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Will Consider India for NSG Membership: Germany

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Will Consider India for NSG Membership: Germany

With Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) deciding to discuss India's membership to the non- proliferation body in its next month's meeting, Germany today said it will consider India's bid keeping its "excellent" track record in the field of non-proliferation.
:azn::azn:

"We very much appreciate India's policy and its excellent track record in the field of non-proliferation and we acknowledge that track record... India wants to become full member in various control regimes, NSG... If it applies for its membership, we will consider its membership and take into account the Indian track record," German Ambassador Thomas Matussek told reporters here.

The envoy, who was briefing the media on the forthcoming visit of German Chancellor Angela Merkel here, said on the request of India, Germany has already amended its export control rules.

He said the German move will help in high-technology trade between India and Germany.

India is wanting to have membership of multi-lateral export control regimes like NSG, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group (AG) and got a boost earlier this week when the 46-nation elite group, decided to initiate discussion on New Delhi's bid in its June meeting.
FILED ON: MAY 27

news.outlookindia.com | Will Consider India for NSG Membership: Germany
 
I don't think anyone in India is interested in anymore nuclear tests regardless of NSG membership.

I think India's not signed the CTBT, precisely because it feels the need to do further tests.

CTBT compliance map
CTBT_Participation.svg



People who work in the non-proliferation arena think that India's failed nuclear tests means that India wants to keep the ability to test on the table.




India's H Bomb Revisited


1513.jpg


Yes, Virginia, India’s H-bomb fizzled.

K Santhanam (who was director of test site preparations for India’s 1998 nuclear tests; pictured above, handing the firing keys to the range safety officer) has admitted what everyone else has known for a long time — that India’s 1998 test of a thermonuclear device was unsuccessful:

“Based upon the seismic measurements and expert opinion from world over, it is clear that the yield in the thermonuclear device test was much lower than what was claimed. I think it is well documented and that is why I assert that India should not rush into signing the CTBT,’‘ Santhanam told [the Times of India] on Wednesday.

[snip]

Sources said that Santhanam had admitted that the test was a fizzle during a discussion on CTBT organised by IDSA. Karnad also participated in the seminar. He told TOI that no country has succeeded in achieving targets with only its first test of a thermonuclear device.

“Two things are clear; that India should not sign CTBT and that it needs more thermonuclear device tests,’‘ said Santhanam.

This is a subject we have covered in some detail here at Arms Control Wonk.com (see The Bomb, Dmitry. The Hydrogen Bomb, 10 April 2005.)

1. Yes, India’s thermonuclear device probably probably did fizzle, looking at the seismic data.

2. Some Indian scientists, including the former chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission PK Iyengar and now Santhanam, keep pointing out this somewhat embarrassing fact because it is part of an argument for India to resume nuclear testing.

3. India’s evident need to resume testing to complete development of a thermonuclear device is the principal reason that I opposed a “clean” NSG exemption for India (See: Will India Test Again?, 23 June 2008 ).

Here is my original post on the subject, reproduced because I am lazy and I recall the reading list was somewhat helpful:

Did India successfully test a two-stage thermonuclear device in May 1998?

There are substantial reasons for skepticism. India claimed that it detonated three devices on 11 May 1998 at Pokhran (right)—a 43-kiloton thermonuclear explosion, a 12-kiloton fission explosion and a 0.2-kiloton fission explosion. (India then claims to have conducted low yield tests on 13 May 1998.)

Seismic analyses (particularly Wallace et al) conclude the cumulative yield for the 11 May tests was only 12-kilotons. A yield that low is probably “too small to have been a full test of a thermonuclear weapon”—suggesting the test fizzled.

The US intelligence community reportedly shares this conclusion. Govenment officials told Mark Hibbs of Nucleonics Week that analysts from Livermore’s Z Division “have now concluded that the second stage of a two-stage Indian hydrogen bomb device failed to ignite as planned.” Subsequently, “senior U.S. expert” confirmed to Hibbs that this account was correct.

Indian scientists have been quick to dispute these estimates, arguing that Western scientists have made inaccurate assumptions about the geography of the Indian test site. This argument has always struck me as unconvincing, in part because of data that has been presented from the 1974 test.

A former chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission, PK Iyengar, has used calculations similar to those of Wallace et al to suggest that the second stage of the two-stage thermonuclear weapon failed to ignite—“the fusion core burnt only partially, perhaps less than 10 per cent.” Iyengar, however, has an axe to grind—he wants India to resume nuclear testing.

Such failures have plagued new nuclear designers before. China’s seventh nuclear test (CHICOM 7)—and second thermonuclear weapon—also fizzled, resulting in a yield estimated at the time between 15-25 KT.

