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Truth vs hype of Indian defence modernisation in the last 10 years

He is targeting to streamline most of the processes - lets hope he is successful in it.

That's needs to be seen, but I would also want him to make the forces more efficient too, since they are part of the problem too.
 
@sancho u miss c-130J
IAF+C-130J.jpg
 
True, but who is talking about half good? I was talking about half the truth, which is something else. When you look at the modernisations that I showed, IAF and IN area clearly improving at a good pace and that is often not shown by generalisations. So when 2 of our 3 forces are doing good in terms of defence modernisations, that's more than half good right?

I'll appreciate your effort at starting this thread, in order to clarify some "truth v/s hype". The fact is that: just as there are "many truths", there is also a "humongous hype" that exist; and most of all, even overlap each other. But they are not even fully known or talked about, even here for that matter.

To simplify matters somewhat: there has been and there is continuing to be a growth and development in the Armed Forces both quantitatively and qualitatively. But whether that is satisfactory or not elicits different answers (views) depending on who that question is addressed to!

Leaving that aside for the time being; it is crystal clear that (in my view) most of the responsibility lies within the precincts of MoD. And that is less to do with "policy paralysis" and various other things being 'bandied about' so freely here and elsewhere. MoD (in the Indian Scheme of things) is the primary decision maker with MoF having an accessorial role as facilitator or spoiler, since it holds the "purse-strings".
Hence again (in the Indian Scheme of things) the Bureaucrats of MoD have the powers and the abilities to either "push" or "block" decision making. Very poor use of those powers and abilities have been on constant display during the term of the last Govt. How and why did it happen? Because of a RM who had poor leadership and managerial skills. There is no escaping that fact; however much A.K. Antony may be a consummate Politician or an Individual of great personal integrity. Those qualities were less called for in his role as RM; than a clear and decisive display of Leadership and Managerial abilities.
The moment that AKA was appointed to the post, he was appointed to a very Senior Managerial position and was required to act in a manner befitting that; which he clearly was unable to.
E.G. if Narayanamurthy was unable to function effectively as Head of Infosys, all the responsibility for his acts would devolve on him.
Therefore; as far as the failings of MoD are concerned, the "buck stops at" Anthony. Period.

The Armed Forces themselves; also need "to carry the can" wrt to their own failings. The Armed Forces have begun to display traits of both the Bureaucrats and the Politicians in their approach to their issues. But that seems to be a natural corollary to the "Indian Scheme of things" again. Which has led to the Services following the adage of "if you can't beat them, join them" with some exception, one being the last CNS.
Most of all; the Services need to recognise that as 'end-users'; they are in fact the biggest stake-holders in what is being developed/built within the country or what is being acquired from outside.
But they are still in the role of "kids" who keeps a "wish list" for Santa Claus to fulfill at Yule-Tide!
Hence the outcome is similar.

Only the IN has played a reasonable role in working to not only define but also create some of the hardware that they need. With commensurate results. While the other services have had less than edifying results to show.
I find it amusing that news reports are highlighting something being described as "lack of war-readiness" only because it grabs eyeballs and it also helps to 'pitch' some (hidden) agendas. The fact is that a (any) "War Reserve" is quantified in terms of X days of ammo, eqpt. etc etc. etc. What has been happening recently, is something known as "padding" in Civvy Street Mgmt. Every year ; that X quantity has been increased by a certain quantity/percentage as a revised requirement. How that revised reqd. quantity is reflected in reality is hard to determine, since some of those revisions are strictly arbitrary in nature. That then leads to the "headline mongering" that we get to see, but who knows the reality?
The real requirements then get overlooked, and there are plenty of those extant as it is. Even the last COAS rode that "hobby-horse" since it helped him to push another "personal" agenda. Unfortunately so. And the MoD let it pass......

