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Missions Conducted by SSGs

VisionHawk

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ok there are some missions conducted by Pakistani special forces Commandoes MEN AT THEIR BEST

(It was a normal day in the National Capital, when the news of the kidnapping of a school bus carrying more than 35 primary school children, all of whom were below 12 years of age, as well as two teachers and a driver. Authorities immediately fell in stress and pressure about how to stop this chaotic situation. Not only were the Government worried about the lives of the children, they were also trying to figure out a way handle the mediocrity.

It was learned that the kidnappers were 6 Afghan militants, their motif was to get the Pakistani government to accept some of their extremely inexhorbitant demands that included giving them military assets along with fighter jets in the Pak-Airforce.

The news played hell with the parents of the children, who were on the verge on going hysterical. Parents and media both stormed the offices of the authorities, trying to find out what steps were being taken to end the situation.

The government fell a very tricky and difficult situation as the terrorists pressurized them at the same time. They indicated the terrorists that their demands were under consideration and the government will need a little time to fulfill their demands. The terrorists replied by saying that they will be allotted 72 hours before any "unpleasant event occurs". Then they asked for food for themselves and the hostages, which they were immediately given.

Internally the government had decided to no to give in their demands, and they were planning to take the terrorists down. Many tactical and intelligence teams were called to the operation. Including ISI and SSG, it was decided that there should be a way of contact with the inside world. The terrorists had drawn the curtains of the place so there was virtually no contact inside. It was figured out that the terrorists might be convinced to let an ill child hostage and a teacher walk out of the house and receive medical treatment then they will be returned to the terrorists. That was made their key to the inside world, the two hostages were allowed free. They reported that the hostages were held in separate rooms, guarded by armed terrorists, the terrorists were armed with Kalashinkov assault rifles and pistols, they were wearing typical Afghan dress and army boots and MAY have body armor.

During all that time they were supplied with food and water.

Day one had passed, the next day the hostages were contacted and told that an operation would be carried out at sunset time and it will be aimed to kill all the terrorists on the spot, therefore the hostages had to be prepared for the sudden outbreak of the breach. The hostages had to shift themselves on the floor or under any furniture just 1 minute before the showdown. Any confusion or carelessness could result in severe casualties. The news quietly spread between the hostages during mealtime.

The next day, at the given time the hostages moved to the appropriate locations. The terrorists were really very attentive now; they had their guns ready at all time, and seemed very less hesitant towards taking the lives of the hostages. It was also discovered later that they wore masked that covered their one eye so that they would only have point and fire without worrying to aim.

Then after one minute, a volley of gas and smoke grenades was fired through the house's windows and into the rooms. After an interval of 3 or 4 seconds SSG's commandos of the "Zarrar Jareeh" began entering through windows and doors, they were armed with MP5 sub-Machine guns, and Laser trained Glock and Beretta pistols. They were wearing camouflage dress, kevlar vests, and Gas masks, and spare gas grenades. The terrorists were not ready for the attack, but they blindly returned fire, putting lives of the hostages at risk.

It was difficult for them to see through the smoke and gas fumes irritated their eyes. Thankfully, no hostages went hysterical by the heavy the gunfire that rocked the whole neighborhood. By the first 40 seconds 2 terrorists lay dead, they were accurately chest and head shot through the deadly MP5 9mm bursts. The rest of the four terrorists also fell victims of the commandos' bullets within the next 1 minute! The commandos worked like greased lightening, they stormed the whole house with their guns on the ready, and every terrorist that fell in their way. One terrorist tried to shoot the hostages, just as he was about to execute one of them, two SSG-ians entered the room and pumped him full of lead. It was a really close call, were they late of a second, there might have casualties.

The breech ended within 2 minutes, all terrorists lying dead, all hostages rescued, with no casualties. The Afghan government denied any responsibility of the militants. The parents of the children commended the government and SSG especially for carrying out such a successful operation.
 
