Two Nation Theory

[Joe Shearer]

"thought"??!!

Dear Sir,

What is unclear about my statement?

This is based on the citations that I have already provided. There is no speculative element here, nor am I purporting to fish people's thoughts out of their heads.

Anti-Hindi agitations of Tamil Nadu - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

There was direct evidence to the effect dude. If we were going to be forced to study Hindi as our first language what else do you expect? Also please note that there are enough Indian 'nationalists' that times among Tamilians also. Rajaji himself was one.

Also you better read about how Periyar rose to prominence. He was a leader against discrimination by Brahmins. And remember Brahmins have always been a minority. Inspite of all that there is untouchability even now in Tamilnadu. A district collector could not take some BC people into a temple because of the brahmin opposition in that village. A man of his stature was afraid for security, in 2010!!

Yes there was the obvious connection between Brahmins and North Indians as was percieved then, where the Aryan-Dravidian theory had not much opposition. Today we know the theory is disputed. And add to it what happened with our languages. How can anyone expect people to tolerate saying in 15 years you will have to learn Hindi and teach your children and compete with the rest of Indians a large part of whom do not understand Hindi themselves?

This is for all other Indians also on this forum. please understand that language movements came about as there was a time frame set to bring Hindi as the sole official language. What people demanded was the retaining of English as official language. It is a fair compromise as it is as difficult for you as for me. Besides, in hindsight all that India has today in terms of English advantage have been possible only because of language movements.

My point was about Tamil minority sentiment. Does your note mean that it did not exist? Or does it mean that I stated anything anywhere in contradiction to what you have stated?

Perhaps the confusion is because you think that a minority sentiment, and feelings of alienation, are in some way disloyal. Or that justifications are needed for Tamil sentiment. If that is so, it is superfluous. Such sentiment doesn't in any way impinge on the modern-day Tamilians loyalty, or the personal loyalty of anyone.

If, like Kartic Sri, or like Raghu, you are worried about people hostile to India building on these allusions, surely you don't feel that India will rise or fall according to our postings on this blog, or that enemies of the country are waiting for us to tell them about our weaknesses here, so as to draw up complex plans. These weaknesses, and the plans of our enemies, are the worst-kept secrets in the world. It really doesn't matter what you or I write or say, people will conspire and plot, or they will look on amused and go about their business, depending on their sanity and rationality.

With respect to seccession prominent leaders were sensible enough to realize that people did not want separation. Whatever people were asking was to stick to 'Unity in Diversity'. There is nothing to be ashamed of for me if some of my people wanted it at that point of time.

Ah, here we have it. Who said that there was something to be ashamed of?

Try to understand the grossness and insult involved in this totally perverse thinking.

* Indian Muslims felt alienated in the 30s, and wanted constitutional safeguards.
* Since these did not happen, the ultimate step, partition, was sought.
* Partition is against India, it was disloyal to India.
* By implication, the thinking of the Indian Muslim of the 30s and 40s has to be monitored, and stamped out wherever it occurs.
* This thinking includes any kind of minority sentiment.
* For any Indian citizen to display minority sentiment is disloyal and treacherous.
* For any other Indian citizen to discover minority sentiment demands an immediate and robust defense.

Great balls of fire. What are we to do with this line of logic? Can we have any kind of discussion without it degenerating into a welter of competing loyalty oaths?

There is enough evidence of attempts aimed at wiping out local languages. Even the assurance that Nehru gave:


only hinted that English could have been removed at least later which is not acceptable. If you want participation in a nation there should be a fair chance. English gave us that. Nobody liked english, if today many urban TN kids cannot speak Tamil its their problem.


All the racism that followed is just reaction by simple minded people who did not understand this. What we have today in TN is a bunch of racist and casteist jobless parties

I could not agree with you more; these parties are also among the most mind-numbingly corrupt. I would be happy to share with you my thoughts on the current Tamil Nadu political situation, but it would be seriously off-topic, and I do not do so on private mail since I do not wish to intrude on your privacy. You may find that our views on the current situation are largely identical.

But it has nothing to do with my original argument.

Sincerely,

'Joe'

 

[toxic_pus]

More than that - First, the Taliban, if taken as a 'community of extreme conservatives' wish to impose their ideology on all of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and therefore on all 'communities of Pakistan and Afghanistan' - liberal, conservative and moderate.

How is that different from Jinnah claiming to represent Muslims, circa 1937, in spite of ML securing a mere ‘4.8%’ of Muslim votes in the Provincial Elections of 1937. How is that different from Jinnah shoving the idea of Pakistan down NWFP’s throat, or for that matter the throat of entire Assam where non-Muslims were in majority, except for the district of Sylhet, circa 1946.

