Scrap MMRCA buy F-35 says Ajai Shukla

[Veeru]

Scrap MMRCA buy F-35 says Ajai Shukla

Veteran journalist Ajai Shukla of Business Standard is arguing:

a.) Why waste money on 4th ++ generation fighter aircraft when USA is ready to give 5th Gen in US $ 65 million a piece

b.) The USA has pronm,ised to supply it by 2015-16 at the same time the first new MMRCA will join IAF.

c.) His point is of money, superior technology, timely delivery


But he forgets that how can be believe Americans + Americans will not share technology as we are also developing 5th gen with Russia.

Ajai Shukla: End this MMRCA hara-kiri

Knife-edge tension is guaranteed as senior executives from Eurofighter GmbH and Dassault assemble on Friday in the office of Vivek Rae, Director General (Acquisitions) of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The purpose of the gathering: to open commercial bids for the world’s most ill-conceived and biggest international arms purchase. I refer to the Indian Air Force’s harebrained proposal to buy 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) that will be outrun and outgunned by Chinese fighters soon after they enter Indian Air Force (IAF) service.

The opening of bids in any big contract is a tense moment. Eurofighter’s and Dassault’s inordinate anxiety also stems from the fact that the IAF buy is crucial to their future. Eurofighter GmbH faces serious internal problems with partner nations scaling down their orders. India is desperately needed to restore the economics of production. Britain’s Royal Air Force has already slashed its order for Typhoons. And, last week, The New York Times reported that Germany’s Luftwaffe (which ironically spearheads the Typhoon campaign in India) is trimming its purchase from 177 to 140 Typhoons. Dassault is in even direr straits, with Rafale having failed to find a single international customer; there are just 180 Rafale fighters on order, all for the French military, which hardly has a choice.

The only relatively carefree man at the start of that meeting on Friday might be Mr Rae himself, who will be sitting on the defence ministry’s war chest of Rs 42,000 crore. But his good cheer may not survive the opening of bids because the MoD’s estimate – arrived at some six years ago – will almost certainly be dwarfed by the lower bid. Last month the MoD revalued its original estimation in a process called “benchmarking”. But Mr Rae knows that if the winning quote emerges significantly more expensive than the MoD’s “benchmarked” figure, the process will begin anew.

Such an eventuality would be a blessing in disguise; and the best way to sidestep this cockamamie purchase of overpriced fighters that will take heavy casualties in any future conflict with China. Both the Typhoon and Rafale are “4th Generation-plus fighters”, inferior in crucial aspects like stealth to the J-20, China’s “5th Generation” (Gen-5) stealth fighter that took to the skies this year. Admittedly the J-20 would need a decade of flight-testing before it enters operational service, but the first MMRCA would only be delivered to India by 2015-16. Five years after that, operational J-20s, of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), will be dominating the Himalayas. The IAF MMRCAs, already outclassed by 2020, will limp around the skies till 2050 since the MoD will rightly protest that Rs 42,000-84,000 crore have been spent on them.

The IAF sadly is shutting its eyes to this even as China’s rising aerospace profile informs the security calculus of other regional air forces. Japan, South Korea and Singapore are realising that a Gen-5 fleet is needed for a credible defence capability against the PLA. South Korea is set to choose Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Lightening II, the only Gen-5 fighter on offer in the global market. The Japan Air Self Defence Force (JASDF) too is veering around to the F-35 after Lockheed Martin was denied export clearances to supply Tokyo the F-22 Raptor, unarguably the world’s most advanced fighter. In 2003, Singapore invested money into the F-35 development programme; it is on course to buy the aircraft.

Given that a rising China makes choosing Gen-5 a no-brainer, why then is the IAF (presumably a rational actor) inexplicably buying Gen-4+ fighters?

The reason, sadly, is the political-bureaucratic stranglehold over procurement in which any IAF re-evaluation carries a penalty of years of delay.

In the early 2000s, when the IAF framed the case for buying an MMRCA, no Gen-5 aircraft were available for sale. The F-35 was under development but was not ready for flight-testing, an essential part of India’s procurement process.

Unwilling to wait for a Gen-5 fighter, the IAF scaled down its requirements and initiated an impartial multi-vendor contest for whatever Gen-4+ fighters were there in the market.

