Secretive Conversation about good and bad Jihadis

[Dash]

http://www.tribuneindia.com/mobi/ne...nversation-about-good-bad-jihadis/360404.html

 

[RealNapster]

http://www.tribuneindia.com/mobi/ne...nversation-about-good-bad-jihadis/360404.html

You should also post the article.

 

[T-72M1]

You should also post the article.

Yep, lousy way of starting a potentially spicy thread, I'll do it for him now.


Posted at: Feb 7, 2017, 1:02 AM; last updated: Feb 7, 2017, 1:02 AM (IST)
Secretive conversation about good & bad jihadis
Cyril Almeida
The conversation about what to do with the good jihadis isn't going to be held by the average Pakistani, it will be held by the state. And the State’s calculus is necessarily different.

THE first, tentative steps towards the final frontier — dismantling the infrastructure of jihad in toto — or an all-too-familiar false start? The detention of Hafiz Saeed and co could be either. But it is also something else: a signal that the long, state-led conversation of what to do with the good jihadis has begun. Cloaked in secrecy, debated by vested interests and held, potentially, on terms of compromise rather than a bold reimagining of the Pakistani project, it could go horribly wrong. To understand why, we have to start with the war against the bad jihadis. Terrible as they were and long as the fight against them will be, the bad jihadis got it wrong on three counts: Utility, survivability and strategy. The strategy was flawed because with a relatively small militant footprint the bad jihadis tried to overthrow the state. And while the state's response was muddled for years, the state had disproportionately larger resources in what was a prematurely imposed fight for survival. From there, with their small militant footprint and no real hook in society — no mosque-madressah-social welfare network to sustain ideology and attract recruits — the mass, muscular survivability of the bad jihadis was a low-probability outcome. And then there was the lack of utility — repurpose and redirect the bad jihadis to where? Afghanistan was the only possibility and it may have made some sense — the bad jihadis were predominantly Pakhtun, while the Punjabi among them were familiar with the Afghan jihad. But the problem was obvious: the Afghan Taliban already existed and were doing a fine enough job on their own, while the large-scale foreign — US/Western — presence made the deliberate redirection to Afghanistan a non-starter. Even chronic risk-takers here are not suicidal. Bad strategy, low survivability and no utility made the bad jihadis the obvious candidates for an early demise — or at least a vast diminishment of their numbers. The worrying thing is that none of that applies to the good jihadis. And institutional memory — both civilian and uniformed — may favour the worst-case outcome in the great conversation that has been opened: What to do with the good jihadis: merge them back into society or dissolve them altogether? Given the narrow, state-led confines in which the conversation will take place, the institutional — state — view is fundamental. And from inside the state, a seemingly coherent story can be constructed. To the Kashmir-centric, anti-India jihadi lot, a debt of gratitude is owed: theirs is the unfinished business of Partition, a noble cause for which they have fought bravely. A debt like that cannot simply be wiped away. With the Kashmir-centric, anti-India lot, a continuing reality cannot be ignored: they have not attacked us; they come to heel when ordered; and they remain the one thing that drives India crazy.