Similarly, Livermore’s first attempt at “super” also failed—resulting from what Herb York called “a simple design flaw … engendered by the novelty of the technology and by our inexperience.”

Sources:

Brian Barker et al, “Monitoring Nuclear Tests,” Science 281:5385 (25 September 25, 1998) 1967-68 (subscription).

Mark Hibbs,”India May Test Again Because H-Bomb Failed, U.S. Believes,” Nucleonics Week 39:48 (26 November 1998) 1.

Mark Hibbs, “Because H-Bomb Fuel Didn’t Burn, Iyengar Pleads For Second Test,” Nucleonics Week (1 June 2000) 6.

PK Iyengar, “Nuclear Nuances,” The Times of India (22 August 2000) (full text in the comments).

SK Sikka et al,”The recent Indian Nuclear Tests: A Seismic Overview,” Current Science 79:9 (10 November 2000) 1359-1366 (draft).

Gregory van der Vink et al, “False Accusations, Undetected Tests and Implications for the CTB Treaty,” Arms Control Today 28:4 (May 1998) 7-13).

Terry C. Wallace, “The May 1998 India and Pakistan Nuclear Tests,” Seismological Research Letters 69 (September 1998) 386-393 (preprint).]

Herbert York, Making Weapons, Talking Peace: A Physicist’s Odyssey from Hiroshima to Geneva (Basic Books, 1987) 78.

Jeffrey Lewis • India's H Bomb Revisited

Do checkout the comment section as well. Some Americans scientists square off against Indian scientists on the true versus reported yield of India's nuclear tests.
 
I think India's not signed the CTBT, precisely because it feels the need to do further tests.
Well at this stage i don't think it is anywhere in our strategic circle...Though not sure what benefit we will get by signing CTBT....


People who work in the non-proliferation arena think that India's failed nuclear tests means that India wants to keep the ability to test on the table.
I believe the opposition is because of the biased rules. If international community is ready to accept India as a nuclear power which enjoys the same powers that P-5 then i don't see any reason for India not to join...However no side is ready to budge on that....


Do checkout the comment section as well. Some Americans scientists square off against Indian scientists on the true versus reported yield of India's nuclear tests.
I would rather listen to my scientists who actually did the test instead of American's ....
 

Uh huh.

Quote mark hibbs
I remember what happened when I wrote that article in the fall of 1998 saying in the headline that the US had concluded that the Indian “H-Bomb failed.”

Almost overnight after the article was published I got a huge bundle of papers from BARC and DAE sent to me by diplomatic pouch from Mumbai informing me with all kinds of numbers that I was wrong.

I gave the papers to laboratory geoscientists at several European countries and the US. One main CTBTO monitoring scientist told me explicitly: “Nope. The stuff in these papers is shitty science. They haven’t shown that you are wrong.”

That having been said, please note however that, as PK Iyengar had made the case to me back a decade ago, once again this “news” is surfacing in India because their bomb makers want to keep testing. Some things in India are changing fast. Other things aren’t.

Mark Hibbs - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
 

The article I posted is much after 1998. If the opinion of M Hibbs counts so much for you, I would like to believe those in BARC. For two reasons both of which I cant post on a public forum.

Here is however something to chew :

The seismic data had been analysed in detail by western analysts with all their calibrations without the knowledge of depth of burial or fusion/fission ratio.This is a serious limitation,besides lack of knowledge about the geo-physical conditions at Pokhran..therefore their estimates are gross estimates with a margin of error of at least +/- 30% or worse….We have to leave it at that.If the western analysts are happy with their estimates, the estimate is good for them.But the Indian science establishment need not take them seriously at all,except for some one like Santhanam et al to quote it for their own arguments and for Indian press/media to play it up.
 
As a bonus.

charles meade author of "Nuclear testing and new strategic framewrorks : the need for a strategic nuclear framework reponsive to terrorist threats / Meade, Charles"

I got into a huge pissing match with the Indians on this issue as I was the principal author of Barker et. al. 1998 which had the yield estimates far below the Indian press releases. A number of Indian scientists tried to submit a comment to Science rebutting our analysis. We asked them to provide the in-country seismic data on which they based their analysis, but they refused. Luckily, in the end, their comment was rejected and never published.

On a related note, I saw the other day that wikipedia has a glowing description of the Indian 1998 tests, citing the inflated yields and saying the tests were a huge technical accomplishment. See

Pokhran-II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In the next day or so, I plan to submit a corrected analysis.
 
Cardsharp, I can point to credible western estimates of yield that match the Indian claims. Read my previous reply and just go though the first link I have given. You will get references to the same western country scientists showing clear compliance to Indian measurements.
 

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