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Pakistan and the FMCT (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty) - Conference on Disarmament

India-US Nuclear Deal is one its kind ... and India got it inspite of being not a member of NPT ... and its got a rock-solid non-proliferation record , unlike Pakistan.

NSG group will open up nuclear fuel supplies to India pretty soon. :yahoo:
Even after Pakistan got nukes(by watever means) and is getting nuke reactor from china without any Hyde type law,you still try to remain in denial mode.

Today , Pakistani diplomacy is not so much influential in international circles ... thats why its important to have economic muscle in addition to military might.
Are u sure even after when india was kept out of istanbul conference on afghanistan on pakistan's insistence.And when no body paid attention to india's views in london conference.
 
Continuation of Obama Hillary failed policies..!
Indo-US facist alliance is go to long way..because the indians will do anything for money!

American policies are clear..they want India to play big brother of the region because China and Russia have refused to play into american imperial goals..Which speaks volumes about "india to big to submit" yeah right..
 
Firstly,
Pakistan is not India and India is not Pakistan...

secondly,
India is not planning on a war with any country. The very notion of sophisticated weaponry is to prevent others from doing so!

Firstly your post is not related to mine so i wonder why you quoted it and secondly Pakistan is not India and India is not Pakistan......agreed but US is US which drives its foreign policy based on its own strategic interests and does not give 2 hoots about anyone else including India. So if things are cozy between India and US today good for you guys......how long does it stay that way is however debatable.

Thirdly,

"Taste of US friendship" that you talk about seems like gold from an Indian perspective. You get sophisticated weaponry, Billions in aid. As far as the WOT is concerned, firstly, blame your inept leadership for putting your country where it is, secondly, WOT is as much your war as it is to the Americans. WOT can be argued with multiple perspectives depending on where your geographical location is , put that on the back burner and the PAK-US relationship does not look bad..

Wish you all the good luck in this case. And yeah you can have all the gold, we don't need it. And yes we have an inept leadership and they are to be equally blamed if not more.
 
India to seek full NSG membership

Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao will visit Washington next month to take forward U.S. President Barack Obama's assurance to help India secure full membership of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and three other non-proliferation multilayered organisations. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev during his visit last December had also held out a similar assurance.

“We intend taking it up with the U.S. We want to work with the U.S. for full membership of the NSG,” said official sources.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is also scheduled to arrive here a couple of months later to hold talks with her counterpart S.M. Krishna.

The sources termed Washington's removal of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) from the entities list earlier this week as important and felt these changes were in line with the commitment made by Mr. Obama.

On the civil nuclear front, India had signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation which prescribes additional amounts through contributions by member-countries in case of a nuclear accident. However, the U.S. government and civil nuclear companies have been told that they would have to look for opportunities in India within the ambit of the Limited Nuclear Liability Act which is a “national obligation.”

Stapled visas

The sources also said India and China were making progress on the issuance of stapled visas by Beijing to domiciled residents of Jammu & Kashmir. “Our embassy in Beijing has been in touch with the consular department of the Foreign Ministry in China and they have said they are working on a solution. The Chinese say they are dealing with the problem and it should no longer be a problem,” they said. (Other sources however said China had stopped issuing stapled visas to Indians domiciled in J&K but would continue to follow its 12-year-old policy with regard to Arunachal Pradesh residents).
The Hindu : News / National : India to seek full NSG membership

I say Indian diplomacy is working & succeeding on multiple fronts but more work is needed.
 
On topic, Pakistan's position on the issue, and its criticizim of arbitrary and discriminatory treatment meted out by the West on issues of nuclear trade, is completely legitimate and valid.
 
On topic, Pakistan's position on the issue, and its criticizim of arbitrary and discriminatory treatment meted out by the West on issues of nuclear trade, is completely legitimate and valid.

I really don't see how. Simply put, we have a 'waiver' from the NSG so that's all there is to it. Furthermore, there's certainly nothing 'arbitrary' about their treatment. Pakistan has as tainted a past as they come when it comes to nuclear proliferation so they're in no position to cry foul. Officially Khan might have taken the fall, but thankfully no one's buying it.
 
I really don't see how. Simply put, we have a 'waiver' from the NSG so that's all there is to it. Furthermore, there's certainly nothing 'arbitrary' about their treatment. Pakistan has as tainted a past as they come when it comes to nuclear proliferation so they're in no position to cry foul. Officially Khan might have taken the fall, but thankfully no one's buying it.