A reality like that can't easily be ignored. And with the Kashmir-centric, anti-India lot, flexible strategy has ensured survivability, even if their utility may have eroded. The strategy has adapted: from the large-scale, full-fledged mobilisation of the 1990s to a drip-drip, interspersed by the occasional spectacular attack. The changed strategy has been complemented by a masterful approach to survival: build a vast mosque-madressah-social welfare network that supplies recruits, yes, but also puts hooks deep into society. So even if someone wants to rip those hooks out, they will have to tear open flesh and the social fabric itself. And while the good jihadis' utility may be vastly diminished — hence the opening of the conversation in the first place — the debt of the past and reality of the present are significant. Stack those up — strategy, survivability and (past) utility of the good jihadis — against the conversation that has now been opened, what to do about the good jihadis? There are, once the nascent conversation turns to strategic choices, only two realistic options. Either dissolve the groups — dismantle their infrastructure, dislodge their leaderships, and disarm and disband their cadres — or merge them with society — the mythical mainstreaming, whereby the groups retool and repurpose themselves to serve society, through politics and social welfare. If you are the average citizen, or at least the average citizen who believes in a certain kind of Pakistan — the costs and benefits are easy enough to calculate. Dissolution, the end of the existence of the groups in any and all forms, will impose a high cost upfront, but will put Pakistan back on track to becoming the country it is supposed to be. But the conversation about what to do with the good jihadis isn't going to be held by the average Pakistani, it will be held by the state.It has been served loyally in the past by the good jihadis; the security apparatus is battle hardened, but the state war weary; and merger is a helluva lot simpler to effect than dissolution. But therein lies the problem: dissolution versus merger is not a choice that can be revisited easily, if at all. Look how difficult it has been to even begin the conversation: more than two decades since the savagery and regional instability of the mid-1990s; more than a decade and a half since 9/11; and nearly a decade since Mumbai. Choose mainstreaming today and dissolution may never be an option again. Eventually survival, post-mainstreaming, of the good jihadis could become a threat to the survival of the state that the bad jihadis could never become. The more secretive, the more state-led the conversation, the greater the potential threat to all of us.

By arrangement with the Dawn


@Dash copy paste this in your OP and I'll delete this post.

 

[Dash]

Yep, lousy way of starting a potentially spicy thread, I'll do it for him now.


Posted at: Feb 7, 2017, 1:02 AM; last updated: Feb 7, 2017, 1:02 AM (IST)
Secretive conversation about good & bad jihadis
Cyril Almeida
The conversation about what to do with the good jihadis isn't going to be held by the average Pakistani, it will be held by the state. And the State’s calculus is necessarily different.

THE first, tentative steps towards the final frontier — dismantling the infrastructure of jihad in toto — or an all-too-familiar false start? The detention of Hafiz Saeed and co could be either. But it is also something else: a signal that the long, state-led conversation of what to do with the good jihadis has begun. Cloaked in secrecy, debated by vested interests and held, potentially, on terms of compromise rather than a bold reimagining of the Pakistani project, it could go horribly wrong. To understand why, we have to start with the war against the bad jihadis. Terrible as they were and long as the fight against them will be, the bad jihadis got it wrong on three counts: Utility, survivability and strategy. The strategy was flawed because with a relatively small militant footprint the bad jihadis tried to overthrow the state. And while the state's response was muddled for years, the state had disproportionately larger resources in what was a prematurely imposed fight for survival. From there, with their small militant footprint and no real hook in society — no mosque-madressah-social welfare network to sustain ideology and attract recruits — the mass, muscular survivability of the bad jihadis was a low-probability outcome. And then there was the lack of utility — repurpose and redirect the bad jihadis to where? Afghanistan was the only possibility and it may have made some sense — the bad jihadis were predominantly Pakhtun, while the Punjabi among them were familiar with the Afghan jihad. But the problem was obvious: the Afghan Taliban already existed and were doing a fine enough job on their own, while the large-scale foreign — US/Western — presence made the deliberate redirection to Afghanistan a non-starter. Even chronic risk-takers here are not suicidal. Bad strategy, low survivability and no utility made the bad jihadis the obvious candidates for an early demise — or at least a vast diminishment of their numbers. The worrying thing is that none of that applies to the good jihadis. And institutional memory — both civilian and uniformed — may favour the worst-case outcome in the great conversation that has been opened: What to do with the good jihadis: merge them back into society or dissolve them altogether? Given the narrow, state-led confines in which the conversation will take place, the institutional — state — view is fundamental. And from inside the state, a seemingly coherent story can be constructed. To the Kashmir-centric, anti-India jihadi lot, a debt of gratitude is owed: theirs is the unfinished business of Partition, a noble cause for which they have fought bravely. A debt like that cannot simply be wiped away. With the Kashmir-centric, anti-India lot, a continuing reality cannot be ignored: they have not attacked us; they come to heel when ordered; and they remain the one thing that drives India crazy.

