Korea: The First War We Lost

[Tiqiu]

This is wrong.

China abandoned that objective when they themselves crossed over from the 38th and launch the Spring Offensive in 1951, that offensive is committed "SOUTH" of Seoul, the capital of South Korea

I suggest we all need to read more books about something we were never personally involved first before jumping to the conclusion with certainty. For a subject like the Korean war, apart from the accounts from the Chinese side, I would put more weighting on the words of those combat historians, especially that of this US army detachment commander of the 5th Historical Detachment in the Korean War - Lieutenant Bevin Alexander. Like Mao said: "No Investigation, No Right to Speak"

Historical Detachment commanders (from left) Pierce W. Briscoe, William J. Fox, and Bevin Alexander, with driver Private Donald L. Ruby and clerk Corporal Harry L. Knapp at Eighth Army Rear in Taegu as they are about to leave for the front in early June 1951.

I am going to get his book, and will be very interested in going through the details, with emphasis of the following particular chapters:

Chapter 31: The United States Decides to Conquer

American leaders get a UN resolution passed to occupy North Korea, hold elections, and reunite the country with South Korea, meaning right-wing Syngman Rhee would become ruler. This ignores the interests of Red China, which fears an American presence on the Yalu river frontier with Korea.

Chapter 32: Red China Warns the United States

Beijing protests a UN invasion of North Korea, threatening on October 3, 1950, that South Korean troops can cross the 38th parallel, but that Red China will intervene if American forces do so. Washington ignores the warning. Meantime Truman meets with MacArthur on Wake island in the Pacific on October 15, 1950. MacArthur says there is very little chance the Chinese or Russians will come into the war.

Chapter 39: A Time to Reconsider

The Chinese have landed heavy blows to warn the Americans not to advance, but MacArthur is not listening. MacArthur refuses to accept evidence that strong Chinese forces have entered Korea. No one in Washington challenges his interpretation, though on November 6, 1950, MacArthur changes his tune and says Chinese “are pouring across all bridges over the Yalu.”

Chapter 41: A Different Kind of Army

Description of the unusual structure and way of operating of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF)—no officers corps, no military ranks, telling everyone details of the tactical or strategic plan, forming units around a “three-times-three” system of three three-man teams plus a leader, weapons largely limited to rifles, machine guns, grenades, satchel charges, mortars. Also description of Chinese battle tactics.

Chapter 47: The Breakout

Description of the dramatic retreat of marines and soldiers down the narrow mountain road from Hagaru-ri to the sea at Hungnam, and the abandonment of the American plan to conquer North Korea.

Chapter 51: Acheson’s Calculated Risk

The UN calls for the Chinese and Americans to withdraw from Korea, for Korea to reunite, and for all Koreans to decide on their government. Also for an “appropriate body” to decide on the status of Taiwan and Red China’s admission to the UN. Acheson accepts the plan, confident the Chinese will reject it—and thereby lose in world opinion. He’s right. General Collins decides MacArthur’s claim that morale had shrunk is wrong. Ridgway begins a march back northward. Description of R&R leaves to Japan.

Chapter 55: The Spring Offensive

The Chinese launch a massive offensive on April 22, 1951. UN forces fall back to the No Name Line, running from just north of Seoul roughly eastward to the Sea of Japan. This line holds. New Eighth Army commander James A. Van Fleet orders a counteroffensive. By June 13, 1951, the Chinese are back to about the 38th parallel, centering their defense on the Iron Triangle. All along the front they establish heavily dug-in emplacements laced with bunkers. Positional war comes to Korea.


Chapter 56: Talking Peace and Practicing War

Andrei Gromyko, deputy Soviet foreign minister, advises Americans on June 23, 1951, to seek a military armistice, not a political settlement, in Korea. On June 30, 1951, Ridgway offers an armistice. Next day the Chinese agree to suspend military operations and hold peace talks at Kaesong on the 38th parallel. The Americans agree to peace talks, but refuse to accept a cease-fire. This is a great mistake, rejecting Gromyko’s advice, and leads to two more years of deadly war.





Korea: The First War We Lost (Contents)
Chapter 1: June 25, 1950
The attack of North Korea and South Korea’s inability to stop it.

Chapter 2: How Did It Happen?
Origins of the separation of Korea along the 38th parallel

Chapter 3: Partition
Refusal of the Soviet Union to allow trade or contacts into North Korea. Election of right-wing Syngman Rhee as leader in the South. Creation of harsh Stalinist state in the North under Kim Il Sung. Most industry in North, best land in the South. Kimchi and “honey wagons.”

Chapter 4: Hands Off Taiwan and Korea
Victory of Communists in Chinese civil war. Flight of Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan 1949. Belief in Washington that Red China a satellite of the Soviet Union. Statement by Secretary of State Dean Acheson leaving Taiwan and Korea outside U.S. defensive line. Leads Kim Il Sung and Joseph Stalin to plan seizure of South Korea.

Chapter 5: Attack Across the 38th
South Koreans have no weapons to stop North Korea’s Soviet-made T34 tanks. ROK ( Republic of Korea or South Korean) forces abandon Seoul, move south in chaos. U.S. sets in motion emergency evacuation of Americans from Korea.

Chapter 6: Decision in Washington
President Truman resolves to intervene to protect South Korea. He sees the Soviet Union as the instigator of the invasion.

Chapter 7: War and the Quarantine of Taiwan
President Truman directs General Douglas MacArthur to repel the North Koreans with air and sea forces. He believes that Red China is a party to the invasion, and orders the U.S. Seventh Fleet to prevent the Communist Chinese from invading Taiwan and eliminating the Nationalist regime there.

Chapter 8: The Army of the United Nations
Congress supports Truman’s actions. The Soviet Union continues its boycott of the UN Security Council, permitting the U.S. to get the UN’s endorsement of its actions. The UN asks the U.S. to designate a UN commander. Truman names MacArthur, who flies into Korea, and informs Truman he must commit U.S. land forces. Truman authorizes him to use all available American forces without limit.

Chapter 9: Goodbye to the Good Times
American occupation forces in Japan are thrown into the Korean maelstrom. Comfortable billets in Japan are exchanged for extremely difficult conditions in Korea. The experience is a great shock to American soldiers.

Chapter 10: The Teenagers Stand and Fight
A small contingent, Task Force Smith, is the first American element to meet the North Korean onslaught, at Osan on July 5, 1950. The North Koreans overrun the American positions, forcing the Americans to retreat in haste.

Chapter 11: Withdrawal in Disorder
A battalion of the 34th Infantry Regiment encounters the North Koreans at Pyongtaek on July 6, 1950, but it offers little resistance, and retreats in haste. North Koreans drive the 34th out of Chonan on July 7, 1950.

Chapter 12: One Bonanza, Several Defeats
General Walton H. Walker, Eighth Army commander, tries to set up a defense line along the Kum river. U.S. aircraft strike enemy tanks and infantry north of Chonui on July 9, 1950. Aircraft shatter a North Korean column at Pyongtaek on July 10, 1950. North Koreans drive the 21 st Infantry out of Chonui and Chochiwon on July 10-12,1950. To the east of the Americans, North Koreans drive back South Korean forces.

Chapter 13: The Kum River
North Koreans outflank the 34th Infantry at Kongju on the Kum river on July 14, 1950, sending the Americans in quick retreat.

Chapter 14: Taepyong-ni
North Koreans set up a devastating roadblock behind the 19th Infantry at Taepyong-ni on the Kum river on July 16, 1950, and cause huge casualties.

Chapter 15: Taejon
Americans are driven out of Taejon in a chaotic battle on July 20, 1950.

Chapter 16: The Ghost Division
While American attention is riveted on the main road and highway route in Korea—the Seoul-Taejon-Taegu axis---the North Koreans undertake an envelopment of South Korea, with the 5th Division moving along the Sea of Japan and the 6th Division driving along the Yellow Sea. But the 5th Division moves timidly and the 6th Division takes up priceless days occupying the ports of southwestern Korea., giving the Americans just enough time to throw in blocking forces.

Chapter 17: Retreat to the Naktong
South Korean troops block the 5th North Korean Division on the Sea of Japan, while American forces stop the 6th North Korean Division near Masan, west of Pusan, and also slow the advance of North Korean forces heading toward Taegu. General Walker sets up a strong defensive line along the Naktong river in late July and early August 1950.

Chapter 18: The First Counteroffensive
Americans launch offensive west of Masan in early August 1950. The operation begins with dogfights on ridgelines, but marines soon advance along the coast road and army soldiers on a road inland. The advance halts when grave dangers appear north of Taegu.

Chapter 19: The Days Along the Naktong
Only July 29, 1950, General Walker declares that “we are going to hold this line” along the Naktong. “We are going to win.” Description of the beginning stages of the dramatic, violent period in August 1950, when the North Koreans fling attack after attack against the Pusan Perimeter, but are unable to break through.

Chapter 20: “We Are Going to Hold This Line”
Description of the spectacular later battles that preserve the Pusan Perimeter and leave the attacking North Koreans badly damaged and unable to achieve any major advance.

Chapter 21: Forging a Sword of Vengeance
General MacArthur devises a plan to invade Inchon, the port city of Seoul, from the sea and sever the only double-tracked railway in Korea, vital to supply the North Koreans attacking the Pusan Perimeter. This, he says, will destroy the enemy army.