The lead R&D orgn under MoD is DRDO. A huge Behemoth with mixed results to show at various times in its existence. It is in recent times, that the results are getting noticeably and consistently better.
But MoD has consistently failed to set goals and achieve results from this Orgn in the past. Individuals and (specific) Labs performed outstandingly in the past, but no thanks to MoD. It is fairly recently that MoD has reset/re-booted the Orgn. That has had again something to do with the reluctance of successive RMs to discard the mantle of Politicians and take on "Productivity Issues" in the Labor Union-heavy Ordnance Factories Board and DRDO (much less so in).
The hard reality is that the Services need the Production Agencies (whether PSU or Pvt. Sector) to function effectively wrt their supply chain, this is where MoD again has to function effectively as the MANAGER and ensure that things get done.

More than anything else, what is now needed; is a serious re-structuring of the Armed Forces and its Higher Command including the setting up of a CDS as well as various Commands based on tasks/capabilities. That will be the real "growth" rather than just increasing Squadrons and Divisions.
 
@sancho what about these few questions...........

1. defense spending as % of GDP is at 50 years low of 1.7%.
2. Even after 10 years we haven't signed MMRCA contract & our AF is CRITICALLY short of Fighters & is depending on flying coffers - mig 21.
3. P-75I project is still in LIMBO.
4. 2nd IAC, light helicopters for army, howitzers & many major equipment procurement hasn't still seen any progress, instead programs were cancelled after tenders, tests, etc.

You don't hide 50% loses with 50% success.
 
@sancho what about these few questions...........

1. defense spending as % of GDP is at 50 years low of 1.7%.
2. Even after 10 years we haven't signed MMRCA contract & our AF is CRITICALLY short of Fighters & is depending on flying coffers - mig 21.
3. P-75I project is still in LIMBO.
4. 2nd IAC, light helicopters for army, howitzers & many major equipment procurement hasn't still seen any progress, instead programs were cancelled after tenders, tests, etc.

You don't hide 50% loses with 50% success.

I'll just respond to the underlined (point no.1) above. That reasoning is seriously flawed; any spend quantity as a percentage of GDP is simply a guide-line; as a guide-line of "prudent and justifiable" spending. Therfore it does not naturally flow that GoI (or any Govt.) can spend, only because it has some 'latitude' to do so.
What about corresponding percentage expenditure on Education, Health-Care, Infrastucture and so on?
India still hopes/aims to be primarily a "Welfare State" rather than a "Security State".
Which matters more to Mr.Indian Joe?
 
The moment that AKA was appointed to the post, he was appointed to a very Senior Managerial position and was required to act in a manner befitting that; which he clearly was unable to.
E.G. if Narayanamurthy was unable to function effectively as Head of Infosys, all the responsibility for his acts would devolve on him.
Therefore; as far as the failings of MoD are concerned, the "buck stops at" Anthony. Period.

That's the problem, it is not as simple as that. Even if Modi would had been the DM, he could not have made Kaveri engine a success, unless he would had developed the engine and the fighter project as a whole by himself. That however is not the duty of the DM, just as it's not his duty to calculate lifecycle costs in the mid air refuelling tender of the IAF, or that decisions he took were blocked by other ministries (finance ministry for tankers, environment ministry for naval base for example) or how he has to blacklist companies if the law says so. All this simply has nothing to do with managing skills or decision making of the DM or not, so you can't blame the DM for such problems only. And the myth about lack of decisions should be countered by the first 2 posts either, since he actually decided and added quiet a lot in favor for the improvement of the forces and the defence of India in general.

What he should had done though, is to take a stronger leading position of MoD towards the forces and the industry, to take them accountable for delays, failures and corruption too. MoD can't be effective if these sides don't work propperly with them! He also should had forced the forces for changes that makes procurements or the defence of India more efficient. Combining procurements of different forces (SR SAM, ATGM, Avro replacement and MPA), diverting roles / arms and techs (helicopters mainly to IA, maritime attack and coastal defence to IN, high altitude surveillance and refuelling under IAF...).