The NSG waiver itself, and now the reported statements of helping India become a member of the NSG, MTCR etc. is precisely the 'discriminatory and arbitrary' treatment Pakistan is criticizing.

The NSG has no standards for granting non-NPT signatories 'waivers'. in fact it explicitly forbids them. No new standards to govern such waivers were introduced nor the NSG charter amended - India was merely issued a waiver because the West felt like it could make money.

Had the NSG outlined a series of conditions that needed to be met by all/any of the NPT non-signatories (be it a good record on proliferation, improved C&C controls, democracy etc.) then at least the other nations would have a roadmap on conditions to fulfill in order to get their own waivers.

Secondly, other nations, from both East and West, that are already a part of the NSG have a worse or similar record when it comes to past proliferation. Some Western nations were instrumental in Israel acquiring nuclear technology for example, and AQ Khan himself was facilitated in acquiring nuclear technology by entities in the West.

In terms of the outward proliferation done by the West and AQ Khan, Khan is far behind, since all he was able to do was sell some outdated centrifuge designs and a dud warhead design to Iran and Libya, while Western nations proliferated enough technology to help build the entire nuclear weapons program of Israel and Pakistan.

The AQ Khan and proliferation argument, to justify discriminating against Pakistan in the NSG, is therefore invalid.
 
A treaty on fissile materials
By Zahir Kazmi
Published: January 31, 2011

The writer is a master’s student at the Strategic and Nuclear Studies Department of the National Defence University, Islamabad

Does blocking negotiations over the vaunted fissile material treaty serve any purpose for Pakistan? The international community blames Islamabad for the impasse at the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Things may change as the states that keep a poker face at the negotiating table will break cover if Islamabad runs out of aces. Pakistan will face added economic, political and media pressure. The UN secretary-general’s veiled indication to shift the issue to the UN Security Council and the US-based Council on Foreign Relation’s December forecast, that Pakistan may disintegrate in four to six years, are the two ends of this blitz. Why did Pakistan prefer to stand in splendid isolation on the proposed fissile materials ‘cut-off’ treaty (FMCT) at Geneva? A brief pause to explain the term fissile material is essential.

Disagreement on the definition of fissile material is one of the reasons for stalemate at the CD. Risking oversimplification, highly-enriched uranium and weapon-grade plutonium are the fissile materials that form the cores of nuclear bombs and some states want to include other materials in this category. If we were to destroy all existing stocks of fissile material and promise not to produce them in future, we would be talking of disarmament. Consider the following to understand the magnitude of the threat the world faces today. Countries that have nuclear weapons possess enough fissile material stockpiles to destroy the world many times over. Likewise, enough potentially weapon-usable plutonium has been produced in their civil nuclear power reactors to make tens of thousands of weapons. Hence, it’s easy to conclude that a treaty must take stock of all fissile materials produced to-date.

There are three things that the world can do with fissile materials. A complete elimination is ideal to attain the UN’s long-standing universal disarmament agenda. A complete and verifiable stocktaking of all fissile materials and halting future production is another option. Readers can judge the merit of this proposed mechanism which seeks to halt the production of a few fissile materials but without a verification regime. Such measures carry the risk that as long as there is enough fissile material for even one bomb, the possibility exists of its use by a rational state or an equally ‘rational’ non-state actor.

The idea of the FMCT emerged in the 1950s and is mired, ostensibly, amongst two major camps with competing interests. The first camp desires a halt in future production with a verification mechanism. America initially opposed verification but is now amenable to the idea. Keeping old stocks and halting future production makes President Obama’s ‘Nuclear Zero’ pledge a pipe dream. Non-nuclear weapon states muddle blankly in this arms control camp due to their politico-economic interests. They don’t realise that the risks of exposing their people as the ‘nuclear-haves’ gives no assurance that they won’t use nuclear weapons.

The second camp is a complex mix that prefers a complete and verifiable stocktaking of fissile materials while it decides to go for complete disarmament or otherwise. Many states conveniently hide behind Pakistan and side with the first camp because Islamabad is blocking the FMCT for them and they otherwise retain the option of moving the goalposts. Brazil, South Africa, some European and Arab states, and even India will leave their comfort zone once the chips are down. Hence, Islamabad is not as isolated as it appears to be.

Pakistan wants a fissile material treaty but disagrees on its projected scope. Merely a halt in future production will freeze its stocks asymmetries with India. Unlike Pakistan, India has the advantage of getting fuel for its nuclear reactors from the P-5 dominated nuclear suppliers group and using its domestic resources for making weapons at a fast pace. This exceptionalism is a function of common economic-politico-strategic interests. Conversely, Pakistan is under layers of onion-like export control sanctions. Hence it shouts ‘foul play’ against this neo-nuclear apartheid.

