Cheetah786
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Saudi Arabia fears that the initial Iran-P5+1 nuclear agreement will be finalised. The lifting of sanctions on Iran might well allow it to stabilise the Syrian government of President Bashar al-Assad and defeat the insurgency in the core areas of Homs, Aleppo, Daraa, and Damascus, while also securing Baghdad and the south of Iraq. This would limit the Wahhabi terrorist to the desert and economically feeble regions between eastern Aleppo, Mosul, and Anbar. Saudi Arabia would then find itself in a position where its regional influence would be severely weakened. Moreover, this would significantly weaken the ruling Al-Saud royal family, as its legitimacy depends on its role as the protector of Sunni Islam .
As such, Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, and the current level of its involvement in the Levant conflicts, is not sufficient to roll back Iran's gains and to secure Saudi Arabia's vital interests. The key battlegrounds are Iraq and Syria. The hitherto-favoured Saudi option of supporting proxies there to counter Iran's proxies is becoming problematic. The most effective wahhabi groups fighting against Iran are Jabhat al-Nusra - Al-Qaeda's official affiliate in Syria - and the Islamic State. Both see the overthrow of the Al-Saud family as part of their ultimate objective. This means that the only effective alternative to acceptance of Iranian dominance is likely to be direct military intervention by Saudi Arabia, if possible leading a Sunni-Arab coalition.
FORECAST
The Al-Saud family faces a difficult choice. They can accept Iranian regional hegemony, resulting in a significant threat to their domestic survival and the loss of their own regional role. Alternatively, they can escalate their commitment to the Sunni-Shia conflict. However, doing so and then failing would also increase domestic instability risks.
If the Saudi leadership chooses to intervene, it may well fear that it has a narrow window of opportunity to rally Sunni forces and attempt to check Iran's growing influence, at least in Syria. As such, Saudi Arabia would probably attempt to convince its Arab allies, especially the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Jordan, and probably Turkey, to engage in an air campaign against Syrian government forces, particularly the Syrian air force in locations such as Deir al-Zour, Hasaka, Damascus, and Aleppo, in order to tip the balance in the insurgents' favour. Many of these locations have co-located military and civilian airports, raising the risk of collateral damage to aircraft. Such actions would increase the risk to the airspace above Syria, Iraq, Jordan and potentially Turkey, as Assad's forces would use their remaining air defence capability against Sunni Arab aircraft, and as Iran (and Russia) would likely seek to enhance Assad's forces' air defence capabilities. Moreover, this action would expose participating states to retaliation by Shia militant groups sponsored by Iran, with attacks against commercial assets and against government personnel becoming more likely.
Given the US current stance on Syria, it would be unlikely to give political support, still less logistic or other enabling assistance, to Saudi military intervention. However, in extremis the Al-Saud leadership and its allies may well believe that they have no choice but to take action as best they can, without US support.
As such, Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, and the current level of its involvement in the Levant conflicts, is not sufficient to roll back Iran's gains and to secure Saudi Arabia's vital interests. The key battlegrounds are Iraq and Syria. The hitherto-favoured Saudi option of supporting proxies there to counter Iran's proxies is becoming problematic. The most effective wahhabi groups fighting against Iran are Jabhat al-Nusra - Al-Qaeda's official affiliate in Syria - and the Islamic State. Both see the overthrow of the Al-Saud family as part of their ultimate objective. This means that the only effective alternative to acceptance of Iranian dominance is likely to be direct military intervention by Saudi Arabia, if possible leading a Sunni-Arab coalition.
FORECAST
The Al-Saud family faces a difficult choice. They can accept Iranian regional hegemony, resulting in a significant threat to their domestic survival and the loss of their own regional role. Alternatively, they can escalate their commitment to the Sunni-Shia conflict. However, doing so and then failing would also increase domestic instability risks.
If the Saudi leadership chooses to intervene, it may well fear that it has a narrow window of opportunity to rally Sunni forces and attempt to check Iran's growing influence, at least in Syria. As such, Saudi Arabia would probably attempt to convince its Arab allies, especially the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Jordan, and probably Turkey, to engage in an air campaign against Syrian government forces, particularly the Syrian air force in locations such as Deir al-Zour, Hasaka, Damascus, and Aleppo, in order to tip the balance in the insurgents' favour. Many of these locations have co-located military and civilian airports, raising the risk of collateral damage to aircraft. Such actions would increase the risk to the airspace above Syria, Iraq, Jordan and potentially Turkey, as Assad's forces would use their remaining air defence capability against Sunni Arab aircraft, and as Iran (and Russia) would likely seek to enhance Assad's forces' air defence capabilities. Moreover, this action would expose participating states to retaliation by Shia militant groups sponsored by Iran, with attacks against commercial assets and against government personnel becoming more likely.
Given the US current stance on Syria, it would be unlikely to give political support, still less logistic or other enabling assistance, to Saudi military intervention. However, in extremis the Al-Saud leadership and its allies may well believe that they have no choice but to take action as best they can, without US support.
