The remarkable progress in the Trans-Pacific Partnership has been realized and only recently has the negotiation experienced a stall; due in part to Japan and the United States’ differences in basic trade agreements. The Liberal Democratic Party’s Chairman of the TPP Affairs Committee, Nishikawa Koya, recently had explained that it is the strategy of government to secure measures for sugar, wheat, rice and then to maintain the advantage within the negotiations for dairy products, pork and beef. According to the TPP Affairs Committee , they wish to secure acceptable numbers that shall enable Japanese lawmakers’ promise to the people, which is to protect some farm products .
I’m sure you may already see that Japanese media have attempted to ascertain the nature of the disagreement. Some media sources have even assumed and have circulated that Japanese Government was considering special quota of imports wherein American rice imports would be given prioritization over the rice imports of other countries, some media sources have even tried to say that United States was making demands that Japan could not accept, one example was the effective exclusion of cars by taking more than 30 years to abolish tariffs on car imports.
It is understandable that the Japanese Media would correlate the issue of Gaiatsu, which basically means “Outside Pressure”, in context to the United States. The reason for this is because throughout the bilateral relations between Japan and the United States, the latter has always tried to implement Gaiatsu on Japan in order to prying open Japanese markets in bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations. In fact, in earlier times, the issue of Gaiatsu was a reality because it was used by progressive leaders especially when Japan was considered an industrial threat to the United States during the 1970s, 1980s. During earlier decades of bilateral trade friction, resolving dispute with the United States was the most important driver of Japanese trade policy; even multilateral negotiations under the GATT were accompanied by bilateral Japan – US discussions on the side. One then is left wondering, “If Gaiatsu worked so well in the past, then why is it not working so well now in the present time period?”
The answer to this is: WTO. Since Japan was part of the WTO, one method of handling any trade friction with the United States was through the WTO’s Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism. By utilizing the legalized multilateral framework of the WTO, this had strengthened Japan’s bargaining leverage and bargaining power over time and had effectively weakened the US Pressure on Japan regarding any issues of trade.
A second point that I want to emphasize is that Japan no longer is considered a threat, specifically, an Industrial competitor to the United States as it once was during the 1980s. Besides the concept of Ishitsuron no longer influences negotiators from the United States.
A third issue that I want to mention is that from preliminary experience, any notion of tough stance is not taken seriously. As you remember during the preliminary consultation about Japan possibly joining the TPP negotiations in 2012, it was the United States that had announced a policy of not approving Japan’s participation in TPP talks unless all items, particularly rice and other agrarian goods were put on the negotiation table for tariff elimination. Then what happened? It then later backed off.
Japan places a significant premium on its participation on these TPP negotiations: in both strategic and trade terms. The participation of Japan only amplifies both the strategic and economic importance of the TPP for the United States. With the participation of Japan and its involvement in TPP, this enables the TPP to effectively compete with any of the China-led regional comprehensive economic partnerships that are already around, which, ironically, also involves Japan but not the United States. Absent of Japan, the TPP becomes a sideshow in the US strategic game against China and hardly the vehicle to facilitate the US rebalancing to Asia that America would like it to be. Hence, the threats to expel Japan from the TPP negotiatins carry little weight. Besides, Japanese Government understands and is verily aware of the fact that TPP is hostage to any instance of discord in politics in Washington. Unless the Obama Administration has any fast-track authority from Congress, which from our understanding of the Democrats’ decreasing influence and the rising clout of Republicans in Congress and Senate, this is by no means assured. So, in our vantage point, American has to compromise , as we are willing to compromise.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership is a noble collection of developed markets with emerging markets and can help the United States propel itself into the Asia-Pacific region yet again, as part of the American stratagem of realigning towards Asia. One thing that many economists, political analysts as well as defense analysts will take into consideration are three observations:
1. The role of Japan in balancing the developing new order in Asia-Pacific in context to the ascendancy of the People’s Republic of China
2. The economic interdependency of China and Japan --- and how will this economic reality manifest itself into national defense policies
3. The United States – Japanese Mutual Defense Treaty
Japan definitely has a candid responsibility to ensuring that China, its largest trading partner is not in anyway left to think that it is secondary and is dispensable because that is the farthest from the truth. Japanese National Politics – which is influenced by nationalist right wing forces, left with forces and then the centralists. While the right wing forces would prefer Japan to maintain a more robust defense aperture , this would be contradictory to national interest as it would damage the trade with China. The trade with China, as it stands, is already nearing $400 Billion per annum. Where can we replace that number ? $400 Billion. So one is left to wonder how can we maintain the demands of the US-Japanese Military Alliance without having it affect our economic viability and restitution from economic recession ? It requires sound policies – one that will not endanger China , or affect the various intergovernmental processes that have been developed with China these past 30 some years. Will the TPP be positive for Japan ? Will it damage Japanese-Chinese economic ties ? That remains to be seen.
Reference:
Why the US struggles against Japan in TPP negotiations | East Asia Forum
Japan, America and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Stalemate | The Economist
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