What does the future hold? As the stand-off continues, the states with smaller stocks of fissile materials will be inclined to address fissile material stock asymmetries. The nuclear-haves will try to shift the FMCT agenda to the UN Security Council because they don’t have to worry about consensus. States content with their stocks will bargain on other geopolitical issues before they negotiate a treaty. Russia and China link negotiating the FMCT to progress on the Paros (Prevent Arms Race in Outer Space) concept.

Why would new nuclear powers need more stocks for weapons, as only a few bombs can cause serious damage and deter any adversary? This is a tough question. One can look to old nuclear proliferators for answers as they chose to retain weapons and stocks. The reality is that this is a power maximisation game and a measure to achieve security — some obtain it with weapons and economy, and others with economy or by allying with those countries in the first group.

The consensus-based CD faces three bigger and older challenges than the FMCT. These include nuclear disarmament, Paros and negative security assurances by nuclear weapon states. Progress on the latter three doesn’t fit in the power maximisation agenda. On April 5, 2009, Obama pledged Nuclear Zero and resolved to control all fissile material in four years, yet his administration pursues an arms control treaty on fissile materials. US domestic politics offers an explanation for this volte-face. Any progress on the FMCT augments the Democrats’ domestic political fortune. Success in breaking the logjam at the CD negotiations will improve Obama’s approval ratings as his Nuclear Zero and global peace initiatives won him a Nobel.

Islamabad may coalesce on the FMCT if existing fissile material stocks are included in the scope, if there is a promised verification mechanism or if layers of its sanctions-laden-onion are peeled off. Ostracising Pakistan and comparing it to a nuclear armed Congo will bring it under undue pressure and complicate the achievement of universal stability.

The proposed FMCT does not suit a silent majority that will step into the fray if Pakistan is singed more. Pakistan will have to walk the tightrope for the sake of others. Islamabad developed its nuclear programme under great duress but does it have any levers now? Time will tell.

Published in The Express Tribune, January 31st, 2011.

A treaty on fissile materials – The Express Tribune
 
Pakistani Nuclear Arms Pose Challenge to U.S. Policy


WASHINGTON — New American intelligence assessments have concluded that Pakistan has steadily expanded its nuclear arsenal since President Obama came to office, and that it is building the capability to surge ahead in the production of nuclear-weapons material, putting it on a path to overtake Britain as the world’s fifth largest nuclear weapons power.

For the Obama administration, the assessment poses a direct challenge to a central element of the president’s national security strategy, the reduction of nuclear stockpiles around the world. Pakistan’s determination to add considerably to its arsenal — mostly to deter India — has also become yet another irritant in its often testy relationship with Washington, particularly as Pakistan seeks to block Mr. Obama’s renewed efforts to negotiate a global treaty that would ban the production of new nuclear material.

The United States keeps its estimates of foreign nuclear weapons stockpiles secret, and Pakistan goes to great lengths to hide both the number and location of its weapons. It is particularly wary of the United States, which Pakistan’s military fears has plans to seize the arsenal if it was judged to be at risk of falling into the hands of extremists. Such secrecy makes accurate estimates difficult.

But the most recent estimates, according to officials and outsiders familiar with the American assessments, suggest that the number of deployed weapons now ranges from the mid-90s to more than 110. When Mr. Obama came to office, his aides were told that the arsenal “was in the mid-to-high 70s,” according to one official who had been briefed at the time, though estimates ranged from 60 to 90.

“We’ve seen a consistent, constant buildup in their inventory, but it hasn’t been a sudden rapid rise,” a senior American military official said. “We’re very, very well aware of what they’re doing.”

White House officials share the assessment that the increase in actual weapons has been what one termed “slow and steady.”

But the bigger worry is the production of nuclear materials. Based on the latest estimates of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, an outside group that estimates worldwide nuclear production, experts say Pakistan has now produced enough material for 40 to 100 additional weapons, including a new class of plutonium bombs. If those estimates are correct — and some government officials regard them as high — it would put Pakistan on a par with long-established nuclear powers.

“If not now, Pakistan will soon have the fifth largest nuclear arsenal in the world, surpassing the United Kingdom,” said Bruce Riedel, a former C.I.A. officer and the author of “Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of Global Jihad.”

