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Opinion Asia
Ishtiaq Ahmed / 23 June 08
Three incidents, the last a threat, dominated the headlines over a one week period in Pakistan this month. On June 11, 2008, eleven Pakistani soldiers and ten militants were killed in an air strike by US-led forces based in Afghanistan. A spokesman for the Pakistan government condemned it as a cowardly and unprovoked. He added, such acts of aggression dont serve the common cause of fighting terrorism. A spokesperson for the Bush administration responded by declaring the air strike as a legitimate response to an attack on coalition forces by insurgents who retreated into Pakistan from Afghanistan.
The situation was greatly exacerbated when on June 13, when Taliban insurgents mounted a well-coordinated attack on the prison in the southern city of Kandahar. A suicide bomber drove a truck full of explosives into the front gate of the prison blowing apart large portions of the prison. Some 1,000 prisoners, including hundreds of Taliban militants, including some Al Qaeda operatives escaped. Two days later, Afghan President Hamid Karzai threatened to send troops over the border into Pakistan to confront militants based there. He said that when militants crossed over from Pakistan to kill Afghans and coalition troops, his nation had the right to retaliate in "self-defence". It was widely believed that Karzai made such a statement after getting clearance from the Americans.
Miles away, but within the neighbourhood, an Indian journalist Amit Baruah, wrote an article in the Hindustan Times of 17 June, 2008 entitled Who do you thank for better India-Pakistan ties? (Clue: Neither of them). Baruah tried to solve his riddle by asserting that the United States had simply superseded India as Pakistans most hated foreign enemy. While the Pakistan government continues to emphasise its whole-hearted commitment to fight alongside the United States, as far as the Pakistani people are concerned, the Americans were hell bent on destroying Pakistan and Islam.
Considering that the United States and Pakistan were once upon a time close allies through bilateral and regional security pacts, it is a matter of some puzzlement how that relationship has transformed.
There can be no denying that the US-Pakistan relationship has experienced dramatic vicissitudes and metamorphoses after 1954 when Pakistan was co-opted in the worldwide US policy of containing Soviet Communism and granted substantial military aid. President Dwight E. Eisenhower (1953-1961) famously described Pakistan as the most allied ally. His Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles waxed eloquent on the Pakistani soldiers strong religious beliefs which rendered Pakistan a formidable bastion against atheistic Marxism. The Pakistani leaders reciprocated by declaring the United States as the leader of the free world and Pakistans most trusted benefactor.
Such pronouncements, however, were essentially instrumentalist. They were based on national self-interest calculations rather than a commitment to shared political ideals. The Americans were always sceptical about Pakistans democratic credentials. On the other hand, the Pakistanis were not averse to fighting communism, but their main objective was to acquire American weapons and technology to brace their military capability against their much bigger rival, India. There is little to suggest that the core of this relationship is any different today.
Although the 9/11 terrorist outrage traumatised American, it also sent shudders down the spines of all governments that feared Muslim terrorists were going to launch a worldwide jihad to impose Islam. Over the years, Pakistan helped America trace and capture Al Qaeda operatives but could not succeed in destroying Taliban elements ensconced in the rugged mountainous enclaves along the Pak-Afghan border. As a result, the Taliban continue to operate in that region and regularly menace the coalition forces.
The latest twist in the US-Pakistan relationship took root in March 2007 when Musharraf virtually dismissed Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry on charges of abuse of office. The sacking was clumsy, resulting in a spontaneous movement for democracy, that in spite of considerable repression, could not be stifled by the Musharraf regime. The Americans supported the movement for democracy that gained pace, but were hoping that Benazir Bhuttos Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) would emerge as the biggest party in a fair and free election. However, Ms Bhutto was assassinated on December 27, 2007.
In the general elections that followed on February 18, 2008 the PPP did win most seats, but the conservative Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), not enjoying Amercan favour and blessings, did well. Both formed a coalition government led by PPPs Yousaf Raza Gilani, but the PML-N withdrew when its demand that the deposed judges should be given back their jobs and Musharraf should be removed from office through a simple parliamentary majority, was rejected by the PPP.