HERE IS AN ARTICLE HOW PAKISTANI SSG SOLDIERS KICKED RUSSIAN BUTS IN AFGHANISTAN


On the 20th of April, 1985 at 22.00hr, orders were given to the 1st Company of the 500th Separate Special Force to move forward from Asadabad to the Kunar River, where they would ferry men and equipment across, and make a sweeping movement into the area of the village of Sangam, which was located in the Maravar Ravine only 3 km from the base camp. According to earlier reconnaissance reports, there was a Mujahadin observation post located here manned by eight, maybe ten soldiers.
During the movement, two other companies were assigned as cover units. The 2nd and 3rd were ordered to cover the movements of the 1st from the predominant hills overlooking the area. These units consisted of eight armoured cars and two tanks, which were to make a flanking movement and at the same time provide support for the advancing infantry in case of an emergency.
Here we must emphasize that these soldiers, both officers and enlisted men, had never taken part in an actual combat operation, except for once when they'd provided cover support, and they had no real combat experience under fire. Even in this role, they hadn't actually ever met the enemy in a combat situation and now, with morale high among the troops, they hoped at last for action against the enemy. (Let us remember the events which led to the Shutul Tragedy.) Upon crossing the Kunar River, spirits were so high among the troops that even hints from the ferrymen and the disappearance of the local guides upon reaching the other shore could not deflate them. Everyone thought of this as another training operation rather than a combat operation.
As the company arrived on the eastern outskirts of Sangam, which was located only about 5km from the Pakistani border, at 05.00 hr on the 21st of April, they began sweeping the area in search of the enemy. Though they found no enemy forces in the village, they did, however, find proof that they had once been there not too long before the arrival of the Russian forces who were now moving into the area. At that point in time, according to official records of the operation, Major T. lost contact with the 1st company Special Squadron, which had now separated into four groups and begun advancing towards village of Daridam by way of the ravine. Eyewitnesses confirmed that the company Commander Lt. Cmdr. Nicolay Tsebruk was operating under the orders of the Battalion Commander to move forward.
The four operation groups went into Daridam with two groups to the left of the ravine, and the other two to the right, directed by the Company Commander and thus remained without cover from above. The operation was observed by the Commander of the 3rd
Company, who could visually observe Daridam and report the situation to the Battalion Commander. Lt. Kuznetsov was first to make contact with the enemy and reported that his forces were chasing two Dushmans trying to escape by way of the village of Netav, and on to China.
Upon hearing slight and then intensive gunfire, Lt. Tsebruk left his messenger with the group and took four soldiers forward in the direction of the gunfire. They climbed the right slope of the ravine and took a position on a stone terrace. Witnesses who were questioned later all came to the same conclusion, which was that when the Company Commander realised that he'd walked into a trap, he climbed to the terrace and there he was killed by a bullet in the throat, by heavy fire from the Dushman and Pakistan spetsnaz (Black Storks), which was being directed at the soldiers of the 1st Company.
In the days before the operation, the Battalion Commander along with the Company Commanders observed the area in which they now operated from an observation post of the Afghan Army (the Greens). Anybody who fought in the Afghan War was well aware of the leakage of information by way of the Greens and its visual effects in combat. But in this particular day of planning, this was not taken into consideration and the results were disastrous for the Russian units who participated in the battle. The Commander of the 3rd group became an eyewitness to the entrapment of the 1st and gave this account:
Having come down a dry riverbed, the enemy began taking up positions to the rear of the 1st Squadron and cutting off their escape route. The observing Commander, supposing that they were Russian troops coming to the aid of the trapped 1st, did not call for artillery support upon seeing them. This allowed the enemy enough time to bring forward fifty more soldiers. The heavy fire from the enemy using captured heavy Russian machine guns, small arms, and mortars prevented the attempts of the 2nd and 3rd from coming to the support of their trapped comrades. While Russian forces who were trying to help were being held off, the enemy was calmly shooting small groups of trapped soldiers, some of whom sent up smoke signals to attract helicopter support and thereby gave away their positions to the enemy.
Meanwhile as the situation was steadily deteriorating, the rest of the combat forces who were presently in Asadabad were being rushed forward to reinforce their comrades who were engaged in the battle. These troops were slowed when their tanks struck mines and the armoured personnel carriers got stalled on the rocky ground; one tank was lost to the mines. For the trapped men who were now surrounded by the enemy, precious minutes were lost. The mounting casualties and the lack of ammunition reached the point where those who had no ammunition in their rifles began to throw what hand grenades they had at the advancing enemy forces.
Lt. Kuznetsov, himself wounded, dragged a wounded soldier to cover (he survived) and then returned to his group, only to find that the encirclement was complete and further escape was now impossible. Trapped without ammunition and seriously wounded, Lt. Nicolay Kuznetsov blew himself (and everyone within 200 m.) up with an F-1 grenade. At the same time there was another act of heroism which stands out in the history of the Afghan War. Seven soldiers of the 1st Squadron who chose death over capture and torture, which was the normal treatment of Russian POW's during this war, also took their own lives with a grenade made from an OZM-72 mine. They were as follows: Gavrash, Kukharchuk, Vakuljuk, Marchenko, Musika, Mustafin, and Boitchuk. Long may their memory survive this war.
Later in the same day of operation, when the combined forces with armoured carrier support arrived at the scene of the Maravar battle, they rescued the surviving soldiers who had escaped the encirclement and were bringing out wounded comrades.
Towards the morning of the 22nd of April, those who'd survived told stories of the frenzy of the massacre and the mutilation of the dead and wounded Russian soldiers by the enemy forces where they fell on the battlefield.
The fallen were disembowelled, their eyes were poked out, and then they were burned. Many who were wounded and still alive when this was going on a suffered a horrible death at the hands of the enemy. One such soldier was Lance Corporal Vasiliy Fediev, who was ordered by an enemy soldier to surrender. He in turn cut the enemy's throat with his knife and suffered horribly at the hands of his captors. He was tormented far longer than the other prisoners, and in the end his bones were crushed with stones and their rifle butts.
Over the next two days, having lost three more soldiers, the survivors and the reinforcing troops brought the maimed bodies of their fallen comrades away from the battlefield. One such body was that of Sgt. Victor Tarasov. He was said to have been taken prisoner and killed by a volley of rockets fired from a Russian air support helicopter. Perhaps the pilot thought he saw a soldier wearing the light sand-coloured uniform of the Special Forces and opened fire, but in reality Tarasov was wearing the usual uniform.
This and other reported cases led to the speech of Professor Sakharov to the 1st Session of Delegates in 1988 when he accused our troops in combat of killing their own comrades who were prisoners, rather than letting them fall into the hands of the enemy if they couldn't liberate them. But he failed to say that those prisoners would be tortured to death anyhow. It was better to die quickly than at the hand their enemy captors.