But they are still in the role of "kids" who keeps a "wish list" for Santa Claus to fulfill at Yule-Tide!
Hence the outcome is similar.
Only the IN has played a reasonable role in working to not only define but also create some of the hardware that they need. With commensurate results. While the other services have had less than edifying results to show.

Very true, whenever I see the ammount of changes Arjun requires I always ask myself, where was IA during the development of the tank? Why didn't they add these requirements in the initial stages. Some of course are caused by the long delays, but they actually want a complete different tank now.
IN is indeed more involved, but not necessarily for the good of India either. Their N-LCA requirement is pure nonsense and has caused more delayes of the whole LCA project, than it will IN's operational capabilities. The naval Dhruv that they rejected instead of trying to create solutions to make it more suitable now suddenly gets more interest. That at a time when they want to add 100s of foreign helicopters, instead of Indian once, that are under production or could be developed (IMRH).

But yes, the gap between the forces and the industry shows the problem in India too, since they don't work with eachother and complaining only about eachother!

One can also add the lack of interest of Indian private industry, that is very slowly understanding the potenital of the market. But even here, we only see complains about to government or the forces, while no own will to do something is shown.

All these areas must be dealt with and that will take more than 5 years time. One reason why I would like to see the new DM to follow policies that the older DM has started, to make the forces and the industry understand, that there will be a constant aim on progress of the government, no matter which party is ruling. Otherwise, we will see them trying to change everything to their benefit everytime when a new DM steps in, just as we see it now.
 
@sancho what about these few questions...........

1. defense spending as % of GDP is at 50 years low of 1.7%.

It doesn't matter if it's 1.7% or 17%, unless you make the process of setting up requirements, procuring / developing and delivering the products more efficient. Therefor simply spending more or asking for more funds is not the solution.

Simple example - if IA had selected the same Spyder SAM system that IAF has chosen for the short term requirements, with Maitri SAM as the long term prospect, they wouldn't neet to complain about the lack of SR SAMs now. That has nothing to do with the lack of funds, just with inefficient procurement policies and ego problems between the forces! So increase spending in reasonable steps is the one side, but using the available funds in a far more efficient way, is the more important side!

2. Even after 10 years we haven't signed MMRCA contract & our AF is CRITICALLY short of Fighters & is depending on flying coffers - mig 21.

That has different reasons as I often show. The policy change from MRCA to MMRCA with strategic benefits in mind, the fact that IAF made a silly decision to accept all 6 fighters for trials, or that the industrial requirements needs to be fulfilled by Dassault first, before the deal can be signed.
And IF IAF really would be worried about squad numbers, they would had asked for more MKIs from Russia, or added another LCA MK1 squad, what does this tell us? That the squadron issue number is just another hype!

3. P-75I project is still in LIMBO.

No relation to the shortfall of subs now and do you know which sub IN has selected? If not, what contract should MoD sign?

4. 2nd IAC,

Under development, with the expected development problems. Imo it still goes better than the Gorshkov procurement, but that's another issue. Have explained about LUH in earlier posts.

You don't hide 50% loses with 50% success.

Depends on the point of view, the one is the pessimistic, the other the optimistic. For the last 10 years, we clearly are well above the 50%, so more than enough reasons to be optimistic about the defence capability of at least IAF and IN. Now the focus must be to improve the figure further, instead of talk everything down that was achieved!
 
That's the problem, it is not as simple as that. Even if Modi would had been the DM, he could not have made Kaveri engine a success, unless he would had developed the engine and the fighter project as a whole by himself. That however is not the duty of the DM, just as it's not his duty to calculate lifecycle costs in the mid air refuelling tender of the IAF, or that decisions he took were blocked by other ministries (finance ministry for tankers, environment ministry for naval base for example) or how he has to blacklist companies if the law says so. All this simply has nothing to do with managing skills or decision making of the DM or not, so you can't blame the DM for such problems only. And the myth about lack of decisions should be countered by the first 2 posts either, since he actually decided and added quiet a lot in favor for the improvement of the forces and the defence of India in general.

