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Babur and Phalcon ?

It can or cannot hug terrain is irrelevant to my question...You answer me my question, can you hit launch center of babur if it is beyond 300 kms somewhere between 400 to 450 kms?

Please keep your own scenario in mind before replying....
1. Where are you going to place Babur launcher?............in Afganistan...........

2. If you place Babur 450 km away then what high value targets are you going to Target in India.

3. If you place Babur 450km away then Shaurya comes into play which has a range of 700 km.

4. Brahmos's stated range for a given payload is 290km..................Actual range............only the manufacturer knows......but given its dimension................it will be atleast in the range of 450 to 550 km if not more.................you may ask how.......read on some defence forum not Indian but other....

5. But for the Brahmos's actual range of 290 km ................more than enough for a country of a width of average 300-350km...

6. All high value targets on our western border falls well within Brahmos' range.

7. For anything beyond.....................Deadly Shaurya................hypersonic...........700km range...........nose dive capability.....highly accurate...


chao
 
This will play in I guess ...

BragMos+airlaunch.jpg

Is it in service? :no:
 
It can or cannot hug terrain is irrelevant to my question...You answer me my question, can you hit launch center of babur if it is beyond 300 kms somewhere between 400 to 450 kms?

Please keep your own scenario in mind before replying....
1. Where are you going to place Babur launcher?............in Afganistan...........

2. If you place Babur 450 km away then what high value targets are you going to Target in India.

3. If you place Babur 450km away then Shaurya comes into play which has a range of 700 km.

4. Brahmos's stated range for a given payload is 290km..................Actual range............only the manufacturer knows......but given its dimension................it will be atleast in the range of 450 to 550 km if not more.................you may ask how.......read on some defence forum not Indian but other....

5. But for the Brahmos's actual range of 290 km ................more than enough for a country of a width of average 300-350km...

6. All high value targets on our western border falls well within Brahmos' range.

7. For anything beyond.....................Deadly Shaurya................hypersonic...........700km range...........nose dive capability.....highly accurate...


chao

Cant you read between the lines? Weren't we talking about Brahmos?

Isn't you who said you can target babaur's launch centre with Brahmos in order to halt guidance of Babur??.. I simply raised a question what if launch centre is beyond Barhmos's range and you instead of answering now talking totally beside the point.

Shaurya is a TBM, not a cruise missile my dear friend.
 
Increase!! Hypersonic Bhramos (currently in operation) having longer range sounds dopy.
Brahmos is supersonic not hypersonic. The latter haven't been developed yet....so its not in operation.....:smokin:
 
Who has seen the future? Ajj ke baat karo!

Anything beyond 290 km which falls into CM category?
It is possible the real range of the Brahmos could be greater than 300km...My guess is it shold be at least 350km or more.. and it must be kept secret so we could get decieved within the war...So we must be precautious in our defence locations...can't plan according to their exposed ranges.........:smokin:
 
The greatest challenge for a cruise missile defense is the detection and tracking of the missile early enough to engage it before it reaches its target. A viable cruise missile defense will have as its goal the earliest possible detection of a missile after its launch. Sensor detection capabilities should be pushed out to as far a distance as possible from the areas defended to allow as much time as possible to track and intercept the missile. Also, in homeland defense, intercepting the attacking missile out over the ocean lessens the consequence management implications than over populated areas on land. Achieving this requires the ability to detect and launch an interceptor quickly so as to extend intercept ranges to the farthest point possible.

Cruise missile flight paths make detection a particularly challenging undertaking. Shorter range missiles offer little reaction time. The missiles fly close to the Earth’s surface, and advanced systems are programmed to use topography (valleys, hills,
and mountains) and the Earth’s curvature to mask their approach from detection by the defender.

Traditional approaches to CMD were specific, i.e., the defense of a particular point such as a naval vessel or military base, and relied on radar to fulfill the detection mission. By virtue of their size and design, cruise missiles present small radar cross
sections (RCS) during head-on intercept, which is the method employed by most point defenses. Generally, low-flying objects are difficult to detect against other ground objects and sea-backgrounds. The radar must locate a faint cruise missile signal against the hundreds of thousands of echoed returns from signals created by ground clutter. Ground-based radars have gaps in their field of coverage that allow lowflying objects, like cruise missiles, to exploit the curvature of the Earth. Defense of
wider areas requires complementing the ground-based radar with air- or space-borne assets to provide more time to detect and track and result in more opportunities for interception.

