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China's Expanding Strategic Footprint in South Asia
China has recently decided to develop second sea port in Sri Lanka at Colombo. This port would be in addition to the one already existing at Hambantota. Along with it, China has also agreed to develop a rail and road link between Yunnan province & Chittagong, a port city of Bangladesh. These steps have consolidated China's presence in India's strategic backyard.
China has been intensifying the development of strategic assets in South Asia for the better part of this decade. It began with the Karakoram highway. Subsequently, the Chinese built ports in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan & Myanmar. Though India has friendly relations with all its neighbours barring Pakistan, the greater engagement of Chinese with these countries has allowed them increase their diplomatic influence over India.
A few years ago, India signed a free trade agreement with Sri Lanka. This FTA proved to be very successful and made India its largest trading partner. But the Chinese have now almost undone this advantage by becoming the largest foreign donor to Sri Lanka. Last year Chinese donated $1.2 billion to Sri Lanka replacing Japan from the donor top spot.
India too helped the Rajapaksa government by providing non-lethal military assistance to fight its war against LTTE, but it was no match for the military assistance that originated from China, and to a lesser extent from Pakistan. More recently, the Sri Lankan defence secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa visited China trying to further deepen the defence cooperation with Beijing. China reciprocated by agreeing to construct another sea port in Colombo.
No Indian company showed any interest to construct this port, for which there are structural reasons. Indian companies are mostly privately owned whereas Chinese companies are state owned. The latter are protected by the Beijing in times of trouble and benefit from not being hamstrung by shareholder value and profit-maximisation. They also bid and secure projects which allow the Chinese state to gain strategic advantage.
The construction of the deep sea port at Hambantota & the latest one in Colombo was precisely to fulfill this latter objective. A strong foothold for the Chinese in Hambantota would allow them to control a vast area of the Indian Ocean extending up to Antarctica, if the need arises.
The Chinese relationship with Bangladesh is not dissimiliar. They have now decided to develop the rail and road link between Yunnan province and the Chittagong port. This is a trilateral project of which Myanmar is also a party. This project would reduce the distance between Yunnan and Chittagong to only 111km. The Chinese already host trans-shipment rights at Chittagong. Now this rail and road link would further increase their presence at Chittagong. In addition, China is planning to construct a deep sea port at Sonadia island.
Both Sri Lanka & Bangladesh say that they want to become trans-shipment hubs in South Asia. Sri Lanka plans to replace Dubai & Singapore as trans-shipment hubs for India. Bangladesh wants to become a trans-shipment hub for goods bound for Nepal, Bhutan & northeast India. China is interested in these ports to protect its sea lines of communication and to secure overland access routes in the event of an unforseen strategic problem in the Malacca Straits.
In both cases, if Chinese economic interests are served, then India also stands to benefit in similar fashion. But a problem arises in the strategic sense if one keep in view the recent muscular foreign policy China has adopted against India. Since there is little hope for India to drive Pakistan away from China, it can only think of working with its other neighbours.
The smaller neighbours of India have tried to play the China card against India to keep their bigger South Asian neighbour under check and also to extract the best deals from both. In this situation, overplaying the Chinese threat could also work to India’s disadvantage.
At the same time, India cannot ignore the ever growing expansion of Chinese influence in South Asia. As of now, both Sri Lanka & Bangladesh have said that the facilities being developed with China are of a commercial nature only. India should work to ensure that this remains the case.
India should also try to benefit economically from these new facilities being developed. In tandem, it should also try and persuade its neighbours not to allow these facilities to be transformed into military outposts, a state of affairs which would only increase the prospect of a militarised South Asia. India's neighbours ought to be acutely aware of this prospect.
China's Expanding Strategic Footprint | Opinion Asia
China has recently decided to develop second sea port in Sri Lanka at Colombo. This port would be in addition to the one already existing at Hambantota. Along with it, China has also agreed to develop a rail and road link between Yunnan province & Chittagong, a port city of Bangladesh. These steps have consolidated China's presence in India's strategic backyard.
China has been intensifying the development of strategic assets in South Asia for the better part of this decade. It began with the Karakoram highway. Subsequently, the Chinese built ports in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan & Myanmar. Though India has friendly relations with all its neighbours barring Pakistan, the greater engagement of Chinese with these countries has allowed them increase their diplomatic influence over India.
A few years ago, India signed a free trade agreement with Sri Lanka. This FTA proved to be very successful and made India its largest trading partner. But the Chinese have now almost undone this advantage by becoming the largest foreign donor to Sri Lanka. Last year Chinese donated $1.2 billion to Sri Lanka replacing Japan from the donor top spot.
India too helped the Rajapaksa government by providing non-lethal military assistance to fight its war against LTTE, but it was no match for the military assistance that originated from China, and to a lesser extent from Pakistan. More recently, the Sri Lankan defence secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa visited China trying to further deepen the defence cooperation with Beijing. China reciprocated by agreeing to construct another sea port in Colombo.
No Indian company showed any interest to construct this port, for which there are structural reasons. Indian companies are mostly privately owned whereas Chinese companies are state owned. The latter are protected by the Beijing in times of trouble and benefit from not being hamstrung by shareholder value and profit-maximisation. They also bid and secure projects which allow the Chinese state to gain strategic advantage.
The construction of the deep sea port at Hambantota & the latest one in Colombo was precisely to fulfill this latter objective. A strong foothold for the Chinese in Hambantota would allow them to control a vast area of the Indian Ocean extending up to Antarctica, if the need arises.
The Chinese relationship with Bangladesh is not dissimiliar. They have now decided to develop the rail and road link between Yunnan province and the Chittagong port. This is a trilateral project of which Myanmar is also a party. This project would reduce the distance between Yunnan and Chittagong to only 111km. The Chinese already host trans-shipment rights at Chittagong. Now this rail and road link would further increase their presence at Chittagong. In addition, China is planning to construct a deep sea port at Sonadia island.
Both Sri Lanka & Bangladesh say that they want to become trans-shipment hubs in South Asia. Sri Lanka plans to replace Dubai & Singapore as trans-shipment hubs for India. Bangladesh wants to become a trans-shipment hub for goods bound for Nepal, Bhutan & northeast India. China is interested in these ports to protect its sea lines of communication and to secure overland access routes in the event of an unforseen strategic problem in the Malacca Straits.
In both cases, if Chinese economic interests are served, then India also stands to benefit in similar fashion. But a problem arises in the strategic sense if one keep in view the recent muscular foreign policy China has adopted against India. Since there is little hope for India to drive Pakistan away from China, it can only think of working with its other neighbours.
The smaller neighbours of India have tried to play the China card against India to keep their bigger South Asian neighbour under check and also to extract the best deals from both. In this situation, overplaying the Chinese threat could also work to India’s disadvantage.
At the same time, India cannot ignore the ever growing expansion of Chinese influence in South Asia. As of now, both Sri Lanka & Bangladesh have said that the facilities being developed with China are of a commercial nature only. India should work to ensure that this remains the case.
India should also try to benefit economically from these new facilities being developed. In tandem, it should also try and persuade its neighbours not to allow these facilities to be transformed into military outposts, a state of affairs which would only increase the prospect of a militarised South Asia. India's neighbours ought to be acutely aware of this prospect.
China's Expanding Strategic Footprint | Opinion Asia