Second, the Taliban seek to impose their will on all communities through force and violence, and yes, the methodology does count. Advancing their agenda through social and political discourse and democratic government does not mean they are imposing on all communities, rather they are convincing all (or enough) communities to vote for them and buy into their vision.

Right.

'…Jinnah privately admitted to Woodrow Wyatt, who was visiting India with a Parliamentary Delegation, that he might be prepared to let Ambala and Burdwan go; Calcutta, however, he had to have, even at the price of 'serious trouble' and civil war. This threat of communal violence was the ultimate weapon in the armoury of a politician, playing from extreme weakness for the highest stakes, who had no experience of launching or controlling an agitation.’ (Sole Spokesman by Ayesha Jalal; pg 175)

It doesn’t appear that Jinnah was willing to advance his agenda ‘through social and political discourse and democratic government’ uniformly in all cases and was more than willing to do just the opposite where he met resistance. You obviously know what happened next, in Calcutta, in 1946. Besides, his clubbing of NWFP and Assam within the ‘Pakistan Group’ – as it was called in ML’s proposal following Cabinet Mission Plan (CMP) – was anything but democratic. In fact, it was just the opposite.

India in 1947 as well - every nation in the world uses one identity marker or the other. Just because you don't like the identity marker selected by those who would campaign for an independent Pakistan does not make it any less legitimate (at the time) than the identity markers selected by the 190+ other nations in the world.

Joe has already gone into great detail on this issue - at the time, in the context of the British Colony of India and independent nationhood bearing down, the broader and prominent identity marker became religion. Religion did not subsume the other aspects of identity by a diverse people in Pakistan (though successive rulers attempted to do just that), it merely put them on the back-burner.

It also doesn’t make it any more legitimate (at that time or now or ever) when just few years after birth that very identity ‘marker’, selected by the campaigners of independent Pakistan, in dunked forever in Bay of Bengal by those very people who were the most vocal in the campaign of independent Pakistan.

Also, immediately after independence, Jinnah’s declaration of Urdu to be the sole national language of Pakistan, completely disregarding the largest spoken language in Pakistan, proves you wrong that the other ‘markers’ of identity was ‘merely put on the back-burner’. Those other ‘markers’ were simply rejected of hand.

Your dichotomy arises from the fact that you see no distinction between Muslims, as a minority community within a large non-Muslim society, and Muslims, as separate nation, just because they pray facing the same direction.

You keep repeating instead of understanding. Its a point that has been addressed.

Au contraire, it is you who can’t quite figure out if a Bengali Muslim will find more commonality with a Bengali Hindu or a Punjabi Muslim.

 

[Kabir Panthi]

1. A united Dominion of India would be given independence.
2. Muslim-majority provinces would be grouped - Baluchistan, Sind, Punjab and North-West Frontier Province would form one group, and Bengal and Assam would form another.
3. Hindu-majority provinces in central and southern India would form another group.
4. The Central government would be empowered to run foreign affairs, defence and communications, while the rest of powers and responsibility would belong to the provinces, coordinated by groups.

Plan of June 16

The plan of May 16, 1946 had envisaged a united India in line with Congress and Muslim League aspirations. But that was where the consensus between the two parties ended since Congress abhorred the idea of having groupings of Muslim majority provinces and that of Hindu majority provinces with the intention of 'balancing' each other at the Central Legislature. The Muslim League could not accept any changes to this plan since the same 'balance' or 'parity' that Congress was loath to accept formed the basis of Muslim demands of 'political safeguards' built in to post-British Indian laws so as to prevent absolute rule of Hindus over Muslims.

If the demand for "balance" is to mean that certain religious groups are to be given disproportional powers, then it is a good thing that the plan was rejected.

Also, I believe there was a provision for the "Muslim group" including United Punjab, United Bengal, and Assam to secede after 15 years. Obviously that would have meant genocide and ethnic cleansing of practitioners of Indic philosophies, on a much larger scale than actually happened.

So, all in all, good thing that that plan was tossed out.

 

[toxic_pus]

Why can't one use 'whatever is available', so long as violence is not resorted to, to advocate and negotiate in favor of the rights of a community? Did I not point out that the Baloch nationalists in Pakistan are doing just that with their threats and demands for independence, and that they have sparked national discourse on the issue and caught the attention of the major political parties?

Strawman. My point was if a community can wake up one fine morning and claim their ‘right’ to be ‘independent’. It had nothing to do with how they should go about claiming their ‘right’.