Years later, as the IAF finds itself choosing between two Gen-4+ aircraft, it must also note that the F-35 is on the cusp of operational clearance. It’s manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, has signalled in multiple ways that it would supply the IAF that fighter at a fly-away cost of $65 million per aircraft (significantly cheaper than the Rafale and the Typhoon) with deliveries beginning by 2015.

Washington has indicated that any F-35 sale to India would be expeditiously cleared. But for an insecure IAF, used to being shoved around by the MoD, a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. The MMRCA purchase would bring in six squadrons of reasonably good fighters, even if they were outclassed by the PLAAF in war.

Any change at this state, or so the IAF believes and accepts, would require fresh MoD clearances and financial sanctions that could take another three years.

But there is an alternative. The IAF must frankly tell the MoD that the situation has changed, and that national security demands scrapping the overpriced MMRCA procurement and buying the F-35 through a single-vendor contract.

The defence of the realm cannot be held hostage to the procedural requirement of multi-vendor bidding; nor is overpaying justifiable if it was done through competitive bidding.

New Delhi has recently procured several fine aircraft on a single-vendor, government-to-government basis: the Sukhoi-30MKI from Russia; and the C-130J and C-17 transport aircraft from the US. The procurement of a new fighter that will form the backbone of the IAF for decades must be treated with the same urgency. Ajai Shukla: End this MMRCA hara-kiri

 

[Paan Singh]

he suggested this earlier

 

[my name is arya]

cut the crap f35 is not useful for us , yes we can drop mmrca but we have better option

pak fa , lca3 ,su35

 

[cyphercide]

Keep MMRCA,Get F-35 for Indian Navy says Cyphercide!!!

 

[ramu]

If in case India goes for F35 then what will happen to the delicate balance between Pakistan and India ?

 

[cyphercide]

If in case India goes for F35 then what will happen to the delicate balance between Pakistan and India ?

Cmon man,why drag in Pakistan's name for no reason?Don't turn this thread into a troll fiesta.

 

[ramu]

Cmon man,why drag in Pakistan's name for no reason?Don't turn this thread into a troll fiesta.

I was reading about F35 when I saw the beautiful F16s in the background. Could not resist the possibility of F16s facing off against Mig29s, Su30 MKIs and F35s ...

Uhhhh la laa ,,,,

 

[DESERT FIGHTER]

Old news n posted before... abt 65million per unit is just BS...its well over 100+ million n the price is gettin higher n the programe into issues.... plus the training,spares etc will add to cost also.


@ramu kaka... bhai kabhi tou ghairat kha k trolling chor diya kar! sharam kar yara.

 

[illusion8]

Ajai might be marketing American tech but the time lines he mentions are worrisome and scary, But no point in scrapping the MMRCA, better find a different place for the F35 in the IAF, again the question arises of the vast number of platforms to maintain and of amount of Tech transfer and belief on the US having the kill switch or whatever BS i keep hearing.

But does seem like India needs to look at stop gaps and a 5th gen platform, again people would argue about PAK FA and also that it will kill our AMCA project and about our relation with Russia. All this is confusing as hell.

 

[misterme2]

F 35 is the way forward. The tech, the specs, the building of a blossoming friendship is in INdia's grasp. It is time for some in India to shed this old mentality of USA being an evil nation and grow up. Look past that and focus on the current and future geopolitical situation in the world. We would a strong country to back India and INdia only. Some may push Russia but the Ruskies are part of the problem coz they supply CHina with even more advanced tech. Don;t fool yourelf. China is treated differently than India when it comes to weapons plateforms and research by Russia.

 

[ramu]

Second thoughts about the F-35

When the most senior U.S. military officer admits that the largest defence procurement program in history has affordability issues, then you can bet that the situation is dire. Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has even put forth the likelihood that at least one variant of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter may be cancelled, and total numbers reduced.

Even if the F-35 eventually meets reasonable cost projections, it must still be vetted as an operational combat aircraft. It was not only meant to be an affordable fifth-generation fighter-bomber for the U.S. and her allies, but also to have lower maintenance costs than aircraft now in service. These claims may also turn out to be inaccurate, with the F-35 a potential hangar-queen like the F-22 Raptor.

Besides the F-35’s development and cost troubles, we are left with the question of whether 65 of these particular planes will meet Canada’s defence and alliance commitments. Unlike the F-22 Raptor, which has been built exclusively for the U.S. military, the F-35 was conceived as a less capable aircraft in terms of sheer performance but better than the planes of potential adversaries, especially in terms of stealth and first-strike capability — and development costs would be shared with trusted allies.