At the end of the battle, reports show that on that day, three dozen Special Forces soldiers resisted an onslaught of a combined force of 400 Dushman and Pakistani soldiers and met their deaths. Their names shall go down in the history of this war and their heroism and self sacrifice will be remembered by all who served during the conflict in Afghanistan.
 
Another article of PAK SSG mission in afghanistan

Kunar battalion (# of military unit 93992) of the 66th separate infantry brigade of Dzhelalabad division moved to Novobad bridge across Kunar river on 15th May of 1983.

The task: companies # 8 and 9 were supposed to occupy commanding heights and blockade Nova ravine, the 7th company blockades Gandzhgal and Borugey ravines, where a special group of mine-layers would be installing sensors LRealiyaі. A battalion of Ltsarandoyі (Afghan forces) was given to Soviet units under indispensable condition that Afghan groups would be moving in advance of Soviet soldiers.

Immediately after passage across the river Afghan soldiers refused to move forward and politic officer of Soviet battalion made a decision to move ahead of them. Soldiers of both Soviet and Afghan battalions mixed and some Soviet-Afghan groups were organised. In particular, seven Ltsarandoyі soldiers Lmergedі with the 2nd platoon of the 7th company (the head of platoon lieutenant Demtchenko), which was leaded, in fact, by the political officer lieutenant S. Amosov, who was taking care of recently arrived lieutenant Demtchenko.

The 7th company was supposed to break up on platoons and to be located on three knolls - 1st platoon on the right side, the 3rd, leaded by the commander of the company - captain A., in the heart of the ravine, the 2nd platoon on the left wing, the closest position to the Pakistan border, which was just three kilometres away.

Towards the dawn of the 16th of May units had to take starting positions. But some of them - while approaching the prospective positions, were fired upon by the rebellions (Afghan partisans sometimes were called rebellions as their movement was against the Afghan revolution), who occupied the knolls already. So we had to talk about information leak via Afghan officers again (which was the source, among the number of such tragedies, of destruction of Soviet soldiers in Maravar ravine two years later).

In this particular case two platoons of the 9th company and the group of the commander of the 7th company, based on his words, which was leaded by him on the top of Lhisі knoll were fired upon and had urgently to look for new positions. The company commander had to withdraw to kishlak. Practically all other eyewitnesses stated that company commander did it leaded by selfish ends, hoping to get something there. One way or another, having pulled the 3rd platoon in kishlak, the commander of company allowed suddenly appeared enemies to block him and begin an unplanned combat.