Chapter 22: MacArthur v. the Joint Chiefs
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are timid and fight MacArthur’s Inchon invasion plan. But MacArthur presses onward, gaining Truman’s support.

Chapter 23: MacArthur Calls on Chiang Kai-shek
MacArthur visits the Nationalist leader on Taiwan on July 31-August 1, 1950, raising suspicions that the U.S. is forging an alliance with Chiang and might attack the Red Chinese. Truman is livid, but the General is not moved. MacArthur also calls for the destruction of North Korea, not merely its defeat.

Chapter 24: The Decision on Inchon
MacArthur overcomes overt opposition of the Joint Chiefs to an Inchon landing at a special meeting in Tokyo on August 21, 1950. The Chiefs are still dubious but Truman and Acheson are enthusiastic.

Chapter 25: MacArthur Alienates Truman
MacArthur releases a message August 26, 1950, to be read to the Veterans of Foreign Wars implying that Truman’s wary handling of the Taiwan situation is wrong, and suggesting that the U.S. should openly support Chiang against the Chinese Reds. Truman demands that MacArthur retract the statement.

Chapter 26: The North Koreans Try Once More
Description of the last desperate efforts of the North Koreans to break through the Pusan Perimeter, and drive the Americans into the sea. All their attacks fail.

Chapter 27: The Joint Chiefs Get Cold Feet
Fearing the North Koreans will crack the Pusan Perimeter, the Joint Chiefs send a final warning on September 7, 1950, warning of disastrous consequences if the Inchon landing fails. MacArthur responds fiercely, saying this is the one way to ensure the defeat of the North Koreans. The Chiefs back down.

Chapter 28: Inchon
Description of the highly successful landing of marines and army soldiers at Inchon on September 15, 1950, and their quick breakout to seize Seoul, twenty miles away.

Chapter 29: The Assault on Seoul
Description of the fierce battles on the outskirts of Seoul between North Koreans and U.S. marines and soldiers, beginning September 22, 1950, and the subsequent street-by-street fights to drive the enemy out of the city.

Chapter 30: Breakout from the Perimeter
Description of the swift movement of American and South Korean forces northward in late September 1950 after the North Korean army disintegrates upon losing its supplies with the seizure of Seoul and severing of the rail lines.

Chapter 31: The United States Decides to Conquer
American leaders get a UN resolution passed to occupy North Korea, hold elections, and reunite the country with South Korea, meaning right-wing Syngman Rhee would become ruler. This ignores the interests of Red China, which fears an American presence on the Yalu river frontier with Korea.

Chapter 32: Red China Warns the United States
Beijing protests a UN invasion of North Korea, threatening on October 3, 1950, that South Korean troops can cross the 38th parallel, but that Red China will intervene if American forces do so. Washington ignores the warning. Meantime Truman meets with MacArthur on Wake island in the Pacific on October 15, 1950. MacArthur says there is very little chance the Chinese or Russians will come into the war.

Chapter 33: Up to the Chongchon River
The UN invasion of North Korea starts on October 9, 1950, Eighth Army advancing in the west and X Corps east of the high Taebaek mountain spine next to the Sea of Japan. Eighth Army captures the North Korean capital of Pyongyang and drives toward the Chongchon river, sixty miles south of the Yalu.

Chapter 34: Destination: The Yalu River
MacArthur unleashes UN forces in several separate, uncoordinated thrusts northward. He discounts hints that the Chinese are about to enter the war.

Chapter 35: The Warning Blow Falls
On October 25, 1950, Chinese troops ambush a ROK regiment just north of Unsan and another ROK regiment at Onjong, ten miles farther north and only fifty miles from the Yalu. ROK troops abandon Onjong but hold onto Unsan, though Chinese pressure grows ominously.

Chapter 36: Disaster at Unsan
The U.S. 8th Cavalry Regiment relieves ROKs at Unsan on November 1, 1950, while a battalion of the 5th Cavalry Regiment fails to break a Chinese roadblock southwest of Unsan. The 8th Cavalry sustains heavy attacks, and is ordered by I Corps to withdraw. Two battalions get out, though suffering heavily, but the 3rd Battalion on the west is surrounded and cannot retreat.

Chapter 37: The Lost Battalion
Description of the virtual destruction of the 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, in heavy fighting November 1-4, 1950.

Chapter 38: The Chinese Back Off
Most American, British, and ROK forces withdraw to the south side of the Chongchon river, the British 27th Brigade near Pakchon on the west suffering many losses from Chinese attacks as it disengages. But on November 6, 1950, the Chinese break contact and withdraw entirely from the fight.

Chapter 39: A Time to Reconsider
The Chinese have landed heavy blows to warn the Americans not to advance, but MacArthur is not listening. MacArthur refuses to accept evidence that strong Chinese forces have entered Korea. No one in Washington challenges his interpretation, though on November 6, 1950, MacArthur changes his tune and says Chinese “are pouring across all bridges over the Yalu.”

Chapter 40: Empty Rhetoric on the Potomac
MacArthur rejects any suggestion that his drive to the Yalu should be called off. He says U.S. air power can halt any Chinese offensive. MacArthur is ignorant of the great Chinese ability to hide from American air surveillance. Again, no one in Washington challenges MacArthur’s judgment.

Chapter 41: A Different Kind of Army
Description of the unusual structure and way of operating of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF)—no officers corps, no military ranks, telling everyone details of the tactical or strategic plan, forming units around a “three-times-three” system of three three-man teams plus a leader, weapons largely limited to rifles, machine guns, grenades, satchel charges, mortars. Also description of Chinese battle tactics.

Chapter 42: Attack into the Unknown
Eighth Army in west sets final offensive to start November 24, 1950, while advance of X Corps east of the mountain spine continues slowly. Marines and soldiers in east move cautiously up to Changjin (Chosin) reservoir. Chinese secretly mass 180,000 troops in the west and 120,000 in the east. UN forces are largely unaware of the Chinese semiguerrilla tactics of deception, surprise, and stealthy infiltration at night.

Chapter 43: The “Home-by-Christmas” Offensive
In the west, the offensive goes well at first, but blow falls on the ROK 8th Division in mountains near Tokchon on the extreme right or east. Chinese shatter the ROKs, and move into the rear of IX Corps in the center. The 2nd Division and Turkish Brigade catch the brunt of the Chinese assaults, and are badly shattered. Other Eighth Army forces retreat with great speed.

Chapter 44: The March to the Sea
In chaotic fighting around the Changjin (Chosin) reservoir in the mountains of the east, Chinese forces cut off most of the 1 st Marine Division and parts of the army 7th Division.

Chapter 45: The Agony of the Three Battalions
Description of the shattering attacks on 7th Division troops on the eastern side of the Changjin (Chosin) reservoir.

Chapter 46: An Act of Defiance
Description of the intense fighting of marines to disengage from the western side of the Changjin (Chosin) reservoir and get back to Hagaru-ri on the exit road leading south.

Chapter 47: The Breakout
Description of the dramatic retreat of marines and soldiers down the narrow mountain road from Hagaru-ri to the sea at Hungnam, and the abandonment of the American plan to conquer North Korea.

Chapter 48: MacArthur Panics
The General abruptly changes from easy confidence to outrage. “We face an entirely new war,” he announces. Washington talks frantically—and does nothing. As X Corps on the east escapes, Eighth Army on the west withdraws 120 miles in the longest retreat in American history. President Truman is tricked by reporters into saying that the U.S. might use the atomic bomb. A world uproar follows, and British Prime Minister Clement Attlee flies to confer with Truman.

Chapter 49: Back to the 38th Parallel
In the Attlee-Truman talks December 4-8, 1950, Britain withdraws its proposal for Taiwan to be ceded to Red China but favors Red China’s admission to the UN. Truman says he hopes “world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb.” The U.S. agrees to end the war by reestablishing the border at the 38th parallel. General Walker is killed in a jeep accident, and is replaced by Matthew B. Ridgway. MacArthur wants to risk world war by extending the conflict directly to China.

Chapter 50: The New Year’s Eve Offensive
UN forces have withdrawn to the Imjin river just north of Seoul. The Chinese launch an offensive which captures Seoul and drives the Americans back to about the 37th parallel. Chinese supply facilities are primitive, however, and they are unable to continue. Washington rejects MacArthur’s proposal to extend the war to mainland China. MacArthur claims American soldiers’ morale has declined, threatening their battle efficiency.

Chapter 51: Acheson’s Calculated Risk
The UN calls for the Chinese and Americans to withdraw from Korea, for Korea to reunite, and for all Koreans to decide on their government. Also for an “appropriate body” to decide on the status of Taiwan and Red China’s admission to the UN. Acheson accepts the plan, confident the Chinese will reject it—and thereby lose in world opinion. He’s right. General Collins decides MacArthur’s claim that morale had shrunk is wrong. Ridgway begins a march back northward. Description of R&R leaves to Japan.

Chapter 52: North to the Kansas Line
In March 1951, Eighth Army moves northward on both sides of Chunchon in the center, causing the Chinese to abandon Seoul for fear of being outflanked. The Chinese delay the advance with antitank mines and bunkers, and assemble large forces in the Chorwon-Pyonggang-Kumwha “Iron Triangle” for a counterstroke.