However, I am assuming that, Kashmir Freedom Struggle™ is an exception, where violence can be resorted to.

Secondly, given that there is an existing compact of nationhood between the communities that comprise Pakistan, the 'stakeholders' (the Federal Government) does indeed have greater say. That compact of nationhood did not exist in British India - the political discourse on the issue between the INC and ML was meant to be an attempt to arrive at that compact on nationhood, that would have then given the Indian State more say as a stakeholder, but that never came to pass.

Goal post shifting. You are now defining, who or what constitutes stakeholders. Firstly, no ‘nationhood’ exists between ‘the communities that comprise Pakistan’ (or for that matter even India). What exists is ‘statehood’. This statehood very much existed, in British India, till Jinnah started his communal politics. Secondly, the non-Muslims (primarily the Sikhs and Hindus) in the Muslim major provinces very much had their stakes.

And pray tell where I said that the Baluch do not know what is in their best interest?

You used that rhetoric in the context of Balochistan. What was I supposed to conclude.

Please pay closer attention, I said that breaking up into smaller nations may not be in the best interests of the smaller nations - whether it is or is not is only something dialog between the stakeholders will establish, and in the case of Pakistan, it will be, and should be (regardless of whatever politically inflammatory rhetoric the Baloch nationalists use) dialog primarily within the confines of the compact of nationhood already entered into, until such time as both stakeholders agree that compact of nationhood does not serve the interests of either.

It appears that some Baluchistanis have already decided that their interest will be best served by being a smaller nation, while GoP thinks otherwise. What gives. Should those Baluchistanis now get their own 'small nation' like ML got in the face of Congress' opposition, circa 1946.

 

[Omar1984]

I should keep the 900 million Hindus to myself - whoa - you mean I have to continue my leash on them?

The fact is your country has more than 900 million hindus. The hindus make a majority in your country. We Pakistanis will never accept that we are the same as the 900 million hindus you have living in india.


I'm being honest here. What do you want us to do? Put a fake smile on our faces and sing fake hindu-muslim bhai bhai

You hindus are just very different from us, you dont understand us and we dont understand you. Partition happened for the good.

You hindus are always against the two nation theory because you hindus are so much in number (almost a billion) and no matter what you will always stay the majority.

 

[toxic_pus]

Also, I believe there was a provision for the "Muslim group" including United Punjab, United Bengal, and Assam to secede after 15 years. Obviously that would have meant genocide and ethnic cleansing of practitioners of Indic philosophies, on a much larger scale than actually happened.

I am not sure if it had a time frame as such, however, there was an option for secession in ML's terms of agreement (12 May, 1946)

After the constitutions of the Pakistan Federal Government and the Provinces are finally framed by the constitution-making body it will be open to any Province of the Group to decide to opt out of its group, provided the wishes of the people of that Province are ascertained by a referendum to opt out or not. (Para 4)

This was an absurd and equally dangerous proposition.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Correction: the opposition to temple entry was from politically powerful OBCs, who have grabbed a big chunk of reservations for themselves.

In fact, in a direction other than ethnicity and linguistics, this is an excellent example of the multi-valent nature of identity being a better model than the TNT by itself. Whatever the prevalent index of identity at a moment, once it is addressed (in the case of Tamilians, by the creation of linguistic states in 56), other indices take over.

I believe, this subject to discussion and academic investigation, that the scope also narrows to smaller geographies. The Koch movement in West Bengal is an example. This example is selected deliberately in preference to other better known ones so that there might be a semblance of objectivity in discussing it.

 

[Jade]

Dear Sir,

As it happens, we are in perfect agreement with regard to your note, except for one single sentence.

I quite agree with you that social structure, propensity to face discrimination and denial of rights constitute the ingredients of minority sentiment. But I would add that these are the ingredients; they are cooked and readied for consumption by perception, the perception of prejudice against them, for any reason.

We come to the pesky sentence.

Tamilians fit none of the above categories.

True. But that is not the point. A significant, influential section of the Tamilians thought that there was prejudice. It was this that fostered separatist sentiment. Language was just one element; please go through the resolutions I have mentioned.

Similarly, Indian Muslims feared discrimination; this perception was strong enough to drive their move for safeguards. And we all know by now what came of that.

Sincere regards.

Dear Sir,

First, I beg to differ with you that significant section of the Tamilians harbored separatist sentiment. The movement was always confined to anti-Brahmin Tamil leaders. These leaders tried to make it a mass movement by using anthropology to support their theory, but failed miserably until the government introduced Hindi as the subject in schools

Second, anti-Brahmin Tamil leaders certainly harbored separatist sentiment, but not because there was prejudice but because of perception of growing links between Brahmins and Congress and subsequently they feared Brahmins would dominate the Tamil society.

