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27 Feb 19: PAF shot down two Indian aircrafts inside Pakistani airspace: DG ISPR

I would rather trust a farmer from cheechawatni drunk on moonshine claiming he saw Maryum Nawaz make wine out of water than an Indian youtuber

Lmao. This one could have become a timeless joke if it was said infront of the right audience ala Ja-rule-Chappelle one ''Can somebody get hold of Ja''
 
Not sure if this short film on the failed Balakot strike has been posted before, but did Pakistan engage any of the intruding Indian aircraft with SAMs on the 26th February?

Just indian wild imagination with so many technical fault.
Hq9 is radar guided and this iaf mk2 is dispensing flares to avoid being hit.
 
the mig 21 of Wg Cdr Abhinandan was part of a package of at least 2 ac, which was following a high/low strategy. where the su 30 formed the high part n the mig 21 formed the low part of this flight.

in theory, this is an excellent tactic, which makes even legacy ac like the mig 21 very potent for their assigned role.
the prob that the wg cdr faced that day was that the su 30 flying high was either the one-shot down or it bugged out leaving the wg cdr alone to fend for himself, with zero possibility of getting out unscathed.

him walking out of it all is the best thing that he could hope for.

ps: I want to interview the wg cdr n ask him how it felt when the aim 120 slammed into his ac, as it an experience that very few to get experience in the first place n than live to tell the tail.
 
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... PA's AD radars and PAF's ground radars played dismal role.
Corrret me if im wrong but Pakistani radars did pick it up, hence, the Pakistani fighters were able to chase the intruders away.

I can't member whether the enemy aircraft crossed LOC or not or misfired just before reaching the LOC.
 
Corrret me if im wrong but Pakistani radars did pick it up, hence, the Pakistani fighters were able to chase the intruders away.

I can't member whether the enemy aircraft crossed LOC or not or misfired just before reaching the LOC.
There are different accounts.
IAF mirages did fire and the bombs landed in AJK. The escalation was on cards already and a strike was imminent yet it was allowed to occur. PAF eventually chased them away but this could have been avoided once it was known that IAF was scrambling strike sorties. Even if IAF fired from with-in IOK, the threat of PAF’s BVR equipped aircrafts could have deterred them. The Radars could have picked them up after they had Taken off, they aligned themselves in a formation to attack and were vectoring towards LOC.
So at what instance did radar pick them up ?
And how delayed were PAF aircrafts in closing in on them on LOC ?

To prevent this in future, what necessary actions should be taken ?

AWACS and EW aircrafts were used during PAF’s raid on IOK, should they have been put in place a day earlier too when IAF attack was expected ?

and the concern is IAF stretching PAF from skardu to masroor, how to cater for that?
 
and the concern is IAF stretching PAF from skardu to masroor, how to cater for that?

China is how Pakistan will cater for it - historically India could fully invest its efforts on Pakistan but now - India has to worry about China and account for it..
 
There are different accounts.
IAF mirages did fire and the bombs landed in AJK. The escalation was on cards already and a strike was imminent yet it was allowed to occur. PAF eventually chased them away but this could have been avoided once it was known that IAF was scrambling strike sorties. Even if IAF fired from with-in IOK, the threat of PAF’s BVR equipped aircrafts could have deterred them. The Radars could have picked them up after they had Taken off, they aligned themselves in a formation to attack and were vectoring towards LOC.
So at what instance did radar pick them up ?
And how delayed were PAF aircrafts in closing in on them on LOC ?

To prevent this in future, what necessary actions should be taken ?

AWACS and EW aircrafts were used during PAF’s raid on IOK, should they have been put in place a day earlier too when IAF attack was expected ?

and the concern is IAF stretching PAF from skardu to masroor, how to cater for that?
It was a mix of RoEs and the IAF using diversionary tactics that predicated firing on them.
Primarily, the ground radars had intermittent tracks as the M2k strike force headed west and then north to refuel before turning southwest-ish.

While the intelligence existed, you cannot in the modus operandi in place and the diplomatic environment for Pakistan fire first on an Indian aircraft that hasn’t launched a weapon at a Pakistani target. Now, this is a silly premise in the days of standoff munitions but the alternative is to start firing at Indian aircraft inside Indian territory and trigger all out war.
It’s similar to the predicament faced by the JFK administration wrt USSR and Cuba in that you need “communication” when you scramble assets which is done through locking targets.