What he should had done though, is to take a stronger leading position of MoD towards the forces and the industry, to take them accountable for delays, failures and corruption too. MoD can't be effective if these sides don't work propperly with them! He also should had forced the forces for changes that makes procurements or the defence of India more efficient. Combining procurements of different forces (SR SAM, ATGM, Avro replacement and MPA), diverting roles / arms and techs (helicopters mainly to IA, maritime attack and coastal defence to IN, high altitude surveillance and refuelling under IAF...).

The RM/DM has a very important role; even if it may be simply distilled to asking the right questions and ensuring that the correct and complete answers are given. He is exactly like a CEO. Many of the CEOs in India are from families that started and own their business, consequently they have little knowledge of even 'nuts and bolts' matters. And yet they run things, and very successfully at that!
Again; most of the time by "asking the right questions and ensuring that the correct and complete answers are given" (in a nutshell). Apart from that; the RM/DM has to have some basic understanding of the Policy that his Govt. has in mind. Mr.Antony did not display any such qualities in office.
Contrast that with one of India's most successful RM/DMs ever. A man called Mr.Jagjivan Ram in the era ca. 1971.
Why was he successful?
Because he knew precisely how little he knew, of the 'nuts and bolts' of his Ministry; therefore he found the best Bureaucrats to man his Ministry, asked them all the "right questions" at the right time, ensured that they delivered what was required of them; and most importantly, made sure that they worked in perfect tandem with the Services and their Chiefs.
Voila; the results were seen at the Race-Course maidan at Dacca in Dec 1971.

Then there was another peculiar creature who had adorned the chair of RM/DM; a man called Mr.V.K.Krishna Menon, who thought he knew everything. And ended up as a massive disaster to his Ministry and his Country! But he was too intelligent to even understand that fact, till his dying day.

Mr.A.K.Anthony was somewhere in between those two. If he had to fight a War in his tenure, then he (and his country-men) might have had to become wiser in some way.
Luckily he only had to skirmish with the likes of V.K.Singh who did not do any credit either to his Service or his Designation.
 
Yes, because it's not the lack of funds or will to provide new arms and techs by the MoD that caused several of the problems in IA, but internal problems of IA itself, which he should deal first before complaining at the MoD. This is just a PR case like it can be seen in many countries, when forces trying to convince a new governement to provide more toys, but spending is only one side of the solution, increasing efficiency, taking on corruption within IA in a stronger way and reducing bureaucracies are other sides of the same story.

I think to write it off the army chief's statement that India is not war ready ...as a mere PR stunt is insulting to Army chief.

Is army chief naïve enough to publicly admit that Indian army is not war ready ....just to get more funds ???

Is that the level to which IA chief will fall just for sake of funds to belittle the institute he heads in the eyes of fellow countrymen and world at large ??? I do not think so .

I think this is the honest admission on part of army chief to clarify to new administration .

Do you think mere addition of some strategic , world class assets will make us ready for war that we envisage ?

whatever military modernization efforts have happened in last decades they were absolutely piecemeal and haphazard fashion without any long term planning and vision . That is the truth ...and just half hearted measures here and there don't make us war ready .

I find it amusing that news reports are highlighting something being described as "lack of war-readiness" only because it grabs eyeballs and it also helps to 'pitch' some (hidden) agendas. .

Yes statements such as ' lack of war readiness ' will grab eyeballs ....if it comes straight from horse's mouth i.e. Army chief himself ...The statement was not made by any ordinary rumor-mongerer !!!

Once again I wonder why we are belittling repute and character of Head of Indian army by painting him as someone who can be so selfish and narrow minded that he will deliberately lie to him PM and in the process tarnish the sacred image of great institution of army in the eyes of country and the world .... just to get some funds or fulfill hidden agendas ???
 
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Yes statements such as ' lack of war readiness ' will grab eyeballs ....if it comes straight from horse's mouth i.e. Army chief himself ...The statement was not made by any ordinary rumor-mongerer !!!