“And judging by the new nuclear reactors that are coming online and the pace of production, Pakistan is on a course to be the fourth largest nuclear weapons state in the world, ahead of France,” he said. The United States, Russia and China are the three largest nuclear weapons states.

Mr. Riedel conducted the first review of Pakistan and Afghanistan policy for President Obama in early 2009.

Pakistan’s arsenal of deployed weapons is considered secure, a point the White House reiterated last week while declining to answer questions about its new estimates. The United States has spent more than $100 million helping the country build fences, install sensor systems and train personnel to handle the weapons. But senior officials remain deeply concerned that weapons-usable fuel, which is kept in laboratories and storage centers, is more vulnerable and could be diverted by insiders in Pakistan’s vast nuclear complex.

In State Department cables released by WikiLeaks late last year, Anne Patterson, then the American ambassador to Pakistan, wrote of concerns that nuclear material in Pakistan’s laboratories was vulnerable to slow theft from insiders. The cables also revealed an American effort to deny its ally technology that it could use to upgrade its arsenal to plutonium weapons.

“The biggest concern of major production, to my mind, is theft from the places where the material is being handled in bulk — the plants that produce it, convert it to metal, fabricate it into bomb parts, and so on,” said Matthew Bunn, a Harvard scholar who compiles an annual report called “Securing the Bomb” for the group Nuclear Threat Initiative. “All but one of the real thefts” of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, he said, “were insider thefts from bulk-handling facilities — that’s where you can squirrel a little bit away without the loss being detected.”

On Monday, The Washington Post, citing nongovernment analysts, said Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal now numbered more than 100 deployed weapons. In interviews over the past three weeks, government officials from several countries, including India, which has an interest in raising the alarm about Pakistani capability, provided glimpses of their own estimates.

Almost all, however, said their real concern was not the weapons, but the increase in the production of material, especially plutonium. Pakistan is completing work on a large new plutonium production reactor, which will greatly increase its ability to produce a powerful new generation of weapons, but also defies Mr. Obama’s initiative to halt the production of weapons-grade material.

Nuclear projects are managed by the Pakistani military, but the country’s top civilian leaders are, on paper, part of the nuclear chain of command. Last year, Pakistan’s prime minister visited the new plutonium reactor at Kushab, suggesting at least some level of knowledge about the program. “We think the civilians are fully in the loop,” one senior Obama administration official said.

Still, it is unclear how Pakistan is financing the new weapons production, at a time of extraordinary financial stress in the country. “What does Pakistan need with that many nuclear weapons, especially given the state of the country’s economy?” said one foreign official who is familiar with the country’s plans, but agreed to discuss the classified program if granted anonymity.

“The country already has more than enough weapons for an effective deterrent against India,” the official said. “This is just for the generals to say they have more than India.”

American officials have been careful not to discuss Pakistan’s arsenal in public, for fear of further inflaming tensions and fueling Pakistani fears that the United States was figuring how to secure the weapons in an emergency, or a government collapse. But in November Mr. Obama’s top nuclear adviser, Gary Samore, criticized Pakistan for seeking to block talks on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, which, if negotiated and adopted, could threaten Pakistan’s program.

In interviews last year, senior Pakistani officials said that they were infuriated by the deal Washington struck to provide civilian nuclear fuel to India, charging it had freed up India’s homemade fuel to produce new weapons. As a result, they said, they had no choice but to boost their own production and oppose any treaty that would cut into their ability to match India’s arsenal.

In a statement in December, the Pakistan’s National Command Authority, which overseas the arsenal, said that it “rejects any effort to undermine its strategic deterrence,” adding, “Pakistan will not be a party to any approach that is prejudicial to its legitimate national security interests.”

Tommy Vietor, a spokesman for the National Security Council, said Friday that Mr. Obama remained “confident” about the security of Pakistani weapons, and said he “continues to encourage all nations to support the commencement of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.” Other officials say efforts are now under way to find a way to start negotiations in new forums, away from Pakistani influence.

A senior Pakistani military officer declined Monday to confirm the size of his country’s nuclear arsenal or the describe rates of production, saying that information was classified.

“People are getting unduly concerned about the size of our stockpile,” said the officer, who was not authorized to speak publicly. “What we have is a credible, minimum nuclear deterrent. It’s a bare minimum.”
 
US is the last country on the planet, we would seek advise on how to run and manage our nuclear program so the title of thread should be something like this US policies poses a challenge to Pakistan's nuclear program. Creating unnecessary hysteria and then wonder why there is a growing anger towards the US in Pakistan. US can't digest the fact that Pakistan is a nuclear country and while the continued blessing is showered upon India, every means are used to somehow curb and destroy Pakistans nuclear program.
 