Prime Minister Gilani now heads a weaker government. He has had to appear to be independent of American influence and pressure in order to maintain a popular image. In doing so, he has announced a unilateral change in policy towards terrorism, particularly towards Pakistani Taliban elements. Henceforth, the war on terror would be fought not only through military means; political and economic incentives will also be offered to wean away more moderate sections among the Islamists, while the hardcore will receive no quarter. Consequently peace deals were arranged in Swat and other tribal areas with the militants. The basic understanding was that these militants would not take part in violent action within Pakistan but would be allowed to apply Islamic law in areas under their control.
The Americans found such an arrangement a breach on the part of the Pakistan governments commitment to partake in the war on terror. This has been denied by Pakistan. Recent events bring out in sharp relief the growing chasm in the ambivalent US-Pakistan liaison. The United States cannot wage its war on terror without Pakistani assistance and cooperation, but direct American military intervention has not gone down well in Pakistan and has embarrassed the government. On the other hand, the Americans are not likely to desist from striking at targets within Pakistan if they believe that key Taliban and Al Qaeda forces were hiding in them. Equally, Pakistan cannot abjure its commitment to partake in the war on terror without adversely affecting its position in South Asia.
Given that the United States and India already see themselves as strategic partners, Pakistan would not want to alienate itself from the United States. It cannot hope to establish a Sino-Pakistan counterweight in this region because China may not respond with enthusiasm to such an overture. The latter is at present interested in promoting its economic capability and that means relatively less investment in traditional balance-of-power exercises.
With the strategic necessity of both parties to each other obvious, notwithstanding current mutual misgivings and reservations, the instrumentalist character of the US-Pakistan relationship looks likely to endure. In this regard, a revision may only prove timely when a new US administration takes over at the end of this year.
Ishtiaq Ahmed is Professor of Political Science and a Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), National University of Singapore.
Ishtiaq Ahmed / 23 June 08
Three incidents, the last a threat, dominated the headlines over a one week period in Pakistan this month. On June 11, 2008, eleven Pakistani soldiers and ten militants were killed in an air strike by US-led forces based in Afghanistan. A spokesman for the Pakistan government condemned it as a cowardly and unprovoked. He added, such acts of aggression dont serve the common cause of fighting terrorism. A spokesperson for the Bush administration responded by declaring the air strike as a legitimate response to an attack on coalition forces by insurgents who retreated into Pakistan from Afghanistan.
The situation was greatly exacerbated when on June 13, when Taliban insurgents mounted a well-coordinated attack on the prison in the southern city of Kandahar. A suicide bomber drove a truck full of explosives into the front gate of the prison blowing apart large portions of the prison. Some 1,000 prisoners, including hundreds of Taliban militants, including some Al Qaeda operatives escaped. Two days later, Afghan President Hamid Karzai threatened to send troops over the border into Pakistan to confront militants based there. He said that when militants crossed over from Pakistan to kill Afghans and coalition troops, his nation had the right to retaliate in "self-defence". It was widely believed that Karzai made such a statement after getting clearance from the Americans.
Miles away, but within the neighbourhood, an Indian journalist Amit Baruah, wrote an article in the Hindustan Times of 17 June, 2008 entitled Who do you thank for better India-Pakistan ties? (Clue: Neither of them). Baruah tried to solve his riddle by asserting that the United States had simply superseded India as Pakistans most hated foreign enemy. While the Pakistan government continues to emphasise its whole-hearted commitment to fight alongside the United States, as far as the Pakistani people are concerned, the Americans were hell bent on destroying Pakistan and Islam.
Considering that the United States and Pakistan were once upon a time close allies through bilateral and regional security pacts, it is a matter of some puzzlement how that relationship has transformed.
