet the perpetual critical shortages faced by the Army. Pre-bid meetings were accordingly held with prospective private players in late 2016. In these meetings, PSUs—Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL), Electronic Corporation of India Ltd (ECIL) and OFB — were not invited as the MOD had decided to build additional capacities in the private sector only.
Subsequently, Director General Ordnance Services (DGOS), published RFPs in March this year for procurement of eight types of critical Ammunition Stores inviting offers from the private sector only. The intended participation of Indian private industry in this segment was aimed at harnessing the capabilities of the private sector to accelerate the process of indigenisation of strategic ammunitions to meet the requirements of Armed Forces.
The MoD had good reasons not to allow DPSU participation. According to figures available with those who have the responsibility to deal with ammunition availability, BEL and ECIL, entrusted with manufacturing the crucial electronic fuses meant for 105 and 130 mm guns, will take five and six years respectively to complete the existing orders given to them, because of their own track record, dating back to many years, of manufacturing just about 50,000 fuses per month.
The Army cannot wait so long. Therefore the decision to invite the private sector participation in what is considered a strategic sector was taken. The idea was to create additional capacity in the country (in the private sector) even as DPSUs continued to manufacture part of the requirement.
Accordingly, sources say as part of the RFP process, the pre-bid meeting was held at Sena Bhavan on 8 May 2017 in which DPSUs were not allowed to participate as the response was invited only from the private sector. In fact, representatives of some PSUs who happened to be in the room were barred from attending the pre-bid discussion.
Then suddenly, in early June following vigorous lobbying by representatives of ECIL and BEL, the Department of Defence Production (DDP) apparently reversed the earlier decision not to allow DPSUs to participate in the eight RFPs under discussion.
The fear among private sector players now is that the level playing field that was being offered by the MoD by keeping the DPSUs out is being abandoned. The reason is simple: DPSUs already have the rights to technology sourced from abroad–and purchased earlier. They can, therefore, quote a price much lower than the private manufacturers who are still in talks with some of their foreign partners for the Transfer of Technology (ToT). “In the event, this RFP is extended for bidding to DPSUs, PSUs and OFB… (it will) result in a further additional price advantage to the DPSUs, PSUs and OFB due to the ability to cross-subsidize across two different orders,” one of the associations said in a letter to the government.
While the DPSUs can theoretically supply crucial ammunition at a lower price, they are certainly not in a position to meet the timelines prescribed by the Army. In any case, the Army is not taking away the orders from the DPSUs; the private players would only add to indigenous capacity.
As other private sector competitors said in a communication to the government: “We learn that the PSUs are being allowed to participate in the bidding which would definitely be a retrograde step…allowing the entry of PSUs will be the repeat of the PSUs dependent model which has repeatedly failed miserably over all those years.”
Almost all of them have sought reversal of the MoD decision and have even approached the Prime Minister’s office (PMO) to intervene in the matter.
While the government’s final decision is awaited, there is clearly an internal tussle on within the MoD, given that the final extension for participation in the eight crucial ammunition tenders is yet to be published by the ministry.
Meanwhile, the Army continues to wait for the crucial ammunition.
This article was first published on Bharat Shakti and has been published here with permission
https://swarajyamag.com/defence/-fl...ys-acquisition-of-crucial-ammunition-for-army
Banglar Bir
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Debacle in Doklam reveals serious flaws in India’s “Neighborhood First” policy
P K Balachandran, July 25, 2017
The unfolding realities underlying the Sino-Indian standoff over the border in Doklam are clearly bringing out serious flaws in Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Neighborhood First” policy.
The “Neighborhood First’ policy enunciated in 2014 as India’s new foreign policy “mantra” has not achieved what it was meant to achieve.
Instead of generating friendly feelings towards India, with the small neighbors looking up to it for motherly affection, it has created apprehensions, if not fear of domination by a boastful and chest thumping hegemonic Big Brother.
Offers of billions of dollars of aid and lobbying for big ticket project contracts are either rejected or reluctantly consented to out of an ingrained fear of domination.
With a tradition of thinly veiled meddling in the politics of its neighbors, any push by India for greater economic ties is suspected to be a political Trojan Horse. One of the techniques resorted to by the weaker neighbors is delaying the implementation of projects or putting spokes in the wheel to bring them to a grinding halt.
India has conflicts with its powerful neighbors too. The conflict with Pakistan is endemic. The one with China is also endemic but the difference is that Sino-India flare ups have occurred only once in a while.
Also Read: Doklam: Will safeguard China’s sovereignty at any cost, PLA threatens India
But the on-going Sino-Indian conflict over the border in Doklam seems to be as serious as the one in 1962. It could lead to a destructive war, which will leave India’s economy badly bruised.