The NSG waiver itself, and now the reported statements of helping India become a member of the NSG, MTCR etc. is precisely the 'discriminatory and arbitrary' treatment Pakistan is criticizing.

Once again, I think their decision is perfectly valid. For starters, name one country that was reckless enough to start a direct military confrontation with its nuclear armed neighbor. The entire concept of MAD revolves around states behaving rationally and predictably. Pakistan risked provoking a full blown nuclear war when it invaded Kargil in '99. It seems perfectly fair to me to deny such a nation access to fissile material.

The NSG has no standards for granting non-NPT signatories 'waivers'. in fact it explicitly forbids them. No new standards to govern such waivers were introduced nor the NSG charter amended - India was merely issued a waiver because the West felt like it could make money.

The waiver allows India to exponentially increase its nuclear stockpile should the need arise. I think we both know that there's more to it than just money. I don't think a single American company is involved in building any of our nuclear power stations. Just the French and Russians if I'm not mistaken. The reality is that the world is eager to engage India because it is an emerging power. It only makes sense to facilitate our rise given how we're one of the very few stable, secular and democratic nations in the region.

Had the NSG outlined a series of conditions that needed to be met by all/any of the NPT non-signatories (be it a good record on proliferation, improved C&C controls, democracy etc.) then at least the other nations would have a roadmap on conditions to fulfill in order to get their own waivers.

India is a large, secular and democratic nation that holds about 15% of the worlds population, the 2nd largest standing army and has one the fastest growing economies on the planet. Clearly ours is an exception rather than the norm, hence the waiver.

Secondly, other nations, from both East and West, that are already a part of the NSG have a worse or similar record when it comes to past proliferation. Some Western nations were instrumental in Israel acquiring nuclear technology for example, and AQ Khan himself was facilitated in acquiring nuclear technology by entities in the West.

Could you elaborate a little? I'm not sure if you're trying to imply the west is somehow responsible because Khan stole their nuclear secrets. I sure hope not, because that would be ridiculous.

In terms of the outward proliferation done by the West and AQ Khan, Khan is far behind, since all he was able to do was sell some outdated centrifuge designs and a dud warhead design to Iran and Libya, while Western nations proliferated enough technology to help build the entire nuclear weapons program of Israel and Pakistan.

Officially, 'Israel may or may not have nuclear weapons'. Since we can't know for sure I think we should stick to the facts.
 
Can we envision a time when the US and her Allies will make Pakistan into an example for other nuclear powers and aspirants such as Iran? Or is it possible that that the US and her allies have trapped themselves in the exemptions they have created?

Turning up the heat


Asif Ezdi The writer is a former member of the Pakistan Foreign Service.
Monday, September 12, 2011




Ever since Pakistan’s decision in June 2009 to block the commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on the conclusion of a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, the country has come under severe pressure from Washington to give up the veto that every participating state enjoys by virtue of the consensus rule. Pakistan has demanded that the treaty should address not only the future production of the bomb-making material, as the US would like, but also existing stocks held by the nuclear powers. This position is supported by several countries like Iran, Brazil, Myanmar, Indonesia, Colombia and Ukraine, but Pakistan has been alone in the 65-nation body in making this demand a precondition.

Being much smaller than India, and inferior to it in conventional forces, Pakistan has to depend for its security largely upon the credibility of its nuclear deterrent. Because of the larger stocks of fissile material that India holds, Pakistan has some catching up to do, especially in plutonium required for the production of more compact nuclear weapons. A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), which Washington and its friends are pushing, would however freeze that gap in perpetuity to Pakistan’s disadvantage, while the Indian nuclear weapons programme is being aided by the decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) taken in 2008 under US initiative to exempt India from the restrictions on the supply of nuclear fuel and equipment to non-NPT countries. The credibility of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent is threatened also by India’s strategy (“Cold Start”) of launching lightening thrusts into Pakistani territory using conventional forces, without crossing Pakistan’s nuclear threshold; and by India’s plans to develop a Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system.

India’s efforts to neutralise Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent are hardly surprising. What is remarkable is that the US and its allies and partners are also pursuing policies that threaten to erode the strategic balance in South Asia, leaving Pakistan with no choice but to take appropriate measures to upgrade its nuclear deterrent, and pushing the region into an arms race.