A reality like that can't easily be ignored. And with the Kashmir-centric, anti-India lot, flexible strategy has ensured survivability, even if their utility may have eroded. The strategy has adapted: from the large-scale, full-fledged mobilisation of the 1990s to a drip-drip, interspersed by the occasional spectacular attack. The changed strategy has been complemented by a masterful approach to survival: build a vast mosque-madressah-social welfare network that supplies recruits, yes, but also puts hooks deep into society. So even if someone wants to rip those hooks out, they will have to tear open flesh and the social fabric itself. And while the good jihadis' utility may be vastly diminished — hence the opening of the conversation in the first place — the debt of the past and reality of the present are significant. Stack those up — strategy, survivability and (past) utility of the good jihadis — against the conversation that has now been opened, what to do about the good jihadis? There are, once the nascent conversation turns to strategic choices, only two realistic options. Either dissolve the groups — dismantle their infrastructure, dislodge their leaderships, and disarm and disband their cadres — or merge them with society — the mythical mainstreaming, whereby the groups retool and repurpose themselves to serve society, through politics and social welfare. If you are the average citizen, or at least the average citizen who believes in a certain kind of Pakistan — the costs and benefits are easy enough to calculate. Dissolution, the end of the existence of the groups in any and all forms, will impose a high cost upfront, but will put Pakistan back on track to becoming the country it is supposed to be. But the conversation about what to do with the good jihadis isn't going to be held by the average Pakistani, it will be held by the state.It has been served loyally in the past by the good jihadis; the security apparatus is battle hardened, but the state war weary; and merger is a helluva lot simpler to effect than dissolution. But therein lies the problem: dissolution versus merger is not a choice that can be revisited easily, if at all. Look how difficult it has been to even begin the conversation: more than two decades since the savagery and regional instability of the mid-1990s; more than a decade and a half since 9/11; and nearly a decade since Mumbai. Choose mainstreaming today and dissolution may never be an option again. Eventually survival, post-mainstreaming, of the good jihadis could become a threat to the survival of the state that the bad jihadis could never become. The more secretive, the more state-led the conversation, the greater the potential threat to all of us.

By arrangement with the Dawn


@Dash copy paste this in your OP and I'll delete this post.

I'm mobile so I couldn't and can't thank you for posting it

You should also post the article.

Couldn't.

Yep, lousy way of starting a potentially spicy thread, I'll do it for him now.


Posted at: Feb 7, 2017, 1:02 AM; last updated: Feb 7, 2017, 1:02 AM (IST)
Secretive conversation about good & bad jihadis
Cyril Almeida
The conversation about what to do with the good jihadis isn't going to be held by the average Pakistani, it will be held by the state. And the State’s calculus is necessarily different.

THE first, tentative steps towards the final frontier — dismantling the infrastructure of jihad in toto — or an all-too-familiar false start? The detention of Hafiz Saeed and co could be either. But it is also something else: a signal that the long, state-led conversation of what to do with the good jihadis has begun. Cloaked in secrecy, debated by vested interests and held, potentially, on terms of compromise rather than a bold reimagining of the Pakistani project, it could go horribly wrong. To understand why, we have to start with the war against the bad jihadis. Terrible as they were and long as the fight against them will be, the bad jihadis got it wrong on three counts: Utility, survivability and strategy. The strategy was flawed because with a relatively small militant footprint the bad jihadis tried to overthrow the state. And while the state's response was muddled for years, the state had disproportionately larger resources in what was a prematurely imposed fight for survival. From there, with their small militant footprint and no real hook in society — no mosque-madressah-social welfare network to sustain ideology and attract recruits — the mass, muscular survivability of the bad jihadis was a low-probability outcome. And then there was the lack of utility — repurpose and redirect the bad jihadis to where? Afghanistan was the only possibility and it may have made some sense — the bad jihadis were predominantly Pakhtun, while the Punjabi among them were familiar with the Afghan jihad. But the problem was obvious: the Afghan Taliban already existed and were doing a fine enough job on their own, while the large-scale foreign — US/Western — presence made the deliberate redirection to Afghanistan a non-starter. Even chronic risk-takers here are not suicidal. Bad strategy, low survivability and no utility made the bad jihadis the obvious candidates for an early demise — or at least a vast diminishment of their numbers. The worrying thing is that none of that applies to the good jihadis. And institutional memory — both civilian and uniformed — may favour the worst-case outcome in the great conversation that has been opened: What to do with the good jihadis: merge them back into society or dissolve them altogether? Given the narrow, state-led confines in which the conversation will take place, the institutional — state — view is fundamental. And from inside the state, a seemingly coherent story can be constructed. To the Kashmir-centric, anti-India jihadi lot, a debt of gratitude is owed: theirs is the unfinished business of Partition, a noble cause for which they have fought bravely. A debt like that cannot simply be wiped away. With the Kashmir-centric, anti-India lot, a continuing reality cannot be ignored: they have not attacked us; they come to heel when ordered; and they remain the one thing that drives India crazy.