As a result of the Doklam standoff, Bhutan may want to hive off from India’s orbit and get into China’s, or it could try to be equidistant, which will be disadvantageous to India rather than China.
Old Policy Under New Name
Although the reference here is to “Modi’s Neighborhood First policy” it will be unfair to single Modi out for blame. India’s policy towards its smaller neighbors (other than Pakistan) has been patronizing and domineering right from the time of independence in 1947. Narendra Modi only articulated it clearly, and gave it a name.
However, Modi promises to take the policy to the farthest extent as he is the fountainhead of a resurgent, fired up, and jingoistic India.
As predicted by some commentators when he took office in 2014, the Modi-led government has exacerbated tension with Pakistan and China, regardless of the fact that these are the only countries in the neighborhood which could stand up to India.
Pakistan has had a huge share in creating trouble with India by unleashing cross border terrorism. But New Delhi has been showing its wrath against Islamabad by unleashing unbridled violence against its own Muslim citizens in Kashmir on the charge that Kashmiri youth are throwing stones at Indian Security Forces at the behest of Pakistan.
Deaths and blinding of hundreds of Kashmiri youth have alienated Kashmiris from India. Tension in Kashmir is also manifested in Indo-Pak cross border firing on a daily basis.
Conflict with China
As regards, China, Modi has been challenging the emerging Asian and world power abandoning the previous governments’ policy of managing the relationship, especially the sensitive and unsettled border dispute.
In contrast to the approach of Rajiv Gandhi, P.V. Narasimha Rao, A.B. Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh, Modi began challenging China over issues which do not directly impinge on India’s immediate interest.
He opposed Chinese President Xi Jinping’s prestigious flagship project, the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, merely because one of the roads in the project traverses an area which has been in Pakistan’s “illegal occupation” since 1948. It makes no sense to rake up this issue when there is no earthly chance of India’s ever getting back the said area from Pakistan.
In 1966 China had built the Karakoram highway in the disputed Gilgit-Baltistan area of Pakistan-held Kashmir. But at that time India wisely chose not to waste its breath over that.
The Modi regime opposed the OBOR project on political grounds disregarding China’s plea that the OBOR is an economic project to benefit the area and region as a whole, and is completely unrelated to the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, which, it said, should be settled by India and Pakistan bilaterally.
New Delhi went further and badmouthed the OBOR, propagated its alleged ill effects and boycotted the OBOR summit in Beijing, knowing full well that President Xi was using it to boost his image ahead of the up-coming and all-important Communist Party Congress.
Earlier, Modi allowed the exiled Tibetan leader, the Dalai Lama, and American Ambassador Richard Verma to make high profile visits to Arunachal Pradesh which China claims as being part of Tibet. And most recently, India held the Malabar naval exercise with China’s arch rivals, US and Japan.
Doklam Standoff
However, what irked China and made it extremely belligerent, was the Indian incursion into Doklam on the border between Bhutan and Tibet/China, to thwart the construction of a road by China.
India said that Doklam is disputed territory and that it had deployed troops as per the 2007 agreement with Bhutan which requires collaboration to protect each others’ national interests.
But China said that the area belongs to it as per the 1890 treaty between British India on the one hand, and Tibet/China on the other.
At any rate, the area adjoins Bhutan and not India, and therefore, India has no locus standi there, China argued.
China charged that India had forced itself upon Bhutan which had been in the process of settling the border dispute with it through talks since 1985. China also pointed out that Bhutan had only recently claimed Doklam and that this was done on India’s prodding. India has made Doklam an issue to safeguard its security and not Bhutan’s, China pointed out.
Also Read: Will Bhutan exert its independent stand in the Doklam conflict?
While the two Asian giants are involved in a tense standoff, with India refusing to withdraw its troops from Doklam, and China threatening to wage war to eject them, Bhutan finds itself in a cleft stick.
Bhutan has problems with China as well as India. But its immediate problem is with India. It is economically extremely dependent on India. India can annex it, as it annexed neighboring Sikkim in 1975.
Bhutan cannot antagonize China either, because China can annex it, as it annexed Tibet in 1951.
Need for Independent Foreign Policy
The Sino-Indian standoff over Doklam has put Bhutan at the cross roads. Given the likelihood of tension in Sino-Indian relations increasing, Bhutan will soon have to take charge of its foreign policy fully.
Given the alienation of the Bhutanese people from India because of its economic domination and its continued bid to control its foreign policy, Bhutan is likely to move closer to China, if only to keep India under check.
