rkjindal91
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'Smiling Buddha' had caught US off-
guard in 1974 Dec 7, 2011, 02.57AM IST TNN [ Srinivas Laxman ] MUMBAI: The American intelligence
community in the Nixon era missed
India's preparations for a nuclear
weapons test and was caught unawares
when "Smiling Buddha" was successfully
conducted at Pokhran on May 18, 1974. The revelation means India managed to
keep the US in the dark over Smiling
Buddha as well as the Pokhran-II tests in
1998, some 25 years later. A recently declassified intelligence
community staff post-mortem made
public on Monday by the US National
Security Archive and the American
Nuclear Proliferation International
History Project shows America had taken its eye off India as it was caught up with
its initiatives with China and the Vietnam
war. The record says: "India's peaceful nuclear
explosion on 18 May, 1974, caught the US
by surprise in part because the
intelligence community had not been
looking for signs that a test was in the
works." Nixon administration policymakers
assigned a low priority to the Indian
nuclear programme and there was no
sense of urgency "to determine whether
New Delhi was preparing to test a nuclear
device. Intelligence and production (analysis and reporting) on the topic fell
off during the 20 months before the
tests". The oversight can be attributed to
icy vibes between New Delhi and
Washington during the Nixon era. In early 1972, however, two years before
the test, the US State Department's
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)
predicted India could make preparations
for an underground test without
detection by American intelligence. The INR report warned the US
government had given a "relatively
modest priority" to relevant intelligence
collection activities. The White House was
more focused on the Vietnam war and "a
grand strategy" towards Beijing and Moscow. However, the small spate of reports about
a test had such "apparent reliability and
seeming credibility," that they prompted
a review of India's nuclear intentions by
INR and other government
establishments. "In the end government officials (US) could not decide whether
India had made a decision to test
although a subsequent lead suggested
otherwise," it said. While the US State Department had
cautioned India against nuclear tests in
late 1970, the concern was never quite
overwhelming. The upshot: India
succeeded in concealing its plan of
preparing for the first nuclear weapons' test at Pokhran on May 18, 1974.
guard in 1974 Dec 7, 2011, 02.57AM IST TNN [ Srinivas Laxman ] MUMBAI: The American intelligence
community in the Nixon era missed
India's preparations for a nuclear
weapons test and was caught unawares
when "Smiling Buddha" was successfully
conducted at Pokhran on May 18, 1974. The revelation means India managed to
keep the US in the dark over Smiling
Buddha as well as the Pokhran-II tests in
1998, some 25 years later. A recently declassified intelligence
community staff post-mortem made
public on Monday by the US National
Security Archive and the American
Nuclear Proliferation International
History Project shows America had taken its eye off India as it was caught up with
its initiatives with China and the Vietnam
war. The record says: "India's peaceful nuclear
explosion on 18 May, 1974, caught the US
by surprise in part because the
intelligence community had not been
looking for signs that a test was in the
works." Nixon administration policymakers
assigned a low priority to the Indian
nuclear programme and there was no
sense of urgency "to determine whether
New Delhi was preparing to test a nuclear
device. Intelligence and production (analysis and reporting) on the topic fell
off during the 20 months before the
tests". The oversight can be attributed to
icy vibes between New Delhi and
Washington during the Nixon era. In early 1972, however, two years before
the test, the US State Department's
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)
predicted India could make preparations
for an underground test without
detection by American intelligence. The INR report warned the US
government had given a "relatively
modest priority" to relevant intelligence
collection activities. The White House was
more focused on the Vietnam war and "a
grand strategy" towards Beijing and Moscow. However, the small spate of reports about
a test had such "apparent reliability and
seeming credibility," that they prompted
a review of India's nuclear intentions by
INR and other government
establishments. "In the end government officials (US) could not decide whether
India had made a decision to test
although a subsequent lead suggested
otherwise," it said. While the US State Department had
cautioned India against nuclear tests in
late 1970, the concern was never quite
overwhelming. The upshot: India
succeeded in concealing its plan of
preparing for the first nuclear weapons' test at Pokhran on May 18, 1974.