A reality like that can't easily be ignored. And with the Kashmir-centric, anti-India lot, flexible strategy has ensured survivability, even if their utility may have eroded. The strategy has adapted: from the large-scale, full-fledged mobilisation of the 1990s to a drip-drip, interspersed by the occasional spectacular attack. The changed strategy has been complemented by a masterful approach to survival: build a vast mosque-madressah-social welfare network that supplies recruits, yes, but also puts hooks deep into society. So even if someone wants to rip those hooks out, they will have to tear open flesh and the social fabric itself. And while the good jihadis' utility may be vastly diminished — hence the opening of the conversation in the first place — the debt of the past and reality of the present are significant. Stack those up — strategy, survivability and (past) utility of the good jihadis — against the conversation that has now been opened, what to do about the good jihadis? There are, once the nascent conversation turns to strategic choices, only two realistic options. Either dissolve the groups — dismantle their infrastructure, dislodge their leaderships, and disarm and disband their cadres — or merge them with society — the mythical mainstreaming, whereby the groups retool and repurpose themselves to serve society, through politics and social welfare. If you are the average citizen, or at least the average citizen who believes in a certain kind of Pakistan — the costs and benefits are easy enough to calculate. Dissolution, the end of the existence of the groups in any and all forms, will impose a high cost upfront, but will put Pakistan back on track to becoming the country it is supposed to be. But the conversation about what to do with the good jihadis isn't going to be held by the average Pakistani, it will be held by the state.It has been served loyally in the past by the good jihadis; the security apparatus is battle hardened, but the state war weary; and merger is a helluva lot simpler to effect than dissolution. But therein lies the problem: dissolution versus merger is not a choice that can be revisited easily, if at all. Look how difficult it has been to even begin the conversation: more than two decades since the savagery and regional instability of the mid-1990s; more than a decade and a half since 9/11; and nearly a decade since Mumbai. Choose mainstreaming today and dissolution may never be an option again. Eventually survival, post-mainstreaming, of the good jihadis could become a threat to the survival of the state that the bad jihadis could never become. The more secretive, the more state-led the conversation, the greater the potential threat to all of us.

By arrangement with the Dawn


@Dash copy paste this in your OP and I'll delete this post.

Also tag some members of u can

 

[T-72M1]

I'm mobile so I couldn't and can't thank you for posting it

fix it when you're on a lap/desktop and tag me so we can clean it up. It's good to have the info posted in the OP itself.

Also tag some members of u can

not sure who to tag but let me try, they may or may not want to comment though..

@Kaptaan @haviZsultan @LA se Karachi @Nilgiri @Soumitra @DESERT FIGHTER @Luffy 500 @Tipu7 @Tshering22 @saiyan0321 @war&peace @Mentee @third eye @sarthak ganguly @Syed.Ali.Haider

there, fairly diverse group of opinions there I think.

go !

 

[haviZsultan]

fix it when you're on a lap/desktop and tag me so we can clean it up. It's good to have the info posted in the OP itself.


not sure who to tag but let me try, they may or may not want to comment though..