Canada has always intended to buy the F-35A, the simplest, least expensive variant, which is a conventional take-off-and-landing aircraft. But affordability is a relative term when an aircraft has not been fully tested and proven. Australia, which originally had intended to buy 100 F-35As, has had to purchase two dozen new F-18 Super Hornets as a stopgap measure due, among other things, to delays in the F-35 program. If the F-35 has further problems, we may have to take the same route.

And even if the F-35 is as effective as claimed, it may still be the wrong plane for Canada. It is not very fast and has less range and weapons-load capacity than other allied fighters — even more so compared with new planes being developed in Russia, India and China.

There are a few multi-role fighter competitions taking place around the globe, and it is instructional to view which aircraft are rising to the top. The nations conducting the most in-depth fighter competitions are India, Brazil and Japan.

The Indian Air Force is seeking up to 126 multi-role fighters for approximately $10 billion, with the provisos that there is a transfer of technology and at least 50 per cent value in industrial offsets. India has traditionally purchased and operated Soviet/Russian designs, as well as quality French fighter aircraft. The six types in the competition are: Saab Gripen, Eurofigther Typhoon, Dassault Rafale, Mikoyan MiG-35, Lockheed Martin F-16 Super Viper and Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet.

The two finalists are the Typhoon and the Rafale, the most expensive contenders. The winner will be determined based on the total package, including technology transfer, industrial offsets, purchase price and life-cycle sustainment costs.

Brazil has had a decade-long on-again, off-again competition to replace its aging French Mirage fighters, with the competitors being the Rafale, Typhoon, Sukhoi Su-35, Gripen and the Super Hornet. It was expected the Rafale would win because of its inclusion in a complex deal between France and Brazil including both naval ships and transport aircraft, but the Gripen has been noted as the best performance-by-cost bid.

Japan has long been a military dependant of the U.S., so it is surprising that the Typhoon has been shortlisted alongside the Super Hornet and the F-35 to be its near-term aerial deterrent to Russian and Chinese incursions. With the F-35 expected to have further delays and costs increasing, the Typhoon might be a winner.

Only time will tell if the F-35 is the outstanding first strike/attack aircraft it is advertised to be, but it will never be a high-speed air supremacy fighter. Canada is so vast that we need a fast, long-range interceptor deterrent against air or sea threats, whether they are terrorist-based or an aggressor nation. Keep in mind that long-range cruise missiles can travel 3,000 miles, with Iran, Pakistan, China and North Korea all having the technology. We need to review the options, just like the rest of our allies, on what aircraft can compliment the F-35, or even replace it.

Mark M. Miller is a Vancouver-based research consultant who writes on international and military affairs.

Second thoughts about the F-35 - thestar.com

 

[Paan Singh]

arey yaar koi bhi le lo but dealy na karo..jf-17 hi le lo..

 

[INDIAN SOLDIER]

Old news n posted before... abt 65million per unit is just BS...its well over 100+ million n the price is gettin higher n the programe into issues.... plus the training,spares etc will add to cost also.


@ramu kaka... bhai kabhi tou ghairat kha k trolling chor diya kar! sharam kar yara.

Its not all about price tag but flaws in the technical design and affordable in terms of capablities with associated values..........

Here we go.........

F-35 JSF Program: When is “Affordability” Not?

“Affordability is the balance of cost and capabilities required to accomplish assigned missions. For over a decade the Marine Corps has avoided the cost of new procurement during a time when the service life of our legacy aircraft were sufficient to meet the missions assigned. However, in the near future, our investment in the capabilities of the F-35B will outweigh the unavoidable legacy aircraft operations and sustainment (O&S) cost increases we will incur with the F/A-18, AV-8B, and EA-6B.”

Introduction to “The Projected Impact of F-35B on USMC Operational Costs”
By Lieutenant General George J. Trautman, III, Deputy Commandant for USMC Aviation.

In 2002, the JSF started life as a “200 Billion dollar program . . . to develop and field an affordable, highly common family of next-generation strike aircraft for the United States Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and allies”. For those not familiar with the term, a “strike aircraft” is basically a bomber, euphemistically referred to as a “bomb truck”.