As a first step Bhutan may establish diplomatic relations with China, which it has not done so far in deference to India, although by the revised 2007 treaty, it can pursue an independent foreign policy.
But the most difficult part for Bhutan will be disentangling itself from India’s economical stranglehold. According to the Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses of New Delhi, 95% of Bhutan’s exports go to India, and India accounts for 75% of its imports. Heavy investments in India-funded hydel projects further tie Bhutan to India. Indian traders indulge in malpractices.
It is said that most of the money India pumps into Bhutan flows back to India. Imports from India have virtually killed Bhutan’s agriculture not to speak of industries.
Bhutan has shown its wish to have friends beyond India by establishing 53 missions abroad. It has defied India on the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal motor vehicle agreement and on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It has already established unofficial contacts with China and might agree to China’s “package deal” on the border dispute.
Also Read: Doklam stand-off: Pentagon tells China, India to engage in direct dialogue
China has said that it will give up claims in certain sections of the border if Bhutan gives up the Doklam plateau, which gives it a strategic advantage over India. One sign of the possibility of a deal over Doklam is that Bhutan has yielded to China’s demands at several places in past negotiations.
Sourabh Gupta, a senior fellow at the Institute for China-America Studies in Washington, suggests an honorable exit for India from the mess it is in.
In an article in South China Morning Post on Sunday, Gupta says: “New Delhi must push Thimpu to take the lead in engaging Beijing and devise a mutually acceptable boundary protocol that acknowledges China’s effective jurisdiction of the area, pending final settlement, in exchange of the restoration of the status quo ante as of June 16, 2017.”
“In parallel, New Delhi must commit to unilaterally vacating the Doklam area while privately holding out for Beijing’s reiteration of the 2012 understanding that the tri-junction boundary points will be finalized in consultation with all three parties concerned.”
Will Modi listen and save India from a military and economic disaster?
http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/0...rious-flaws-indias-neighborhood-first-policy/
War between India, China not impossible; diplomats must prevent it, says Chinese expert
SAM Report, July 24, 2017
War between India and China over Doka La is a possibility and diplomats from both sides must prevent an armed conflict, a Chinese expert has said.
Long Xingchun, a research fellow at the Charhar Institute and director of the Center for Indian Studies at China West Normal University, said that there were precedents of the unnecessary war in the past and the looming one between India and China would harm both countries.
“A war is not completely impossible. There is a great deal of precedents of unnecessary battles fought at the completely wrong time and place. So far, it is the prime goal of diplomats of both sides to prevent a war that neither wants,” Long wrote in the Global Times.
Indian and Chinese troops have been engaged in over a month long stand-off in Doka La, which is at a tri-junction of India, Bhutan and China.
India wants the issue to be resolved diplomatically, but China says the withdrawal of Indian troops is a precondition for talks.
“To this end, they must not bluff. The 1962 war, triggered as India operated the Forward Policy, has left Indians hostile toward China for decades. A larger war today may give rise to strong animosity between the two sides for centuries.”
Long also slammed Indian journalists in China and Indian experts on China for blaming Beijing and state-run media for stoking tensions.
Chinese media and experts have launched a blitzkrieg against India and called for war.
“China doesn’t want a war. Many Indian media outlets and analysts put all the blame on China for the stand-off and conclude that China had plotted to provoke the conflict in an attempt to divert attention from its internal problems,” Long said.
He also said it was wrong to think that China was using the Doka La border stand-off for the Communist Party of China National Congress to be held later this year.
He said, “The reports even related the face-off to the 19th Communist Party of China National Congress to be held later this year. This bookish analysis reflects what little knowledge of China some Indian media and scholars have.”
Long noted that there were not more than 200 China experts in India of which only 10 percent can read or speak Mandarin.
“Regrettably, it is these people that shape India’s understanding and judgment of China.”
“China does have many domestic problems, nonetheless they are no more serious than what’s facing India internally. In fact, to prepare for the 19th Party Congress, China needs domestic harmony and a peaceful international environment rather than conflict, a point which may be hard for Indians to understand,” he writes.
“If India fights a large-scale war with China now, it will not only scare away foreign investment but also disrupt India’s economy.
“Even if a war is brief, China and India may still be locked in a standoff for a long time. In this case, India will have its economic momentum disrupted and lose its opportunities to rise.”
India has blamed China for trying to change the status of the India-Bhutan-China tri-junction, and ruled out unilateral withdrawal of Indian troops.
Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj last week said that China’s attempt to build a road through Bhutan posed a security challenge to India.
On China’s insistence that India withdraw troops from Doka La, she said: “India wants that all troops are removed from the tri-junction point before discussing the issue together. All countries, including Bhutan, are with us.”