@Kaptaan @haviZsultan @LA se Karachi @Nilgiri @Soumitra @DESERT FIGHTER @Luffy 500 @Tipu7 @Tshering22 @saiyan0321 @war&peace @Mentee @third eye @sarthak ganguly @Syed.Ali.Haider

there, fairly diverse group of opinions there I think.

go !

As I have said before it is a matter of priorities, not good or bad terrorists. I have said that constantly but I would also like to stress a difference in the opinion of what are terrorists and freedom fighters. There is also a trust difficit I would like to discuss as well as the fact that India does not appreciate Pakistan's terror fight and keeps provoking us with border tension. Then lot also goes on below the surface. I have had trouble with RAW though I can't even prove it though I do plan to punish those RAW agents brutally one day.

1) Lets start with (priorities) the fact that who is Pakistan's main internal (barring external ones like India and US) enemy? It is to date the TTP/LeJ/JuA and a myriad of violent terrorist groups. LeT though unproven might have, might not have attacked India and may be responsible for the Mumbai and the parliament attacks (though they deny this)... have they ever conducted a terrorist strike in Pakistan against innocent Pakistanis? What will be the case for Pakistan. Will it not naturally fight against the terrorists that are attacking its people and have slain 80000 with their bombings/massacres or will it seek to appease India? The answer is simple. Pakistan's first priority is to eliminate the mess within and destroy the TTP which has caused the most losses to Pakistan. Then we can even think about LeT and US/Indian pressure. Its a reality that the group that is more lethal or harmful to Pakistan will be the first group we focus on. When we haven't defeated the Taliban how can we even think of fighting other groups who might have done something against India?

2) There is a huge difference between India and Pakistan's perception of who is a terrorist and who is not. There is a different classification of terrorists by Islamabad and New Delhi. Many Pakistanis still are unsure about LeT, HuM against innocent civilians as claimed by India. By many's standards they are fighting a legitimate war against occupation of Muslim majority regions, chiefly Kashmir. Being from Lucknow I know well that we have grievances too and the situation is worse in Kashmir than it is in UP/Owadh. So a lot of Pakistanis do not consider your terrorists terrorists but freedom fighters.

3) This point is linked to 2 and the last point. But there is clearly a trust deficit between India and Pakistan. From the Pakistani perspective I know there is the case of Samjhauta express. You said it was done by LeT and later your own courts proved it a lie. Sadhvi Pragya and Purohit and Abhinav Bharat was held responsible as it was for Malegaon? How can we trust India's version of events in this situation? Similarly living in Lucknow I witnessed that you live in another world. You hindus of India blame Pakistan for the simplest of things... A lot of it if being true a lot of it is hype too. Do you seriously believe pigeons and dogs are spying for Pakistan?

4) There is no appreciation for Pakistan's fight against right wing Islamic oriented terrorism. You do not appreciate that despite the trend in the region towards fanaticism and against the public sentiment our government/military, under pressure or not went after these groups. Yet in India a man blamed for a genocide like Modi is sitting as PM. Has India ever taken action as vehemently against Bajrang Dal/Shiv Sena/RSS/VHP and other Hindu groups. Was Babu Bajrangi punished? At least we fight these type of guys. You tolerate them. So India should get down from its moral high horse. Also what is the purpose of ceasefire violations. Is it to distract us from proxies on the western border?... again trust difficit comes to play again.

5) I myself and my family have had trouble with RAW. RAW is tyrant of an agency and I know for sure that it has not left Pakistan alone for a moment. It will get its punishment. In the future every RAW agent we will punish but as I said a lot is going on below the surface which is hidden from public view. In my view and due to what happened to us I am sure and know of locations where RAW has influence. This is within modern day Pakistan. I talked to Rao Anwar too and he alleges RAW is very active in Karachi.

So these are some points to consider. Its not about good or bad Jihadis. Every country uses proxies and for Pakistan we have greater responsibilities than to hunt down any group perceived to be a problem for India. Let us deal with the Taliban scum first then come to us to straighten out your personal problems. I would like to note in any country where there is oppression the type of which we witnessed in Lucknow there is bound to be a response. It me be dull and non violent like some of our relatives or violent in the case of Burhan Wani.