Chapter 53: MacArthur Finally Does It
The approach to the 38th parallel gives Truman a chance to offer a cease-fire. He circulates a draft proposal on March 19, 1951, to Acheson, secretary of defense George C. Marshall, and the Joint Chiefs, and they alert MacArthur as to what Truman is planning. On March 24, 1951, with no notice to Washington, MacArthur usurps the authority of the president and issues a bombastic threat of invasion of China unless Red China sues for peace. This kills Truman’s effort. On April 11, 1951, Truman fires MacArthur. Ridgway replaces him.

Chapter 54: The MacArthur Hearings
Two Senate committees hold hearings May 3-June 27, 1951, on MacArthur’s dismissal and the situation in the Far East. They damage MacArthur, especially concerning his desire to extend the war to China. General Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, summarizes the situation: “This strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.”

Chapter 55: The Spring Offensive
The Chinese launch a massive offensive on April 22, 1951. UN forces fall back to the No Name Line, running from just north of Seoul roughly eastward to the Sea of Japan. This line holds. New Eighth Army commander James A. Van Fleet orders a counteroffensive. By June 13, 1951, the Chinese are back to about the 38th parallel, centering their defense on the Iron Triangle. All along the front they establish heavily dug-in emplacements laced with bunkers. Positional war comes to Korea.

Chapter 56: Talking Peace and Practicing War
Andrei Gromyko, deputy Soviet foreign minister, advises Americans on June 23, 1951, to seek a military armistice, not a political settlement, in Korea. On June 30, 1951, Ridgway offers an armistice. Next day the Chinese agree to suspend military operations and hold peace talks at Kaesong on the 38th parallel. The Americans agree to peace talks, but refuse to accept a cease-fire. This is a great mistake, rejecting Gromyko’s advice, and leads to two more years of deadly war.

Chapter 57: The Bloody Ridges
Description of the terrible battles of Bloody Ridge and Heartbreak Ridge on the eastern front August-October 1951. These engagements are the quintessential battles of the Korean War, and represent the many ridgeline clashes that mark the last two years of the war.

Chapter 58: Another Try for Peace
Peace talks resume October 25, 1951, at Panmunjom. Description of the extremely intricate negotiations between the UN and the Communists. The war is greatly lengthened because Truman refuses to return POWs who don’t want to be sent back to their Communist homelands.

Chapter 59: The POWs Seize the Stage
Description of the dramatic seizure by POWs on Koje-do island of an American general in early May 1952, and the damaging statements his successor makes about alleged UN mistreatment of prisoners in order to get the general released. A great propaganda victory for the Communists.

Chapter 60: Rhee the Despot, Clark the Hawk
Syngman Rhee changes the constitution so he can rule as a dictator. Mark Clark, the new Far East commander, bombs hydroelectric stations in North Korea, and in October 1952 proposes an amphibious landing and air and naval attacks on China itself. He also urges using atomic bombs against China. He’s ignored. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Republican candidate for president seeking to end the war, says “I shall go to Korea.”

Chapter 61: Others Take a Hand
As truce talks break down, president-elect Eisenhower visits Korea in December 1952. He learns nothing about achieving peace. In late March 1953 the Communists propose exchange of sick and wounded POWs on both sides and also urge settlement of the whole POW issue. In June 1953 both sides agree that neutral nations will take responsibility for POWs. Those who want to return home will be able to do so, while the others will be released.

Chapter 62: The Final Crisis
Syngman Rhee tries to torpedo the armistice by releasing 25,000 North Korean prisoners. But the Communists react mildly. Rhee refuses to sign, but agrees not to obstruct an agreement. On July 27, 1953, at Panmunjom the two sides sign an armistice—virtually identical to the terms offered by the Chinese on July 1, 1951. The war has gone on two years longer for no purpose.

Chapter 63: The Long Shadow of the Korean War
The United States spends nearly two decades after signing the armistice in deep animosity to Red China. The conflict ends only in February 1972 when Richard Nixon goes to China and reaches a settlement.

 

[jhungary]

I suggest we all need to read more books about something we were never personally involved first before jumping to the conclusion with certainty. For a subject like the Korean war, apart from the accounts from the Chinese side, I would put more weighting on the words of those combat historians, especially that of this US army detachment commander of the 5th Historical Detachment in the Korean War - Lieutenant Bevin Alexander. Like Mao said: "No Investigation, No Right to Speak"

Historical Detachment commanders (from left) Pierce W. Briscoe, William J. Fox, and Bevin Alexander, with driver Private Donald L. Ruby and clerk Corporal Harry L. Knapp at Eighth Army Rear in Taegu as they are about to leave for the front in early June 1951.

I am going to get his book, and will be very interested in going through the details, with emphasis of the following particular chapters:

Chapter 31: The United States Decides to Conquer

American leaders get a UN resolution passed to occupy North Korea, hold elections, and reunite the country with South Korea, meaning right-wing Syngman Rhee would become ruler. This ignores the interests of Red China, which fears an American presence on the Yalu river frontier with Korea.

Chapter 32: Red China Warns the United States

Beijing protests a UN invasion of North Korea, threatening on October 3, 1950, that South Korean troops can cross the 38th parallel, but that Red China will intervene if American forces do so. Washington ignores the warning. Meantime Truman meets with MacArthur on Wake island in the Pacific on October 15, 1950. MacArthur says there is very little chance the Chinese or Russians will come into the war.

Chapter 39: A Time to Reconsider

The Chinese have landed heavy blows to warn the Americans not to advance, but MacArthur is not listening. MacArthur refuses to accept evidence that strong Chinese forces have entered Korea. No one in Washington challenges his interpretation, though on November 6, 1950, MacArthur changes his tune and says Chinese “are pouring across all bridges over the Yalu.”

Chapter 41: A Different Kind of Army

Description of the unusual structure and way of operating of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF)—no officers corps, no military ranks, telling everyone details of the tactical or strategic plan, forming units around a “three-times-three” system of three three-man teams plus a leader, weapons largely limited to rifles, machine guns, grenades, satchel charges, mortars. Also description of Chinese battle tactics.

Chapter 47: The Breakout

Description of the dramatic retreat of marines and soldiers down the narrow mountain road from Hagaru-ri to the sea at Hungnam, and the abandonment of the American plan to conquer North Korea.

Chapter 51: Acheson’s Calculated Risk

The UN calls for the Chinese and Americans to withdraw from Korea, for Korea to reunite, and for all Koreans to decide on their government. Also for an “appropriate body” to decide on the status of Taiwan and Red China’s admission to the UN. Acheson accepts the plan, confident the Chinese will reject it—and thereby lose in world opinion. He’s right. General Collins decides MacArthur’s claim that morale had shrunk is wrong. Ridgway begins a march back northward. Description of R&R leaves to Japan.

Chapter 55: The Spring Offensive

The Chinese launch a massive offensive on April 22, 1951. UN forces fall back to the No Name Line, running from just north of Seoul roughly eastward to the Sea of Japan. This line holds. New Eighth Army commander James A. Van Fleet orders a counteroffensive. By June 13, 1951, the Chinese are back to about the 38th parallel, centering their defense on the Iron Triangle. All along the front they establish heavily dug-in emplacements laced with bunkers. Positional war comes to Korea.


Chapter 56: Talking Peace and Practicing War

Andrei Gromyko, deputy Soviet foreign minister, advises Americans on June 23, 1951, to seek a military armistice, not a political settlement, in Korea. On June 30, 1951, Ridgway offers an armistice. Next day the Chinese agree to suspend military operations and hold peace talks at Kaesong on the 38th parallel. The Americans agree to peace talks, but refuse to accept a cease-fire. This is a great mistake, rejecting Gromyko’s advice, and leads to two more years of deadly war.





Korea: The First War We Lost (Contents)
Chapter 1: June 25, 1950
The attack of North Korea and South Korea’s inability to stop it.

Chapter 2: How Did It Happen?
Origins of the separation of Korea along the 38th parallel

Chapter 3: Partition
Refusal of the Soviet Union to allow trade or contacts into North Korea. Election of right-wing Syngman Rhee as leader in the South. Creation of harsh Stalinist state in the North under Kim Il Sung. Most industry in North, best land in the South. Kimchi and “honey wagons.”

Chapter 4: Hands Off Taiwan and Korea
Victory of Communists in Chinese civil war. Flight of Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan 1949. Belief in Washington that Red China a satellite of the Soviet Union. Statement by Secretary of State Dean Acheson leaving Taiwan and Korea outside U.S. defensive line. Leads Kim Il Sung and Joseph Stalin to plan seizure of South Korea.

Chapter 5: Attack Across the 38th
South Koreans have no weapons to stop North Korea’s Soviet-made T34 tanks. ROK ( Republic of Korea or South Korean) forces abandon Seoul, move south in chaos. U.S. sets in motion emergency evacuation of Americans from Korea.

Chapter 6: Decision in Washington
President Truman resolves to intervene to protect South Korea. He sees the Soviet Union as the instigator of the invasion.

Chapter 7: War and the Quarantine of Taiwan
President Truman directs General Douglas MacArthur to repel the North Koreans with air and sea forces. He believes that Red China is a party to the invasion, and orders the U.S. Seventh Fleet to prevent the Communist Chinese from invading Taiwan and eliminating the Nationalist regime there.

