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Bl[i]tZ
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The origins of the Siachen problem can be traced to the Simla agreement of 1972. That agreement demarcating the Line of Control between India and Pakistan did not demarcate where the line of control went and simply stated that it went “Northwards”. This left a great strategic ambiguity as to whether North meant North or if it really meant East, thus creating confusion as to whether Siachen Glacier belonged to Pakistan or India.
Even in the presence of this ambiguity, there was relative peace between 1971 and 1979, when Pakistan was busy with coups and hangings. After taking charge in 1978 through a peaceful coup, Zia-ul-Haq wanted to repair the image of Pakistan army severely dented in the 1971 war. To make up for losing 57,000sq miles of East Pakistan, Zia wanted to capture the 1000sq miles of Siachen, where there was no deployment of either Indian or Pakistani soldiers (because it was a icy waste where no blade of grass grew, like Aksai Chin, which had nothing except strategically important passes connecting Tibet). Pakistan started giving licenses for mountaineering expeditions for tourists. Each of these expeditions were accompanied by representatives from Pakistan army and supplied by helicopter, in accordance with the tradition of gracious subcontinental hospitality. But an all out war on Siachen would have to wait. The reasons were two fold: (1) The Indians, in a display of ungentlemanly behaviour, had attacked across the international border as a retaliation for Pakistan attacking across the line of control in 1965 (and did not limit the war to the line of control as Pakistan’s strategic generals had strategized). So any war on Siachen had the potential to flare up as a major border war (2) Pakistan did not do very well in a major border war.
1984 brought the Nuclear test at Lop Nor in China. Co-incidentally, for presumably unrelated reasons, Pakistan gained the confidence that a conflict along the undemarcated line of control would not flare up into a larger border war. Preparations were made for another mountaineering expedition into Siachen by buying Arctic gear from a shop in London, which was unfortunately run by a RAW agent, who promptly informed the Indians. This set off a race to Siachen, where Indian soldiers and Pakistani soldiers trekked to Siachen, but Indians beat the Pakistanis by 4 days. Yes, all of 4 days. A war followed. In those heights, fighting consisted of not dying in the cold air or lack of oxygen and the side which did not freeze to death won. Indians survived without food longer and won and advanced all the way upto the Saltoro ridge west of Siachen glacier and occupied the 3 major passes into the glacier — Sia La, Gyong La and Bilafond La — thus completely cutting the Pakistan army off from Siachen. Which leads to current status of Siachen problem where India has all of Siachen and Pakistan has a problem with it.
Several attempts were made to dislodge the Indian Army, the most ferocious in 1987 by the then Brig. Gen. Pervez Musharraf who had raised a SSG unit for mountain warfare. The attack proved futile and led to a huge loss of life on the Pakistani side and in a subsequent counter-attack Indians captured even more territory. This assault was a huge loss for Musharraf. Brig. Gen. Mushrraf would later go on to become COAS and distinguish himself by losing in a bigger way in Kargil, but would eventually win in the 1999 war in Islamabad, but I get ahead of myself.
Subsequent intermittent attacks till the mid 90’s were futile as well, which led to one logical conclusion. Siachen could not be won by attacking Siachen, Indian supply routes to Siachen would have to be cut much further south, somewhere along the demarcated line of control. But this war had to wait. A war across Line of Control (as opposed to war on actual ground position line or AGPL) had the potential to flare up as a major war across the international border and … well you get the idea. 1998 brought the nuclear tests by India as well as Pakistan. Co-incidentally, for presumably unrelated reasons, Pakistan gained the confidence that a conflict along the demarcated line of control would not flare up into a larger border war. (As opposed to Lop Nor tests, which only gave the confidence that conflict along the undemarcated line of control would not flare up into a larger border war).
A mountaineering expedition of Mujahideen who were fighting for freedom and against Indian oppression in Kashmir occupied the Kargil heights, leading Musharraf to brag (actual quote)
While the freedom fighters had moral, political and diplomatic support from Pakistan army, they committed a major blunder of not securing air support and were ultimately beaten back. Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail has a few choice words for everyone vis-a-vis air support in Kargil and you can read it in his blog, but I digress.
Subsequent events of 9/11, a bad economy, Americans in the region, and defence build up by both India and Pakistan meant that Siachen issue could not be solved by military adventures, leaving no option but to solve it using talks. Which leads to the present day:
Pakistan should convince India that Siachen was taking a heavy toll on both sides, consuming valuable money and resources, which could be better spent in Ballistic missiles, Artillery and Nuclear bombs which both India and Pakistan desperately need. But the talks are at a deadlock: To withdraw from Siachen, India has started to place demands that Pakistan should validate the Actual Ground Position line agreeing that North is in fact North, and not East. This is unacceptable to Pakistan, especially because if North is in fact East, the Karakoram pass connecting Pakistan to Tibet falls under Pakistan’s claim. But if the North is in fact North, then all attempts by Musharraf would have gone in vain and all weather friends who are taller than the mountains may not be pleased.
So the conflict endures in the face of obstinacy by both sides, where Pakistan’s principled position stands as firm as the mountains and Indian’s hearts are as cold as the Siachen glacier.
Where else are Gyong La and Conway Saddle ? 
My theory is supported by the fact that Gyong La isn't even shown in the repeatedly posted map by Indians ! FYI , its one of the three passes of the Glaciers ... Now go figure !
if India is openly oppose China and want to mess with SCS contest...we will surely return your favor somewhere else...since J&K is constested land...it's logical place to start with...as for your question :can? will? should? could? would? ...Nerhu asked the same questions before 1962...for his forward policy.