What the US should have been doing to promote peace and stability in South Asia is to take Pakistan’s security concerns on board and try to accommodate them. Instead, Washington has chosen to turn up the heat on Pakistan. Relentless and mounting pressure is being applied, bilaterally, through third countries and in multilateral fora, to compel Pakistan to agree to the immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations in the CD.

In a speech in the CD last February, Clinton accused Pakistan of abusing the consensus principle and warned that US patience was “not infinite”. If negotiations were not begun in the CD, she declared, the US was determined to pursue “other options”.

Bilaterally, the US has raised the issue of FMCT negotiation in its “strategic dialogue” with Pakistan. It is now expected to be taken up by the Americans strongly when Gilani meets Clinton during his visit later this month to New York to address the UN General Assembly. There is a possibility that Obama might link his visit to Pakistan, which was at one time being considered for late 2011, with concessions by Pakistan on the FMCT and other issues.

Even more important than bilateral pressure, the US has sought to enlist Chinese backing. There was much satisfaction when in August 2009, shortly after Pakistan announced its decision to block FMCT negotiations, China called for work on the treaty to start as soon as possible. At a meeting in the following month with Ellen Tauscher, US Under Secretary for Disarmament, a senior British official gloated – somewhat prematurely – that China had “dumped” Pakistan in the CD.

As part of the campaign to pressure Pakistan, a high-level conference on “revitalising multilateral disarmament negotiations” was held in September last year at the UN General Assembly. A follow-up conference in July this year duplicated this exercise. At these meetings, Pakistan came in for criticism from several delegations and from the UN Secretary General for “abusing the consensus principle”. Several countries suggested that the option of negotiating the FMCT outside the CD – such as in an ad hoc committee of the General Assembly, or a UN conference – should be considered. This was opposed by Pakistan, China, and a number of developing countries. The Pakistan delegation also made it clear at the July meeting that Pakistan would not join any such process, nor would it consider accession to any treaty concluded through such a process.

Although the US has been speaking for more than a year of pursuing “other options” to conclude the FMCT, it has not yet spelt out the precise mechanism. The reason is that there are no easy options at all. Washington has been consulting its allies and partners but has not yet found a broadly acceptable approach. Among the five permanent members of the Security Council (P-5), China is the main opponent of taking the matter away from the CD.

There are different views even within the US administration. Some are wary of taking the matter outside the CD, especially to the General Assembly, where decisions are taken by vote. Instead, they favour exerting more pressure on Pakistan, bilaterally and through Beijing, to bring it to heel. Even the threat to walk away from the CD has been made partly in the expectation that it would induce Beijing to persuade Islamabad to give up its objections to negotiating the FMCT in the CD.

If that does not work, the US would favour “a P-5 led process outside the CD that could open the door down the road to a negotiating process”. One plan under consideration is to create a ‘Contact Group’ of the P-5 and other countries like Germany, Japan and Brazil which possess nuclear technology, as well as India, to hold initial technical discussions outside the CD, before returning the matter to the CD for formal negotiations at a later stage. This would build on a Japan-Australia initiative this year under which the two countries organised technical discussions on the margins of the CD in preparation for future negotiations. China and Pakistan did not attend these meetings.

Under US initiative, the P-5 have held two meetings in the last few months to promote FMCT negotiations. Significantly, the press statement issued after their second meeting, held on August 30, spoke of their determination to conclude the treaty at the earliest possible date “in the CD”. Further meetings of the P-5, with the participation of “other relevant parties”, are now planned during the General Assembly session beginning tomorrow (September 13).

The FMCT is currently the top US priority in multilateral nuclear disarmament. The US aim, needless to say, is not only to conclude the FMCT but also to ensure that Pakistan becomes a party to it. That gives Pakistan considerable leverage which it should be using to back its demand for equality of treatment with India with regard to access to peaceful nuclear technology, exemption from the NSG guidelines and membership of export control regimes.

After the FMCT, the next item on the US disarmament agenda will be the ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Pakistan has so far made its signature of the treaty conditional upon India doing the same. We now need to review this position in light of Washington’s rejection of the Pakistani demand for arrangements similar to the India-US nuclear deal.
Instead of whining about discriminatory policies and pleading for fair treatment, we should make it clear to Washington that Pakistan will not sign the CTBT unless it is also given the same rights and status as India in nuclear matters. Since the treaty cannot become effective without Pakistan becoming a party, Washington would then have to choose between the entry into force of the CTBT and continuing with its double standards. If it is wise, it will choose the former.


Email: asifezdi@yahoo.com
 
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