Chapter 8: The Army of the United Nations
Congress supports Truman’s actions. The Soviet Union continues its boycott of the UN Security Council, permitting the U.S. to get the UN’s endorsement of its actions. The UN asks the U.S. to designate a UN commander. Truman names MacArthur, who flies into Korea, and informs Truman he must commit U.S. land forces. Truman authorizes him to use all available American forces without limit.

Chapter 9: Goodbye to the Good Times
American occupation forces in Japan are thrown into the Korean maelstrom. Comfortable billets in Japan are exchanged for extremely difficult conditions in Korea. The experience is a great shock to American soldiers.

Chapter 10: The Teenagers Stand and Fight
A small contingent, Task Force Smith, is the first American element to meet the North Korean onslaught, at Osan on July 5, 1950. The North Koreans overrun the American positions, forcing the Americans to retreat in haste.

Chapter 11: Withdrawal in Disorder
A battalion of the 34th Infantry Regiment encounters the North Koreans at Pyongtaek on July 6, 1950, but it offers little resistance, and retreats in haste. North Koreans drive the 34th out of Chonan on July 7, 1950.

Chapter 12: One Bonanza, Several Defeats
General Walton H. Walker, Eighth Army commander, tries to set up a defense line along the Kum river. U.S. aircraft strike enemy tanks and infantry north of Chonui on July 9, 1950. Aircraft shatter a North Korean column at Pyongtaek on July 10, 1950. North Koreans drive the 21 st Infantry out of Chonui and Chochiwon on July 10-12,1950. To the east of the Americans, North Koreans drive back South Korean forces.

Chapter 13: The Kum River
North Koreans outflank the 34th Infantry at Kongju on the Kum river on July 14, 1950, sending the Americans in quick retreat.

Chapter 14: Taepyong-ni
North Koreans set up a devastating roadblock behind the 19th Infantry at Taepyong-ni on the Kum river on July 16, 1950, and cause huge casualties.

Chapter 15: Taejon
Americans are driven out of Taejon in a chaotic battle on July 20, 1950.

Chapter 16: The Ghost Division
While American attention is riveted on the main road and highway route in Korea—the Seoul-Taejon-Taegu axis---the North Koreans undertake an envelopment of South Korea, with the 5th Division moving along the Sea of Japan and the 6th Division driving along the Yellow Sea. But the 5th Division moves timidly and the 6th Division takes up priceless days occupying the ports of southwestern Korea., giving the Americans just enough time to throw in blocking forces.

Chapter 17: Retreat to the Naktong
South Korean troops block the 5th North Korean Division on the Sea of Japan, while American forces stop the 6th North Korean Division near Masan, west of Pusan, and also slow the advance of North Korean forces heading toward Taegu. General Walker sets up a strong defensive line along the Naktong river in late July and early August 1950.

Chapter 18: The First Counteroffensive
Americans launch offensive west of Masan in early August 1950. The operation begins with dogfights on ridgelines, but marines soon advance along the coast road and army soldiers on a road inland. The advance halts when grave dangers appear north of Taegu.

Chapter 19: The Days Along the Naktong
Only July 29, 1950, General Walker declares that “we are going to hold this line” along the Naktong. “We are going to win.” Description of the beginning stages of the dramatic, violent period in August 1950, when the North Koreans fling attack after attack against the Pusan Perimeter, but are unable to break through.

Chapter 20: “We Are Going to Hold This Line”
Description of the spectacular later battles that preserve the Pusan Perimeter and leave the attacking North Koreans badly damaged and unable to achieve any major advance.

Chapter 21: Forging a Sword of Vengeance
General MacArthur devises a plan to invade Inchon, the port city of Seoul, from the sea and sever the only double-tracked railway in Korea, vital to supply the North Koreans attacking the Pusan Perimeter. This, he says, will destroy the enemy army.

Chapter 22: MacArthur v. the Joint Chiefs
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are timid and fight MacArthur’s Inchon invasion plan. But MacArthur presses onward, gaining Truman’s support.

Chapter 23: MacArthur Calls on Chiang Kai-shek
MacArthur visits the Nationalist leader on Taiwan on July 31-August 1, 1950, raising suspicions that the U.S. is forging an alliance with Chiang and might attack the Red Chinese. Truman is livid, but the General is not moved. MacArthur also calls for the destruction of North Korea, not merely its defeat.

Chapter 24: The Decision on Inchon
MacArthur overcomes overt opposition of the Joint Chiefs to an Inchon landing at a special meeting in Tokyo on August 21, 1950. The Chiefs are still dubious but Truman and Acheson are enthusiastic.

Chapter 25: MacArthur Alienates Truman
MacArthur releases a message August 26, 1950, to be read to the Veterans of Foreign Wars implying that Truman’s wary handling of the Taiwan situation is wrong, and suggesting that the U.S. should openly support Chiang against the Chinese Reds. Truman demands that MacArthur retract the statement.

Chapter 26: The North Koreans Try Once More
Description of the last desperate efforts of the North Koreans to break through the Pusan Perimeter, and drive the Americans into the sea. All their attacks fail.

Chapter 27: The Joint Chiefs Get Cold Feet
Fearing the North Koreans will crack the Pusan Perimeter, the Joint Chiefs send a final warning on September 7, 1950, warning of disastrous consequences if the Inchon landing fails. MacArthur responds fiercely, saying this is the one way to ensure the defeat of the North Koreans. The Chiefs back down.

Chapter 28: Inchon
Description of the highly successful landing of marines and army soldiers at Inchon on September 15, 1950, and their quick breakout to seize Seoul, twenty miles away.

Chapter 29: The Assault on Seoul
Description of the fierce battles on the outskirts of Seoul between North Koreans and U.S. marines and soldiers, beginning September 22, 1950, and the subsequent street-by-street fights to drive the enemy out of the city.

Chapter 30: Breakout from the Perimeter
Description of the swift movement of American and South Korean forces northward in late September 1950 after the North Korean army disintegrates upon losing its supplies with the seizure of Seoul and severing of the rail lines.

Chapter 31: The United States Decides to Conquer
American leaders get a UN resolution passed to occupy North Korea, hold elections, and reunite the country with South Korea, meaning right-wing Syngman Rhee would become ruler. This ignores the interests of Red China, which fears an American presence on the Yalu river frontier with Korea.

Chapter 32: Red China Warns the United States
Beijing protests a UN invasion of North Korea, threatening on October 3, 1950, that South Korean troops can cross the 38th parallel, but that Red China will intervene if American forces do so. Washington ignores the warning. Meantime Truman meets with MacArthur on Wake island in the Pacific on October 15, 1950. MacArthur says there is very little chance the Chinese or Russians will come into the war.

Chapter 33: Up to the Chongchon River
The UN invasion of North Korea starts on October 9, 1950, Eighth Army advancing in the west and X Corps east of the high Taebaek mountain spine next to the Sea of Japan. Eighth Army captures the North Korean capital of Pyongyang and drives toward the Chongchon river, sixty miles south of the Yalu.

Chapter 34: Destination: The Yalu River
MacArthur unleashes UN forces in several separate, uncoordinated thrusts northward. He discounts hints that the Chinese are about to enter the war.

Chapter 35: The Warning Blow Falls
On October 25, 1950, Chinese troops ambush a ROK regiment just north of Unsan and another ROK regiment at Onjong, ten miles farther north and only fifty miles from the Yalu. ROK troops abandon Onjong but hold onto Unsan, though Chinese pressure grows ominously.

Chapter 36: Disaster at Unsan
The U.S. 8th Cavalry Regiment relieves ROKs at Unsan on November 1, 1950, while a battalion of the 5th Cavalry Regiment fails to break a Chinese roadblock southwest of Unsan. The 8th Cavalry sustains heavy attacks, and is ordered by I Corps to withdraw. Two battalions get out, though suffering heavily, but the 3rd Battalion on the west is surrounded and cannot retreat.

Chapter 37: The Lost Battalion
Description of the virtual destruction of the 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, in heavy fighting November 1-4, 1950.

Chapter 38: The Chinese Back Off
Most American, British, and ROK forces withdraw to the south side of the Chongchon river, the British 27th Brigade near Pakchon on the west suffering many losses from Chinese attacks as it disengages. But on November 6, 1950, the Chinese break contact and withdraw entirely from the fight.

Chapter 39: A Time to Reconsider
The Chinese have landed heavy blows to warn the Americans not to advance, but MacArthur is not listening. MacArthur refuses to accept evidence that strong Chinese forces have entered Korea. No one in Washington challenges his interpretation, though on November 6, 1950, MacArthur changes his tune and says Chinese “are pouring across all bridges over the Yalu.”

Chapter 40: Empty Rhetoric on the Potomac
MacArthur rejects any suggestion that his drive to the Yalu should be called off. He says U.S. air power can halt any Chinese offensive. MacArthur is ignorant of the great Chinese ability to hide from American air surveillance. Again, no one in Washington challenges MacArthur’s judgment.

Chapter 41: A Different Kind of Army
Description of the unusual structure and way of operating of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF)—no officers corps, no military ranks, telling everyone details of the tactical or strategic plan, forming units around a “three-times-three” system of three three-man teams plus a leader, weapons largely limited to rifles, machine guns, grenades, satchel charges, mortars. Also description of Chinese battle tactics.