 

[T-72M1]

. I have had trouble with RAW though I can't even prove it though I do plan to punish those RAW agents brutally one day.

eh, tell us a bit more ?

1) Lets start with (priorities) the fact that who is Pakistan's main internal (barring external ones like India and US) enemy? It is to date the TTP/LeJ/JuA and a myriad of violent terrorist groups. LeT though unproven might have, might not have attacked India and may be responsible for the Mumbai and the parliament attacks (though they deny this)... have they ever conducted a terrorist strike in Pakistan against innocent Pakistanis? What will be the case for Pakistan. Will it not naturally fight against the terrorists that are attacking its people and have slain 80000 with their bombings/massacres or will it seek to appease India? The answer is simple. Pakistan's first priority is to eliminate the mess within and destroy the TTP which has caused the most losses to Pakistan. Then we can even think about LeT and US/Indian pressure. Its a reality that the group that is more lethal or harmful to Pakistan will be the first group we focus on. When we haven't defeated the Taliban how can we even think of fighting other groups who might have done something against India?

fair enough if they have a pecking order in terms of what jihadi groups they want to take out first, the problem is that a lot of them don't even make the list.

2) There is a huge difference between India and Pakistan's perception of who is a terrorist and who is not. There is a different classification of terrorists by Islamabad and New Delhi. Many Pakistanis still are unsure about LeT, HuM against innocent civilians as claimed by India. By many's standards they are fighting a legitimate war against occupation of Muslim majority regions, chiefly Kashmir. Being from Lucknow I know well that we have grievances too and the situation is worse in Kashmir than it is in UP/Owadh. So a lot of Pakistanis do not consider your terrorists terrorists but freedom fighters.

everyone knows of the valley but what is happening in UP/Owadh ?

4) There is no appreciation for Pakistan's fight against right wing Islamic oriented terrorism. You do not appreciate that despite the trend in the region towards fanaticism and against the public sentiment our government/military, under pressure or not went after these groups. Yet in India a man blamed for a genocide like Modi is sitting as PM. Has India ever taken action as vehemently against Bajrang Dal/Shiv Sena/RSS/VHP and other Hindu groups. Was Babu Bajrangi punished? At least we fight these type of guys. You tolerate them. So India should get down from its moral high horse. Also what is the purpose of ceasefire violations. Is it to distract us from proxies on the western border?... again trust difficit comes to play again.

I'm not interested in being an apologist for any right wing hindu extremism but babu bajrangi was punished as far as I know.

but it is difficult to have an exchange of ideas if you say stuff like Modi's genocide etc. I could argue, but I have no interest in wasting time, you're basically saying is that Modi is a terror mastermind like Masood Azhar or bin laden etc, good luck with that.

5) I myself and my family have had trouble with RAW. RAW is tyrant of an agency and I know for sure that it has not left Pakistan alone for a moment. It will get its punishment. In the future every RAW agent we will punish but as I said a lot is going on below the surface which is hidden from public view. In my view and due to what happened to us I am sure and know of locations where RAW has influence. This is within modern day Pakistan. I talked to Rao Anwar too and he alleges RAW is very active in Karachi.

no idea what you're on about but I'm all ears if you want to drop a few juicy tidbits here.

So these are some points to consider. Its not about good or bad Jihadis. Every country uses proxies and for Pakistan we have greater responsibilities than to hunt down any group perceived to be a problem for India. Let us deal with the Taliban scum first then come to us to straighten out your personal problems. I would like to note in any country where there is oppression the type of which we witnessed in Lucknow there is bound to be a response. It me be dull and non violent like some of our relatives or violent in the case of Burhan Wani.

tell us about being oppressed in Lucknow then.

about burhan wani and his likes, from my perspective, ek haath me quraan, doosre me AK-47, pocket me grenades aur goliyon ki maala... this shit will get your brains blown out by security forces anywhere no earth, even in saudi and Pakistan.