Third, I beg to differ with you that ‘Language was just one element’; nothing gave the anti-Brahmin Tamil leaders the opportunity to make the movement a mass one until imposition of Hindi in government schools which lead to widespread protests in 1930’s.

Lastly, I feel there is little common ground between the Tamilian Movement and Muslims movement for separate statehoods. Hence cannot be compared. Muslims feared, while Tamilian Movement leaders perceived a future threat

Regards

 

[ajpirzada]

COMMNT: The idea of Pakistan —Ammar Ali Qureshi

Pakistan as an idea in the 1940s appealed to all sections of Muslim society in India. It would be wrong to assume that sects such as the Ahmedis or Shias took a collective decision

Professor Ishtiaq Ahmed, in his article “The demand for Pakistan and Islam” (Daily Times, June 8, 2010), has raised a number of contradictory and controversial points that demand clarification and refutation. His statement about Ahmedis and Shias, of being initially wary of joining Pakistan or rejecting it first before accepting it, can be disproved from his own article. For example about Ahmedis, he says that they were wary till Sir Zafarullah was won over by Jinnah. Sir Zafarullah was present at the 1940 Resolution in Lahore and solidly behind Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah at that historic meeting, which means that Ahmedis had embraced the idea of Pakistan in 1940 when it was first presented. It is difficult to divine what anyone’s opinion was before 1940 as the idea of Pakistan had not been publicly presented or articulated before the Lahore Resolution.

Professor Ahmed quotes a statement attributed to Raja Sahib of Mahmudabad, a Shia, in 1939 in which he is talking about a separate state based on religious laws. If this statement by Raja Sahib is accepted as true, then it also has to be admitted that Shias in India were in favour of a separate state in 1939 and this contradicts Professor Ahmed’s latter statement that Shias rejected the demand for Pakistan in 1945 and later switched their loyalties to Jinnah. Raja Sahib’s statement shows that they were ahead of the game in the quest for a separate state as Raja Sahib made that statement in 1939, which is one year before the Pakistan Resolution was passed in 1940. As for the correspondence between Allama Zaheer and Jinnah, one can say that it represented the personal opinion of Allama Zaheer and it was not reflective of all Shias, just as Maulana Azad’s views or stance adopted by other religious parties towards Pakistan (although they knew that Sunnis would form a majority) cannot be considered as the opinion of all Sunnis.

It is well known that the top leadership of the All India Muslim League, since its inception in 1906, had stalwarts who were Shia — such as Sir Aga Khan, Syed Ameer Ali, Sir Ali Imam, Raja Sahib of Mahmudabad (both father and son presided over Muslim League sessions in Lucknow), Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Mirza Abul Hassan Ishpahani, etc. These leaders were at the forefront of the Pakistan Movement and played a pivotal role in Muslim League politics since its founding. After 1947, a number of presidents and prime ministers of Pakistan were Shia. A lot of debate has taken place about the idea of Pakistan, but there is little focus on who financed the Pakistan Movement. Sir Aga Khan’s generous financial contributions, as well as fund-raising efforts for the cause of the Muslim League, are well-documented. Stanley Wolpert, in his famous biography of Jinnah, has provided the exact details of Raja Sahib of Mahmudabad’s extremely generous annual financial contribution to the Muslim League and the Pakistan Movement from 1936-47, which makes one say that it was Jinnah’s mind and Raja Sahib’s money that created Pakistan. (It is said that Raja Sahib would go on hunger strikes lasting more than three days when Maharani would not allow him to donate money to the Muslim League and she would later give way so that his hunger strike could be ended.)

Jinnah and Raja Sahib had a very close relationship (like that of a father and son) till their differences arose over the nature of the future state. In his essay ‘Some Memories’ (re-published in 1994 in Mushir-ul-Hasan’s edited book, India’s Partition-Process, Strategy and Mobilisation, pages 415-426), Raja Sahib recalled: “My advocacy of an Islamic state brought me into conflict with Jinnah. He thoroughly disapproved of my ideas and dissuaded me from expressing them publicly from the League platform lest the people might be led to believe that Jinnah shared my view and that he was asking me to convey such ideas to the public. As I was convinced that I was right and did not want to compromise Jinnah’s position, I decided to cut myself away and for nearly two years kept my distance from him, apart from seeing him during the working committee meetings and on other formal occasion. It was not easy to take this decision as my associations with Jinnah had been very close in the past. Now that I look back I realise how wrong I had been” (page 425).