The matter is expected to feature in talks between National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and his Chinese counterpart State Councillor Yang Jiechi when they meet on 27-28 July in Beijing at a NSAs meet from BRICS countries.
http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/0...e-diplomats-must-prevent-says-chinese-expert/
P K Balachandran, July 25, 2017
The unfolding realities underlying the Sino-Indian standoff over the border in Doklam are clearly bringing out serious flaws in Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Neighborhood First” policy.
The “Neighborhood First’ policy enunciated in 2014 as India’s new foreign policy “mantra” has not achieved what it was meant to achieve.
Instead of generating friendly feelings towards India, with the small neighbors looking up to it for motherly affection, it has created apprehensions, if not fear of domination by a boastful and chest thumping hegemonic Big Brother.
Offers of billions of dollars of aid and lobbying for big ticket project contracts are either rejected or reluctantly consented to out of an ingrained fear of domination.
With a tradition of thinly veiled meddling in the politics of its neighbors, any push by India for greater economic ties is suspected to be a political Trojan Horse. One of the techniques resorted to by the weaker neighbors is delaying the implementation of projects or putting spokes in the wheel to bring them to a grinding halt.
India has conflicts with its powerful neighbors too. The conflict with Pakistan is endemic. The one with China is also endemic but the difference is that Sino-India flare ups have occurred only once in a while.
Also Read: Doklam: Will safeguard China’s sovereignty at any cost, PLA threatens India
But the on-going Sino-Indian conflict over the border in Doklam seems to be as serious as the one in 1962. It could lead to a destructive war, which will leave India’s economy badly bruised.
As a result of the Doklam standoff, Bhutan may want to hive off from India’s orbit and get into China’s, or it could try to be equidistant, which will be disadvantageous to India rather than China.
Old Policy Under New Name
Although the reference here is to “Modi’s Neighborhood First policy” it will be unfair to single Modi out for blame. India’s policy towards its smaller neighbors (other than Pakistan) has been patronizing and domineering right from the time of independence in 1947. Narendra Modi only articulated it clearly, and gave it a name.
However, Modi promises to take the policy to the farthest extent as he is the fountainhead of a resurgent, fired up, and jingoistic India.
As predicted by some commentators when he took office in 2014, the Modi-led government has exacerbated tension with Pakistan and China, regardless of the fact that these are the only countries in the neighborhood which could stand up to India.
Pakistan has had a huge share in creating trouble with India by unleashing cross border terrorism. But New Delhi has been showing its wrath against Islamabad by unleashing unbridled violence against its own Muslim citizens in Kashmir on the charge that Kashmiri youth are throwing stones at Indian Security Forces at the behest of Pakistan.
Deaths and blinding of hundreds of Kashmiri youth have alienated Kashmiris from India. Tension in Kashmir is also manifested in Indo-Pak cross border firing on a daily basis.
Conflict with China
As regards, China, Modi has been challenging the emerging Asian and world power abandoning the previous governments’ policy of managing the relationship, especially the sensitive and unsettled border dispute.
In contrast to the approach of Rajiv Gandhi, P.V. Narasimha Rao, A.B. Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh, Modi began challenging China over issues which do not directly impinge on India’s immediate interest.
He opposed Chinese President Xi Jinping’s prestigious flagship project, the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, merely because one of the roads in the project traverses an area which has been in Pakistan’s “illegal occupation” since 1948. It makes no sense to rake up this issue when there is no earthly chance of India’s ever getting back the said area from Pakistan.
In 1966 China had built the Karakoram highway in the disputed Gilgit-Baltistan area of Pakistan-held Kashmir. But at that time India wisely chose not to waste its breath over that.
The Modi regime opposed the OBOR project on political grounds disregarding China’s plea that the OBOR is an economic project to benefit the area and region as a whole, and is completely unrelated to the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, which, it said, should be settled by India and Pakistan bilaterally.
New Delhi went further and badmouthed the OBOR, propagated its alleged ill effects and boycotted the OBOR summit in Beijing, knowing full well that President Xi was using it to boost his image ahead of the up-coming and all-important Communist Party Congress.
Earlier, Modi allowed the exiled Tibetan leader, the Dalai Lama, and American Ambassador Richard Verma to make high profile visits to Arunachal Pradesh which China claims as being part of Tibet. And most recently, India held the Malabar naval exercise with China’s arch rivals, US and Japan.
Doklam Standoff
However, what irked China and made it extremely belligerent, was the Indian incursion into Doklam on the border between Bhutan and Tibet/China, to thwart the construction of a road by China.