 

[Indus Pakistan]

@T-72M1 I used to often read Cyril Alemedia's articles but I now consider him a Indian apologist and the paper he works for should be called 'Indian Dawn'. Frankly notwithstanding free media if I had the levers of power I would use all methods to 'snuff' the paper to death. Such a paper holding such views would never take root in New Delhi and in Washington it would be bought out and 'reset' to sing the American anthem.

As regards the content Cyril lays the options as eithier (i) dissolution, (ii) merger but he overlooks the third one - (iii) capping/restraint. I would either (i) kill them dead/dissolve, (ii) merge them or (iiii) cap/restraint them. I would kill any groups that pose direct or even indirect thrreat to the Pak state. This should be done ruthlessly and by all means at the disposal of the state. Others that do not pose a threat but have no clear benefit I would merge them and re-educate the cadres.

Any group or groups that are entirely focussed on India/Kashmir I would place on 'watch'. They would recieve 'restraining orders' where clear red lines would be laid. I would not pull their teath out as long as they are pointed in the right directrion. However I would restrain the tail - it should not fgrow too deep or gain to wide a traction within society. On this proviso a nod would be given but a tight watch kept with regular reviews. Any infringement of the red lines would result in sever sanction lest they get too 'big headed'.

A final note, nobody start making moral judgements or start acting holier than thou. Every state worth it's name is engaged in pursuit of self interest and in doing that they all use all manner of non state actors, often very dirty actors but then this is a dirty game. A example is CIA and it's honeymoon with the Mu-jihad-een of the Afghan Jihad in 1980s is a classic and great for referance.

*And this Hafiz Saeed would get my 'restraining order' detailing the red lines followed by a pat on his back - with the nessage 'get on with it lad'.

 

[Nilgiri]

fix it when you're on a lap/desktop and tag me so we can clean it up. It's good to have the info posted in the OP itself.


not sure who to tag but let me try, they may or may not want to comment though..

@Kaptaan @haviZsultan @LA se Karachi @Nilgiri @Soumitra @DESERT FIGHTER @Luffy 500 @Tipu7 @Tshering22 @saiyan0321 @war&peace @Mentee @third eye @sarthak ganguly @Syed.Ali.Haider

there, fairly diverse group of opinions there I think.

go !

Let me tag my favourite these days @Robinhood Pandey

 

[Dash]

@T-72M1 I used to often read Cyril Alemedia's articles but I now consider him a Indian apologist and the paper he works for should be called 'Indian Dawn'. Frankly notwithstanding free media if I had the levers of power I would use all methods to 'snuff' the paper to death. Such a paper holding such views would never take root in New Delhi and in Washington it would be bought out and 'reset' to sing the American anthem.

As regards the content Cyril lays the options as eithier (i) dissolution, (ii) merger but he overlooks the third one - (iii) capping/restraint. I would either (i) kill them dead/dissolve, (ii) merge them or (iiii) cap/restraint them. I would kill any groups that pose direct or even indirect thrreat to the Pak state. This should be done ruthlessly and by all means at the disposal of the state. Others that do not pose a threat but have no clear benefit I would merge them and re-educate the cadres.

Any group or groups that are entirely focussed on India/Kashmir I would place on 'watch'. They would recieve 'restraining orders' where clear red lines would be laid. I would not pull their teath out as long as they are pointed in the right directrion. However I would restrain the tail - it should not fgrow too deep or gain to wide a traction within society. On this proviso a nod would be given but a tight watch kept with regular reviews. Any infringement of the red lines would result in sever sanction lest they get too 'big headed'.

A final note, nobody start making moral judgements or start acting holier than thou. Every state worth it's name is engaged in pursuit of self interest and in doing that they all use all manner of non state actors, often very dirty actors but then this is a dirty game. A example is CIA and it's honeymoon with the Mu-jihad-een of the Afghan Jihad in 1980s is a classic and great for referance.

*And this Hafiz Saeed would get my 'restraining order' detailing the red lines followed by a pat on his back - with the nessage 'get on with it lad'.

A small little fellow talking about watch and stuff. That was enlightening