Pakistan as an idea in the 1940s appealed to all sections of Muslim society in India. It would be wrong to assume that sects such as the Ahmedis or Shias took a collective decision. Individual decisions were taken even at family levels and across all classes and sects as to who would opt for Pakistan and who would stay in India. Otherwise it is very difficult to explain how families were divided by partition — some brothers and sisters ended up in Pakistan while others remained in India.

Sahabzada Yaqub opted for Pakistan and found himself fighting in Kashmir few months after Pakistan’s creation while his elder brother, who stayed in India, fought in Kashmir from the Indian side. Zakir Hussain remained in India, headed Aligarh University after partition and later became India’s third president, while his brother Dr Mahmud Hussain migrated to Pakistan and later became a federal minister. Mian Arshad Hussain and Mian Azim Hussain, sons of Punjabi politician Sir Fazle Hussain, opted for two different countries in 1947 and served as Ambassadors of Pakistan and India respectively in the same capital in the 1960s. When the Shah of Iran met General Atiqur Rehman, the then Governor of West Pakistan, he remarked that although “we have not met before but I know about your family as your brother is India’s ambassador in Tehran”. All these examples are of prominent people but even among ordinary and non-prominent families countless such examples of brothers and sisters divided by partition can be found, which underscore the point that it is wrong to assume collective decision making on the part of sects or even families as individual choices played an extremely important role.

Ammar Ali Qureshi is a London-based finance professional and a freelance contributor

Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan

 

[Joe Shearer]

Dear Sir,

First, I beg to differ with you that significant section of the Tamilians harbored separatist sentiment. The movement was always confined to anti-Brahmin Tamil leaders. These leaders tried to make it a mass movement by using anthropology to support their theory, but failed miserably until the government introduced Hindi as the subject in schools

Dear Sir,

As I have said earlier, I am very interested in your personal opinions, and shall value them greatly. However, for the purposes of serious discussion and to be considered serious evidence, I would imagine that some meatier corroboration would be necessary.

Please give me your evidence for stating that it was confined to anti-Brahmin leaders; for your statement that they tried to make it a mass movement by using anthropology to support their theory; and that they failed until the government introduced Hindi as a subject in schools. Evidence other than your own unsupported statement, that is.

You do realise that this is not a question of numbers; it was not an election, it was a separatist faction, a minority feeling. If we sit to count numbers, I have numbers for you: the Justice Party did win elections and did form governments, and that is on record, and has been cited by me. What do you have in refutation?

Second, anti-Brahmin Tamil leaders certainly harbored separatist sentiment, but not because there was prejudice but because of perception of growing links between Brahmins and Congress and subsequently they feared Brahmins would dominate the Tamil society.

My point was not about why they harboured separatist sentiment; it is not important at all, from my point of view. My point was that they did harbour these sentiments.

Third, I beg to differ with you that ‘Language was just one element’; nothing gave the anti-Brahmin Tamil leaders the opportunity to make the movement a mass one until imposition of Hindi in government schools which lead to widespread protests in 1930’s.

If you read the citations and the wording of the resolutions, or the reports of the statements of the leaders in question, you will get the answer. Unlike you, or others who have sprung to defend the Tamil cause, I have quoted sources and authorities. Is it so difficult for you to do likewise? And if it is so difficult, is it because you lack the time, or because these sources and authorities are simply not there?

Lastly, I feel there is little common ground between the Tamilian Movement and Muslims movement for separate statehoods. Hence cannot be compared. Muslims feared, while Tamilian Movement leaders perceived a future threat

Regards

I appreciate that this is your feeling. Feelings are important, no doubt about it. Do you have anything to add to your feelings?

You say that Muslims feared, while Tamilian Movement leaders perceived a future threat. How do you gauge this? How do you know that one set of people were fearful, in a homogeneous, monolithic fashion, and nothing less, whereas the other set were perceptive, in a monolithic fashion, and nothing more? Just one source will do.

Sincerely,

'Joe'

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

How is that different from Jinnah claiming to represent Muslims, circa 1937, in spite of ML securing a mere ‘4.8%’ of Muslim votes in the Provincial Elections of 1937. How is that different from Jinnah shoving the idea of Pakistan down NWFP’s throat, or for that matter the throat of entire Assam where non-Muslims were in majority, except for the district of Sylhet, circa 1946.

I'll grant you that - were the Taliban to end their campaign of violence, they have every right to advocate in favor of their ideological and political position, as the other Pakistani political groups are doing. In fact I argued this earlier I believe, and I think my original intent in the para you responded to was to connect it to their use of violence, but it ended up becoming a separate point in the formatting.