In all, some 2,852 JSF aircraft were planned to be produced for the US Forces, with “Program emphasis is on affordability – reducing the development cost, production cost and cost of ownership of the JSF family of aircraft”.

The JSF aircraft capabilities were to be fielded and start operations in 2008.

Touted as the world’s largest defence procurement program of all time and with such fanfare, Air Force Generals and politicians, alike, were encouraged to commit to the program and flocked to “get with the strength”, declaring how they were very confident and extremely comfortable in their belief in the promise that “Affordability is the cornerstone of the JSF Program”.

Now, some 8 years later, the JSF Program is seven years behind schedule and counting while, at 382.4 Billion Dollars for 409 fewer aircraft, the program’s budgetary estimate has effectively almost than doubled, that is increased by over 97% to be more precise.

Development costs, the ubiquitous RDT&E costs, for the System Development / Demonstration (SDD/EMD) Phase have gone from a budgeted target of 34.4 Billion Dollars at the start of 2002 to 44.8 Billion by the end of 2003 to the then current estimate of over 50 Billion by the end of 2009. The over 30% increase experienced from 2002 to 2003 should have triggered what is known as an Approved Baseline Program (APB) breach, but no such breaches have been reported to the US Congress, even when the overall increases had reached over 45 % by the end of 2009.

Since then, sources inside the Pentagon have now revealed that, following the independent costing study completed in May 2010 which showed the JSF Program had incurred a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of over 90% and not the 57% that reports from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) were encouraging people to infer, the RDT&E budget estimates have had to be increased further - by about another 7.2 Billion Dollars over and above the end of 2009 Budgetary Estimate (50.1681 Billion Dollars) that was used in the President’s 2011 Budget Proposal – PB2011.

However, these sources also say the new budget estimates for the SDD Phase of the JSF Program would have been a lot higher save for some “highly optimistic” management and accounting practices. These have resulted, inter alia, in more development activities and their associated costs being pushed beyond the current SDD Phase. This is in line with the recently coined spin in the December 2009 JSF Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) that the JSF Program is now “focused on developing, and delivering to the warfighter incremental blocks of increasing capability”.

With all the claims still being made about of how the lessons learned from the F-22 Raptor Program would be used to make development of the JSF more affordable, the SDD/EMD budget for the F-22 Program of Record was around 30.7 Billion – some 88.9% of the original JSF SDD Budget of 2002, 68.6% of this budget at the end of 2003, and ~60.9% of the then current estimate at the end of 2009, while just over half (~53%) of the latest estimate.

In the meantime, the cost estimate for the much vaunted, affordable, low costs for the all important on-going operation and support (O&S) of the aircraft (here read “cost of ownership of the JSF family of aircraft&#8221 has ballooned into what looks like a galactic telephone number – almost a Trillion Dollars, and rising, over the life of a fleet with 409 fewer aircraft. This is 2.75 times the cost estimated in the Approved Program Budget (APB) of 2002, when the 409 aircraft were included.

If you believe the contractor’s recent advice and others, like the Lexington Institute, that the price for the JSF will be 60 Million Dollars apiece, then the budgetary estimate for the life cycle costs works out to be between 6 to 7 times the price of the aircraft, when the norm determined from legacy aircraft programs for an 8,000 flying hour/25 year service life is around twice the purchase price.

Admittedly, this is a budgetary estimate that has taken 8 years to develop and not one that appears to have been published, if at all considered, by the recent independent cost review brought about by the Nunn-McCurdy Breach. However, the form guide on the JSF Program of Record makes further increases an almost certain winning bet.

There is the question of the purchase price itself which, until recently, was always answered with a cost; namely, the “unit recurring flyaway cost” or URF Cost. This would be expressed more than not in historical dollar values, like in 2002 dollars, and as an average URF Cost across the full production of 2,443 units – a reduced price figure now not expected to be attained till sometime after 2023. No doubt, the number in 2002 Dollars is smaller, by some degree, than the actual number of dollars that would be required to be paid at the time of purchase, even more so and by a far more significant degree when purchasing early production aircraft. Australia is pencilled in to start purchasing early versions of the F-35A JSF Conventional Take Off & Land (CTOL) aircraft somewhere between 2012 and 2014, out of the Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP). These aircraft will require significant and costly upgrading to reach the capabilities promised back in 2002 as well as correct any deficiencies found during both developmental and operational testing.

