On March 24 1971 - Pakistan Army arrested Sheikh Mujeeb & humiliated him
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You really believe in that? Are you sure an India with Pakistan and Bangladesh would be doing fine and dandy now? You have 75 years of hindsight.
Nixon, Kissinger and the Bangladesh War
By Dr Syed Amir
Bethesda, MD
Today, most people are too young to remember that for a brief period in 1971and 1972, the US enjoyed great popularity in Pakistan, and was credited with saving it from destruction by Indian forces in the wake of Pakistani army’s surrender in East Pakistan on December 16, 1971.
A book by Garry Bass, The Blood Telegram, Nixon, Kissinger and a Forgotten Genocide (2013; Alfred Knopf), provides some fascinating insights into the last tumultuous year of Pakistan’s existence as a united country and the vicious military crackdown in East Pakistan that led to the country’s breakup. Although a number of books and scholarly disquisitions have analyzed Pakistan’s civil war, the Bass’ book is unique in that it highlights the role of President Nixon and Dr Kissinger, the National Security Advisor, in the crisis, their unreserved support of Pakistan in suppression of Bengali nationalism and war with India. The book draws upon some highly classified information not available previously. Although Nixon had a penchant for secrecy, he had installed a clandestine recording system in the White House that recorded all conversations between him and others. The recorded and transcribed materials from the White House tapes, more than four-decades-old, are now being gradually declassified and made available to the public.
The author, a professor of politics at Princeton, listened to hours of recorded conversation between Nixon and Kissinger as the East Pakistan crisis was unfolding. He also studied numerous recently declassified documents, interviewed the former White House staff and talked to a number of Indian military and civilian leaders. The book is a powerful indictment of Nixon and Kissinger for their failure to pressure the Pakistani generals in 1971 from planning and executing a policy of what the author terms genocide of Bengalis.
On March 25, 1971, as talks between Pakistan’s military ruler Yahya Khan and the Awami League leader, Mujib–ur-Rehman, to reach a political settlement broke down; Yahya flew off to Karachi and ordered a military crackdown. According to conservative estimates, some two-hundred thousand people died in the military action. In addition, an estimated ten million Bengalis fled and became refugees in India, eighty to ninety percent of them Hindus.
The US administration meanwhile had been kept informed of the carnage and bloodshed occurring in East Pakistan, most prominently by its own Consul General posted in Dacca. Archer Blood had been sending a detailed account of the situation in his telegrams to the State Department. He was most unhappy about the use of US-supplied arms deployed in the massacre of Bengalis, predicting a breakup of Pakistan. Yet, Kissinger and Nixon dismissed his missives, characterizing them as product of an overreaction. According to the author, Nixon had a great personal fondness for Pakistan’s military ruler. “He’s a decent man”, Nixon repeatedly exclaimed. Both Nixon and Kissinger had a visceral hatred of India and its prime minister, Indira Gandhi, whom they derisively referred to as “the old bitch.” The title of the book, Blood Telegrams, is drawn from the telegrams sent by diplomat Blood. He was finally removed from his vantage point in Dacca, and assigned to a desk job at the State Department in Washington.
Aside from their hostility to India, Nixon and Kissinger had another reason to be especially friendly to Yahya Khan. The US president was trying to extricate American forces from Vietnam and was seeking an opening to China to enlist that country’s help in doing so. Yahya was more than willing to serve as an enabler of this mission. In July 1971, Kissinger, a consummate practitioner of Realpolitick, went on a secret diplomatic mission to Beijing, where he met with Premier Zhou Enlai; his visit paved the way for Nixon’s historic visit to China the following year.
In November 1971, as the situation deteriorated in East Pakistan, Gandhi set out on a tour of world capitals to explain Indian support of the insurgent forces, and India’s growing refugee problems. The book provides a gripping account of her meeting with President Nixon in the White House. Neither had relished the prospect of the encounter. Just before the meeting, Kissinger found Nixon fuming in the Oval Office, his dislike of Gandhi on full display. “The US has given more relief aid to India than the rest of the world combined, why don’t they give us any credit for that,” he demanded. Kissinger replied, “Because these bastards have played an absolutely brutal game with us.”