Chapter 42: Attack into the Unknown
Eighth Army in west sets final offensive to start November 24, 1950, while advance of X Corps east of the mountain spine continues slowly. Marines and soldiers in east move cautiously up to Changjin (Chosin) reservoir. Chinese secretly mass 180,000 troops in the west and 120,000 in the east. UN forces are largely unaware of the Chinese semiguerrilla tactics of deception, surprise, and stealthy infiltration at night.

Chapter 43: The “Home-by-Christmas” Offensive
In the west, the offensive goes well at first, but blow falls on the ROK 8th Division in mountains near Tokchon on the extreme right or east. Chinese shatter the ROKs, and move into the rear of IX Corps in the center. The 2nd Division and Turkish Brigade catch the brunt of the Chinese assaults, and are badly shattered. Other Eighth Army forces retreat with great speed.

Chapter 44: The March to the Sea
In chaotic fighting around the Changjin (Chosin) reservoir in the mountains of the east, Chinese forces cut off most of the 1 st Marine Division and parts of the army 7th Division.

Chapter 45: The Agony of the Three Battalions
Description of the shattering attacks on 7th Division troops on the eastern side of the Changjin (Chosin) reservoir.

Chapter 46: An Act of Defiance
Description of the intense fighting of marines to disengage from the western side of the Changjin (Chosin) reservoir and get back to Hagaru-ri on the exit road leading south.

Chapter 47: The Breakout
Description of the dramatic retreat of marines and soldiers down the narrow mountain road from Hagaru-ri to the sea at Hungnam, and the abandonment of the American plan to conquer North Korea.

Chapter 48: MacArthur Panics
The General abruptly changes from easy confidence to outrage. “We face an entirely new war,” he announces. Washington talks frantically—and does nothing. As X Corps on the east escapes, Eighth Army on the west withdraws 120 miles in the longest retreat in American history. President Truman is tricked by reporters into saying that the U.S. might use the atomic bomb. A world uproar follows, and British Prime Minister Clement Attlee flies to confer with Truman.

Chapter 49: Back to the 38th Parallel
In the Attlee-Truman talks December 4-8, 1950, Britain withdraws its proposal for Taiwan to be ceded to Red China but favors Red China’s admission to the UN. Truman says he hopes “world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb.” The U.S. agrees to end the war by reestablishing the border at the 38th parallel. General Walker is killed in a jeep accident, and is replaced by Matthew B. Ridgway. MacArthur wants to risk world war by extending the conflict directly to China.

Chapter 50: The New Year’s Eve Offensive
UN forces have withdrawn to the Imjin river just north of Seoul. The Chinese launch an offensive which captures Seoul and drives the Americans back to about the 37th parallel. Chinese supply facilities are primitive, however, and they are unable to continue. Washington rejects MacArthur’s proposal to extend the war to mainland China. MacArthur claims American soldiers’ morale has declined, threatening their battle efficiency.

Chapter 51: Acheson’s Calculated Risk
The UN calls for the Chinese and Americans to withdraw from Korea, for Korea to reunite, and for all Koreans to decide on their government. Also for an “appropriate body” to decide on the status of Taiwan and Red China’s admission to the UN. Acheson accepts the plan, confident the Chinese will reject it—and thereby lose in world opinion. He’s right. General Collins decides MacArthur’s claim that morale had shrunk is wrong. Ridgway begins a march back northward. Description of R&R leaves to Japan.

Chapter 52: North to the Kansas Line
In March 1951, Eighth Army moves northward on both sides of Chunchon in the center, causing the Chinese to abandon Seoul for fear of being outflanked. The Chinese delay the advance with antitank mines and bunkers, and assemble large forces in the Chorwon-Pyonggang-Kumwha “Iron Triangle” for a counterstroke.

Chapter 53: MacArthur Finally Does It
The approach to the 38th parallel gives Truman a chance to offer a cease-fire. He circulates a draft proposal on March 19, 1951, to Acheson, secretary of defense George C. Marshall, and the Joint Chiefs, and they alert MacArthur as to what Truman is planning. On March 24, 1951, with no notice to Washington, MacArthur usurps the authority of the president and issues a bombastic threat of invasion of China unless Red China sues for peace. This kills Truman’s effort. On April 11, 1951, Truman fires MacArthur. Ridgway replaces him.

Chapter 54: The MacArthur Hearings
Two Senate committees hold hearings May 3-June 27, 1951, on MacArthur’s dismissal and the situation in the Far East. They damage MacArthur, especially concerning his desire to extend the war to China. General Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, summarizes the situation: “This strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.”

Chapter 55: The Spring Offensive
The Chinese launch a massive offensive on April 22, 1951. UN forces fall back to the No Name Line, running from just north of Seoul roughly eastward to the Sea of Japan. This line holds. New Eighth Army commander James A. Van Fleet orders a counteroffensive. By June 13, 1951, the Chinese are back to about the 38th parallel, centering their defense on the Iron Triangle. All along the front they establish heavily dug-in emplacements laced with bunkers. Positional war comes to Korea.

Chapter 56: Talking Peace and Practicing War
Andrei Gromyko, deputy Soviet foreign minister, advises Americans on June 23, 1951, to seek a military armistice, not a political settlement, in Korea. On June 30, 1951, Ridgway offers an armistice. Next day the Chinese agree to suspend military operations and hold peace talks at Kaesong on the 38th parallel. The Americans agree to peace talks, but refuse to accept a cease-fire. This is a great mistake, rejecting Gromyko’s advice, and leads to two more years of deadly war.

Chapter 57: The Bloody Ridges
Description of the terrible battles of Bloody Ridge and Heartbreak Ridge on the eastern front August-October 1951. These engagements are the quintessential battles of the Korean War, and represent the many ridgeline clashes that mark the last two years of the war.

Chapter 58: Another Try for Peace
Peace talks resume October 25, 1951, at Panmunjom. Description of the extremely intricate negotiations between the UN and the Communists. The war is greatly lengthened because Truman refuses to return POWs who don’t want to be sent back to their Communist homelands.

Chapter 59: The POWs Seize the Stage
Description of the dramatic seizure by POWs on Koje-do island of an American general in early May 1952, and the damaging statements his successor makes about alleged UN mistreatment of prisoners in order to get the general released. A great propaganda victory for the Communists.

Chapter 60: Rhee the Despot, Clark the Hawk
Syngman Rhee changes the constitution so he can rule as a dictator. Mark Clark, the new Far East commander, bombs hydroelectric stations in North Korea, and in October 1952 proposes an amphibious landing and air and naval attacks on China itself. He also urges using atomic bombs against China. He’s ignored. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Republican candidate for president seeking to end the war, says “I shall go to Korea.”

Chapter 61: Others Take a Hand
As truce talks break down, president-elect Eisenhower visits Korea in December 1952. He learns nothing about achieving peace. In late March 1953 the Communists propose exchange of sick and wounded POWs on both sides and also urge settlement of the whole POW issue. In June 1953 both sides agree that neutral nations will take responsibility for POWs. Those who want to return home will be able to do so, while the others will be released.

Chapter 62: The Final Crisis
Syngman Rhee tries to torpedo the armistice by releasing 25,000 North Korean prisoners. But the Communists react mildly. Rhee refuses to sign, but agrees not to obstruct an agreement. On July 27, 1953, at Panmunjom the two sides sign an armistice—virtually identical to the terms offered by the Chinese on July 1, 1951. The war has gone on two years longer for no purpose.

Chapter 63: The Long Shadow of the Korean War
The United States spends nearly two decades after signing the armistice in deep animosity to Red China. The conflict ends only in February 1972 when Richard Nixon goes to China and reaches a settlement.

You seems to forget, between the two of us, I am the one that have combat experience, you do not even know how the "ins-and-outs" work and I have been a keen student of Korean War, My senior thesis is about Korean War, so , I did put into many research hours on the subject. Beside, 2 of my grand father uncle and himself fought in this war.

So, the dick measurement is over, let's roll the reference.

You seems to have problem about what I said. You are not arguing the same thing I am arguing. You argue US was beaten back by the Chinese, and hence Chinese "won" the war. While my argument is of that Chinese Force failed to capitalize the early success (that roll-over you were talking about) and is not able to cross into 38th, which by all account, it should have been. That itself failed their objective of the war.

You focus on a single "Tactical" objective. Which is US needed to be rolled back near North Korean border. And Again, Chinese Achieve that, but the question is, is this all that the Chinese do in that war? Answer is no. Because, the Chinese have occupied Seoul (capital of South Korea), in December 1950, lose it again, on April 1951, and Invade the South Again during the spring offensive in 1951 and ultimately failed the objective. So, how does invade Seoul, commanding a second invasion to the south have anything to do with the original Chinese war goal? Which is to roll over US/UN establishment near the Chinese border?

First of all, I did not say the Move North were not UN sanction nor did I imply UN was not aware of the move. My point was, the original resolution 83/84, only give scope of "South Korean" assistant.

Refworld | Resolution 84 (1950) of 7 July 1950

The Security Council,

Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,

Having recommended that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area,

1. Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which Governments and peoples of the United Nations have given to its resolutions 82 (1950) and 83 (1950) of 25 and 27 June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to restore international peace and security in the area;

2. Notes that Members of the United Nations have transmitted to the United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic of Korea;

3. Recommends that all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States of America;

4. Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces;

5. Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating;

6. Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command.