And as for Jinnah's original low support amongst the Muslim electorate, one has to establish a platform, effectively articulate it and campaign for it before one gains the support of the targeted community. Gandhi didn't fall off a tree one fine day and find that 'the peasants of India' were all lined up for miles to support him. Jinnah did campaign and articulate his agenda effectively and the result was overwhelming support from the Muslim electorate in later years, legitimizing his position as a representative and spokesperson for the community.

Also, the fact that the overwhelming majority of the voters in the NWFP referendum chose Pakistan pretty clearly illustrates their support for Pakistan vs India.

Right.

'…Jinnah privately admitted to Woodrow Wyatt, who was visiting India with a Parliamentary Delegation, that he might be prepared to let Ambala and Burdwan go; Calcutta, however, he had to have, even at the price of 'serious trouble' and civil war. This threat of communal violence was the ultimate weapon in the armoury of a politician, playing from extreme weakness for the highest stakes, who had no experience of launching or controlling an agitation.’ (Sole Spokesman by Ayesha Jalal; pg 175)

It doesn’t appear that Jinnah was willing to advance his agenda ‘through social and political discourse and democratic government’ uniformly in all cases and was more than willing to do just the opposite where he met resistance. You obviously know what happened next, in Calcutta, in 1946. Besides, his clubbing of NWFP and Assam within the ‘Pakistan Group’ – as it was called in ML’s proposal following Cabinet Mission Plan (CMP) – was anything but democratic. In fact, it was just the opposite.

Actually nothing in your comments above negates my point. What was Jinnah's exact quote to Wyatt? And assuming the above quote to be accurate, it does not show Jinnah advocating for violence or supporting it, it shows that he understood the potential for violence at the hands of bigots, were a particular political course chosen, and given his faith in the validity of that political course, he was willing to accept the potential costs that came with it.

The Taliban on the other hand are those 'bigots' who would resort to violence, and have made violence and oppression a hallmark of their campaign - there is no comparison to be made here between Jinnah and the Taliban.

It also doesn’t make it any more legitimate (at that time or now or ever) when just few years after birth that very identity ‘marker’, selected by the campaigners of independent Pakistan, in dunked forever in Bay of Bengal by those very people who were the most vocal in the campaign of independent Pakistan.

It was completely legitimate at the time since Jinnah, the ML and allied parties won the overwhelming support of the Muslim community on the basis of that particular identity marker and agenda. Were it not legitimate at the time then is should have been 'dunked forever in the bay of Bengal', and the Arabian Sea, at that point in history. It was not. The identity marker of religion subsumed all else at the time since the dynamics of discourse were those of protecting the rights of a particular community, the Muslims, in a future United Hindu majority nation. Once a 'Muslim nation' was established, the discourse would obviously shift to other issues, since the issue of 'protecting the rights of a Muslim minority' no longer applied. Joe has been over this already very extensively.

Also, immediately after independence, Jinnah’s declaration of Urdu to be the sole national language of Pakistan, completely disregarding the largest spoken language in Pakistan, proves you wrong that the other ‘markers’ of identity was ‘merely put on the back-burner’. Those other ‘markers’ were simply rejected of hand.

I think I pointed out that successive Pakistani leaders chose to perpetuate the idea that religion was the overriding identity marker at a national level, instead of realizing that once Pakistan came into being, the issues that people cared about were at much more local level. I see that as a flawed position taken by the leadership. That said, I don't see anything inherently wrong in Jinnah proposing Urdu as national language for Pakistan, since it was not a language of any of the ethnic groups native to the lands comprising Pakistan.

Your dichotomy arises from the fact that you see no distinction between Muslims, as a minority community within a large non-Muslim society, and Muslims, as separate nation, just because they pray facing the same direction.

I have said no such thing as 'there is no distinction between Muslims', and I would appreciate it if you not concoct non-existent positions to attribute to me, since this is the second time you have done so after the inaccurate comment about the Baloch you attributed to me.

I have argued, from the beginning, that religion forms part of the identity matrix of individuals. For some it plays a smaller role in identity than for others (and this is true for Pakistanis and other nationalities today). For the Muslim community at the time of partition, given the discourse over the rights of the minority Muslim community in a Hindu majority India, that particular identity marker, out of the community's complex identity matrix, was the dominant one. That cannot be denied since Jinnah and the ML were able to get the overwhelming support of the community on that basis.

Au contraire, it is you who can’t quite figure out if a Bengali Muslim will find more commonality with a Bengali Hindu or a Punjabi Muslim.

As I said, you refuse to understand, attributing to me imagined positions built upon your own biases and animosity towards the 'other'.