The Oval Office meeting between the two leaders was brutal, “angry and protracted.” “Nixon thought she was a warmonger; she thought he was helping along genocide.” The meeting failed to achieve any agreement. India had entered into a defense treaty with the Soviet Union and Nixon warned the prime minister that “a war might not be limited to only India and Pakistan,” hinting the possibility of China entering the fray.
The next day, alone in the Oval Office, Nixon and Kissinger expressed themselves freely. Nixon remarked, “It is just the point when she is a bitch.” Kissinger could not agree more, adding that “well, the Indians are bastards, anyway.”
As the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan were collapsing, Kissinger became worried that, based on some unconfirmed reports, India intended the dismemberment of West Pakistan as well. The CIA had concluded that if India attacked, there was no chance that China, concerned about Soviet reaction, would bail out Pakistan. On December 3, Pakistan in a desperate attempt to turn the tide launched a massive air strike against Indian airfields, but with little effect. Kissinger, emotionally fraught and anxious to save West Pakistan, warned Nixon that Pakistan’s defenses could not last two weeks. He pressured him to arrange transfer of F104 fighter planes from Jordan, Iran and Turkey to Pakistan, even though doing so constituted a clear violation of the existing US laws. On December 12, Nixon and Kissinger warned the Soviet Union to restrain India by noon that day, or they would “initiate unspecified unilateral measures.”
In addition, Nixon ordered the nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise to sail fast forward to the Bay of Bengal in a show of force and to threaten India. Finally, these measures worked. By the noon deadline, the Soviet Union informed the US that they had received assurance from India that “it had no intention of taking any military action against West Pakistan.” A unilateral ceasefire was declared by India on December 17, 1971, the day after East Pakistan’s surrender.
Today, more than five decades later, with the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to recognize that the union of the East and West Pakistan was inherently untenable. Geography, language, cultural, socio-economic factors were all against it. However, it is tempting to contemplate that, had Nixon and Kissinger been less supportive of the Pakistani military leadership and insisted that they reach a political settlement with the Awami League, maybe, the breakup of Pakistan would not have been so traumatic and a dark chapter in the country’s history would have remained unwritten.
(Dr Syed Amir is a former Assistant Professor, Harvard Medical School, and a health science administrator, US National Institutes of Health)
By Dr Syed Amir
Bethesda, MD
Today, most people are too young to remember that for a brief period in 1971and 1972, the US enjoyed great popularity in Pakistan, and was credited with saving it from destruction by Indian forces in the wake of Pakistani army’s surrender in East Pakistan on December 16, 1971.
A book by Garry Bass, The Blood Telegram, Nixon, Kissinger and a Forgotten Genocide (2013; Alfred Knopf), provides some fascinating insights into the last tumultuous year of Pakistan’s existence as a united country and the vicious military crackdown in East Pakistan that led to the country’s breakup. Although a number of books and scholarly disquisitions have analyzed Pakistan’s civil war, the Bass’ book is unique in that it highlights the role of President Nixon and Dr Kissinger, the National Security Advisor, in the crisis, their unreserved support of Pakistan in suppression of Bengali nationalism and war with India. The book draws upon some highly classified information not available previously. Although Nixon had a penchant for secrecy, he had installed a clandestine recording system in the White House that recorded all conversations between him and others. The recorded and transcribed materials from the White House tapes, more than four-decades-old, are now being gradually declassified and made available to the public.
The author, a professor of politics at Princeton, listened to hours of recorded conversation between Nixon and Kissinger as the East Pakistan crisis was unfolding. He also studied numerous recently declassified documents, interviewed the former White House staff and talked to a number of Indian military and civilian leaders. The book is a powerful indictment of Nixon and Kissinger for their failure to pressure the Pakistani generals in 1971 from planning and executing a policy of what the author terms genocide of Bengalis.
On March 25, 1971, as talks between Pakistan’s military ruler Yahya Khan and the Awami League leader, Mujib–ur-Rehman, to reach a political settlement broke down; Yahya flew off to Karachi and ordered a military crackdown. According to conservative estimates, some two-hundred thousand people died in the military action. In addition, an estimated ten million Bengalis fled and became refugees in India, eighty to ninety percent of them Hindus.