To be fair, there are actually argument on whether or not the invasion to the North is supported by United Nation. As there are no resolution passed in the time the "Move North" were commented, the Next resolution (resolution 88) were call to PRC government to discuss the situation in North Korea but that resolution was passed in November, by then the war is a long way inside North Korea.

Refworld | Resolution 88 (1950) of 8 November 1950

The UNSC did not actually supported the motion, the US government, as per National Security Council Memorandum 81/1 stated, the war should only brought into the North if there are "NO CLEAR SIGN OF CHINESE AND SOVIET INTERVENTION" However, the newly established CIA at that time pointed out there are at least 120,000 to 150,000 troop amassed in the Chinese/North Korean border. MacArthur disregard this pieces of intelligence, thus, created an oversight by tunnel vision, that was a strategic failure on MacArthur part.

Document 903 - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII - Historical Documents - Office of the Historian

However, the Chinese now rolled back the UN force after Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River, which effectively pushed all UN force out of North Korea. However, the Chinese did not stop there. Instead the Chinese decided the chase the Defeated 8th Army into South Korea (Which reminiscent what MacArthur did to cross the 38th parallel.) However, the Chinese failed to pursued the defeated UN army in Battle of Wawon and allow the UN 8th Army to retreat south of Seoul and while the Chinese successfully occupied Seoul the second time, however, was once again beaten back after a costly mistake during battle of Imjin river.

Document 296 - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1 - Historical Documents - Office of the Historian

The question, is whether or not the Chinese knew they do not have enough to occupy the south, the answer, simply, for 2 times, the Chinese overestimated the UN force strength and deposition, and both time failed their objective, that is the main reason why there are 2 Koreas today.

 

[Tiqiu]

You seems to have problem about what I said. You are not arguing the same thing I am arguing

Now I don't have problem about what you said, you seem to have problem about what I haven't said yet.

You argue US was beaten back by the Chinese, and hence Chinese "won" the war.

Correct. I think most Chinese don't have problem even if you termed it as "barely wining or draw", due to the higher human sacrifices resulted from poor fire arms and logistics.

While my argument is of that Chinese Force failed to capitalize the early success (that roll-over you were talking about) and is not able to cross into 38th, which by all account, it should have been. That itself failed their objective of the war.

From my understanding of all those Chinese materials covering the Korean war, I don't think one of China's goal was to march on to unify the whole Korea, either at outset or in time when the opportunity arise, and my reasons are based on the followings:

1) When Korean war broke out, CCP had just established government about one year. The priority was to defeat and liberate Taiwan and eradicate those guerilla fighters in number of millions in China's south. China had no interest in Kim's ambition to unify Koren.

2) When asked by Kim II-sung to join the war, all CCP leaders and army generals were against it except Mao and Peng Dehuai. They all knew they were going to confront the strongest army on earth, I don't think they wanted engaging a prolonging war with the US which simply unwinnable.

3) In relation to China failed to capitalize the early success, I think before the fifth round attack started, China's strategy was forcing the US back to negotiation tables by victory in battles. Capturing Souel might be the goal of Jim II-sung, but it was in no way the Chinese intent to extend and prolong the war.

4) Just look those Chapter headings and their abstracts of this book, one should come up with a theory not far away from mine.

In case you misquote/misunderstand me again, I'd like to spell out what I am thinking about the Korean war, that is China won the war because China has achieve its objective - keeping American troops at 38th parallel- winning peace by war for CHINA

 

[jhungary]

Now I don't have problem about what you said, you seem to have problem about what I haven't said yet.

I cannot have problem with stuff that you did not say, I am not telepathic, I cannot read mind.

Correct. I think most Chinese don't have problem even if you termed it as "barely wining or draw", due to the higher human sacrifices resulted from poor fire arms and logistics.

The War is technically not a draw , it is an "Antebellum" which means the war have result back to the state before the war. Or you should use the word "Status Quo" as there are nothing/minimal change before and after the war. The government remains the same, with North Korean in charge of North Korea, South Korean in charge of South Korea. The boundary is largely unchanged too. With the South Korean losing part of the Western border city (Namely Kaesong) and the North losing part to the East, (namely Goseong). The only change is minimal beside population distribution and military strength.

From my understanding of all those Chinese materials covering the Korean war, I don't think one of China's goal was to march on to unify the whole Korea, either at outset or in time when the opportunity arise, and my reasons are based on the followings:

1) When Korean war broke out, CCP had just established government about one year. The priority was to defeat and liberate Taiwan and eradicate those guerilla fighters in number of millions in China's south. China had no interest in Kim's ambition to unify Koren.

If that is the reason, they would not be invading and occupying Seoul the second time by the PVA and North Korean. As I said, as the war progress, China invaded the south not once but 3 times in total. The first time immediately after Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River and stopped during Battle of Wawon at the beginning of December

Second time Chinese invaded the South is with the Chinese New Year offensive during the first week of 1951, which resulting in PVA control of Seoul.

The third time is after the UN counter offensive in late march and early April, resulting the Chinese Spring Offensive in late April, which failed when they did not penetrate the No-Name Line in May.

I would have understand one invasion, or maybe twice (Given the Chinese new years offensive is merely 1 month after the UN troop being send back south), that the Chinese want to capitalize on the retreat and gain as much ground as possible. But for the last invasion which happened 6 months afterward, I have trouble looking at it in any way, shapes or form that would have been related to "Taken the advantage" of the UN troop still reeling from the lost, I mean, the lost happened 6 months ago During Nov 1950, Unless Chinese and North Korean command is this incompetent to think they can still exploit a UN Lost half a year ago, they would have to have modified their original objective from merely getting the UN troop out, to getting even with the UN. Cause there are no way China launch an offensive 6 months after to try anything related to the original objective. Which has long achieved during November 1950. Even more when the Chinese occupied Seoul in Jan 7 1951.

The Chinese could have leave Korean War after stabilising Seoul, and leave behind a stabilisation force of maybe 100,000 to help defend the new gain and converge the troop strength back to recapture Taiwan. That would be logical, not starting a new offensive with 300,000 troop trying to smash the UN line 6 months after their defeat.......

2) When asked by Kim II-sung to join the war, all CCP leaders and army generals were against it except Mao and Peng Dehuai. They all knew they were going to confront the strongest army on earth, I don't think they wanted engaging a prolonging war with the US which simply unwinnable.

The problem is not what you think, the problem is the Chinese indeed engaged in a Prolong war with the US/UN. This is also because of this war lasted from 1950-1953, the Chinese lost the chance to recover Taiwan.

It does not matter what you think, because facts told us they did. The Chinese fought the UN from Oct 1950 to July 1953. That's a prolonged war no matter how you think.....

3) In relation to China failed to capitalize the early success, I think before the fifth round attack started, China's strategy was forcing the US back to negotiation tables by victory in battles. Capturing Souel might be the goal of Jim II-sung, but it was in no way the Chinese intent to extend and prolong the war.

No, the Chinese failed to capitalize the UN withdraw immediately after the UN withdrawal from north of 38th line. The PVA have a chance to eliminate the whole UN 8th Army and US XI Corp, if they were not stopped in Wawon and Kuni-ri. That is a strategic failure simply because if UN 8th Army surrendered, the UN would literally have to withdraw from the theatre. The result will be a lot different by now.

This happen before the Chinese capture Seoul and if this had achieved, there will be of no need to negotiate.

4) Just look those Chapter headings and their abstracts of this book, one should come up with a theory not far away from mine.

In case you misquote/misunderstand me again, I'd like to spell out what I am thinking about the Korean war, that is China won the war because China has achieve its objective - keeping American troops at 38th parallel- winning peace by war for CHINA

If you said that, then I can also argue US won the Korean war because South Korea continue to exist, because the goal of the UN force were to push the North Out of South Korea, and they have achieve that.

Because this is the same argument, you cannot have a war that both side declared a winner, the war is an antebellum, nobody win, nobody lose, but I don't know if you actually know what does that means tho.

 

[Tiqiu]

the war is an antebellum, nobody win, nobody lose, but I don't know if you actually know what does that means tho.

Actually, I don't know if you actually know what does this thread mean. I think for most people, they would care more and give more thoughts to the author's words than yours, that is why he is a combat historian writing numerous books and you are at best an internet blogger. Though without reading his book, I am quite happy to takeaway what he was trying to argue - "that the United States fought two wars in Korea, winning one against North Korea and losing the other to Communist China" - for now.

 

[jhungary]

Actually, I don't know if you actually know what does this thread mean. I think for most people, they would care more and give more thoughts to the author's words than yours, that is why he is a combat historian writing numerous books and you are at best an internet blogger. Though without reading his book, I am quite happy to takeaway what he was trying to argue - "that the United States fought two wars in Korea, winning one against North Korea and losing the other to Communist China" - for now.

lol........I have written books, reports, official accounts as well as 2 freaking research thesis on this topic. There are all sort of people out there who can have its book published. Being published does not equal to any way, sort of form of being "Authority".

Do I think the author of 50 shapes of grey is famous? Yes, but does that means her book is any good? No. You can "take" whatever you want in all sort of publication there are, but that does not address the question I have raise, any sort of Military Historian would agree the war in Korea is an antebellum, you can say China fought 3 war in Korea and won 2. One to US, One to US, and other to South Korea. Does that means anything? No.