India said that Doklam is disputed territory and that it had deployed troops as per the 2007 agreement with Bhutan which requires collaboration to protect each others’ national interests.
But China said that the area belongs to it as per the 1890 treaty between British India on the one hand, and Tibet/China on the other.
At any rate, the area adjoins Bhutan and not India, and therefore, India has no locus standi there, China argued.
China charged that India had forced itself upon Bhutan which had been in the process of settling the border dispute with it through talks since 1985. China also pointed out that Bhutan had only recently claimed Doklam and that this was done on India’s prodding. India has made Doklam an issue to safeguard its security and not Bhutan’s, China pointed out.
Also Read: Will Bhutan exert its independent stand in the Doklam conflict?
While the two Asian giants are involved in a tense standoff, with India refusing to withdraw its troops from Doklam, and China threatening to wage war to eject them, Bhutan finds itself in a cleft stick.
Bhutan has problems with China as well as India. But its immediate problem is with India. It is economically extremely dependent on India. India can annex it, as it annexed neighboring Sikkim in 1975.
Bhutan cannot antagonize China either, because China can annex it, as it annexed Tibet in 1951.
Need for Independent Foreign Policy
The Sino-Indian standoff over Doklam has put Bhutan at the cross roads. Given the likelihood of tension in Sino-Indian relations increasing, Bhutan will soon have to take charge of its foreign policy fully.
Given the alienation of the Bhutanese people from India because of its economic domination and its continued bid to control its foreign policy, Bhutan is likely to move closer to China, if only to keep India under check.
As a first step Bhutan may establish diplomatic relations with China, which it has not done so far in deference to India, although by the revised 2007 treaty, it can pursue an independent foreign policy.
But the most difficult part for Bhutan will be disentangling itself from India’s economical stranglehold. According to the Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses of New Delhi, 95% of Bhutan’s exports go to India, and India accounts for 75% of its imports. Heavy investments in India-funded hydel projects further tie Bhutan to India. Indian traders indulge in malpractices.
It is said that most of the money India pumps into Bhutan flows back to India. Imports from India have virtually killed Bhutan’s agriculture not to speak of industries.
Bhutan has shown its wish to have friends beyond India by establishing 53 missions abroad. It has defied India on the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal motor vehicle agreement and on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It has already established unofficial contacts with China and might agree to China’s “package deal” on the border dispute.
Also Read: Doklam stand-off: Pentagon tells China, India to engage in direct dialogue
China has said that it will give up claims in certain sections of the border if Bhutan gives up the Doklam plateau, which gives it a strategic advantage over India. One sign of the possibility of a deal over Doklam is that Bhutan has yielded to China’s demands at several places in past negotiations.
Sourabh Gupta, a senior fellow at the Institute for China-America Studies in Washington, suggests an honorable exit for India from the mess it is in.
In an article in South China Morning Post on Sunday, Gupta says: “New Delhi must push Thimpu to take the lead in engaging Beijing and devise a mutually acceptable boundary protocol that acknowledges China’s effective jurisdiction of the area, pending final settlement, in exchange of the restoration of the status quo ante as of June 16, 2017.”
“In parallel, New Delhi must commit to unilaterally vacating the Doklam area while privately holding out for Beijing’s reiteration of the 2012 understanding that the tri-junction boundary points will be finalized in consultation with all three parties concerned.”
Will Modi listen and save India from a military and economic disaster?
http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/0...rious-flaws-indias-neighborhood-first-policy/
War between India, China not impossible; diplomats must prevent it, says Chinese expert
SAM Report, July 24, 2017
Long Xingchun, a research fellow at the Charhar Institute and director of the Center for Indian Studies at China West Normal University, said that there were precedents of the unnecessary war in the past and the looming one between India and China would harm both countries.
“A war is not completely impossible. There is a great deal of precedents of unnecessary battles fought at the completely wrong time and place. So far, it is the prime goal of diplomats of both sides to prevent a war that neither wants,” Long wrote in the Global Times.
Indian and Chinese troops have been engaged in over a month long stand-off in Doka La, which is at a tri-junction of India, Bhutan and China.
India wants the issue to be resolved diplomatically, but China says the withdrawal of Indian troops is a precondition for talks.
“To this end, they must not bluff. The 1962 war, triggered as India operated the Forward Policy, has left Indians hostile toward China for decades. A larger war today may give rise to strong animosity between the two sides for centuries.”
Long also slammed Indian journalists in China and Indian experts on China for blaming Beijing and state-run media for stoking tensions.
Chinese media and experts have launched a blitzkrieg against India and called for war.