The US administration meanwhile had been kept informed of the carnage and bloodshed occurring in East Pakistan, most prominently by its own Consul General posted in Dacca. Archer Blood had been sending a detailed account of the situation in his telegrams to the State Department. He was most unhappy about the use of US-supplied arms deployed in the massacre of Bengalis, predicting a breakup of Pakistan. Yet, Kissinger and Nixon dismissed his missives, characterizing them as product of an overreaction. According to the author, Nixon had a great personal fondness for Pakistan’s military ruler. “He’s a decent man”, Nixon repeatedly exclaimed. Both Nixon and Kissinger had a visceral hatred of India and its prime minister, Indira Gandhi, whom they derisively referred to as “the old bitch.” The title of the book, Blood Telegrams, is drawn from the telegrams sent by diplomat Blood. He was finally removed from his vantage point in Dacca, and assigned to a desk job at the State Department in Washington.
Aside from their hostility to India, Nixon and Kissinger had another reason to be especially friendly to Yahya Khan. The US president was trying to extricate American forces from Vietnam and was seeking an opening to China to enlist that country’s help in doing so. Yahya was more than willing to serve as an enabler of this mission. In July 1971, Kissinger, a consummate practitioner of Realpolitick, went on a secret diplomatic mission to Beijing, where he met with Premier Zhou Enlai; his visit paved the way for Nixon’s historic visit to China the following year.
In November 1971, as the situation deteriorated in East Pakistan, Gandhi set out on a tour of world capitals to explain Indian support of the insurgent forces, and India’s growing refugee problems. The book provides a gripping account of her meeting with President Nixon in the White House. Neither had relished the prospect of the encounter. Just before the meeting, Kissinger found Nixon fuming in the Oval Office, his dislike of Gandhi on full display. “The US has given more relief aid to India than the rest of the world combined, why don’t they give us any credit for that,” he demanded. Kissinger replied, “Because these bastards have played an absolutely brutal game with us.”
The Oval Office meeting between the two leaders was brutal, “angry and protracted.” “Nixon thought she was a warmonger; she thought he was helping along genocide.” The meeting failed to achieve any agreement. India had entered into a defense treaty with the Soviet Union and Nixon warned the prime minister that “a war might not be limited to only India and Pakistan,” hinting the possibility of China entering the fray.
The next day, alone in the Oval Office, Nixon and Kissinger expressed themselves freely. Nixon remarked, “It is just the point when she is a bitch.” Kissinger could not agree more, adding that “well, the Indians are bastards, anyway.”
As the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan were collapsing, Kissinger became worried that, based on some unconfirmed reports, India intended the dismemberment of West Pakistan as well. The CIA had concluded that if India attacked, there was no chance that China, concerned about Soviet reaction, would bail out Pakistan. On December 3, Pakistan in a desperate attempt to turn the tide launched a massive air strike against Indian airfields, but with little effect. Kissinger, emotionally fraught and anxious to save West Pakistan, warned Nixon that Pakistan’s defenses could not last two weeks. He pressured him to arrange transfer of F104 fighter planes from Jordan, Iran and Turkey to Pakistan, even though doing so constituted a clear violation of the existing US laws. On December 12, Nixon and Kissinger warned the Soviet Union to restrain India by noon that day, or they would “initiate unspecified unilateral measures.”
In addition, Nixon ordered the nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise to sail fast forward to the Bay of Bengal in a show of force and to threaten India. Finally, these measures worked. By the noon deadline, the Soviet Union informed the US that they had received assurance from India that “it had no intention of taking any military action against West Pakistan.” A unilateral ceasefire was declared by India on December 17, 1971, the day after East Pakistan’s surrender.
Today, more than five decades later, with the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to recognize that the union of the East and West Pakistan was inherently untenable. Geography, language, cultural, socio-economic factors were all against it. However, it is tempting to contemplate that, had Nixon and Kissinger been less supportive of the Pakistani military leadership and insisted that they reach a political settlement with the Awami League, maybe, the breakup of Pakistan would not have been so traumatic and a dark chapter in the country’s history would have remained unwritten.
(Dr Syed Amir is a former Assistant Professor, Harvard Medical School, and a health science administrator, US National Institutes of Health)
my2cents
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Even Jinnah did not believe in a separate nation in 1937. After losing 1937 provincial election's to INC, he came up with a separate nation demand to unite muslim under one cause. His party Muslim League did not get a majority in any of the provinces. It was all a political stunt and he alone is the harbinger of hate between our countries. He sowed the seeds of hate which resulted in millions of hindus and muslims getting butchered and families getting seperated and you see the results. He did not care for muslims who will be left behind.