Satellite assets have difficulty detecting cruise missiles through dense cloud cover. Unlike ballistic missiles, which break through the highest bands of clouds, the low-flying nature of cruise missiles enables them to use the cloud deck as cover from space-based detection. The lack of persistence of orbiting platforms over any given stretch of ground makes them less than optimal platforms with which to provide the continuous coverage necessary for surveillance against short-duration threats. Satellites are costly platforms with numerous responsibilities. Tasking existing satellite capacity for the homeland cruise missile defense mission may divert their use from other priority areas. The deployment of a dedicated satellite constellation for those purposes would be prohibitively costly. Consequently, space-based sensors will likely serve complementary
roles to ground- and air-based assets. The optimal sensor platform for cruise missile detection, therefore, will be air-based. By looking down on the Earth, elevated sensors can spot a cruise missile from many angles, unlike ground-based radars which may only see the nose. Even more importantly, air-based sensors can see over any obstructing terrain that might otherwise
be used to conceal a cruise missile’s flight path. An air-based sensor platform can also survey a wider area than a ground system, since it can see farther over the Earth’s horizon than is possible from ground-level surveillance platforms. Distinguishing the cruise missile from ground clutter will remain a task for air sensors, but the ability to see more of the weapon in flight should provide stronger signals for analysis against items on the ground.

In sum, the cruise missile surveillance mission is best accomplished with look-down, ground-clutter-filtering radar augmented by imaging infra-red sensors, mounted on an aerial platform that is as persistent as possible, with the lowest possible operating costs.

Next comes Interceptors to shoot down Cruise Missiles, once cruise missiles are traced, detected and tracked.
 
The greatest challenge for a cruise missile defense is the detection and tracking of the missile early enough to engage it before it reaches its target. A viable cruise missile defense will have as its goal the earliest possible detection of a missile after its launch. Sensor detection capabilities should be pushed out to as far a distance as possible from the areas defended to allow as much time as possible to track and intercept the missile. Also, in homeland defense, intercepting the attacking missile out over the ocean lessens the consequence management implications than over populated areas on land. Achieving this requires the ability to detect and launch an interceptor quickly so as to extend intercept ranges to the farthest point possible.

Cruise missile flight paths make detection a particularly challenging undertaking. Shorter range missiles offer little reaction time. The missiles fly close to the Earth’s surface, and advanced systems are programmed to use topography (valleys, hills,
and mountains) and the Earth’s curvature to mask their approach from detection by the defender.

Traditional approaches to CMD were specific, i.e., the defense of a particular point such as a naval vessel or military base, and relied on radar to fulfill the detection mission. By virtue of their size and design, cruise missiles present small radar cross
sections (RCS) during head-on intercept, which is the method employed by most point defenses. Generally, low-flying objects are difficult to detect against other ground objects and sea-backgrounds. The radar must locate a faint cruise missile signal against the hundreds of thousands of echoed returns from signals created by ground clutter. Ground-based radars have gaps in their field of coverage that allow lowflying objects, like cruise missiles, to exploit the curvature of the Earth. Defense of
wider areas requires complementing the ground-based radar with air- or space-borne assets to provide more time to detect and track and result in more opportunities for interception.

Satellite assets have difficulty detecting cruise missiles through dense cloud cover. Unlike ballistic missiles, which break through the highest bands of clouds, the low-flying nature of cruise missiles enables them to use the cloud deck as cover from space-based detection. The lack of persistence of orbiting platforms over any given stretch of ground makes them less than optimal platforms with which to provide the continuous coverage necessary for surveillance against short-duration threats. Satellites are costly platforms with numerous responsibilities. Tasking existing satellite capacity for the homeland cruise missile defense mission may divert their use from other priority areas. The deployment of a dedicated satellite constellation for those purposes would be prohibitively costly. Consequently, space-based sensors will likely serve complementary
roles to ground- and air-based assets. The optimal sensor platform for cruise missile detection, therefore, will be air-based. By looking down on the Earth, elevated sensors can spot a cruise missile from many angles, unlike ground-based radars which may only see the nose. Even more importantly, air-based sensors can see over any obstructing terrain that might otherwise
be used to conceal a cruise missile’s flight path. An air-based sensor platform can also survey a wider area than a ground system, since it can see farther over the Earth’s horizon than is possible from ground-level surveillance platforms. Distinguishing the cruise missile from ground clutter will remain a task for air sensors, but the ability to see more of the weapon in flight should provide stronger signals for analysis against items on the ground.