According to various defence acquisition guides, handbooks and experts in the field, the URF Cost is only part of the overall purchase price, and, in the case of the JSF, a relatively smaller part than that of legacy aircraft programs. But, the Air Force Generals and senior procurement bureaucrats have persisted in answering any question about the price of this aircraft by using this figure.
However, since the latter part of last year, this figure has been morphed into the newly coined term “unit recurring flyaway price” or URF Price.

If you read the disclaimer on the contractor’s Powerpoint slides, it appears that this URF price does not include the cost of the engine and related propulsion components nor some other things, such as Engineering Change Orders or ECOs.

This same chart, though somewhat artistically sanitised, was recently used by Tom Burbage of Lockheed Martin in his presentation to Australia&#8217;s Minister for Defence Materiel & Science, the Hon Greg Combet, to show that all is well, at least pricing <sic> wise. The upshot is that these two charts and the data contained therein are fundamentally the same, as are the trends of the curves themselves which have just been moved upwards by a fixed amount across the periods of the schedule as shown.

However, the intents and purposes of the later chart would appear to the educated observer to contain the additional elements of subterfuge and confabulation, likely for the consumption of senior officials in the Australian Department of Defence and the Defence Material Organisation (DMO) as well as their Minister, though hardly for their benefit, or for the benefit of their fellow Australians.

A similar though apparently earlier slide entitled &#8220;URF Cost Status&#8221; from a presentation put together by the Danish Ministry for Defence and dated the 29th of January, 2010, puts some more flesh on the bones in relation to the F-35A JSF (CTOL) unit recurring flyaway cost, now being called the URF Price; this time with some actual dollar figures populating the vertical axis of the graph. This chart may go some way to explain why Lockheed Martin representatives and others, like the Lexington Institute, are saying the price for the F-35A JSF is going to be around US$60 Million Dollars, in Then-Year Dollars or TY$s.

This would appear to exclude propulsion, listed as Government Furnished Equipment.

For the JSF Program, ECOs are going to be very important . . . and very costly &#8211; even more so given the level of the aforementioned advisory about &#8220;highly optimistic&#8221; management and accounting practices being the order of the day.

The JSF program has much of the design, development, testing and production being done in parallel; also known as &#8220;concurrently&#8221;. Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) aircraft are being built before designs are complete and before these designs have been fully verified, validated and demonstrated/tested. This high level of &#8220;concurrency&#8221; is what the US Government&#8217;s Audit Office (the GAO) and others have been warning about for years; in fact, since the program&#8217;s inception.

The extreme levels of risk associated with this inordinately high level of &#8220;concurrency&#8221; are what will drive up the costs of such things as ECOs or Engineering Change Orders. These are the design changes that result from things like the waivers and concessions required on the production line through to problems found during testing which require redesign. The JSF Program is almost certain to have the highest level of ECOs ever seen in any military aircraft production program, by far, and they will be ongoing for over a decade, well beyond the current development phase.

Now, this has just been a quick overview of the JSF affordability issue and, as always, the devil is in the detail of which there is much; both detail and devilishness. But, suffice to say, if there are those who still believe in the claim that &#8220;Affordability is the cornerstone of the JSF Program&#8221;, then they are almost certain to also believe in tooth fairies that ride on the backs of pigs that fly.

Given the OSD continues to claim the F-35 Joint Strike fighter is still going to be affordable, the fundamental and unanswered question is:

How?

 

[Bl[i]tZ]

With more delays, cost overruns countries around the world have been concerend about the cost of F-35. There should be no doubt in any one's mind about the capabilities of F-35 as Rafale and Typhoon are no match for F-35, since its is true multirole 5th gen fighter.

The reason why we shouldn't get into this F-35 predicament is

1. US will most probably not transfer any technology. The offsets of MMRCA is 50% and we need this technology to improve our aviation industry. 50% of $ 12 billion is $6 billion - which will be a huge boost.

2. It will dent our credibility as an arms purchaser. We asked these companies to wait for such a long time and now if we scrap the contract just because we took 4 years to evaluate and now we can see something better if we just delay it by 4-5 years. This is unbelievable.

3. There are 2400 F-35 orders to LM by USAF. LM won't be in a position to supply us these aircraft anytime soon and given that 2017 is the final deadline to retire Mig21s, we shouldn't get into a project yet under development.

4. Finally, do we really want to be dependent on an upredictable country like US for our strike aircrafts. I mean they could strangle us in case of a war by not supplying spares.