Also, if you don't want your post being poke in pieces without any sort of argument, leave what you believe with yourselves. You post it, then it instantly become a publicly challenge, of course you can come back in the end and say "Regardless of what you said, I still believe in the topic more than you" but did it actually do anything??

And if US did lose the war to China, then please do explain why the Chinese is not still occupying Seoul as we speak? If you cannot answer this question, then maybe you should not open a thread to begin with.

 

[Tiqiu]

lol........I have written books, reports, official accounts as well as 2 freaking research thesis on this topic. There are all sort of people out there who can have its book published. Being published does not equal to any way, sort of form of being "Authority".

If this is true, then simply post up some to counter what the Author was trying to say.

And if US did lose the war to China, then please do explain why the Chinese is not still occupying Seoul as we speak?

And if US did not lose the war, why the US is not still occupying Pyongyang, the capital of NK?

 

[jhungary]

If this is true, then simply post up some to counter what the Author was trying to say.

Then what is the point of posting it here? If you are simply "agreeing" what's the "author say?"

And I did raise several question about how China win when they lose both Chinese New Years offensive and Spring Offensive. I have yet to see any answer beside "i believe in the author more than you"

And if US did not lose the war, why the US is not still occupying Pyongyang, the capital of NK?

Dude, I am not the one that said US won, I said the war is an antebellum. Again, do you understand what does that means when I say the war is an "antebellum"? US have not occupied Pyongyang before the war, US did not occupy Pyongyang after the war, that's what it mean by "antebellum"

A War make up with numerous battle, occupying Phongyang or Seoul is a direct result of a single battle, you can win some battle and you can lose some in a war. But as I said, I am not the one that claim US "Won" the war now am I?

You sir, on the other hand, claim the Chinese won the Korean War.

 

[Tiqiu]

You sir, on the other hand, claim the Chinese won the Korean War.

This is what I first said in #48:

Mao never supported NK' s move to unify the south, in fact China was angry about Kim and had played no part in his sudden attack. So it is unfair to put China in your "communist side" when judging winner and loser. China's only goal was no American boots/ military bases near her boarder threading her security, so China is the winner for achieving this objective.

Then this is what I said in #63:

In case you misquote/misunderstand me again, I'd like to spell out what I am thinking about the Korean war, that is China won the war because China has achieve its objective - keeping American troops at 38th parallel- winning peace by war for CHINA

Then at last I said in #65:

Though without reading his book, I am quite happy to takeaway what he was trying to argue - "that the United States fought two wars in Korea, winning one against North Korea and losing the other to Communist China" - for now.

So Can you tell us where did I simply claim:"the Chinese won the Korean War" in a manner you were trying so hard to put me into.

Let me say it again, Though without reading his book, I am quite happy to takeaway what he was trying to argue - "that the United States fought two wars in Korea, winning one against North Korea and losing the other to mmunist China" - for now.

I fully understand any thread is open for discussion of all views from all sides and I am open and ready to be convinced upon compelling evidence. But if you don't want to post up your best works on the subject matter , and expect us to buy what you said in just few paragraphs, then you can't blame others, but yourself, for not listening you rather than listening the author. The reason is simple, the author's account were from first hand thus of primary source, yours were just from internet which are secondary at the best.

If you still have problem, I suggest you to write to Mr Bevin Alexander at bevinalexander.com to rebut his claim, if you succeed than by logic you would convince more people rather than few people here.

 

[Jlaw]

South Korean is what it is today because of the South Koreans. They rebel and overthrow the dictator Park which was put In power by United States in which the South Koreans had no say.

Similarly North Koreans is what It is today because they did not rise up.

Ancient Chinese proverb. The ocean will float or sink a boat.

Nothing to do with United States or China.

Yet they elect another Park who is the daughter of the dictator Park?

 

[jhungary]

So Can you tell us where did I simply claim:"the Chinese won the Korean War" in a manner you were trying so hard to put me into.

this

Mao never supported NK' s move to unify the south, in fact China was angry about Kim and had played no part in his sudden attack. So it is unfair to put China in your "communist side" when judging winner and loser. China's only goal was no American boots/ military bases near her boarder threading her security, so China is the winner for achieving this objective.

especially, you said in the last sentence.

so China is the winner for achieving this objective.

If you are not talking about the war, then could you be so kindly to enlighten us what did China win?? World Cup??

Also, China indeed wanted a Unified Korea by DPRK, just as MacArthur wanted a Unified Korea under Rhee's banner. As I explained that was the 3 offensive is for, just that the Chinese aren't equally that good and you have no answer to my question.

Let me say it again, Though without reading his book, I am quite happy to takeaway what he was trying to argue - "that the United States fought two wars in Korea, winning one against North Korea and losing the other to mmunist China" - for now.

I fully understand any thread is open for discussion of all views from all sides and I am open and ready to be convinced upon compelling evidence. But if you don't want to post up your best works on the subject matter , and expect us to buy what you said in just few paragraphs, then you can't blame others, but yourself, for not listening you rather than listening the author. The reason is simple, the author's account were from first hand thus of primary source, yours were just from internet which are secondary at the best.

If you still have problem, I suggest you to write to Mr Bevin Alexander at bevinalexander.com to rebut his claim, if you succeed than by logic you would convince more people rather than few people here.

I don't need to write to Mr Alexander, because he does not said what you interpreted.

If you care to read his book in full, you would know he provided a comprehensive account to before and after the Chinese intervention.

In his book, he detailed how China push over the UN/American force during the UN counter Offensive, in the end, the writer hinted the US finally end the war in Korea by improving relationship with China in 1972 (Which is actually not an actual account as there are no peace treaty ever signed by all parties and the Korean War is technically not over) His account were too broad to cover all the points both political and military.

He did not jump to the conclusion that US win the war with North Korea, but lose a war with China, you do. In fact, after reading the book, he did not got into any conclusion at all.

Again, I have written numerous Military and Political article myself, in all spectrum, I wrote for Book Publisher for modern Military Affair, I wrote manuals for US Military Intelligence Operation. I wrote Thesis for my University Degree. I wrote professional article in Military Blog like this one

Like this one.

Stealth vs Jammer : The AirSea Battle Concept

And if you do not want to be challenge, you shouldn't post anything online.

 

[yantong1980]

Thanks that Western power under UN flag stopped. China just stand out of rubble of WW2 and civil war, and still has to deal with Taiwan, but forced to stop combined Western powers move from south. I admire Chinese leadership that time, without that China will facing another dark years.

 

[3Kingdoms]

The bulk of the Army .. understrength and undersupplied against the Chinese and the North Korean. This is the reason why the UN troop was routed that quickly.

I've read American accounts of under-trained, under-supplied soldiers in the 8th Army and X Corps etc. Some divisions had none english speaking Koreans. Post WW2 the US government decided to spend money on new war strategies involving their new toys - bombers & jets etc. Neglecting infantry training.
But with regards to supplies, let me use quotes indicating UN troops were very well equipped.

Appleman 1989 - Disaster in Korea.

Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River.
'Despite the lack of manpower, the US Eighth Army had three and half times the firepower of the opposing Chinese forces'

Alexander 1986 Korea: The First War We Lost

Battle of Chosin Reservior (retreating from Hungnam)
'About 105,000 soldiers, 98,000 civilians, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies were shipped from Hungnam to Pusan'.

Battle of Chosin Reservoir - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I believe the reason for the quick retreat was due to; Weather and Guerrilla tactics.
Weather as low as -37C, frostbites, radios, vehicles and weapons malfunctioned. It would affect morale of both UN/CPV but the Chinese had it much worse. Lack of clothing cause too high a level of troop deaths. I've read stories of US soldiers running passed dead frozen CPV bodies in the battle of Chosin.

Regarding Tactics.

Alexander - How Wars Are Won
"The Chinese had no air power and were armed only with rifles, machineguns, hand grenades, and mortars. Against the much more heavily armed Americans, they adapted a technique they had used against the Nationalists in the Chinese civil war of 1946–49. The Chinese generally attacked at night and tried to close in on a small troop position—generally a platoon—and then attacked it with local superiority in numbers. The usual method was to infiltrate small units, from a platoon of fifty men to a company of 200, split into separate detachments. While one team cut off the escape route of the Americans, the others struck both the front and the flanks in concerted assaults. The attacks continued on all sides until the defenders were destroyed or forced to withdraw. The Chinese then crept forward to the open flank of the next platoon position, and repeated the tactics."

Memoirs of Peng Dehuai
"It was nearly dusk when the enemy troops penetrated to the Unsan-Kusong line -- the place we had planned for our counterattack. The enemy troops had been worn out after a day's fighting and were not ready to dig themselves in when small detachments of our troops began to strike at their rear. Then our main force swept into the enemy ranks with the strength of an avalanche and engaged the enemy at close quarters with grenades and bayonets. The superior firepower of the enemy became useless. Over-turned and damaged enemy vehicles were strewn over the road, blocking the retreating enemy troops. This method of fighting, which the enemy troops had never experienced before, took them by surprise"

Memoirs of Marshal Peng Dehuai
Great site from a Korean Vet!