“China doesn’t want a war. Many Indian media outlets and analysts put all the blame on China for the stand-off and conclude that China had plotted to provoke the conflict in an attempt to divert attention from its internal problems,” Long said.
He also said it was wrong to think that China was using the Doka La border stand-off for the Communist Party of China National Congress to be held later this year.
He said, “The reports even related the face-off to the 19th Communist Party of China National Congress to be held later this year. This bookish analysis reflects what little knowledge of China some Indian media and scholars have.”
Long noted that there were not more than 200 China experts in India of which only 10 percent can read or speak Mandarin.
“Regrettably, it is these people that shape India’s understanding and judgment of China.”
“China does have many domestic problems, nonetheless they are no more serious than what’s facing India internally. In fact, to prepare for the 19th Party Congress, China needs domestic harmony and a peaceful international environment rather than conflict, a point which may be hard for Indians to understand,” he writes.
“If India fights a large-scale war with China now, it will not only scare away foreign investment but also disrupt India’s economy.
“Even if a war is brief, China and India may still be locked in a standoff for a long time. In this case, India will have its economic momentum disrupted and lose its opportunities to rise.”
India has blamed China for trying to change the status of the India-Bhutan-China tri-junction, and ruled out unilateral withdrawal of Indian troops.
Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj last week said that China’s attempt to build a road through Bhutan posed a security challenge to India.
On China’s insistence that India withdraw troops from Doka La, she said: “India wants that all troops are removed from the tri-junction point before discussing the issue together. All countries, including Bhutan, are with us.”
The matter is expected to feature in talks between National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and his Chinese counterpart State Councillor Yang Jiechi when they meet on 27-28 July in Beijing at a NSAs meet from BRICS countries.
http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/0...e-diplomats-must-prevent-says-chinese-expert/
Note the picture above with the Sikh Indian soldier with hundreds of Chinese troops behind him. Look at him with such a brave face!! Indian or what, I admire his very manly stance. However, only one bullet may end his precious life.
For a moment I thought the soldiers behind were Indian soldiers and the Sikh guy is the commander.
Note the picture above with the Sikh Indian soldier with hundreds of Chinese troops behind him. Look at him with such a brave face!! Indian or what, I admire his very manly stance.
What a badass dude. Imagine what must be going through his head. Standing like this in front of heavily armed enemy troops. Very patriotic and admirable.
Banglar Bir
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Innocent brave young Patriotic men. Filthy corrupt Politicians merely use them as disposable pawns.
Note the picture above with the Sikh Indian soldier with hundreds of Chinese troops behind him. Look at him with such a brave face!! Indian or what, I admire his very manly stance. However, only one bullet may end his precious life.
I have watched in TV the footings of real exchange of bullets between China and Vietnam. I could see the night sky illuminated with millions of bright bullets fired from each side and flying to hit the opponents on the other side. The sight perplexed me. It was a kind of fireworks that killed many lives and destroyed many properties on the ground of both the sides.
Banglar Bir
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To Doklam and back: India–China standoff
Author: Sourabh Gupta, ICAS
China and India are locked yet again in a standoff of Himalayan proportions.
Almost five weeks after Indian troops trespassed and forcibly halted the activities of a Chinese road construction crew on a narrow plateau at the China–Bhutan–India tri-junction area in the Sikkim Himalayas, the two sides appear no closer to resolving their quarrel. The area in question, the Dolam plateau in the Doklam area, is the subject of a legal dispute between China and Bhutan, is under the effective jurisdiction of China, and holds an important security interest to India.
The restoration of the status quo in the Doklam area will be a protracted affair.
China, the aggrieved party, bears little interest in unwinding the standoff on terms other than its own. Worse, there is no agreed definition among the parties of the object of discord at stake and China does not even view India as the appropriate interlocutor to engage with to unwind the standoff.
China’s position on and solution to the standoff is blunt.
The alignment of the China–India boundary in the Sikkim Himalayas sector is mutually defined as per Article 1 of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 relating to Sikkim and Tibet (‘the line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier, and follows the … water-parting’). Indian representatives since prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru have formally accepted this. By interfering in a Chinese road construction project roughly three kilometres to the north of the plain letter of Article 1, India has violated China’s territorial sovereignty. As a precondition for any dialogue, India must vacate its trespass unconditionally.
To the extent that the area in question is the subject of a dispute due to Bhutan’s belated claim to the area in the 14th round of Sino-Bhutanese boundary talks, this is wholly a matter to be resolved between Beijing and Thimphu. Until such time, Bhutan — let alone India that has no locus standi to intervene — must respect China’s effective jurisdiction over the Doklam area.