5. And I forgot to add, we have already invested capital and are engaged in the development of a 5th Gen fighter with Russia.

My 2c!

 

[illusion8]

Second thoughts about the F-35

When the most senior U.S. military officer admits that the largest defence procurement program in history has affordability issues, then you can bet that the situation is dire. Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has even put forth the likelihood that at least one variant of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter may be cancelled, and total numbers reduced.

Even if the F-35 eventually meets reasonable cost projections, it must still be vetted as an operational combat aircraft. It was not only meant to be an affordable fifth-generation fighter-bomber for the U.S. and her allies, but also to have lower maintenance costs than aircraft now in service. These claims may also turn out to be inaccurate, with the F-35 a potential hangar-queen like the F-22 Raptor.

Besides the F-35&#8217;s development and cost troubles, we are left with the question of whether 65 of these particular planes will meet Canada&#8217;s defence and alliance commitments. Unlike the F-22 Raptor, which has been built exclusively for the U.S. military, the F-35 was conceived as a less capable aircraft in terms of sheer performance but better than the planes of potential adversaries, especially in terms of stealth and first-strike capability &#8212; and development costs would be shared with trusted allies.

Canada has always intended to buy the F-35A, the simplest, least expensive variant, which is a conventional take-off-and-landing aircraft. But affordability is a relative term when an aircraft has not been fully tested and proven. Australia, which originally had intended to buy 100 F-35As, has had to purchase two dozen new F-18 Super Hornets as a stopgap measure due, among other things, to delays in the F-35 program. If the F-35 has further problems, we may have to take the same route.

And even if the F-35 is as effective as claimed, it may still be the wrong plane for Canada. It is not very fast and has less range and weapons-load capacity than other allied fighters &#8212; even more so compared with new planes being developed in Russia, India and China.

There are a few multi-role fighter competitions taking place around the globe, and it is instructional to view which aircraft are rising to the top. The nations conducting the most in-depth fighter competitions are India, Brazil and Japan.

The Indian Air Force is seeking up to 126 multi-role fighters for approximately $10 billion, with the provisos that there is a transfer of technology and at least 50 per cent value in industrial offsets. India has traditionally purchased and operated Soviet/Russian designs, as well as quality French fighter aircraft. The six types in the competition are: Saab Gripen, Eurofigther Typhoon, Dassault Rafale, Mikoyan MiG-35, Lockheed Martin F-16 Super Viper and Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet.

The two finalists are the Typhoon and the Rafale, the most expensive contenders. The winner will be determined based on the total package, including technology transfer, industrial offsets, purchase price and life-cycle sustainment costs.

Brazil has had a decade-long on-again, off-again competition to replace its aging French Mirage fighters, with the competitors being the Rafale, Typhoon, Sukhoi Su-35, Gripen and the Super Hornet. It was expected the Rafale would win because of its inclusion in a complex deal between France and Brazil including both naval ships and transport aircraft, but the Gripen has been noted as the best performance-by-cost bid.

Japan has long been a military dependant of the U.S., so it is surprising that the Typhoon has been shortlisted alongside the Super Hornet and the F-35 to be its near-term aerial deterrent to Russian and Chinese incursions. With the F-35 expected to have further delays and costs increasing, the Typhoon might be a winner.

Only time will tell if the F-35 is the outstanding first strike/attack aircraft it is advertised to be, but it will never be a high-speed air supremacy fighter. Canada is so vast that we need a fast, long-range interceptor deterrent against air or sea threats, whether they are terrorist-based or an aggressor nation. Keep in mind that long-range cruise missiles can travel 3,000 miles, with Iran, Pakistan, China and North Korea all having the technology. We need to review the options, just like the rest of our allies, on what aircraft can compliment the F-35, or even replace it.

Mark M. Miller is a Vancouver-based research consultant who writes on international and military affairs.

Second thoughts about the F-35 - thestar.com

Off topic Why is Canada buying so much stuff?, what seems to be the threat perception to the Canadians and from whom?.

{whether they are terrorist-based or an aggressor nation. Keep in mind that long-range cruise missiles can travel 3,000 miles, with Iran, Pakistan, China and North Korea all having the technology We need to review the options, just like the rest of our allies, on what aircraft can compliment the F-35, or even replace it.}

They don't intend to shoot down ballistic missiles with air crafts do they..