On the other hand, Chinese and North Korea failed to take advantage of this oversight by MacArthur and did not gain much after the UN general withdrawal. In itself is a Strategic Failure.

CPV soldiers had it hard! It's amazing the physical feat they accomplished.
The 8th army had motorized retreat & air cover. CPV forces could only move while dark by foot, traversing hilltops, off main routes avoiding bombers all the while starving, cold, exhausted, ultimately CPV forces where spent.

Memoirs of Peng Dehuai - 3rd Campaign
"By now the Chinese People's Volunteers had fought three major campaigns in a row in severe winter after their entry into Korea three months before. They neither had an air force nor sufficient anti-aircraft guns to protect them from enemy bombers. Bombed by aircraft and shelled by long-range guns day and night, our troops could not move about in the daytime. And they had not a single day's good rest in three months. It is easy to imagine how tired they were."

Statue Peng Dehuai Korean/Chinese border.

Another one would be Chinese and North Korean Knows they are undersupplied (like you said) and yet they still tried to move south in Spring Offensive.

The CPC blamed Stalin for supplies delivered untimely and inadequately. Maybe they thought supplies would eventually get their way? I'm not saying CPV had perfect planning, the high cost of life 'Pyrrhic Victory' is thought provoking.

It may sound heroic to use civilian to move supply by hand, but if you have to resort to this level of resupply, then that means you are not ready for an operation or campaign. Being brave or being resourceful is a good trait of a commander, but not necessarily help to fight a war.

I feel for the hardship the civilians and troops went through, some of those dead knew nothing but war, tragic.
Having said that, distribution of weapons via civilian mobilization was the only way; as noted above the CPV traversed off-road plus limited transport they had mostly got destroyed and they did what they could regardless.

Both sides where guilty of extending beyond supply lines, I'm guessing because command wants to seize imitative?

 

[jhungary]

I've read American accounts of under-trained, under-supplied soldiers in the 8th Army and X Corps etc. Some divisions had none english speaking Koreans. Post WW2 the US government decided to spend money on new war strategies involving their new toys - bombers & jets etc. Neglecting infantry training.
But with regards to supplies, let me use quotes indicating UN troops were very well equipped.

Appleman 1989 - Disaster in Korea.

Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River.
'Despite the lack of manpower, the US Eighth Army had three and half times the firepower of the opposing Chinese forces'

Alexander 1986 Korea: The First War We Lost

Battle of Chosin Reservior (retreating from Hungnam)
'About 105,000 soldiers, 98,000 civilians, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies were shipped from Hungnam to Pusan'.

Battle of Chosin Reservoir - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I believe the reason for the quick retreat was due to; Weather and Guerrilla tactics.
Weather as low as -37C, frostbites, radios, vehicles and weapons malfunctioned. It would affect morale of both UN/CPV but the Chinese had it much worse. Lack of clothing cause too high a level of troop deaths. I've read stories of US soldiers running passed dead frozen CPV bodies in the battle of Chosin.

You are mistaken about Unit Supply (LOG train) and Unit Equipment (TO&E)

A unit can be well equip, the definition of well equip is that every one in the unit have their standard weapon, and weapon for their specific purpose. For the US Military, the definition of "well equip" or "combat fit" unit would be any single unit filled their TO&E (table of organisation and equipment) which basically you have everyone in your unit and everyone was armed what they are supposed to.

Logistic is another question. It has been a constant problem to bring supply that North into Korea. The problem the logistic effort encountered by the UN troop including a shortage of fuel and lubricant, ammunition, winter clothing and food.

The problem is quite well documented, due to the lack of machine that can run that high that cold. Most Quartermaster unit started to use dog and packed animal to transport to and from depot. In fact, in most case, ammunition and food have to bring in by actually soldier hauling them up the mountain.

Here are some of the article written from US Army Quartermaster Corp detailing the supply issue in Korea

Petroleum Supply in Korea 1951

Subsistence Supply in Korea

QM Distribution System in KOREA

Remount!

These article detail many problem the US/UN army faced during the campaign and the subsequent solution over these problem.

Regarding Tactics.

Alexander - How Wars Are Won
"The Chinese had no air power and were armed only with rifles, machineguns, hand grenades, and mortars. Against the much more heavily armed Americans, they adapted a technique they had used against the Nationalists in the Chinese civil war of 1946–49. The Chinese generally attacked at night and tried to close in on a small troop position—generally a platoon—and then attacked it with local superiority in numbers. The usual method was to infiltrate small units, from a platoon of fifty men to a company of 200, split into separate detachments. While one team cut off the escape route of the Americans, the others struck both the front and the flanks in concerted assaults. The attacks continued on all sides until the defenders were destroyed or forced to withdraw. The Chinese then crept forward to the open flank of the next platoon position, and repeated the tactics."

Memoirs of Peng Dehuai
"It was nearly dusk when the enemy troops penetrated to the Unsan-Kusong line -- the place we had planned for our counterattack. The enemy troops had been worn out after a day's fighting and were not ready to dig themselves in when small detachments of our troops began to strike at their rear. Then our main force swept into the enemy ranks with the strength of an avalanche and engaged the enemy at close quarters with grenades and bayonets. The superior firepower of the enemy became useless. Over-turned and damaged enemy vehicles were strewn over the road, blocking the retreating enemy troops. This method of fighting, which the enemy troops had never experienced before, took them by surprise"

Memoirs of Marshal Peng Dehuai
Great site from a Korean Vet!



CPV soldiers had it hard! It's amazing the physical feat they accomplished.
The 8th army had motorized retreat & air cover. CPV forces could only move while dark by foot, traversing hilltops, off main routes avoiding bombers all the while starving, cold, exhausted, ultimately CPV forces where spent.

Memoirs of Peng Dehuai - 3rd Campaign
"By now the Chinese People's Volunteers had fought three major campaigns in a row in severe winter after their entry into Korea three months before. They neither had an air force nor sufficient anti-aircraft guns to protect them from enemy bombers. Bombed by aircraft and shelled by long-range guns day and night, our troops could not move about in the daytime. And they had not a single day's good rest in three months. It is easy to imagine how tired they were."

Statue Peng Dehuai Korean/Chinese border.

The CPC blamed Stalin for supplies delivered untimely and inadequately. Maybe they thought supplies would eventually get their way? I'm not saying CPV had perfect planning, the high cost of life 'Pyrrhic Victory' is thought provoking.



I feel for the hardship the civilians and troops went through, some of those dead knew nothing but war, tragic.
Having said that, distribution of weapons via civilian mobilization was the only way; as noted above the CPV traversed off-road plus limited transport they had mostly got destroyed and they did what they could regardless.

Both sides where guilty of extending beyond supply lines, I'm guessing because command wants to seize imitative?

Again, I don't see any way to glorify this because if China was to fight a war back then with the US, with the technological gap back then, if they don't fight by number, what else can they do?

You need to understand, the US had always been fighting conventional warfare up to that point, where even Mexico fight a laid-out heads-up battle with the US, this type of warfare are new (apart from the Marine whom experience something like that from the Japanese during WW2.)

The problem is, however, the way that China fought in this war is not "Sustainable" and in fact, by engaging in Korean war, which lead to a generation of people being killed and wounded, they have effectively write themselves off in any future engagement, the Chinese have to abandon the aim to recapture Taiwan, and also they were subverted by the Russian until late 1960s

While it is admirable for these men to die for their countries aim like that, to rush in the artillery net just to swamp your enemy, it does not actually do much to the war or what happened after.

 

[Tiqiu]

especially, you said in the last sentence.

so China is the winner for achieving this objective.

This is the second half of my sentence, you forgot, either intentionally or recklessly, the first part of my sentence before the comma. My last sentence was: "China's only goal was no American boots/ military bases near her boarder threading her security, so China is the winner for achieving this objective." You surely know the basic grammar rules,right?

If you are not talking about the war, then could you be so kindly to enlighten us what did China win?? World Cup??

What did China win? let me reiterate:China is the winner for achieving the objective, which was no American boots/military bases near her boarder threatening her security.

He did not jump to the conclusion that US win the war with North Korea, but lose a war with China, you do. In fact, after reading the book, he did not got into any conclusion at all.

Even i don't write books, nor will I intend to, I know a good author will lead the readers to his conclusion, instead of simply spelling it out for them. What does this review on The New York Times Book Review mean to you?
-ALA Booklist "Bevin Alexander...argues in this well-researched and readable book that the United States fought two wars in Korea, winning one against North Korea and losing the other to Communist China." -The New York Times Book Review

Again, I have written numerous Military and Political article myself, in all spectrum, I wrote for Book Publisher for modern Military Affair, I wrote manuals for US Military Intelligence Operation. I wrote Thesis for my University Degree. I wrote professional article in Military Blog like this one

Irrelevant. What is relevant here is that if you could read,speak, write Chinese(btw, not just speaking Cantonese) and have lived in China for a period of time, then you would be able to know the interpretation of both sides who were fighting the war. Any school kids here know if they write an essay only covering one side of the argument, they will only get 50% of the scores at most because it ought to cover the views of both sides, e.g., pros & cons.

And if you do not want to be challenge, you shouldn't post anything online.

You said you are not telepathic,yet you were tying to read my mind again. I love debating with people of different views and background. If you knew the Chinese word for crisis(also means challenge), you would understand it meas threat/opportunity in unity.