Problems Faced by Pakistan Army in 71 war // Reasons for surrender

[Windjammer]

Thanks i understand,however i am very sorry for what happen at LAHORE today,it could have been avoided.

Yes we are also sorry for the train derailments....it hardly made the news.

 

[Kyusuibu Honbu]

Most likely the house troll came up with that. He keeps posting POW pictures everywhere too as if people don't know the difference between POWs captured in war (all wars, all sides) and en masse official surrender by people with a 2000 year history of being ruled by outsiders.

Given his "crowd", they probably don't. After all these are people who celebrate their conquerors and rapists.

Correction its over 2400 years, the first instance of subjugation is as early as 518 BC by Achemenid empire

 

[Kedardel]

I want to understand what happened after surrender in East Pakistan, Why didn't the West Pakistan forces launched an offensive to grab loads of lands habitable or otherwise in Western India to have a better bargain. Didn't the safety of east guaranteed by West ?
Why the Western Pakistan forces stop after surrender in the east ?? Or they thought to take revenge in 1999 ??

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

Hamreay bachoun ko tu eik dafa terrorists ney mara hey magar tumarey Brahmin to Dalit ko har roz martey hai'n.....

aur tumharay musalaman ek dusray ki masjid shaheed kartay hain!!

 

[niaz]

1971 is one of the worst years of my life because my beloved country was cut in half by India. Since that time I have been reading all articles / write ups about the events leading up to, during 1971 and after the event. Naturally I have also read Hamood ur Rahman report among many others.

In war there are always problems as the enemy is always fully prepared. It must have been realised by the Pak Army High command after 1965 that while Pak Army could defeat Indian Army in a battle, it could not do so in a long grinding war. Only way to thwart Indian designs is to fight a defence war on a ground of your own choosing, thereby negating the Indian numerical advantage. Yahya Khan in particular should have been aware of it since he failed to take Akhnur after successfully crossing the Tawi River. Additionally, GHQ at Rawalpindi must have also received intelligence about India amassing troops along the East Pakistan border.

However, it appears that no lessons were learnt by the Pak Army and there were no plans by the Pak Army Eastern Command to handle the contingency of a possible Indian invasion. In the meantime, performance of the vast Indian military machine had until that time also been lack lustre. Indian defeat against the Chinese in 1962 and the stalemate against an army half their size in 1965 probably jolted the Indian Army High Command into self-introspection.

Therefore when the refugees started pouring in after the launch of Operation Searchlight on 25th March 1971 and Indra Gandhi asked FM Manekshaw to attack East Pakistan. Per his own admission, FM Mankeshaw insisted that he needed time to fully prepare for the war.

There is little doubt that Pakistan Army, even if the number were double, could not have outfought Indian Army form outside and the Mukti Bahini from the inside simultaneously. Foreseeing this; both Lt Gen Sahibzada Yaqub Khan and Vice Admiral SM Ahsan, who followed Sahibzada as Governor of East Pakistan, were against taking military action to crush the opposition. Lt General Tikka Khan was appointed governor on March 6, 1971 as prelude to the military action.

In my humble opinion, either military action should not have started at all, but once the water is under the bridge, Pakistan Army Eastern Command should have fought on and not surrender so easily. I have heard FM Mankeshaw in an interview that given the size & the terrain, he had predicted one & a half month to achieve victory, instead it took only 13 days.

Had there been at least a couple of pitched battles with about10,000 Indian dead before the capitulation, one could understand that given the adverse circumstance Pak Eastern Command fought well. On the other hand, Indian Army losses of 1,426 killed and 3,611 wounded against the capture of 56,694 Armed Forces, 12,192 Paramilitary personnel and 24,114 Civilians, spells out how poorly the coward Niazi fought the war. I have always believed that in 1971, Pak Army consisted of lions led by the donkeys.

One of the reasons of my ire against the coward Niazi is the fact that he was party to the arming of volunteer brigades Al Badr & Al Shams. Regret to admit that it was these religious extremist members of Jamaat Islami that committed most of the atrocities against Bengali civilians for which I as a Pakistani shall always feel ashamed.