There can be no denying that the US-Pakistan relationship has experienced dramatic vicissitudes and metamorphoses after 1954 when Pakistan was co-opted in the worldwide US policy of containing Soviet Communism and granted substantial military aid. President Dwight E. Eisenhower (1953-1961) famously described Pakistan as the most allied ally. His Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles waxed eloquent on the Pakistani soldiers strong religious beliefs which rendered Pakistan a formidable bastion against atheistic Marxism. The Pakistani leaders reciprocated by declaring the United States as the leader of the free world and Pakistans most trusted benefactor.
Such pronouncements, however, were essentially instrumentalist. They were based on national self-interest calculations rather than a commitment to shared political ideals. The Americans were always sceptical about Pakistans democratic credentials. On the other hand, the Pakistanis were not averse to fighting communism, but their main objective was to acquire American weapons and technology to brace their military capability against their much bigger rival, India. There is little to suggest that the core of this relationship is any different today.
Although the 9/11 terrorist outrage traumatised American, it also sent shudders down the spines of all governments that feared Muslim terrorists were going to launch a worldwide jihad to impose Islam. Over the years, Pakistan helped America trace and capture Al Qaeda operatives but could not succeed in destroying Taliban elements ensconced in the rugged mountainous enclaves along the Pak-Afghan border. As a result, the Taliban continue to operate in that region and regularly menace the coalition forces.
The latest twist in the US-Pakistan relationship took root in March 2007 when Musharraf virtually dismissed Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry on charges of abuse of office. The sacking was clumsy, resulting in a spontaneous movement for democracy, that in spite of considerable repression, could not be stifled by the Musharraf regime. The Americans supported the movement for democracy that gained pace, but were hoping that Benazir Bhuttos Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) would emerge as the biggest party in a fair and free election. However, Ms Bhutto was assassinated on December 27, 2007.
In the general elections that followed on February 18, 2008 the PPP did win most seats, but the conservative Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), not enjoying Amercan favour and blessings, did well. Both formed a coalition government led by PPPs Yousaf Raza Gilani, but the PML-N withdrew when its demand that the deposed judges should be given back their jobs and Musharraf should be removed from office through a simple parliamentary majority, was rejected by the PPP.
Prime Minister Gilani now heads a weaker government. He has had to appear to be independent of American influence and pressure in order to maintain a popular image. In doing so, he has announced a unilateral change in policy towards terrorism, particularly towards Pakistani Taliban elements. Henceforth, the war on terror would be fought not only through military means; political and economic incentives will also be offered to wean away more moderate sections among the Islamists, while the hardcore will receive no quarter. Consequently peace deals were arranged in Swat and other tribal areas with the militants. The basic understanding was that these militants would not take part in violent action within Pakistan but would be allowed to apply Islamic law in areas under their control.
The Americans found such an arrangement a breach on the part of the Pakistan governments commitment to partake in the war on terror. This has been denied by Pakistan. Recent events bring out in sharp relief the growing chasm in the ambivalent US-Pakistan liaison. The United States cannot wage its war on terror without Pakistani assistance and cooperation, but direct American military intervention has not gone down well in Pakistan and has embarrassed the government. On the other hand, the Americans are not likely to desist from striking at targets within Pakistan if they believe that key Taliban and Al Qaeda forces were hiding in them. Equally, Pakistan cannot abjure its commitment to partake in the war on terror without adversely affecting its position in South Asia.
Given that the United States and India already see themselves as strategic partners, Pakistan would not want to alienate itself from the United States. It cannot hope to establish a Sino-Pakistan counterweight in this region because China may not respond with enthusiasm to such an overture. The latter is at present interested in promoting its economic capability and that means relatively less investment in traditional balance-of-power exercises.
With the strategic necessity of both parties to each other obvious, notwithstanding current mutual misgivings and reservations, the instrumentalist character of the US-Pakistan relationship looks likely to endure. In this regard, a revision may only prove timely when a new US administration takes over at the end of this year.
Ishtiaq Ahmed is Professor of Political Science and a Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), National University of Singapore.