For its part, India does not deny the validity of Article 1 of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890. Its alignment on the ground, in its view, is not an established fact however. As per the same article, the ‘boundary of Sikkim and Tibet [was to] be the crest of the mountain-range separating the waters flowing’ southwards and northwards. The ‘line [that] commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier’ does not correspond with this principle and should in fact be marked on the ground six kilometres to the north — making the area of trespass wholly Bhutanese soil.
By way of its bilateral Friendship Treaty of 2007 with Bhutan, which calls upon both sides to ‘cooperate closely … on issues relating to their national interests’, India enjoys a basis to intervene in the dispute on Thimphu’s behalf.
China’s road construction activity in this area constitutes a ‘significant change of the status quo’. Its disturbs India’s security interests as well as violates an ‘understanding’ arrived at by Indian and Chinese boundary negotiators in 2012 that the final alignment of the boundary in the tri-junction area would be settled in consultations that involved India. China must therefore desist from further road-building in this area and India stands ready to mutually ease the standoff on this basis.
India’s troop intervention in Doklam is not without grave political risk. Its diplomatic communications throughout this episode have been couched in the imprecise political language of status quos and understandings. By contrast, China’s communications have been grounded in the black-and-white language of legal sovereignty.
India’s intervention also risks setting dangerous precedents.
For the first time, India is militarily engaging a state actor — and one no less than China — from the soil of a third country. Second, it is militarily intervening on behalf of a friendly partner country to uphold the latter’s claims of sovereignty to a patch of territory that it does not effectively control. Not even the mighty US military extends defence obligations to disputed territories that its allies do not exercise effective control over — let alone intervene on their behalf. Third, the China–India–Bhutan boundary is not the only unresolved tri-junction along the length of India’s extended northern frontier. Payback in the same coin would be highly unpalatable.
The trespass also calls into question the political lessons learnt by India from its 1962 debacle. The proximate trigger that autumn was the placement by New Delhi of a lightly armed military post in advance of its map-based claim line. Then, as now, New Delhi assumed that its troops were unilaterally entitled to plug the breach that had opened up as a result of a discrepancy between the map-based — and in this instance Convention-based — line and the (watershed) principle that was to guide the line’s demarcation on the ground.
Having engaged in a high-risk venture, the onus resides on India’s shoulders to devise the conditions of its exit. To this end, it must confront the tangled legalities of the situation.
New Delhi does not possess legal standing to directly engage China to ease the standoff. That standing is held by Bhutan. New Delhi must push Thimphu to take the lead in engaging Beijing and devise a mutually acceptable boundary protocol that acknowledges China’s effective jurisdiction of the area, pending final settlement, in exchange for the restoration of the status quo as of 16 June 2017. In parallel, New Delhi must commit to unilaterally vacating its trespass in the Doklam area while privately holding out for Beijing’s reiteration of the 2012 understanding that the tri-junction boundary points will be finalised in consultation with all (three) parties concerned.
Time is of the essence. New Delhi has made its point. The longer the standoff persists now, the stronger will be the impression that it is New Delhi that is engineering a lasting change in the status quo — in turn, inviting political reprisals by Beijing.
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/07/26/to-doklam-and-back-india-china-standoff/
Author: Sourabh Gupta, ICAS
China and India are locked yet again in a standoff of Himalayan proportions.
Almost five weeks after Indian troops trespassed and forcibly halted the activities of a Chinese road construction crew on a narrow plateau at the China–Bhutan–India tri-junction area in the Sikkim Himalayas, the two sides appear no closer to resolving their quarrel. The area in question, the Dolam plateau in the Doklam area, is the subject of a legal dispute between China and Bhutan, is under the effective jurisdiction of China, and holds an important security interest to India.
The restoration of the status quo in the Doklam area will be a protracted affair.
China, the aggrieved party, bears little interest in unwinding the standoff on terms other than its own. Worse, there is no agreed definition among the parties of the object of discord at stake and China does not even view India as the appropriate interlocutor to engage with to unwind the standoff.
China’s position on and solution to the standoff is blunt.
The alignment of the China–India boundary in the Sikkim Himalayas sector is mutually defined as per Article 1 of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 relating to Sikkim and Tibet (‘the line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier, and follows the … water-parting’). Indian representatives since prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru have formally accepted this. By interfering in a Chinese road construction project roughly three kilometres to the north of the plain letter of Article 1, India has violated China’s territorial sovereignty. As a precondition for any dialogue, India must vacate its trespass unconditionally.