 

[Jade]

Dear Sir,

As I have said earlier, I am very interested in your personal opinions, and shall value them greatly. However, for the purposes of serious discussion and to be considered serious evidence, I would imagine that some meatier corroboration would be necessary.

Please give me your evidence for stating that it was confined to anti-Brahmin leaders; for your statement that they tried to make it a mass movement by using anthropology to support their theory; and that they failed until the government introduced Hindi as a subject in schools. Evidence other than your own unsupported statement, that is.

You do realise that this is not a question of numbers; it was not an election, it was a separatist faction, a minority feeling. If we sit to count numbers, I have numbers for you: the Justice Party did win elections and did form governments, and that is on record, and has been cited by me. What do you have in refutation?



My point was not about why they harboured separatist sentiment; it is not important at all, from my point of view. My point was that they did harbour these sentiments.



If you read the citations and the wording of the resolutions, or the reports of the statements of the leaders in question, you will get the answer. Unlike you, or others who have sprung to defend the Tamil cause, I have quoted sources and authorities. Is it so difficult for you to do likewise? And if it is so difficult, is it because you lack the time, or because these sources and authorities are simply not there?



I appreciate that this is your feeling. Feelings are important, no doubt about it. Do you have anything to add to your feelings?

You say that Muslims feared, while Tamilian Movement leaders perceived a future threat. How do you gauge this? How do you know that one set of people were fearful, in a homogeneous, monolithic fashion, and nothing less, whereas the other set were perceptive, in a monolithic fashion, and nothing more? Just one source will do.

Sincerely,

'Joe'

Sir, some time more than academic evidence, real incidences give better perspective of history. There can be no better example than the 1957 elections. In the 1957 elections, In spite of its slogan for Dravida Nadu, DMK managed to win only 15 of the 205 seats in the state assembly. These results forced DMK to give up the demand for Dravida Nadu. In the 1962 election, the same party with out the slogan of Dravida Nadu more than tripled its seats, winning 50 seats to the State Legislative Assembly. There can be no better proof than this that movement was confined to certain sections.

Everyone write their opinion as blogger, you write your own and I write mine. Nobody can gauge anything especially in as complex subject as History. Anyway, the events that took place in the history of India such as formation of Pakistan clearly show that fight for Muslim statehood was in a different plane than that of Tamil Nationalism movement

The source, I used is “The DMK and the politics of Tamil Nationalism” by Robert Hardgrave

Regards

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Strawman. My point was if a community can wake up one fine morning and claim their ‘right’ to be ‘independent’. It had nothing to do with how they should go about claiming their ‘right’.

The community did not 'wake up one fine day'. As you pointed out, Jinnah and the ML did not have a lot of support for their agenda initially. It was only after effectively campaigning and articulating their position that they were able to gain the support of the community, and the call for independence, as explained quite well by Joe, was primarily a negotiating tactic and a 'last resort'.

The Baloch nationalists have used similar rhetoric, though they have not been able to find success at the ballot box much, but even as representatives of a small number of Baloch, their rhetoric has had the desired effect, of pushing the discourse over resource distribution, provincial rights and autonomy in the direction they wish.

However, I am assuming that, Kashmir Freedom Struggle™ is an exception, where violence can be resorted to.

When the basic condition of the compact between kashmiris and India or Pakistan, plebiscite and self-determination, is refused to the Kashmiris, and control imposed through military force, what do you expect?

Goal post shifting. You are now defining, who or what constitutes stakeholders. Firstly, no ‘nationhood’ exists between ‘the communities that comprise Pakistan’ (or for that matter even India). What exists is ‘statehood’. This statehood very much existed, in British India, till Jinnah started his communal politics. Secondly, the non-Muslims (primarily the Sikhs and Hindus) in the Muslim major provinces very much had their stakes.

I won't argue over semantics, use 'Statehood' if you wish. A compact of "Statehood' was entered into by the communities that comprise Pakistan (as was the case in India, save for Kashmir). Once that compact is formed, actual negotiations over the concerns of any of the communities within the State should be first and foremost within the context of that compact (regardless of the political rhetoric used by those trying to take a seat at the negotiating table).

That compact of 'Statehood' was never entered into by the communities that formed Pakistan and India. British India was the forced colonization and amalgamation of multiple territories in South Asia by the British. The people and their elected representatives entered into no 'compact of Statehood' in that colony. The negotiations between the INC and the ML were precisely for that purpose as the British were finally ending their occupation of the region.

You used that rhetoric in the context of Balochistan. What was I supposed to conclude.