The commander of the battalion, mayor CZ., having no full information about the real situation and receiving a radio message from the commander of the 7th company describing the situation, amassed all available artillery and helicopters fire on the kishlak and its approaches.

Meanwhile almost all groups of other companies of the battalion had fire contact with enemies, located on dominated hills. The Soviet-Afghan group of lieutenant S. Amosov, which was combating already and reporting about destruction of 20 Ldukhsі asked for help, having heard about situation began to help the group of company commander. Let-s remind, the Amosov-s group had taken the left wing position and controlled the way in Gandzhgal ravine to the Pakistan border. At the same time the 1st platoon of lieutenant R., having left his positions on the right wing, began to come down to the kishlak, preventing the Ldukhs-і attempts to surround the blocked platoon simultaneously missing Amosov-s hill and its approaches from range of vision.

In an hour Amosov-s group was attacked by huge - up to 200 rebellions - modzhakhed-s forces. At the first minutes of the combat the radio was destroyed by bullets. The platoon lost the possibility to report about the situation and ask for help. The picture of the began combat could be seen by the 1st platoon but as we know it had moved from its position downhill. The armoured group of the 7th company, which was supposed to cover Amosov-s group from the rear, moved to kishlak too. All attention was amassed on company commander-s group. At the same time soldiers of the 9th company were killing, left without a cover of artillery and helicopters, as well as people of Amosov-s group.

Having seen impossibility to stay on exposed, from all sides, to enemies fire hill, Amosov and Demchenko decided to come downhill leading the wounded soldiers to the ravine, besides, towards that time company commander group was released from kishlak and was withdrawing, together with the 1st platoon, to its regular position.

Three our soldiers and two Ltsarandoysі stayed on the top of the hill in order to cover withdrawing group. They repulsed the first attack and got few minutes of respite. That time wasn-t even enough to bandage wounds (their comrades found later dressing packets near their, mutilated by bullets and stones, bodies). The second attack began and all of them were killed. At the same time the group of Pakistan special forces about one hundred in number, outflanked the knoll on the left side and moved along the dry river-bed hiding on the terrace at hill-s foot. It was enough for them to spend only one hour for the march from their training centre, located near the border, to Gandzhgal.

Amosov and his people were withdrawing in line. They didn-t have time to come even to the middle of the hill when were exposed to fire from above by Ldukhsі who demolished the covering group. They managed to move for another ten metres but were doomed to. Having let Russian group to approach at distance of 50 metres, Pakistan soldiers rose above their shelters and fired to our group. Everything was over for half a minute. They approached to our soldiers, finished wounded ones, took weapon, ammunition, took their shoes off and taking off the uniform from Ltsarandoyі left the place.

All that happened in range of vision of armoured group, located still near the kishlak. They even tried to fire with automatic grenade launchers, but the distance was too far. The surrounding and liquidation of Soviet- Afghan group was done very fast and clear that proves the presence of Pakistan special forces group LBlack storkі . Our groups met them even in Pandzhsher, place pretty far away of Pakistan border. Many rifles shells with Pakistan marks were found on the place of combat as well as uniform beret of LBlack storksі

Only one sergeant, from the 2nd platoon of the 7th company, survived, wounded in the very beginning of the combat and put behind stones by his comrades where he was lying for few hours. When our groups approached the place of combat they found lieutenant Amosov in small stria with a machine gun in his hands. His body was riddled with bullets. Dead lieutenant Demtchenko and some soldiers had grenades in their hands. Considering the position of private Gadzhiev they found out he-d blown up a grenade under himself.

Having considering the reasons of the tragedy few versions of what happened were issued. Those versions defamed memory of killed warriors. By that commanders of the battalion and the 7th company just underlined their unscrupulous methods. But all killed warriors, who took the general thrust, aimed to a battalion, still are heroes, in memory of their comrades.

We didn't set ourselves as an object consideration of the reasons of the tragedy and all its details. We just want you to know about that heroic episode of Afghan war. And we remember names of lost Soviet warriors.