To the extent that the area in question is the subject of a dispute due to Bhutan’s belated claim to the area in the 14th round of Sino-Bhutanese boundary talks, this is wholly a matter to be resolved between Beijing and Thimphu. Until such time, Bhutan — let alone India that has no locus standi to intervene — must respect China’s effective jurisdiction over the Doklam area.
For its part, India does not deny the validity of Article 1 of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890. Its alignment on the ground, in its view, is not an established fact however. As per the same article, the ‘boundary of Sikkim and Tibet [was to] be the crest of the mountain-range separating the waters flowing’ southwards and northwards. The ‘line [that] commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier’ does not correspond with this principle and should in fact be marked on the ground six kilometres to the north — making the area of trespass wholly Bhutanese soil.
By way of its bilateral Friendship Treaty of 2007 with Bhutan, which calls upon both sides to ‘cooperate closely … on issues relating to their national interests’, India enjoys a basis to intervene in the dispute on Thimphu’s behalf.
China’s road construction activity in this area constitutes a ‘significant change of the status quo’. Its disturbs India’s security interests as well as violates an ‘understanding’ arrived at by Indian and Chinese boundary negotiators in 2012 that the final alignment of the boundary in the tri-junction area would be settled in consultations that involved India. China must therefore desist from further road-building in this area and India stands ready to mutually ease the standoff on this basis.
India’s troop intervention in Doklam is not without grave political risk. Its diplomatic communications throughout this episode have been couched in the imprecise political language of status quos and understandings. By contrast, China’s communications have been grounded in the black-and-white language of legal sovereignty.
India’s intervention also risks setting dangerous precedents.
For the first time, India is militarily engaging a state actor — and one no less than China — from the soil of a third country. Second, it is militarily intervening on behalf of a friendly partner country to uphold the latter’s claims of sovereignty to a patch of territory that it does not effectively control. Not even the mighty US military extends defence obligations to disputed territories that its allies do not exercise effective control over — let alone intervene on their behalf. Third, the China–India–Bhutan boundary is not the only unresolved tri-junction along the length of India’s extended northern frontier. Payback in the same coin would be highly unpalatable.
The trespass also calls into question the political lessons learnt by India from its 1962 debacle. The proximate trigger that autumn was the placement by New Delhi of a lightly armed military post in advance of its map-based claim line. Then, as now, New Delhi assumed that its troops were unilaterally entitled to plug the breach that had opened up as a result of a discrepancy between the map-based — and in this instance Convention-based — line and the (watershed) principle that was to guide the line’s demarcation on the ground.
Having engaged in a high-risk venture, the onus resides on India’s shoulders to devise the conditions of its exit. To this end, it must confront the tangled legalities of the situation.
New Delhi does not possess legal standing to directly engage China to ease the standoff. That standing is held by Bhutan. New Delhi must push Thimphu to take the lead in engaging Beijing and devise a mutually acceptable boundary protocol that acknowledges China’s effective jurisdiction of the area, pending final settlement, in exchange for the restoration of the status quo as of 16 June 2017. In parallel, New Delhi must commit to unilaterally vacating its trespass in the Doklam area while privately holding out for Beijing’s reiteration of the 2012 understanding that the tri-junction boundary points will be finalised in consultation with all (three) parties concerned.
Time is of the essence. New Delhi has made its point. The longer the standoff persists now, the stronger will be the impression that it is New Delhi that is engineering a lasting change in the status quo — in turn, inviting political reprisals by Beijing.
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/07/26/to-doklam-and-back-india-china-standoff/
帅的一匹
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As an i'ndependent' nation, Bhutan is controlled by India diplomatically and economically. But China will break there monopoly just like we do in Nepal. Lot of Bhutanese had got vocal about their fury and unsatisfaction toward India's bully, including their former freign minister.according to the Simla accord in 1890, Doklang area belongs to China. India is such a coward nation doesn't dare to face China directly but sneak through in the name of protecting Bhutan. Pity on Bhutanese.
Banglar Bir
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Sad, however a grim reality world wise and what a waste of innocent young budding flowers. We,in fact witnessed the same horrific events and much more during 1971. Poor innocent young men of all sides made to be the Politicians sacrificial lambs. Just want to erase those gruesome events of death and destruction.,
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China want to build bilateral relationship with Bhutan and contra versa. Indians pose huge pressure on Bhutan government, warn them not to do so.
It's already been 21th century, still a dirty bully like India want to place independent nation under its pawn. Unbelievable...
Barhat had entered into our land, we have to fight back. Got no choice.
It's already been 21th century, still a dirty bully like India want to place independent nation under its pawn. Unbelievable...
Barhat had entered into our land, we have to fight back. Got no choice.
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