Paying better attention to the language used and forming conclusions based on what was written, rather than your preconceived positions about what I believe, would be a good idea.

It appears that some Baluchistanis have already decided that their interest will be best served by being a smaller nation, while GoP thinks otherwise. What gives. Should those Baluchistanis now get their own 'small nation' like ML got in the face of Congress' opposition, circa 1946.

Some Baloch indeed have decided that their interests are better served as a smaller independent nation, but since the Baluchistan entered into a 'compact of Statehood' with Pakistan, negotiations between the Baluch and the State, to alleviate Baluch concerns, will take place under that compact, until such time as all stakeholders agree that a unified nation does not serve the interests of all stakeholders best.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Sir, some time more than academic evidence, real incidences give better perspective of history. There can be no better example than the 1957 elections. In the 1957 elections, In spite of its slogan for Dravida Nadu, DMK managed to win only 15 of the 205 seats in the state assembly. These results forced DMK to give up the demand for Dravida Nadu. In the 1962 election, the same party with out the slogan of Dravida Nadu more than tripled its seats, winning 50 seats to the State Legislative Assembly. There can be no better proof than this that movement was confined to certain sections.

Dear Sir,

I really do not know how many times I have had to explain that what is at issue here is not Tamil minority sentiment being in a majority, but that it existed.

If it had been in a majority, and if that majority had turned violent, even if it had been a significant minority practising violence, Tamil Nadu today would not be in exactly the same position. Either it would be far more independent, or it would be a scorched earth.

What was this paragraph? A pure speculation. What did it display? That plain speculation, pure speculation is utterly useless, and only facts matter.

On the other hand, I appreciate the long-awaited effort at providing substantial evidence. The elections of 1957 were significant, the increased presence of the DMK due to the 62 elections was also significant. I have not read the book cited, but am glad that my example and constant urging have had their impact. Thank you for the citation.

Everyone write their opinion as blogger, you write your own and I write mine. Nobody can gauge anything especially in as complex subject as History. Anyway, the events that took place in the history of India such as formation of Pakistan clearly show that fight for Muslim statehood was in a different plane than that of Tamil Nationalism movement

The source, I used is “The DMK and the politics of Tamil Nationalism” by Robert Hardgrave

Regards

Indeed history is a complex subject. That is precisely why one must come to discuss it with evidence, evidence that may be compared with other evidence, based on which comparison reasonable people may come to reasonable conclusions.

As you know, only on simple and direct physical observations - it is wet today, there is a truck stationary on the highway ahead - can one rely on reportage. The moment the matter is even moderately complex, eye-witness accounts of any event are a well-known example, well-known in the literature and discussed and analysed threadbare, we need comparative accounts of more than one person. In the case of social or societal events, it becomes a question not of direct observation but of observations which are analysed by acceptable experts in their fields, and which analyses are then compared or cited in arguments about the implications of these events.

You will it is to be hoped understand if you get the implications of this that the opinions of bloggers are of no consequence whatsoever, and that it is evidence, and only evidence that counts. Of course, it is then open to you to dismiss that itself as an opinion, and to reduce the discussion to garbage, by insisting that it is only opinions that matter. It is then and only then that we can take into consideration flat, unsupported opinions such as, "Anyway, the events that took place in the history of India such as formation of Pakistan clearly show that fight for Muslim statehood was in a different plane than that of Tamil Nationalism movement". There it is, bald and without any background or foreground or any kind of reasoning behind it: just a flat statement of personal opinion, to be accepted or rejected, no via media acceptable.

Then the question becomes one merely of whose voice is the more strident. Then there is no point in using computers and networks, one may as well assemble in a well-selected mob, and hurl jeers, abuse, missiles and pieces of mind at each other, finally, all else failing, taking recourse to barnyard methods.

If that is what you want, I wish you well but cannot participate; there is nothing under these circumstances that remains to be said, and there is nothing to be gained by dredging through the same assertions of will again and again.

Sincerely, and best wishes for your future contests of will,

'Joe'

 

[Gin ka Pakistan]

If India would have not been partitioned in 1947

1. Its Muslims Population would have been 350 Million by now which means BJP could never come in to power and India would have been the biggest Muslim populated country in the world.

2. India would have been neighbor of Afghanistan and during cold war USSR had access to warm waters through it. US had no friend in the region to fight USSR invasion of Afghanistan.

3. India would have been neighbor of Iran and Israeli bases in it.

You know India will never want so many Muslims in it , so the first point will not be liked by many right wing Indians but the Strategic location of Pakistan is which India needs.

They are already in Afghanistan Tajikistan and Pakistan is in their way.