In sum, the cruise missile surveillance mission is best accomplished with look-down, ground-clutter-filtering radar augmented by imaging infra-red sensors, mounted on an aerial platform that is as persistent as possible, with the lowest possible operating costs.

Next comes Interceptors to shoot down Cruise Missiles, once cruise missiles are traced, detected and tracked.
simply that babur is toast when it comes to phalcon then how do we counter act it ?
 
simply that babur is toast when it comes to phalcon then how do we counter act it ?

No Babur is not a toast it will roast alot over the hedge on the other side considerable damage with barrage of CMs.
Provided india has the state of the art Real-Time Integrated Battle Management Systems for specifically Cruise Missile Defenses.

Now image 50 CMs fired on different targets with-in the range how many would be detected and neutralized would all be fried? Highly unlikely. Only the construction of an active defense ensures the ability to intercept and destroy cruise missiles after they have been launched. Only an active defense deployed on a wide-area scale can defend. Such a defense also demands a highly capable information backbone to connect all these systems and ensure they communicate seamlessly with each other.
india is not on that par it still has to workout and develop such systems or procure so does Pakistan. Capabilities and systems does exist it costs time and money and dedicated men long way down I say.
 
It can or cannot hug terrain is irrelevant to my question...You answer me my question, can you hit launch center of babur if it is beyond 300 kms somewhere between 400 to 450 kms?

Please keep your own scenario in mind before replying....

Cant you read between the lines? Weren't we talking about Brahmos?

Isn't you who said you can target babaur's launch centre with Brahmos in order to halt guidance of Babur??.. I simply raised a question what if launch centre is beyond Barhmos's range and you instead of answering now talking totally beside the point.

Shaurya is a TBM, not a cruise missile my dear friend.


No I didn't say anything about targetting babaur's launch centre with Brahmos.

If the launch center is beyond brahmos' range then it is not significant a danger as far as our valuable targets are concerned. So you can keep your babur launch centres in Afganistan or Iran for that matter.

Shaurya ....a cruise missile or not ...........it can target Babur lauchers way beyond Brahmos' range.

And I was replying to whether India can target Babur Launchers anywhere in Pakistan with Brahmos or otherwise.
 
No I didn't say anything about targetting babaur's launch centre with Brahmos.

If the launch center is beyond brahmos' range then it is not significant a danger as far as our valuable targets are concerned. So you can keep your babur launch centres in Afganistan or Iran for that matter.

Shaurya ....a cruise missile or not ...........it can target Babur lauchers way beyond Brahmos' range.

And I was replying to whether India can target Babur Launchers anywhere in Pakistan with Brahmos or otherwise.
We have a new supersonic cruise missile which will target ure Shaurya missile launchpads nomatter whereever they are situated....and we are keeping that missile secret weapon..unless there is any war happens...so U don't have to worry we won't leave U in despair.....we will give U a thrilling enjoyment in case of war......:eek:
 
We have a new supersonic cruise missile which will target ure Shaurya missile launchpads nomatter whereever they are situated....and we are keeping that missile secret weapon..unless there is any war happens...so U don't have to worry we won't leave U in despair.....we will give U a thrilling enjoyment in case of war......:eek:


You are most welcome..............

And by the way Shaurya has been tested many times from underwater pantoons and underground misssile silos...


:cheesy:
 
You are most welcome..............
And by the way Shaurya has been tested many times from underwater pantoons and underground misssile silos...
:cheesy:
Thats great ! we love to have competition like that..for sure we developed all those capabilities to rival any advanced system within the world as for as the cruise Missiles are concerned and to target almost anywhere within India...nomatter they are underground Silos or underwater subs.....We love to have extreme competition from ure side.....:)
 
Thats great ! we love to have competition like that..for sure we developed all those capabilities to rival any advanced system within the world as for as the cruise Missiles are concerned and to target almost anywhere within India...nomatter they are underground Silos or underwater subs.....We love to have extreme competition from ure side.....:)


But we don't like to have any competition.............and thats why India will keep on spending more and more on defence in the future......................a ballpark figure of capital expenditure in defence for next 5 years is expected to be about US $ 120 billion...................

So....................competition ? huh...................think again.
 
You are right we didn't need a competition with India ??? Some Small things can easily done the Big JOB why to spend BILLIONS on these things
 

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