Top man on the totem pole
Shoulder patch of No. 14 Squadron The remaining three kills were all claimed by Flight Lieutenant Khalid mahmood, who in the space of just over seven weeks, established himself as 'top man on the totem pole' when it came to the F-16 community. There is every possiblity that he could have surpassed Squadron Leader Mohammad Mahmood Alam's celebrated 1965 feat of destroying five aircraft in a single sortie. Khalid's first success came on:
September 12th, 1988
Khalid recieved an order to scramble from the ADA facility at Kamra at 0700 hours. On getting airborne, Khalid ( who was flying as lead in F-16A 85-728) and his wingman were directed by GCI to head a north-west towards the border in the vicinity of Nawagai. As they moved towards the designated area, word was passed by GCI that radar revealed the presence of a pair of hostile aircraft at around 32,000 ft on a heading og 90 degrees and behaving in such a way that a voilation appeared likely. To head off this threat, the two F-16s were vectored almost north on a heading of 330 degrees, only to learn that the radar contacts had also turned on to a northernly course and were now flying parallel to the border but remaining inside Afghanistan. At this point, the the F-16s swung right to an easterly heading and 'shackled' (performed a cross-over manoeuvre). Within a few moments of taking up this new course, GCI reported three more enemy aircraft at about 33,000 ft. The two fighting Falcons performed roughly a 180 degrees turn and headed towards the fresh contacts. Still at 10,000 ft, Khalid very quickly brought his own radar into play. This revealed the enemy flight to be four-strong, in echelon starboard with about 3,000 ft of separation between each member of the formation . Khalid proceeded to lock up the No. 4 at a range of 16 nm and saw that his own heading was 280 degrees. He then engaged afterburner and told GCI that he was accelerating to 550 kt before instructing his wingman to begin climbing. As they ascended, both aircraft passed
Flight Lieutenant Khalid Mehmoodthrough broken cloud at 20,000 ft, Khalidthen observing a RHAW (Radar Homing and Warning) indicating which alerted him to the fact that the hostile aircraft were Mig-23s. He notified GCI of this and then succeeded in gaining a visual 'tally' at a range of 7 nm, subsequently noticing that the four Afghan warplanes were in clean condition (i.e., no drop-tanks or bombs) and that they all featured a basically khaki camouflage colour scheme. At about the same time the first two MIGs reversed their course and began heading back towardsthe F-16s at about 33-34,000 ft. It was also apparent that this pair was rapidlyoverhauling the front four, which would seem to indicate that the latter had decelerated, perhaps in an attempt to place F-16s under threat. If it were indeed a tactical ploy, it failed dismally to succeed in its objective. Khalid chose to press on with his pursuit of the larger group and at a arange of 1.3 nm while in an attitude of 135 degrees of bank (i.e. near inverted) at 33,000 ft, he launched an AIM-9L at the No. 4 aircraft. Quickly rejecting the lock, he rolled out into level flight and turned to look for the original pair which was now much too close (about 5,000ft/1524 m away) as they overshot the four-ship. Since the pair clearly posed no immediate danger, Khalid turned his attaention back to the larger group and locked on to the No. 3 from almost directly astern at a distance of about 13,500 ft. It was now that Khalid worked out a cunning plan which, if executed correctly, would allow him to kill all six enemy aircraft. Basically, it envisaged using his three remaining Sidewinders (one AIM-9L and two AIM-9Ps) to 'splash' the last three of the four-ship element before disposing of the other two with the Vulcan M61 cannon.
In accordance with that plan, Khalid launched an AIM-9P at the No. 3 aircraft while at 34,000 ft on a heading of 40 degrees, and then began moving towards the No. 2. At this moment, GCI intervened with a warning call to break right. Khalid responded immediately and in doing so lost his chance of outdoing Alam's earlier achievement. Perhaps the most frustrating thing about this call was that it was subsequently found to be unnecessary and was probably prompted by 'clutter' on GCI's radar display.Whatever the reason, that manoeuvre cost Khalid precious seconds and even though he attempted to re-engage, by now the remaining enemy aircraft were in a descending left-hand turn and accelerating away towards the sanctuary of Afghanistan. With regard to the two MIG-23s that Khalid did engage, the Pakistan Army later found wreckage of both. Khalid remains confident that he would have taken all six had he not been distracted by the false call.
Pakistan Military Consortium :: www.PakDef.info