Here they are:

Lieutenants:

AMOSOV Sergey Anatolievich
DEMCHENKO Georgy Alexandrovich

Sergeants and soldiers:

ARTEMENKOV Alexandr Anatolievich
BALANDIN Sergey Victorovich
BOCHKIN Boris Alexeevich
GADZHIEV Nukhitdin Omarovich
GALIY Vitaly Vasilievich
GNEDOY Victor Vladimirovich
KACHKOVSKY Nicolay Eugenievich
KORSHUNOV Mikhail Victorovich
LOSEV Alexandr Jurievich
LUTSAY Alexandr Vladimirovich
MIRZAKARIMOV Abdulkhamid Abdukalamovich
RYAZANOV Jury Petrovich
TURLYBAEV Serkibay Kaybagorovich
FADEEV Victor Arsentievich

Lieutenant G. Demchenko was posthumously awarded a status of a Hero of Soviet Union (the highest award in former Soviet Union).

Lieutenant S. Amosov was posthumously awarded a status of a Hero of Russia in 1994 by the decree of the President.
 
The mission for the stabilty of holy kaba by pakistani SSG personal in saudi arabia when some fully armed militants are crossing the barriers of our holy kaba (the militants wants that the king of saudi arabia must resine and the election must be held in saudi arabia) if iam not rong then saudi arabia call for pakistani SSG personal and then SSG kill all the militants who r fully armed and standing on the top of the roof of kaba mousqe

The take over of the Grand Mosque by group lead by Juhayman bin Sayf al-Utaybi on November 20, 1979, therefore, the whole episode is called as Juhayman upraising. To make it brief Saudi Arabia is a very complex and ancient tribal system to this day. Since the creation of modern day country of Saudi Arabia which was basically based on the alliance between about nineteen tribes, the system has worked very well for the Saudis but the out side can’t have a grasp and understanding of the system.

Juhayman was from tribe of Utaybi and they are basically inhabitants of small city called Sajir which now central Saudi Arabia. Juhayman had studied under Shaikh Bin Bazz and other very noble scholars but because of his tribal ancestorical history with the tribe of Ibn-Saud he had life long hatred and immense magnitude on destroying the monarch. Before the take over he and his followers had issued a decree called Saba Rasa’il (Seven letters) which was illegally published and circulated, therefore, the take over of the Grand Mosque was inevitable. It was only the Saudi Govt., which misread and misjudged their movements.

What lead to the storming and Pakistani and French connection is very clear. The SANG (Saudi Arab National Guard) and the Saudi land Forces were very reluctant to storm the Grand Mosque of its sacrosanct according to Qur’an & Hadith. The Mosque had to be recaptured pillar by pillar, and some of the Saudi soldiers were very unhappy at the prospect of fighting in the House of Allah.

Prince Sultan spoke to a group of them. ‘You can go home now if you want to,’ he cried. ‘You needn’t fight. But what am I to do? Send for the Pakistanis?’ Pakistan, whose officers monitor the training of the Saudi army, had volunteered to send Muslim stormtroopers into Makkah. Pakistan had already reinforced their contingent with another 1,800 special operation troops. France had flown tear-gas shells and percussion grenades to Jeddah, together with instructors-to whom, later, the French press imaginatively gave the credit for recapturing the Mosque. ‘This is our shame, and we must eradicate it ourselves, ‘cried Prince Sultan. Next ten days saw the Saudi assault troops go pillar by pillar and room by room in the basement to recapture the Mosque. Most Saudi soldiers had never been through real combat action and by the end of action 270 died and 461 injured; 185 rebels killed. In the end there was no so-called Mahdi and Juhayman plus his few men were caught after three weeks search in the warren of cellars below the Grand Mosque.
 
To be patriotic is quite an OK thing but to be objective is quite another. When you talk about their missions, it is equally befitting that you talk about their failures as well in addition to the successes. In 1965, they were para-dropped on to Indian airfields to carry out sabotage and other objectives which they failed to do and apart from a few, all perished. '71 had similar ramnifications for them.

Lets hope they've learned from their mistakes I'll say again.
 
Well if you are saying that they were failed to do their mission properly could you enlighten us a bit why did they? What were the situation? I hope it wasn't a situation of tanks versus some good trained paratroopers!
 
They were para-dropped on to Indian airfields like Halwara and others. The problem was that there were intelligence failures and on top of that, the army was poor in its communications within the heirarchy as well as with other bracnhes (airforce & navy). The moment the first para-troopers set foot on the first airfield; they were doomed since their presence had already been picked up.

All but few perished (some were even killed by ordinary villagers owing to the numbers game, some reports suggest) and throughout the war from then onwards, all Indian airfields and surrounding villages were on constant alert and their inhabitants on the look-out for 'para-troopers'.

Same was the case on our side, because we expected similar (para-trooper) missions to be carried out by Indians on our airfields.
 

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