Once again I wonder why we are belittling repute and character of Head of Indian army by painting him as someone who can be so selfish and narrow minded that he will deliberately lie to him PM and in the process tarnish the sacred image of great institution of army in the eyes of country and the world .... just to get some funds or fulfill hidden agendas ???


Are you even sure that the COAS said the exact same words to the PM? :azn:
Was that an official statement released by the Director General (Public Relations), Ministry of Defence; Govt. of India?

Having some idea of how all the Orgns (incl MoD, the Services, DRDO , OFB et al) function; I wrote what I did in the post earlier. Read it again and you may precisely understand what I meant.

News reports are just that...................... reports written by some Journalistic "hack".
 
Are you even sure that the COAS said the exact same words to the PM? :azn:
Was that an official statement released by the Director General (Public Relations), Ministry of Defence; Govt. of India?

Having some idea of how all the Orgns (incl MoD, the Services, DRDO , OFB et al) function; I wrote what I did in the post earlier. Read it again and you may precisely understand what I meant.

News reports are just that...................... reports written by some Journalistic "hack".

well . Let us assume that COAS did not make any such statement ...but then did DG ( PR ) , MoD refute such damning statement ascribed to COAS ? No. right ?

so what do you finally conclude ?

I understand how our media plays up 'spicy' statements ...

But in this case ..it is a very sensitive matter . The very fact that DG ( PR ) did not refute a statement that is ascribed to COAS means that he indeed made such or similar statement .
 
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well . Let us assume that COAS did not make any such statement ...but then did DG ( PR ) , MoD refute such damning statement ascribed to COAS ? No. right ?

so what do you finally conclude ?

I understand how our media plays up 'spicy' statements ...

But in this case ..it is a very sensitive matter . The very fact that DG ( PR ) did not refute a statement that is ascribed to COAS means that he indeed made such or similar statement .

Why the DGPR did not refute that 'story' says something too, not necessarily what you think. But closer to what I sought to explain earlier (in the post that you quoted).
Knowing the system rather well, I know what has transpired and why........
 
He is exactly like a CEO.

No he is not, if he would be, he would only deal with 2 different divisions of the same company that shares the same main goal to develop and produce a product. That however is not the case, because he sits between the industry that develops and produce the product and the customer (the forces) and has to deal with both their requirements and performances in their own ways!
He has to provide what the forces require and at the same time try to push the industry to increase their capability and provide defence products. But the problem is, that both ends doesn't necessarily have to work with eachother even if the DM wants it (see PC7 / HTT40 issue for example) and that sets the limits of the DM too.

the RM/DM has to have some basic understanding of the Policy that his Govt. has in mind. Mr.Antony did not display any such qualities in office.

If that would be the case, IN and IAF would not have got so many of the stuff they required, but as showed, he had passed far more procurements than most people are aware off, or would want to credit him for!

Also the fact that Antony...
...has initiated the change to see China as the main threat to India and the related change of policies
...has pushed PSUs for more performance, while inviting private players to more engagement in the defence field
...has changed the policies of ToT & offsets to the highest ever
...has changed the policies to open JV's between foreign vendors and Indian counterparts to participate in defence deals
...has argued in favor of IA and against IAF wrt the use of combat helicopters...

...shows clearly that he has a far better knowledge of what is needed and what he wanted for the forces, the industry and the indian defence as a whole!

Most of his work will be even followed by the new government, be it the improvement of north eastern defence and infrastructure, be it the invitations to get the private companies involved and they will most likely even pass the deals that he couldn't pass in the last FY (A330 MRTTs, Ch47s and most likely even Apaches according to his decisions about the operational use as it seems). Hopefully they also will follow his way of getting critical technology and focus on co-developments, or his stronger stands against DRDO, HAL and Co. That also shows that he did several things that are good and were the right thing to do, although he never will get the credit for it.
What the government has to do better however, is to get IA on track which seems to be the biggest task and change laws and regulations wrt corruption or enviroment issues, because that caused a lot of problems and made decision making less effective.
 
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