 

[livingdead]

I want to understand what happened after surrender in East Pakistan, Why didn't the West Pakistan forces launched an offensive to grab loads of lands habitable or otherwise in Western India to have a better bargain. Didn't the safety of east guaranteed by West ?
Why the Western Pakistan forces stop after surrender in the east ?? Or they thought to take revenge in 1999 ??

pakistan did capture some territory in western sector, so did we... most were returned in simla agreement... some were retained.

 

[khanasifm]

It was political , cultural and religious failure, everyone is focused on military aspect but it was majority (bengalis) treated unfairly by West , that is the bottom line. Bhutto and politicians are to be blamed, military should have not sided with crook politicians and west and given mujeeb to form govt

It did not happen so the outcome, Military deployed to Est Pak never went to fight India they were there to fight insurgency which could be avoided , there were few who resigned in protest against mil. action against bengalis like Gen Shaibzada Yaqoob Khan , who was also later Foreign minister

But Mil was also sucked into conflict due to their comrades being slaughtered by East pak forces mutiny.

 

[livingdead]

1971 is one of the worst years of my life because my beloved country was cut in half by India. Since that time I have been reading all articles / write ups about the events leading up to, during 1971 and after the event. Naturally I have also read Hamood ur Rahman report among many others.

In war there are always problems as the enemy is always fully prepared. It must have been realised by the Pak Army High command after 1965 that while Pak Army could defeat Indian Army in a battle, it could not do so in a long grinding war. Only way to thwart Indian designs is to fight a defence war on a ground of your own choosing, thereby negating the Indian numerical advantage. Yahya Khan in particular should have been aware of it since he failed to take Akhnur after successfully crossing the Tawi River. Additionally, GHQ at Rawalpindi must have also received intelligence about India amassing troops along the East Pakistan border.

However, it appears that no lessons were learnt by the Pak Army and there were no plans by the Pak Army Eastern Command to handle the contingency of a possible Indian invasion. In the meantime, performance of the vast Indian military machine had until that time also been lack lustre. Indian Defeat against the Chinese in 1962 and the stalemate against an army half their size in 1965 probably jolted the Indian Army High Command into self-introspection.

Therefore when the refugees started pouring and after the launch of Operation Searchlight on 25th March 1971 and Indra Gandhi asked FM Manekshaw to attack East Pakistan. Per his own admission, FM Mankeshaw insisted that he needed time to fully prepare for the war.

There is little doubt that Pakistan Army, even if the number were double, could not have outfought Indian Army form outside and the Mukti Bahini from the inside simultaneously. Foreseeing this; both Lt Gen Sahibzada Yaqub Khan and Vice Admiral SM Ahsan, who followed Sahibzada as Governor of East Pakistan, were against taking military action to crush the opposition. Lt General Tikka Khan was appointed governor on March 6, 1971 as prelude to the military action.

In my humble opinion, either military action should not have started at all, but once the water is under the bridge, Pakistan Army Eastern Command should have fought on and not surrender so easily. I have heard FM Mankeshaw in an interview that given the size & the terrain, he had predicted one & a half month to achieve victory, instead it took only 13 days.

Had there been at least a couple of pitched battles with about10,000 Indian dead before the capitulation, one could understand that given the adverse circumstance Pak Eastern Command fought well. On the other hand, Indian Army losses of 1,426 killed and 3,611 wounded against the capture of 56,694 Armed Forces, 12,192 Paramilitary personnel and 24,114 Civilians, spells out how poorly the coward Niazi fought the war. I have always believed that in 1971, Pak Army consisted of lions led by the donkeys.

One of the reasons of my ire against the coward Niazi is the fact that he was party to the arming of volunteer brigades Al Badr & Al Shams. Regret to admit that it was these religious extremist members of Jamaat Islami that committed most of the atrocities against Bengali civilians for which I as a Pakistani shall always feel ashamed.

Its easy to blame 1 person for defeat but I doubt Niazi took decisions on his own, either arming the razakars or surrendering to Indian army... I cant believe he did not consult the higher ups for such crucial decisions.