However, to the credit of Indians once they refueled they used some form of terrain masking(most dangerous and difficult at night) so that the radar systems in the norther sector(and GB radars are pretty limited within mountains) did not detect them until they were already into IP and approaching launch points. They did continue for a few miles or so but by that time PAF interceptor radars were tracking them and they turned away. Now throughout this time there is intelligence for an attack but no one knows where so all military installations are alerted and dont report anything that would warrant a go ahead for PAF to cross the LOC and bring down these aircraft (in practice it would be very difficult to bring the M2ks down in a tail chase as they were in full burner and had a fulcrum (or flanker) flight covering their escape.

So, to the Indian’s benefit they chose a rather obscure and frankly irrelevant target (probably because they have some guy who may be ready to confess he was “trained” there for media show) that it took a while to figure out what they actually had done.

Unfortunately, this is where things get murky whether PAF had AEW airborne or not and whether more CAPs would be useful.
For peacetime there generally are two flights available at X minutes responses to cover the north south axis and additional ones at Y minutes to follow. The IAF executed a textbook ruse tactic to try and spread the PAF(and based on admissions in Muj e Aflaq the QRA was fairly average response compared to say the RAF QRA) but frankly had bad luck and training with their systems integration and procedures.

So from a planning perspective 26th February was decently executed and demonstrated the IAF’s ability to overwhelm the PAF’s C4I through numbers and use off-axis attack patterns. The fact that it was a strategically idiotic move motivated by local political goals notwithstanding. However, 27th February was the PAF demonstrating a good plan being executed well. Frankly no plans survive contact with the enemy but well executed ones have the best chance of success - the PAF executed its better.
 
Keep in mind that India was terming PAF actions as an act of war.
It later transpired that this wasn't related to raiding Indian ground targets or shooting down of the MiG-21 as the ground targets never were hit directly and the MiG was shot down inside Pak airspace.
Targeting the SU-30 deep inside Indian airspace really rattled the Indians calling it an act of war thus threatening with missile strikes.
 
It was a mix of RoEs and the IAF using diversionary tactics that predicated firing on them.
Is there any study on find ways to minimize exploitation of RoE and authorization gap; by the enemy during peace time or periods of skirmishes or high alert? And what if political directions undermine established protocols agianst aggressors? 'Grey Zone' tactics and blurry lines will create trouble from the pov of air warfare especially in this age of technologically advanced warplanes and munitions.
 
Keep in mind that India was terming PAF actions as an act of war.
It later transpired that this wasn't related to raiding Indian ground targets or shooting down of the MiG-21 as the ground targets never were hit directly and the MiG was shot down inside Pak airspace.
Targeting the SU-30 deep inside Indian airspace really rattled the Indians calling it an act of war thus threatening with missile strikes.
But when Pakistan reciprocated the actions Indians soon backed down. Empty vessels make a lot of noise
 
Is there any study on find ways to minimize exploitation of RoE and authorization gap; by the enemy during peace time or periods of skirmishes or high alert? And what if political directions undermine established protocols agianst aggressors? 'Grey Zone' tactics and blurry lines will create trouble from the pov of air warfare especially in this age of technologically advanced warplanes and munitions.
All forces run probing exercises to see defenses. The Indian subs are doing just that so one should look into what they are trying to achieve.

The best weapon at this point is SIGINT and HUMINT. We basically let them know we know that they know we could hear their transmission so they ran to their government to plug that gap with proof. Now that advantage is gone(sooner).
What is left is either having a constant view of Halwara & Ambala along with Bhuj or keeping more aircraft on alert 10 which adds recurring costs either way.
 
All forces run probing exercises to see defenses. The Indian subs are doing just that so one should look into what they are trying to achieve.

The best weapon at this point is SIGINT and HUMINT. We basically let them know we know that they know we could hear their transmission so they ran to their government to plug that gap with proof. Now that advantage is gone(sooner).
What is left is either having a constant view of Halwara & Ambala along with Bhuj or keeping more aircraft on alert 10 which adds recurring costs either way.
We should have let them enter our waters and hit them
 

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