Creating a New Medina (2015). He quotes Jinnah declaring several times, beginning 1941, that he was willing to sacrifice the minority provinces’ three crore Muslims to “liberate” the six crore in the majority provinces. Mr. Dhulipala attributes such statements to a carefully crafted policy by Jinnah to create an independent state that he calls a “New Medina”.
El Sidd
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Concept of self determination and two nation theory for Muslims was not Jinnahs brainchild. Even today Pakistan credits Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and Iqbal for refining the political doctrine.
All Jinnah did was not to fall victim to blackmail of holding a third of Muslim population hostage to subjugate the entire Muslim nation. Jinnah also did not help divide British India into Hindu or Muslim but Muslim and 'others'. Jinnah was grieved when Gandhi was shot dead.
RashidKhanTheLegend
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Jinnah also grieved for his bungalow in Bombay and wished to retain it in case he wants to live in it.
But why would he want a bungalow in a country of Street shitters and Cow dung eaters ?? Why
El Sidd
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He spent happier times of his life in Bombay which he wanted to preserve. It was and probably is legal for him to own the house in Bombay. The man was quite an optimist but he would have known that it was impossible for him to come back when he took off for Karachi having not only succeeded in liberating Sindh from Bombay presidency but the British parliament and sown the seeds for removal of the British imperial crown.
It is tragic that he did not live through to see Pakistan abolishing the crown but he was fortunate enough to witness the Kashmir struggle which he started.
That was not the question. Now that you have 75 years of history, dispense with all the 1937 etc., stuff and look back to see if what Jinnah did was prescient or not from the perspective of India today.
Given chance half of pakistan will come to India , the dream is over . But we will not allow single pakistani to come to India , except hindus and brides who want Indian husbands . Jammu and Kashmir which includes gilgit baltistan is an exception , they are welcome with their whole state because we gave them plegde to give citizenship with treaty of Hari Singh kingh of Kashmir .
RashidKhanTheLegend
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Kyun itna mental gymnastics..
We dont need anybody..
Declare LoC as IB and fence all the bloody border... Please.. for Gods sake
....
my2cents
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Jinnah was not prophetic nor could he envisage a divided country. A country divided on ethnicity, religion and language. He would have been deeply disappointed the way west Pakistan treated it's eastern wing and how it seperated. On top of that no government survived to complete their term. Your army control is evident in every sphere of society. They make sure no leader complete their full term. Corrupt leaders were imposed on your awam. They kept you bewakoof and fed you lies. No land reforms in 70 years tells you that your elite do not like to share power.
AZADPAKISTAN2009
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Pakistan was blessed to have leader like
Sheikh Mujeeb
PradoTLC
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This is exactly what Pakistan Army is doing to Imran Khan.
Sheikh Mujib was asking to call the parliament session as he won the elections. Yahya Khan refused. Instead, he launched Operation Searchlight.
You must read the following thread which has videos embedded in it.
We are repeating history. Imran is arrested in cooked up charges by the military. He was first humiliated on May 9th. If we dont do something, and stop this hand by force, we are doomed again. If the military was taught lesson and asked to account after 1971 instead of being embraced, we would not be where we are today.
Thread by @iOsamaAzam on Thread Reader App
@iOsamaAzam: #OnThisDay March 25th, 1971 Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman was prodded down the stairs of his house by Pakistani soldiers, hitting him from behind with their rifle butts. He was flown to West Pakistan and was j...…threadreaderapp.com
I'm sorry to all my Bengali members here. I was wrong. I called you traitor. You were not traitor. It took us 5 decades to find out who the traitor was.
Chachoo whisky doesn’t read history
You seem to be doing a lot of explaining why Pakistan has the problems it has. That deserves a full academic career. My question was a simple one: As an Indian, are you happy or unhappy that India you have is India of today and not what would have been if it had not been partitioned? To give an example, we had a huge civil war in the middle of 19th century. It was very tragic. But the union prevailed. I can unhesitatingly say preserving the union was good. If we had become USA and CSA, we would be a much weaker and less successful pair of nations. Can you make a statement like that?
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